The Future of Citizenship

by Jose V. Ciprut

The ongoing expansion in the field of citizenship studies is one of the most important and remarkable recent trends in social sciences and humanities research. Some scholars raise questions about citizenship within a larger critique of liberalism and its institutions; others point to citizenship's inherently exclusionary nature. This volume examines—without advocating any ideological agenda—the evolving meaning of citizenship, with an eye to the future. The connected contributions—from the perspectives of anthropology, sociology, psychology, law, history, and other disciplines—examine four basic modes of citizenship in a comparative global context: differentiated, divided, dispersed, and deterritorialized. The future of citizenship may, it is argued, come to rely on a global mode of "citizenship by association," tantamount to a worldwide civic interface.

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CONTRIBUTORS

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**Cover Concept and Design:** Jose V. Ciprut
For my loved ones, enlightened and engaged global citizens, one and all.
“Fatta l’Italia, bisogna ora fare gli italiani.”
Massimo Taparelli, Marchese d’Azeglio, Torino, 1798–1866

“[F]ormula estrema del nuovo compito del ceto politico e intellettuale risorgimentale, sintetizza bene il ruolo, le ambizioni, i limiti e la grandezza del d’Azeglio. In tempi come questi dove la virtù civica e l’identità nazionale sembrano ormai in crisi, forse anche da questo gentiluomo del buon tempo antico abbiamo qualcosa di prezioso da ricevere e da trasmettere a nostra volta.”

From http://www.icanet.it/pascal/storia%20patria/files/tapparelli.htm

ZEIT: Was ist ein echter Deutscher?
BILLER: Der in Deutschland geboren wurde, Kind deutscher Eltern ist, die auch schon in Deutschland geboren wurden. Er hat deutsche Gewohnheiten—was er isst, dass er am Sonntag spazieren geht.

ZEIT: Diese “echten Deutschen” haben ihre Gewohnheiten verändert. Sie essen nicht mehr Klopse, sondern Mozzarella.
BILLER: Das sind noch immer Klopse, die jetzt bloß Mozzarella heißen. Man kennt, was man kennt, und alles andere verunsichert. Wichtig aber ist: Es gibt kein Land auf der Welt, das so wenig rassistisch oder antisemitisch ist wie Deutschland. Trotzdem will man unter sich sein. Und wenn jemand kommt, der anders ist und obendrein der Bote aus der Geschichte ist, die man vergessen will, dann beginnt der Puls schneller zu schlagen.

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At once structure-laden function and context-sensitive process, *citizenship* is a complex term that affords compound connotations, polymorphous denotations, and consequential implications. Each of these qualities is of political, economic, social, cultural, techno-scientific, and modern civilizational import. As the international political economy that affects intra-state affairs and inter-societal relations today continues to acquire a more intricately intertwined global character, the future of citizenship, too, has come to merit greater systemic attention. It is impossible to speak of citizenship in practical dynamic terms without grounding one’s scrutiny and the ensuing discourse on the anthropological, social, and psychological foundations of group organization and group dynamics as well as on a cross-civilizational understanding of how the new realities have come this far, this fast, across time and space; and, therefore, also what citizenship may need to become, why so and how so, as it pursues its trajectory into a future beckoning from an eternal now often mistaken for a self-perpetuating present. This is the very question that this cohesive volume sets out to address from a cross-disciplinary stance, in holistic perspective: what to do with static old labels in dynamic contexts providing safe passage to unprecedented realities pregnant with ever faster-unfolding newer understandings spreading worldwide?

We open the discussion by clarifying the original political economy of citizenship in ancient times and by reexamining the ethics of exclusion in its various forms to date, respectively, from the vantage points of a classicist and of two philosophers of ethics. We proceed by gaining a comparative understanding of the inputs, outputs, and social effects of language policy on the exercise of citizenship, from a linguist’s point of view; and of the less visible linkages among personhood, peoplehood, and polity, from the expert perspective of a psychologist. Then
we look into the evolution of the vestigial and potential aspects of citizenship and the rise of four major and fast-expanding modes of citizenship: differentiated, divided, dispersed, and deterritorialized. This we do via the expert discussions of a historian, a scholar in law and society with a solid grasp of international relations, a seasoned anthropologist, and a political scientist with long experience in the sociological study of mega-cities. This encourages us to reexamine democratic citizenship in fissured societies, a dilemma dissected in a comparative approach by a political scientist who is a political/cultural anthropologist. At this stage, we can delve into the citizen’s “right to be” and the citizenry’s “privilege to become” in “free societies” that provide less than the legally requisite or the socially optimal circumstances and settings necessary to that effect, by letting a jurist share with us his expert discernments. We conclude by weighing the possibilities for a form of citizenship that could provide a mode of association by choice. This we do, carefully, with an eye to the enfuturing present.

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exigencies, from the outset, proved most helpful in materializing the project on time, according to plan. It has been very demanding to reserve the fullest attention I nevertheless have been able to dedicate to this valuable project at a time when members of my family needed my sustained care around the clock. For their compassionate understanding and matchless sacrifice, their enthusiastic moral encouragement, rich spiritual support, and, yes, immense love, I find no words—only the most profound sentiments ever: for if one more little green bottle should accidentally fall, there will be no little green bottles left hanging on my sacrosanct wall. In Phenomenon, a Touchstone Pictures movie written by Gerald Di Pego and directed by Jon Turteltaub, “Will you love me for the rest of my life,” asks softly a fast-dying George Malley played by John Travolta. “No,” replies tenderly a visibly moved Lace Pennamin played by Kyra Sedgwick, “I’ll love you for the rest of mine.” So here’s to life, or whatever is left of it.

Jose V. Ciprut
The ongoing expansion of the field of citizenship studies is one of the most important and remarkable recent trends in social science and humanities research. The very institution of national citizenship has drawn increasing scrutiny from a growing number of critical scholars. Some raise questions about citizenship within the framework of a larger critique of liberalism and its institutions. Others point to citizenship’s inherently exclusionary nature, its historical use as a mechanism of social sorting—indeed, of social control—and its role in helping to obscure the relative power of other influences when constructing individual and collective senses of social identity or developing a notion of value in civic affiliation and a discerning appreciation of potential in political empowerment.

In this book, without advocating any particular ideological agenda, we seek to gain a multivalent understanding of the evolving meaning of citizenship. We start from the earliest notions and move quickly from past to present, the better to acquire a sense of the term’s possible future meanings, applications, and implications. We find that many of the misunderstandings that have led to conflict, too many of the misinterpretations that have ended in blood-spilling exclusions and heart-wrenching self-banishments in the past, and most of the asymmetries and injustices that contaminate the present and threaten to affect the future of citizenship adversely in a ‘globally international’ political economy could be addressed more effectively according to the norms of a worldwide ethic of human communication and civil interface. We consequently endeavor to anticipate the need and the requirements for such a voluntary relational or transactional ethic. We gain the insights leading to our conclusions step by step, as follows.
The Political Economy of Citizenship: A Classical Perspective

The title of chapter 2 and its subject were entrusted to a classicist rather than a political economist after we realized that almost all the extant literature addresses the topic empirically, by way of specific exemplifications of micro-aspects, be they the political economy of reconstruction in the Balkans (Schierup 1999), the housing of the urban poor in Africa (Morrison and Gutkind 1982), state-specific (Lentner 2004) or regional integration–oriented approaches (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001), or social organizational matters, sometimes—and increasingly so—in the context of globalization (Germain and Kenny 2005).

For J. J. Mulhern, ‘citizenship’ is not merely the possession of the franchise; it is also, and especially, one’s eligibility for positions of initiative or command in the very polity where one is a recognized and accepted member. In this unabashedly realistic sense of ‘citizenship’, birth trumps naturalization and age plays a role, as do also residence and the fulfillment of administrative requirements, but wealth does not. In other words, as Mulhern points out, citizenship does not have a reverse means test.

Vestiges of grades of citizenship¹ are noticeable. In the United States, for instance, even though riches may not affect a citizen’s eligibility for positions of initiative or command, wealth remains one of the decisive conditions that affect a citizen’s ability to obtain and discharge positions of high visibility and high public responsibility. At one end of the spectrum, contributors may purchase access and thus put themselves in line for appointments and wealthy candidates may purchase name recognition and succeed to elective office whether or not they are able to help preserve the country from external dangers or are capable of promoting internal stability. And at the other end of the spectrum, advocates may bring pressure to bear on governments at all levels to provide the poor not only with commodities and services but with a means of participation as well, yet without much attention paid to preserving national security or domestic stability.

The exclusion of wealth-associated ability from consideration in defining someone’s eligibility astutely ensures that the influence of wealth will be exercised in unofficial ways, perhaps without regard for the requirements of the position sought. While this situation is quite

unlikely to change in the United States in the near term, Mulhern, who teaches courses on government, is curious to find out whether it may be useful to see how others have dealt with the political economy of citizenship. In chapter 2 he seeks to discover what lessons can be learned from situations as different as those of the United States and those of less stable nations, say, in Latin America.

In his chapter, he first adopts Mill’s definition of the subject of political economy as wealth. Next, he considers two major systems of political economy that have been thought to be formative for the U.S. polity: that of Athens in the time of Solon and the years close to it and that of England in the seventeenth century. Both these examples illustrate an explicit recognition of the relation of wealth to citizenship and an explicit reflection on this relation as well. Mulhern then reconsiders political economy, citizenship, and the ensuing characterizing traits, both in growing economies and in stabilized economies.

May citizenship be deemed a ‘public good’? Although national and international agencies sometimes do assume there is a distinct class of public goods, and then go on to develop programs with this assumption in mind, even Samuelson (1955) was willing “to deny that most public functions fit into . . . [Samuelson’s own] extreme definition of a public good.” Thus, a considerable volume of extant literature to the contrary notwithstanding, it is conceivable that a political economy of citizenship might be developed more usefully without need to suppose there is a separate class of public goods. But, one may ask, if ‘citizenship’ is not to be considered a ‘club good’ either, on what ethical grounds could one possibly interpret inclusion and exclusion within the bounds of a national political economy?

The Ethics of Exclusion

In the history of human civilization, citizens and noncitizens have had their share of discrimination, and even of exclusion, in many guises. Some scholars have examined specific manifestations and concerns in regard to the ethics of inclusion and exclusion inside a given community, from the perspective of the health care profession (Heginbotham

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2. Born in London, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the author of the System of Logic (1843), was later even better known for his Principles of Political Economy (1848).
3. A wealthy merchant who wrote poetry in his spare time, Solon (?–558/559?) penned a constitution that enhanced democratic rule by mitigating disparities in wealth, thereby attenuating class struggles among the citizens of Athens.
1999) or as relates to nationalism and the exclusion of immigrants in, say, Australia (Carens 1988). Others have sought to understand the motives and links that conduce to group assimilation as a way of latching on to citizenship (Joppke and Morawska 2003). Yet others have trained microeconomic lenses on the subject, the better to develop a day-by-day, almost businesslike grasp of it.

For philosophers of ethics, such as Rahul Kumar and David Silver, any discussion of the ethics of exclusion from recognition as a citizen in good standing needs to be situated within the framework of a broader political philosophy. In chapter 3, the authors adopt a largely classical liberal political philosophy in which the role of the state is to advance the interests of its subjects, more particularly the interests of citizens in their conduct of rationally self-governed and meaningfully led lives.

The specific valuations and interests that this rather abstract commitment leads one to identify as concretely salient Kumar and Silver refer to as ‘liberal values’. In the authors’ view, questions of authoritative (state-initiated) exclusion are to be evaluated with the most direct reference to these liberal values. True, one can also be excluded from citizenship not by the state but by one’s fellow citizens in their guise as the ‘body politic’. The moral character of this kind of exclusion, which they refer to as social exclusion, cannot, however, be accounted for in exactly the same terms as the one neatly administered as legal, authoritative exclusion.

These two scholars therefore examine the moral limits of both authoritative and social exclusion. They do so both through theoretical discussion and by examining ‘applied’ issues. For instance, they take a close look at the compatibility of the Pledge of Allegiance with liberal values in the United States, and more generally they examine the degree to which the liberal state may take sides in favor of some citizens over others on matters of value—for instance, regarding the role of homosexuals in a liberal society. But practices of segregation and integration can sometimes begin with the tenor and tone of the official language utilized in such circumstantial contexts.

Language, Policy, and Citizenship: Three Views Compared

With the subject broached in chapter 4, we enter a delicate domain of exclusion and inclusion, one that has proved decisive in both the content and the orientation of citizenship, in theory as in practice, one that encompasses a range of issues, from within-country competitions
among languages, including the very idea of multilingualism and the admissibility of minority languages (Berdichevsky 2004), to the subtle links among democracy, network society, autonomy, identity, and nationalism in the emerging European Union (Smith and Wright 1999), to matters of language and nation building in parts of developing Africa (Asein and Adesanoye 1994), for instance.

Linguist Harold Schiffman’s task is to examine three different polities, the United States, France, and the former USSR, to see how the concept of ‘citizenship’ and its relationship to language (and language policy) play or played out within their purview. Each state has a different notion of how language and citizenship are interconnected. Therefore, each of the three policies is embedded in a specific notion of linguistic culture. These linguistic cultures are not in and of themselves unique in the world, but each does differ in distinct ways from the others. What these polities have in common, however, is that all have undergone revolutions, and after the revolution, their specific ideas about language and citizenship were different. In France and the USSR, the change was deliberate and crucial to the execution of the revolutionary program; in the United States, on the other hand, the nexus between language and citizenship evolved slowly, influenced strongly by immigration from non-English-speaking areas in the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth.

Can anything be said about ideology, in this sociolinguistic domain? Schiffman’s objections to using ‘ideology’ in his arguments were thoroughly explained by him on scholarly grounds during our seminar: “In the last three decades or so, the field of linguistic anthropology has been strongly influenced, if not outright dominated, by a school of thought that stresses the role of ‘ideology’ in the interface between language and culture.” The term ‘ideology’ has replaced a previous focus on what had come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Known more simply as the ‘Whorfian hypothesis’, it held that (1) certain structures in a language influenced the way in which the daily practitioners of that language thought about the world and (2) the Weltanschauung (the worldview) so embodied had practical consequences for the way these user-speakers acted. There typically were stronger and weaker versions of this hypothesis. The weaker ones were supported by a few who felt there was at least some evidence for the hypothesis, if not much proof for it. Proponents of the stronger versions in turn held that the evidence for the hypothesis was most compelling and that eventually more research would therefore ‘prove’ the validity
of this hypothesis. Among linguists, not surprisingly, the hypothesis was more likely to be held strongly by anthropologists and other scholars specializing in the study of the cultures of various groups—of non-Western or non-Indo-European language cultures in particular—whereas formal linguists (those scholars concerned primarily with linguistic theory) remained more in favor of weaker versions or even no version at all of that hypothesis. The acceptance of one or another version of the hypothesis placed theorists along a continuum. The arguments for and against the basic hypothesis seemed to cluster into two camps, situated at the extremities of the continuum, with too few proponents willing to fall in between or attempt to bridge the gap. In formal linguistics, any acceptance at all of the hypothesis opened one to criticism on theoretical grounds: admitting any influence of culture into the ‘formal’ or ‘autonomous’ part of language was, of itself, an outright denial of the primacy of linguistic universals and of ‘deep’ structure, and a person or school affecting such a stance was simply not a linguist, or not sufficiently committed to the true goal of linguistics, which was “to establish a theory that explained everything important about language.” As Schiffman sees it, anything ‘cultural’ would be explained by recourse to ‘performance’ or to some other ‘nontheoretical’ aspects of language.

The tension between the formalists and those more interested in language and culture witnessed an important shift of focus in the late 1970s, accompanied by a switch from the older terminology—Sapir-Whorf or Whorfian hypothesis—to a new emphasis on linguistic ideology as a field of inquiry, a preferable way of thinking about and analyzing the interface between language and culture that, stated in simple terms by Schiffman, looks at “what cultures think or say about (their own) language”—that is, ideas in a particular culture about language, ideas that are not what linguists would call scientific but that nonetheless are widespread in a culture. As Woolard (1998, 4, citing Rumsey 1990, 346) puts it, Schiffman reminds us, a very broad definition of language ideology would be “shared bodies of commonsense knowledge about the nature of language in the world,” whereas a specifically causative or more ‘activist’ definition would be Silverstein’s (1979, 193): “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use.”

Schiffman sees two problems with this claim, one factual and the other interpretive. He presented to our seminar his take on the underly-
ing assumptions on what linguistic ideology ‘is’ (‘conceived by its proponents to be definable as’) by referring us to Woolard’s introduction to the compendium of articles republished as Language Ideologies (Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998), which provides an excellent overview of the basic assumptions and concerns of this field. What emerges from Woolard’s overview (1998, 9) is that there is “no easy consensus on the meaning and use of the term in question, ‘ideology,’” and hence “little point in attempting to legislate a single interpretation of ideology from the range of useful meanings.” In other words, people writing about this issue utilize a number of different definitions of ideology, and these definitions stem from a number of different traditions of usage of the term. This is so not only because of different intellectual and academic traditional uses but also, and more particularly, because the very terms have been used by statesmen, politicians, and political and academic theorists, among them leaders as diverse as Napoleon, Lenin, and Foucault. For Schiffman, Woolard delineates four separate definitional strands, none of which can be sorted out as academic or intellectual on the one hand and political on the other.4

1. The broadest definition is “shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world,” which Woolard attributes to Rumsey (1990, 346).

2. Another definition puts more emphasis on linguistic structure and on the nature of ideology as an active agent: “[S]ets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use,” which Woolard acknowledges as a strand owed to Silverstein (1979, 193).

3. From Heath (1989, 53) comes a third definition: “[S]elf-evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group.”

4. And from Irvine (1989, 255) comes the definition of the “cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interest” (Woolard 1998, 3–4).

4. Schiffman cautions that “it may also be the case that age and social position could also influence one’s use of the terms, since people who came of age when the great ‘ideological’ struggles between Marxism/Leninism and fascism were still being acted out may have definitions of ideology as state-sponsored, complex systems of political thought as their overriding idea, whereas younger people may see ideology as something else.”
It is on the second definition, which as Woolard (1998, 4) suggests “originates in linguistic anthropology and concentrates on the relation of ‘linguistic ideology’ to linguistic structures,” that Schiffman focuses his challenge, though he also finds problematical some of the other claims made in the name of linguistic ideology. He indicated to us that, as Woolard has also pointed out, there are other issues in linguistic anthropology (as also in sociolinguistics and in the sociology of language) that, while related to ‘ideological considerations’, do not explicitly refer to ‘ideology’, among them various cultural conceptions of language and questions having to do with attitudes, prestige, and language standards and standardization—topics that Woolard, for one, thinks would benefit from being brought into a more explicit ‘framework’ of ‘ideology’. In other words, as Schiffman understands it, Woolard represents a point of view that sees ideology as underpinning large parts of language in society and of the attendant sociolinguistic issues, and this notion Schiffman would explicitly and forcefully challenge, primarily because the indeterminable open-endedness of this framework becomes in his view methodologically suspect: the broader the intellectual umbrella, the more difficult it becomes to evaluate, to retain or to refute, any and all such claims. Put differently, if we are to understand whether ‘ideology’ is at work in a particular context, there needs to be a way to falsify such claims, or to offer counterexamples, yet the broader the embrace, the more varied and complex the phenomena subsumed under it and the more difficult it becomes to dismiss false claims. Indeed, as Schiffman’s discerning comparisons of language policy in France, the Soviet Union, and the United States in chapter 4 clearly demonstrate, questions of ideology, language, and public policy in a given society are complicated even more by the complex links among personhood, peoplehood, and polity.

**Personhood, Peoplehood, and Polity**

In earlier times, scholarship’s concerns with persons, peoples, and polities dealt with individual psychology from citizenship status perspectives in content-specific ways—for instance, the acquisition and loss of the right to belong (Maxson 1930), the evolving concept of nationality (Moheymen 1938), or the impact of education on a sense of world citizenship (Garnett 1921)—but rarely with the psychology of citizenship per se (Weeks 1917). Contemporary writings understandably have exhibited scholarly interest in more practical questions, such as the
effects on one another of social trust and e-commerce (Mutz 2005), if, surprisingly, not for the social psychology of citizenship.

In an encompassing direct approach, psychologist David Williams in chapter 5 explores the possibility that the future of the intersubjectively objective notion of citizenship will depend on the contextualized view that people take of themselves and of each other in evolving relational milieus across dynamical transactional environments. He examines whether emancipated personhood is an essential constituent of peoplehood and reflects on the sheer necessity for demands of a universal peoplehood to place reasonable requirements on the polity supposed to sustain that pursuit as such.

Personhood is approached from the psychological standpoint of personal consciousness, which includes not only sentience and self-reflection but also volition, understood as awareness of the capacity to initiate action. In that perspective, identity, both personal and social, relates personhood to peoplehood. Personal identity reflects the operation of the highest levels of conscious agency and is manifest in the way individuals resolve the sometimes conflicting demands of available roles and affordable opportunities. By contrast, social identity is a matter of identification, as it is also a sense—indeed, a feeling—of membership inside or outside groups, often a sensation (mis)construed on the basis of religion, politics, tongue, and ethnicity or family, among many other value-laden guiding grounds in good currency at any given time, and as such perceivable as being either of essential or circumstantial import if most of the time of time-sensitive, pivotal significance in the shaping of belongingness.

The possibility of and for universal peoplehood Williams addresses as a question of the elasticity of the boundaries of social identity. After briefly reviewing the more pertinent items in the extant social science literature and supplementing this overview with observations from the instructional use of a ‘learning module’ that engages the principles of existential humanistic psychology in experiential ways, Williams draws on understandings acquired empirically through a series of structured asynchronous conversations between anonymous Internet partners, according to principles developed by Carl Rogers, to illustrate his insightful conclusions in a convincing way.

The sheer possibility of an emerging polity that would sustain a universal peoplehood Williams elects to approach from Robert Wright’s evolutionary perspective, arguing that sufficient threat is available to motivate the development of a new level of social complexity, and with
it a new social identity: the demands on a ‘sustaining polity’ do not seem excessive under the attenuating circumstances considered.

Williams suggests that a peoplehood, and a polity to support it, can emerge from the full expression of individual identity and have a significant impact on an evolving social identity. Thus, the future of citizenship may emerge from, and require high regard for, personal identity, and not least for the individual consciousness behind it.

But in what sociopolitical circumstances and according to what accompanying worldviews have the makings and implications of citizenship differed across time and space, and what prospects might they henceforth augur? This is what the next chapter proposes to reexamine more thoroughly.

Citizen: Past Practices, Prospective Patterns

The links between politics, ideology, and citizenship, much written about in the past, have recently witnessed a sudden jump in the scholarly interest continuing to be invested in this direction. Among the aspects covered in this gush of ideas one finds analyses of various problems of belonging: in postwar Britain as a prime destination for immigrants from the defunct British Empire and also from some other economically depressed regions of the world (Hampshire 2005), in region- or nation-linked studies (Birtek and Dragonas 2005; İdris 2005; Kernerman and Resnick 2005; Penninx et al. 2004; Quiroz 2005; Yashar 2005), and in studies on diasporic ethnic experiences in Europe (Keyman and İçgduygu 2005), the Europeanization of citizenship (Dell’Olio 2005), and good governance (Bogart 2005) and citizenship at a time of globalization. Many works also examine the idea of and the possibility of a global civilian society (Germain and Kenny 2005). And the volumes written on problems of homelessness, exclusion in democracies (Feldman 2004), or the mounting doubts entertained on citizenship and democracy in progressive thought (Taylor 2004) add up to a mere fraction of the broad and growing variety of coverage being generated by greater attention to the multiple aspects of alienation.

The mentalities that color the political environments in which democratic citizenship is exercised also determine its functions, its limits, and its latitudes, usually by imparting to a society’s agenda its content, its priorities, and its new directions. Thus, practices and patterns of citizenship can vary according to ‘who governs’. No wonder, then, that a massive policy-related scholarly literature also weighs the value of
democratic citizenship in terms of how public issues are dealt with, whether they pertain to the social politics of reproduction (Smyth 2005), the politics of governance (Tewes and Wright 2001), military service and gender issues (Snyder 1999), republican liberalism (Dagger 1997), or the métier of being a citizen in republican Rome (Nicolet 1980). Simply put, models abound.

As modern technological progress and geopolitical developments render more complex the status and role of citizens across the globe, questions are being raised over the makings of, and implications for, citizenship. Mark Gaige in chapter 6 examines whether, in light of these developments, it is possible, even desirable—and if so, what would be required—to systematize the disparate notions of citizenship into a single model aimed at informing academic discourse, public debate, and research. This task Gaige takes to be prompted by the need to clarify the relationship between globalization and nationalism—two principal and seemingly contradictory frameworks of reference for the individual person qua citizen in the contemporary world. Gaige believes it helpful to apply comparative scrutiny to three discrete models of citizenship: liberal, republican, and social.

Liberalism puts primacy on the autonomy of the individual within the context of the self-governing community, republicanism stresses the cohesion of the self-governing community as grounded in laws and in duties, and social citizenship enlarges the ambit of individual rights vouchsafed by liberalism in a manner that includes social welfare and economic protections. Gaige evaluates each of these models for their applicability and relevance to a number of operational manifestations of globalization: the ubiquity of the Internet, the emergence of the euro, the relative ‘dollarization’ of the world economy, the easing of trade strictures, the upsurge in legal and illegal immigration, and the formal presence of alien workers in many countries. Gaige’s thesis comprises three parts: first, globalization may attenuate, but not eradicate, the concept of nation-state citizenship as loyalties come to be increasingly shared by individual nation-states. Second, globalization could foster the universalization of many or most components of liberal, republican, and social citizenships. Third, notwithstanding the preceding, world (or global) citizenship in any guise is unlikely to be realized within any meaningful time frame.

Gaige therefore examines closely whether the economic, social, and cultural forces driving globalization will have an effect on citizenship in general and more specifically on extant political theories about
citizenship. He argues that the attempt to isolate positions on, and to assign approaches to, the topic of citizenship from opposing camps and models such as liberal versus republican is a largely uncreative exercise, for at least two main reasons: first, the degree of overlap among the three models, liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism, often invalidates the claim that differences between models are consequential, and second, and ironically perhaps more to the point, there is no single authoritative version of liberalism, republicanism, or communitarianism to begin with.

The chapter examines the traditional models of citizenship—that is, as manifested in liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism—by enumerating key components and summarizing the criticisms of each model. Gaige then describes and critiques new models of citizenship: cosmopolitan or ‘global’ citizenship and multicultural or ‘group’ citizenship. He argues that although these patterns seem to have a number of normative and descriptive advantages that could add to the explanatory power of each of the three traditional models, each proves to be unsatisfactory as a replacement for any of the traditional models. He concludes that nation-states will likely remain the principal locus of citizenship for the foreseeable future, although probably with a number of internal reformulations. He argues that it is the neo-Kantian mode of citizenship that offers the most promise for a newer understanding and even fresher-minded practice of citizenship.

With these contextualizing analytical syntheses as backdrop, we can now examine four increasingly salient categories of citizenship, each with its own distinctions, upheld by its own logic, and propelled for its very own raisons d’être and each displaying a different evolutionary propensity and promise for the future of citizenship in one of four major modes—differentiated, divided, dispersed, or deterritorialized.

**Differentiated Citizenship: Compound Complexities in Evolution**

*Differentiated citizenship* refers to disparities in the legal status and in ethnic, gender, class, age, or other characterizing features of membership that together greatly affect the qualitative texture of a society. Differentiations sometimes allow one to foresee the longer-term implications and consequences of the idiosyncratic categorical inconsistencies that exacerbate societal fissures, they may ultimately foster the materialization of newer visions and novel designs, and they may help
introduce legally more egalitarian civic circumstances for the citizenry as a whole. Inconsistent actions, based on divergent interpretations of the limits of extant civic rights and responsibilities, however, may raise critical questions of equality and justice at local, state, and global levels. Nevertheless, historical examples remind us that relations of differentiated citizenship continually evolve. Even when the state codifies membership privileges and obligations in distinct categories, minoritized agents in their varied responses—including assimilation, hybridization, and resistance—may challenge privilege and obligations, and even defy definitions of difference. In addition, differences take on divergent meanings in terms of everyday interactions, representations of self and other, territorial implications of civic spaces, and transnational flows.

The literature in this broad field is vast and offers myriad vantage points, from mutual recognition (Kymlicka and Norman 2000) to social differentiation and political inclusion (Holz 2000) across the changing terrain of race and ethnicity (Krysan and Lewis 2004) to the complex politics of identity and the dilemmas of difference (Kenny 2004).

The complex dynamic nature of civic relations demands closest attention to history, to agents, and place. Taking the city as an especially important crucible of citizenship, therefore, Gary McDonogh in chapter 7 analyzes data on changing patterns of difference in two world cities, Barcelona and Hong Kong. As a national capital absorbed into the Spanish state, greater Barcelona raises serious questions of autochthonous identity, both as a site of difference and as a point of intersection for ethnonationalism, economic class, and the state. Contemporary citizenship in Barcelona and Catalonia entails multiple placements within the state, inside an emerging European community, and vis-à-vis global flows of non-European migrants, all of which makes concern over differentiation a key theme for civic debates.

Hong Kong was created by the clash of empires that generated a clear divide between colonizer and colonized. Political boundaries became the stuff of diplomatic negotiation between the British and Chinese states in the late nineteenth century. Britain merely reigned over an expanding Chinese population that it could not assimilate. Post-World War II demographic shifts and development booms since the 1960s have been such that the economic power, the social demands, and the cultural explorations of Hong Kong Chinese have challenged overly dichotomic definitions of ‘minority’ citizenship. Meshing with and across compounding changes in colonial governance, this evolution
has led to the recognition of Hong Kong Chinese citizenship as a status involving new rights as well as new responsibilities, and since its reversion to China in 1997, Hong Kong has continued to offer novel perspectives for civic futures inside continental China as well.

Both cases underscore the critical importance of place, time, power, and culture for understanding differentiation among citizens and for learning from the processes by which differences are created, valued, fostered, or resisted. The examples underscore how even those in subordinate or delimited positions can deeply redefine the content of citizenship in statal and global frameworks, thereby suggesting how others may do so even more conclusively elsewhere in the world.

Citizenship Divided: Muslim Subjects, Arab Citizens, Democratic Dilemmas

In the last few years, the literature on citizenship has come to include an enormous amount of writing by Turkish scholars focusing on this topic, which lies at the intersection of newer questions of identity and issues of Europeanization in a secular Muslim state. Some of these writings we refer to in relevant places throughout this book. There have also appeared many works on Islam in the Arab world and in Europe (Al Sayyad and Castells 2002; Nielsen 1992, 1999); on democracy, Islam, and women’s status (Arat 2005; Rizzo 2005); and on race, Islam, and citizenship (Modood 1992), as well as on a number of other closely related topics.

For Algerian-American scholar Hocine Fetni, who links expertise in law with sociology and international relations, citizenship is the embodiment of individual rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state. According to him, among most of the peoples in the Arab-Muslim world—varied external perceptions to the contrary notwithstanding—alliance seems to be shifting in the masses, which increasingly come to view themselves more as the subjects of Allah (their God) than as the subjects of Dawla (the state). This phenomenon is often largely a result of the state’s failure to honor basic individual rights and of its thereby casting doubt on nationalism’s ability to elicit and to preserve the religious individual’s and family’s civic loyalties to the state.

It is in this light that Fetni in chapter 8 explains why citizenship in the Arab-Muslim world is coming full circle. In the early days of the Islamic state, citizenship based itself on the individual’s belief and faith in, and loyalty to, the umma (the Muslim community of believers). After
centuries of vacuous secularism devoid of palpable results, many of the subjects in the various Arab-Muslim states now exclusively or pre-dominantly feel they are Allah’s subjects once again. What internal and external dynamics led to the failure of the secularist state to cement its civic relations with the individual and unwittingly to alienate the Muslim individual (*shakhs*), thereby promoting in him or her a sense of belonging to the larger community, the umma, the collectivity of believers, instead?

To answer this question, Fetni discusses four observations that shed light on the causes of this unmistakable alienation of the individual and the consequent rejection of secularist citizenship in favor of belonging to a physically nonexistent (if fervently yearned for) Muslim state worthy of its name. Thus evaluated are the various secularist policies adopted across the Arab-Muslim world through a closer examination of how, when combined with certain external and global conditions, they have above all ignited peoples’ sense of their Muslim subjecthood. Through the use of appropriate theoretical concepts, a discussion of relevant history, and firsthand sensitivity to the current socioeconomic and political conditions, Fetni carefully examines the notion of citizenship and its relevance to today’s democratic dilemmas in the Arab-Muslim world through comparisons with Algeria, in ways pivotal to understanding the broader dilemma in the East-West confrontation of two ethnocultural universes at large.

**Citizenship Dispersed: A Third Space Looking for Its Proper Place**

The explosion of investigations in this field of specialized research is noteworthy, stretching from the boundaries of Germanness (O’Donnell, Bridenthal, and Reagin 2005) to Kurdish (Wahlbeck 1999), Asian (Chuh and Shimakawa 2001; Ghosh and Chatterjee 2004; Goh and Wong 2004; Jayaram 2004; Ma Mung 2000), African (Copeland-Carson 2004; Falola and Childs 2004), Greek (Laliotou 2004), Italian (Verdicchio 1997), and Haitian (Catanese 1999) diasporas, to issues of globalization, migration, and security (Friedman and Shalini 2004), to countless other, not less pertinent perspectives.

In chapter 9, political historian David Gutiérrez draws from the more critical tradition of scholarship to explore the important role noncitizens have played in shaping the evolving debate over citizenship at a critical juncture in U.S. history, the period of mass migration that unfolded between the 1880s and the 1920s. He argues that although
this specific period is correctly identified as an epoch in which the modern nation-state and its institution of national citizenship became the normative forms of political organization in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world, the same time period also witnessed the largest transnational migrations in recorded history. As a result of the massive uprooting forces unleashed by the expansion of capitalism around the world, the movement of millions of people into the United States and into other receiving societies threatened the notions of sovereign territory and bounded citizenries by introducing huge numbers of individuals who occupied an ambiguous social location, one that by definition situated itself outside the enfranchised “national community.” The massive mixing of citizen and noncitizen populations that unfolded over this period created a highly volatile social milieu and a situation in which the language of debate (see Schiffman, chap. 4) over the substance (see Mulhern, chap. 2, and McDonogh, chap. 7) and the meaning (see Williams, chap. 5, and Gaige, chap. 6) of the institution of national citizenship became a defining feature of that period’s popular politics.

Millions of people eventually were compacted or integrated under the umbrella of citizenship during those years. But Gutiérrez argues that the constant collision between the centripetal forces of national consolidation and the centrifugal forces of capitalist development inevitably created antinomies in the migrant populations set in motion by that collision. Hence, forced by circumstance, first to migrate and then to operate in a large and expanding gray zone that remained squeezed inside the interstices of the systems of national citizenship being consolidated at both extremities of their sojourns, these noncitizen residents of the United States often came to develop diverse senses of affiliation and collective association that were very much at odds with the emerging state-sanctioned forms and categories of national membership. Noncitizen residents of the United States who lived in these conditions therefore often explored pathways to achieving human rights and modes of democratization that remained outside conventional forms of national citizenship.

Gutiérrez’s chapter demonstrates how, although the diasporic noncitizen populations could never completely escape the forces of coercion and the many constraints imposed on them by agents of the state, they could and did, as ‘noncitizen denizens’ in the United States, create, occupy, and utilize alternative social spaces as communal bases in which they established (and from which they experimented with)
parallel social and cultural institutions, so as to formulate grievances, advance claims against the state, and ultimately even to challenge conventional notions of political community. During the process, they began to develop an increasingly cosmopolitan political and social vocabulary that would help set the terms of future debate, not only over the specific content and tone and broader social meaning of citizenship but also, by extension, over the larger questions of social justice raised by the permanent presence of huge numbers of noncitizens in a society that very much remains organized on principles of territorial sovereignty and on a bounded ideation of citizenry.

Considerations of dispersed citizenship thus automatically raise issues of territoriality with regard to citizenship. This purview of sacred cows sets at loggerheads cosmopolitan and nationalist tempers on some complex issues that remain difficult to resolve on partisan premises because they lead to dichotomous inferences predicated on sincere reactive impulses for reasons not too difficult to discern, a source of concern elaborated on in Henry Teune’s chapter 10.

**Citizenship Deterritorialized: Global Citizenships**

Citizenship is a bundle of rights and obligations that define a person’s societal role. The Westphalian concept of citizenship was based on sovereign claims over territory and on the exclusive loyalty of those recognized by the sovereign as belonging to his estate. Limits applied, some of which arose and evolved in the context of constitutional government, primarily in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There were sovereigns in many spaces: the manor, the town, the bishopric. The multiple political communities recognized in federalism made the claims of state sovereigns always amount to less than those conferred under ‘international’ law.

Globalization as a force of change as well has created a mosaic of social, economic, and political spaces that transcend and weaken the political boundaries of physical space. That very force of change goes up against today’s idea of citizenship based on the moral and legal claims of the Westphalian territorial state. In addition to all else it may have wrought in the past few decades, globalization has revolutionized the meaning of physical space. In its simplest of manifestations, in the form of world economic growth, globalization also leads to migration, and to the commingling of peoples for vital purposes, including the need to work, as discussed with trenchant insight by Gutiérrez in this

Scholarly literature on citizenship and globalization has grown to encompass an impressive repertoire. It places focus on social aspects of internationalism (Dower and Williams 2002), on the global city (İşın 2000), and on the respective and joint challenges to identity (Tan 2005). It gives voice to concerns over inclusion and empowerment (Anderson and Siim 2004), over belonging (Brysik and Shafir 2004; Croucher 2004), and over demands about citizenship education for a global society (Banks 2004). It also engenders growing consideration for a cosmopolitan environmental ethic (Hayden 2005), for citizenship within an ethic for a worldwide civil society (Eade and O’Byrne 2004; Germain and Kenny 2005), and for global democracy (Olssen et al. 2004).

The agents of globalization recognize the rights and obligations of organizations, but with little or no regard for control by state or via arrangements among sovereigns. Individual members of, say, economic organizations, religions, universities, political movements—and today professional associations and even affinity groups—may claim basic rights, which their organization can then seek to ensure and expand. A person’s rights today fall under the purview of human rather than merely civil rights. This is an understanding that has emerged with the evolution of global political institutions over the last few decades. After Westphalia, it became possible for a person to be a citizen without having to belong to a particular church. Today, with the advent of globalization, it is becoming possible for a person to be a ‘citizen’ without therefore having to depend exclusively on a single country.

True, at the moment these bundles of rights remain ambiguous and tentative; also, some are being given ad hoc meaning by organizations still evolving: while professional organizations now challenge states for the rights of their members to exercise their profession, ethnic formations seek support for their members, sometimes against states, toward gaining expression as groups. Some of these organizations are devoted to human rights; they include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the World Court. All these—and even the European Union—render homage to the ‘state-as-pope’, first by claiming the authority accorded them by treaty among sovereign states and then by pursuing their own way.

If globalization is to yield a new world order that is different from the balance of threat of harm among nation-states, it will have to be based on a legal and moral system that goes beyond that of the state.
That vision was shared centuries ago by those who believed that any and all authority should be exercised always for the benefit of people, and not to promote the self-perpetuating interests of the very mechanisms purportedly put in place to dutifully serve them.

**Democraticizations in Fissured Societies: The Makings of Citizenship**

The question of how democracy can stably operate in culturally plural, fissured, fragmented, segmented, or deeply divided societies continues to be an important aspect of the study of citizenship.

Democratizations are endless, dynamic, and, even in contexts of relatively homogeneous citizenship, not necessarily unidirectional or linear processes. Seen through myriad cultural prisms, their utopian goals are never fully achieved nor ever wholly attainable. Social scientists unanimously agree that deep and extensive fissures within society present a serious challenge to developing a stable and viable democracy and hence a free and vibrant democratic citizenry.

Two key methods of achieving democratization in fissured human societies, wherein the citizenship finds itself segmented, are through the *accommodation* and *control* of competing segments of society. In the literature, the social fissures and the political differences that characterize a citizenry are often related to party politics, which can both reflect and affect them. In this respect, party politics in Japan (Kuroda 2005; Scheiner 2006), in Russia (Golosov 2004), in Christian Europe (Eatwell and Mudde 2004; Gehler and Kaiser 2004; Knapp 2004; Mainwaring and Scully 2003), in Iraqi Kurdistan (Stansfield 2003), and in Mexico (Borja 2003), for instance, have been the object of extensive comparative scrutiny.

An important question in this area is how fissures affect and in turn are affected by processes of democratization that have an impact on the notion of citizenship. The constructionist approach\(^5\) that is used in

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5. “Social constructionism is a school of thought introduced into sociology by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s 1966 book, *The Social Construction of Reality*. The focus of social constructionism is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived reality. As an approach, it involves looking at the ways social phenomena are created, institutionalized, and made into tradition by humans. Socially constructed reality is seen as an ongoing, dynamic process; reality is re-produced by people acting on their interpretations and their knowledge of it. Social constructionism is dialectically opposed to essentialism, the belief that there are defining transhistorical essences independent of conscious beings that determine the categorical
political anthropologist Myron Aronoff’s analysis in chapter 11 is grounded in the assumption that human sociability is both expressed and facilitated through the cultural construction, among the citizens, of bonds of collective identity. Hence the central question for democracy and for democratic citizenship is whether the process must necessarily be discriminatory. Collective identities are cultural products of political processes. And social identity becomes most important when it is threatened (see Williams, chap. 5 in this book). Paradoxically, it would appear that, in Aronoff’s words, “to save a culture, one must first lose it.”

Frequently, the process of nation formation appears to involve high tensions between citizens’ exclusive loyalty to their ethnicity and citizens’ inclusive solidarity (unmitigated pluralistic attachment) to the state (see Fetni, chap. 8 in this book). Competing forms of graded nationalisms among the citizenry constitute salient political divisions in most states. And these divisions must be either accommodated through conciliatory mechanisms or controlled through far stronger cultural and political devices, which include, of course, political parties.

The bridging nature of consociational arrangements and dominant party systems becomes more apparent when viewed historically from a constructionist perspective. It is important to investigate the role these arrangements play in transitions to other forms, which can be either more or less democratic. For accommodation to work, a degree of control of each segment by its leaders and control of the polity as a whole by the collective leadership is necessary. In the absence of successful accommodation, the degree of control of the citizenry by the elite is generally much stronger. Mechanisms of control by elites range from coercion through intermediary forms of manipulation to weaker forms of consensus building and power sharing. The latter forms are more compatible with democracy and democratic citizenship.

structure of reality. Within social constructionist thought, a social construction, or social construct, is an idea which may appear to be natural and obvious to those who accept it, but in reality is an invention or artifact of a particular culture or society. The implication is that social constructs are in some sense human choices rather than laws resulting from divine will or nature. This is not usually taken to imply a radical anti-determinism, however. Some ideas which have been famously described as social constructs include: race, class, gender, sexuality, morality, mental illness and even reality. Less controversial but equally important social constructs are languages, games, money, shares, nations, governments, universities, corporations, and other institutions” (Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_constructionism).
Most studies focus on the presence of only one mechanism in a given society or political system. Aronoff suggests, however, that different mechanisms may be applied by different actors, depending on the type of fissures in a polity and on the nature of the particular historical context, and that this helps explain the relative success or failure of democratization processes in at least three states and their citizenries, one Asian, one European, and one Middle Eastern, each representing a different type of ‘fissured society’. Aronoff applies these concepts in combination to explain the cultural and political mechanisms employed to accommodate and control societal divisions in the citizenries of the Netherlands, India, and Israel. His analysis focuses on consociational arrangements in Israel and in the Netherlands, as well as on the advantages and disadvantages for democratization of dominant party systems in Israel and India. With the decline of the dominant parties, the emerging parties of power sponsored Hindu nationalism in India and militant forms of ethnonationalist Zionism in Israel. Aronoff reexamines them as “revitalization movements” reacting to processes of globalization and to domestic forces. These formats of nationalism are contrasted to populist anti-immigrant (anti-Muslim) nationalism in the Netherlands. In all cases, the mobilization of larger segments of the citizenry and the greater representation and influence of previously peripheral groups of citizens are shown to release intolerant and undemocratic forces. This illustrates the fact that processes of democratization in general, and those that encompass differently coopted groups of citizens in fissured societies in particular, are not linear and need not be unidirectional.

The Dangers of Citizenship

According to present-day conceptions, citizenship is a form of membership in a polity and attaches to particular persons. In history, the world’s nations have been accustomed to dividing their peoples into two basic categories, citizens and noncitizens. The literature has long dealt with both categories extensively, whether the matter under scrutiny is “foreigners” in the days of the Romans (Noy 2000), the standing in law of noncitizens in Great Britain and Germany between the French Revolution in 1789 and German Unification in 1870 (Fahrmeir 2000), the status of newcomers in nineteenth-century United States (Wadlin 1889), the “unnatural Frenchness of foreign citizens” during France’s ancient regime (Sahlins 2004), Stalin’s outcasts in the USSR (Alexopoulos...
2003), the transition of immigrants from mere alien to citizenship status in modern Europe (Bauböck 1994), nationality and immigration law in the United Kingdom (Dummett and Nicol 1990), or the international provisos to protect the human rights of noncitizens (Elles 1980).

Every nation, no matter how oppressive, treats its citizens as persons with certain rights or privileges that are not available to noncitizens. A democratic nation grants its citizens extensive rights and privileges; it allows, and perhaps also expects, that citizens will participate in government. Noncitizens are generally regarded by such nations as having no rights or privileges and do not have an opportunity for participation. Yet virtually all nations recognize an intermediate category of noncitizen residents who are granted some reduced measure of rights and privileges. Political theory has had a great deal to say about a nation’s obligations to its citizens but very little about its obligations to noncitizens, including those persons who are temporary or permanent residents. The problem with this essentially binary conception is that it allows for a great deal of injustice. To begin with, it provides nations with a powerful tool of legitimated oppression, namely, ‘denaturalization’: by redefining citizens as noncitizens, typically on grounds of disloyalty, a nation can justify denial of rights and privileges to former citizens, and even generally consign them to political perdition. Second, it also strongly implies that a nation has few if any moral obligations to noncitizens, and even more particularly to those who are not residents. This may not be problematic with respect to Paraguay or Chad, but it becomes highly problematic with respect to a nation such as the United States, which exercises an immense power over noncitizens throughout the world.

As a jurist with an anthropological formation, Edward Rubin in fact is asking in chapter 12 whether it might not be better to modify the dichotomous idea of citizenship with the idea that states have a continuously varying range of moral responsibilities to all people in the world, clearly greatest for its residents, and less but still significant for those whom it widely affects. Perhaps the opportunity to participate in the governance of a nation could vary continuously as well. Surely, if we are serious about the idea of globalization, would we not need to reevaluate a concept that is much too strongly tied to the idea of the self-contained nation-state? This brings us to the ultimate question: Might there be a particular mode of citizenship worth (re)visiting, with an eye to the future of humankind in a globalizing international socio-
political economy, across fast-cross-linking reorganizational settings and even faster-reconfiguring cultural-political contexts?

Citizenship as a Mode of Belonging by Choice

With respect to other forms of belonging, the associational form of citizenship as a concept derives its distinctiveness from the idea of volition or choice. Citizens in the modern sense are those who willingly belong to, and participate in, the collectivity of the nation. Cultural linguistic anthropologist Greg Urban in chapter 13 hence examines the implications of volitional belonging for the circulation of citizenship primarily as a cultural concept. Specifically, Urban contrasts citizenship to other historically widespread forms of social grouping in each of which membership is based on ascription, that is, on inherited attributes rather than on free choice. The central argument in Urban’s concluding chapter is that volitional belonging results in a concept of voluntary group association that affords remarkable properties of self-propulsion. In Urban’s opinion, it is for this reason that elective association tends to supplant all other forms of belonging based on exclusive membership by ascription.

Urban compares citizenship specifically to two other widespread forms of social grouping, clans and classes. The idea of the clan has proven historically to be an effective way to unite a community, and it has staying power within that community. However, Urban reminds us that it contains no motive force that would impel it anywhere beyond the boundaries of the community. In contrast, the idea of class—so very similar to the idea of clans insofar as ascriptive membership is concerned—contains a motive force that impels its movement beyond the local community. That motive force arises from the idea of “better than” built into the class conception: the relativist idea motivates conquest and expansion. However, expansion is limited to the social sphere in which administrative control is possible. In contrast to both of these ideas, citizenship—in a form grounded in free choice of group association—is truly globalizing. People who subscribe to the concept of volitional citizenship are motivated to get others to subscribe to it as well. And those who do not are seen as ‘unfree’ and in need of liberation.

Because of its powerful globalizing properties, the idea of ‘volitional citizenship’ finds itself on a collision course with all other forms of ‘belonging’ grounded in ascription. And chances are that the very idea
may emerge largely unscathed (ultimately, perhaps reinforced, even enshrined) from frontal crashes, ongoing worldwide struggles, and related revolutionary reconfigurations likely to ensue.

The future of citizenship will be nothing like its self-seeking present, let alone its in places still lingering self-effacing past.

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Vestiges of grades of citizenship survive in the United States today, perhaps more in some places than in others. Birth officially trumps naturalization in the United States, and age also plays a part. So do residence and fulfillment of administrative requirements. Wealth and indigence do not. U.S. citizenship does not have a means test.

While means may not affect a citizen’s eligibility for positions of initiative or command in the United States, wealth and indigence do affect the expectation that a citizen will obtain these positions and discharge the attendant duties. Wealthy contributors to political candidates may expect and be expected to be putting themselves in line for appointments that are unavailable to the indigent; wealthy candidates may purchase name recognition and succeed to elective office whether or not they are fit to help preserve the country from external dangers or to promote internal stability. At the other end of the spectrum, advocates may bring pressure to bear on governments at all levels to provide indigent clients with commodities, services, and participation; and well-financed candidates may engage advocates who will use street money or wealth in other forms to help turn indigent clients out to vote. Excluding wealth-associated ability from consideration in defining eligibility for positions of initiative or command ensures that the influence of wealth and indigence will be exercised in other ways—unofficial and relatively unregulated.

Indeed, in the United States, each new attempt to regulate the influence of wealth produces consequences that at least some do not desire, as innovative political managers find ways around the new regulations. The proliferation of Section 527 contributions in the 2004 general election...

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1. Section 527 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which allows tax-exempt organizations to raise money for certain election-related purposes, was embraced quickly by Democrat-oriented labor organizations as a vehicle for injecting money into activities that might...
election as a response to the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation in the United States, for example, is only the latest episode of this kind, and one that was not difficult to anticipate.

While the U.S. situation is unlikely to change in the near term, it still may be useful to see how people in other times and places have thought about and dealt with the political economy of citizenship, and to ask whether there are lessons to be learned from situations as different as, say, those obtaining in the United States and those obtaining in the less stable nations of Latin America.

In this chapter, I take as a point of departure John Stuart Mill’s definition of the subject of political economy as wealth. By wealth he meant money and “everything else which serves any human purpose, and which nature does not afford gratuitously” (Mill 1899, 1, 23). Mill devoted his analysis to the laws of the production and distribution of wealth.

But I do so only as a point of departure. Although systematic considerations of his own may have justified Mill’s excluding indigence from this definition, my purpose requires that Mill’s definition be extended to include indigence. In economics, it may make some sense to consider indigence as no more than the privation of wealth. In politics and political economy, however, indigence has a salience of its own, because political entrepreneurs can appeal to indigence to rally the indigent into an effective bloc. Since the indigent usually are far more numerous than the wealthy, the indigent, if they are unified, may be stronger than the wealthy, at least from time to time. In politics the indigent remain a latent bloc of permanent importance even when they are relatively inactive. Thus, in what follows I treat the subject of political economy as one of wealth and indigence.

My discussion does not use the language of public goods. Although national and international agencies sometimes assume there is a distinct class of public goods and go on to develop programs to address wealth and indigence in terms of public goods, even Samuelson, whose work gave the language of public goods much of its currency in postwar economics, was willing “to deny that most public functions fit into my [his] extreme definition of a public good” (Samuelson 1955, 356)—a good “which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other
individual’s consumption of that good” (Samuelson 1954, 387). This definition or an approximation to it still is taken for granted in much of the literature, apparently on the assumption that many examples may be found that illustrate it, or at least a few important ones. Relying on Margolis’s (1955) critique of Samuelson’s concept of public goods and Samuelson’s (1955) response to it, I shall proceed on the assumption that a political economy of citizenship may be developed more usefully without insisting that there is a separate class of public goods.

Since the theme of this book is the future of citizenship, and since the future emerges from both the past and the present, I treat citizenship to some degree historically by considering two relatively well-known systems of political economy that have been thought to have influenced the American system of citizenship. The former is that of Athens in the preclassical and classical periods, roughly from the late sixth century to the late fourth century B.C.; the latter is that of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mainly in England and America. Both of these examples illustrate explicit recognition of the relation of wealth and indigence to citizenship, as well as explicit reflection on this relation. I go on to consider political economy and citizenship in growing, stable, and declining economies in the approximate present before drawing a few conclusions about the near-term future.

The Example of Antiquity

In the early years of the Greek city, after a period of domination by kings, the conflict of the wealthy with the indigent provided the framework for much of political life. Most cities would incline either toward oligarchy, in which, according to Aristotle, the wealthy ruled, or toward democracy, in which the indigent ruled. Thus, the possession of wealth in Mill’s sense—money and everything else that serves any human purpose, and that nature does not afford gratuitously—clearly was associated with citizenship in ancient Greece.

According to the Aristotelian Athenian Constitution, perhaps written by one of Aristotle’s research assistants rather than by Aristotle himself, Solon (ca. 640–560 B.C.), following earlier precedent, divided the citizens of Athens into four property classes (7.3; Kenyon 1920; Rhodes 1984). The first class, the pentakosiomedimnoi, were those whose property produced 500 measures annually, where the measures were
equivalent in today’s terms to 11.5 imperial gallons wet or 55 liters dry (Rhodes 1984, 174). The second, the *hippeis* (or cavalry) class, included those who possessed property that produced 300 such measures and so should have been able to keep horses. The members of the third class, or *zeugitai* (teamsters or yokers), held land that produced 200 such measures and presumably employed teams of oxen yoked together. The *thetes*, or members of the fourth class, who at first were bondsmen but later might be any laborers, are not said here to have had any productive property but are said elsewhere to have had property yielding less than 150 measures (Rhodes 1984, 48).

It was expected that those whose properties produced more would share in the more dominant of the *archai*, which I have provisionally translated as ‘positions of initiative or command’. This rendering conforms more closely than the customary alternatives, such as ‘offices’ and ‘magistracies’, to the principle that a translation “should make as nearly as possible the same impression as the original” (Robinson 1962, xxvii–xxviii).

2. Making the same impression is in part a matter of having similar associations. A Greek reader seeing the singular expression *arche* or its plural *archai* would think of initiation or cause of action, of the source or origin of action, and would associate the *archai* in the city with other sources of action. As Aristotle says in remarking on the use of *arche* in political contexts, “*Arche* means . . . That at whose will that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, e.g. the *archai* in cities, and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies” (Ross 1928 modified, 1012b34–1013a13). Sir David Ross’s widely used translation, which I have modified here by inserting transliterations from his Greek text (Ross 1924) into places occupied by some of Ross’s English words, illustrates the point I have borrowed from Robinson about the impressions words make. Ross uses ‘beginning’ for *arche* and ‘magistracies’ for *archai*. These two English words are not associated at all as are their Greek originals, since the Greek originals are inflections of the same word and the Englishing words are not. Thus the translated sentence cannot give the same impression as the Greek sentence.

Ross explains in a note to these lines: “The double meaning of *ἀρχή* [*arche*]—‘beginning’ and ‘government’—cannot be reproduced in English” (Ross 1928, n.1). In connection with his attempt at remaking Ross’s translation, Barnes offers in a revised note, “‘Origin’ translates *ἀρχή* [*arche*], elsewhere often ‘source’ or ‘(first) principle’. In Greek, *ἀρχή* also means ‘rule’ or ‘office’ . . .” (Barnes 1984, 2, 1599, n.1).

It is entirely appropriate to use a note to explain the situation when a translation falls short of the same-impression standard. But a fourth-century Greek reader or hearer of these lines would not have thought that *arche* also meant ‘rule’ or ‘office’ or even ‘magistracy’ as something distinct from ‘origin’ or ‘beginning’, and he would not have been able to say it even if he had thought it, since he did not have distinct words for these items. All he had was *arche*. Reading or hearing these lines, he would have thought that the origin or starting point in cities was a special kind of origin or starting point because it depended on choice (*prohairesis*). And he would have associated this originating or initiating activity with the archons—initiators of several different sorts—and with others who held the *arche*.
in the city is command (epitaxis) and judgment (krisis, 1326b14). Hence, my ‘initiative or command’ lets surface the often neglected element of epitaxis.

Thus the Greek reader or hearer would not have thought of offices or magistracies in our sense as distinct from sources of initiative when he mulled these lines. He would have thought instead of sources of certain kinds of public activity—of causes that were human—and would have recognized that in many cities, holding the archai was connected with wealth, even in the democracies. The democratic archai of which the Greek would have thought may be approximated most closely in the United States by jurors, where the jury court is selected by sortition and with little regard to wealth and indigence, though economic hardship does excuse from service, and where service is compensated, if at a low level. And now as then, people of different positions on the wealth-to-indigence scale may respond to jury calls in different ways. Once a society moves away from the notion of citizenship as sharing in public causality through mechanisms such as the jury courts and substitutes for this sharing intermediation through representative government as the norm, the link through which residents might become citizens in the authentic classical sense is weakened severely.

To the modern reader, it may seem obvious that Solon’s division of citizens into four property classes sharing in different positions of initiative and command must have been intrinsically oligarchical, but this system was regarded by the Athenians and by Aristotle as democratic, because the property qualifications for at least minimal participation were low. Even the thetes were eligible to carry on the functions that the Athenians apparently considered the minimum for citizenship—deliberation and judgment—through sitting in the assembly and the jury courts. The Athenian Constitution describes the appeal to the jury courts as among Solon’s most democratic, or most popular (demotikotata), reforms, because the demos, having control of the vote there, had control of the politeia, or citizenship, as well (9.1).

Declaring the thetes qualified to share in the assembly and the jury courts apparently posed an issue of integrity in the time of Pericles (500–429 B.C.). According to the Athenian Constitution, Pericles needed to counter the generosity of his political rival Cimon, who was lavish in his gifts to the demos, but Pericles lacked the personal wealth to be lavish. The Athenian Constitution says somewhat mordantly that Pericles was advised “to give the people their own [property],” and so he
came up with paying them out of tax money to be jurors (27.4). This stratagem of giving people their own—taking their money away so that one might have the wherewithal to represent oneself as their benefactor, usually with considerable loss of resources in the process—has had an enduring effect on political economy and also on citizenship. Once in place, the jury stipends attracted any chance people whatever (tuchontes) rather than the respectable (epieikeis), and the result was judicial corruption (27.5).

Stipends for public service spread to subsidizing theater seats and then to giving payments for attending the assembly—the sovereign deliberative body at Athens. At the very end of the historical part of the Athenian Constitution, its author writes: “At first they decided not to pay stipends for attendance at the assembly. But when men were staying away from the assembly, and the prytanes [presidents] were trying various devices to bring the masses in to ratify the voting, first Agyrrhius provided for the payment of one obol, after him Heraclides of Clazomenae, the man known as ‘king’, raised it to two obols, and then Agyrrhius again raised it to three obols” (41.3; Rhodes 1984, 86). According to Rhodes, three obols would have amounted to an unskilled worker’s daily wage in the late fifth century (Rhodes 1984, 175). In effect, the three obols were bidding the citizen away from his productive work, if he had any. Thus the distribution of wealth and indigence seems to have had an effect on citizenship at Athens in several ways.

The Greek historian and essayist Xenophon (ca. 444–ca. 357) certainly was sensitive to the Athenian situation when he described Spartan attempts to prevent party divisions of the Athenian variety from developing by blocking the tendency toward disparities in wealth. In his Constitution of the Lacedaemonians (Marchant 1900, V, 7.5–6), Xenophon mentions both the cumbersome Spartan iron coinage, which made it difficult to store or transport wealth, and the penalties attached to private possession of gold and silver.

In short, this conception of citizenship, which involved the expectations that citizens would share in deliberation and judgment and that they would have to have the means to participate, was fairly deeply seated in Greek thought. Though in modern thinking citizenship often seems to be conceived noneconomically as a status or a role, from a classical standpoint it is neither of these but rather a state of affairs that prompts an expectation about participation in the city—at least participation in deliberation and judgment—sometimes in higher archai. In Solonian and later Athens, citizenship was not simply a status, because
it did more than confer privilege, and it was not simply a role, because individuals ordinarily did not decide for themselves to take it up or to put it down.

The Enlightenment and Its Influence in America

As one looks at the transmission of views of citizenship through the ages, especially from classical antiquity forward, one finds that, while the emphases change from age to age, much of the ancient thinking perdures, not least in the British Isles. In the seventeenth century, England underwent a prolonged period of intense conflict and controversy over not only who would rule, king or parliament (not people), but also, and more important, what would rule, custom or caprice. This issue came to a head in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the resulting accommodations were given clearer form in the Act of Settlement in 1701.

The controversialists on both sides of this conflict of king with parliament were concerned with the relation of wealth and indigence to citizenship, and they knew their classics well. C. B. Macpherson has pointed out that both the Levellers (the democratic radicals who sought an extension of the franchise) and their opponents associated the franchise with freedom, and both held the view that freedom required property. “For both Levellers and army leaders [Cromwell’s supporters],” Macpherson writes, “franchise was properly dependent on freedom, and freedom meant individual economic independence” (Macpherson 1962, 129). This view, however, was not limited to the Levellers and the army leaders but was widespread. One finds it, for example, in Locke. Macpherson goes on to address two assumptions made by Locke: “These are, first, that while the labouring class is a necessary part of the nation its members are not in fact full members of the body politic and have no claim to be so; and secondly, that the members of the labouring class do not and cannot live a fully rational life. ‘Labouring class’ is used here to include both the ‘labouring poor’ and the ‘idle poor’, that is, all who were dependent on employment or charity or the workhouse because they had no property of their own by which, or on which, they might work” (Macpherson 1962, 221–222). Macpherson finds the sources for these two positions of Locke’s in Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money (1692) and in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). They seem to be reflected also in the Second Treatise, §50, where Locke
notes: “it is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth . . .” (Locke [1679?] 1967, 320).

If we accept this view of Locke, we may be surprised to find him operating more or less in Solon’s terms, with classes defined by ownership of productive property, but deciding against the view that the bondsmen or laborers actually are able to participate in deliberation and judgment. Thus, Locke, because of his concern for property, and especially for the ability to acquire property as capital, eventually came to the view that those without property in the form of capital were not citizens at all. Montesquieu, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century on the English constitution, showed himself to be of a similar mind, observing: “All the inhabitants of the several districts ought to have a right of voting at the election of a representative, except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own” (Montesquieu [1748] 1959, 155). The Enlightenment views came to America with the English settlers, Puritan and otherwise, and so it is not surprising that wealth and indigence were expected to affect political life in America as well. Echoes of this period live on in America, where, for example, local government officials are called freeholders, reflecting English antecedents (Macpherson 1962, 111–117).

Other echoes can be heard in James Madison, writing with Hamilton and Jay under the pseudonym Publius, an allusion to the Roman consul Publius Valerius Publicola, who was recognized in tradition and literature as a founder of the Roman republic. In Federalist 10, Madison notes: “A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 1961, 131). Earlier in Federalist 10, he had observed: “The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests [than is the fallibility of the reason of man]. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay ([1788] 1961, 130–131). Thus, Publius considers both wealth and indigence natural and permanent, and government should not try to prevent this permanent inequality, even though it is expected
that inequality will lead to “division of the society into different interests and parties.” Later in Federalist 10, Publius writes disparagingly of “an equal division of property” as an “improper or wicked project.”

In Federalist 57, as elsewhere, Publius’s answer to this division, which otherwise promises instability, is representative government as one finds it in the proposed U.S. constitution. Here the influence of wealth is kept from exclusive dominance, though it retains a place. The electors of the federal representatives, for example, are to be “Not the rich, more than the poor [but not less or fewer than the poor?]; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune”; and here also the objects of popular choice—the representatives themselves—are to be determined by “No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 1961, 384).

But that is not the whole story. When he comes to the Senate in Federalist 62, Publius adverts to the defects of the House of Representatives that might be corrected by the upper house, observing: “It is not possible that an assembly of men called [to the House of Representatives] for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 1961, 410). Of course, it was not politic for Publius to go very far in the direction of stating explicitly that wealth might figure in selection to serve in the Senate. But he could give classical examples, and he did, noting that “history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that character [‘long-lived republic’] can be applied” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 1961, 415). As the writers and readers of the Federalist knew, the senate was an oligarchical element in each of these three cases, and oligarchy was the rule of the wealthy. If the readers of the Federalist had failed to glean this point from their classical authors, they would have had it brought home to them by Montesquieu, who wrote of “the patricians, the leading men, the rich, and the Senate, which was very nearly the same thing” (Montesquieu [1748] 1959, 169). Thus, denying a property qualification for electors of the representa-
tives and for the representatives themselves was not interpreted by Publius as precluding that, from time to time, some at least would be more likely than others to take part in governing in the Senate, and that one cause of the greater likelihood of their participation would be wealth.

These echoes were recognized by the American historians Charles Beard and Mary Beard in the chapter on Jacksonian democracy in their influential 1930 volume, _The Rise of American Civilization_. They wrote:

While the widening agricultural area was sending an ever-increasing number of representatives to speak for farmers upon the floor of Congress, state after state on the Atlantic coast was putting ballots into the hands of laborers and mechanics whom the Fathers of the Republic had feared as Cicero feared the proletariat and desperate debtors of ancient Rome. Even Jefferson, fiery apostle of equality in the abstract, shrank at first from the grueling test of his own logic; not until long after the Declaration of Independence did he commit himself to the dangerous doctrine of manhood suffrage.

Expressing their anxieties in law, the framers of the first state constitutions, as we have noted, placed taxing or property qualifications on the right to vote. The more timid excluded from public office all except the possessors of substantial property; and those who stood aghast at the march of secularism applied religious tests that excluded from places of political trust Catholics, Jews, Unitarians, and scoffers who denied belief in hell. All people thus laid under the ban of the law they regarded as socially unsafe. “The tumultuous populaces of large cities,” ran the warning words of Washington, “are ever to be dreaded.” In Jefferson’s opinion also, “the mobs of the great cities” were “sores on the body politic.” (Beard and Beard 1930, 542–543)

As McCoy has pointed out in connection with the Kentucky constitution, Madison struggled there to deal with the property issue: “Madison argued strongly that property be made a qualification for suffrage, and that there be a dual suffrage for the upper and lower houses of the legislature in order to protect both ‘the rights of persons’ and ‘the rights of property.’ His reasoning here was that both the indigent and the rich, who invariably formed classes in any civilized society, had each to be given its proper share in government” (McCoy 1980, 130).

Viewed from a classical perspective, both ancient and modern examples show us explicit consideration and institutional recognition of a variety of relations of wealth and indigence to citizenship. In the ancient scheme of things, it was understood that the distinction of the wealthy from the indigent was a permanent one, even though individuals might
move from one group to the other. Perhaps the most obvious reason for believing this distinction to be permanent was that both the wealthy and the indigent, then as now, assessed their own positions by comparison with the positions of others. That is to say, wealth and indigence were and are viewed not as qualities but as relations. Someone with a given level of assets might consider himself wealthy in one society but indigent in another society, in each case because he is wealthier than others or less wealthy than others. As Walter Miller has pointed out, “Poverty in the relative sense . . . may be attributed quite freely to a wide range of populations whose income or other circumstances are adjudged to be lower or worse than those of other populations, specified or unspecified. Poverty in this sense may be applied to populations that are healthy, adequately fed, and adequately housed. The essential element here is not the objective circumstances of the lower income group, but an awareness on their part of differences between their lot and that of others, an awareness centering on the experience of envy” (Miller 1968, I, 265).

Along with the view that wealth and indigence might be permanent conditions, there was another important view at work in the early American mind that drew issues of wealth and indigence—of political economy—to the forefront, since the founders believed that political and economic growth occurred in stages, as it had in Europe. They believed that their republic, which was based on a virtuous yeomanry like that of republican Rome, could grow economically in such a way that manufactures and luxurious consumption would make America more like Europe and that eventually these developments would destroy the republic itself (McCoy 1980, 118–119). So far as they believed that economic growth might destroy the republic, they were subject to serious doubts about it.

Economic Growth and Citizenship

Both the classical view and the Enlightenment view may seem somewhat alien today because of two major shifts over the last 300 years—modern economic growth along with the reaction to it, and, with them, the spread of egalitarianism, especially in the extension of suffrage.

Modern political economy is geared to economic growth—“rapid and sustained rise in real output per head and attendant shifts in the
in 1350–60 cloth accounted for 8 per cent. of the [English export] trade and wool for 92 per cent., whereas in 1538–44 cloth accounted for 92 per cent. and wool for 8 per cent. The pattern of English trade had been transformed. Manufactured cloth had taken the place of raw wool; the Merchant Staplers had been eclipsed by the merchants exporting cloth. At the same time the value of England’s exports had notably increased: though at the end of Henry VIII’s reign the total quantity of wool exported, raw and manufactured, was probably not much greater than that exported in the early or mid-fourteenth century, its total value was probably nearly twice as great, because of the substitution of cloth for wool. (Carus-Wilson 1954, xx–xxi)

T. H. Lloyd studied this shift somewhat later (Lloyd 1977) and came to similar results. Of course, whether this shift would count as economic growth depends ultimately on a qualitative judgment.

**Citizenship in a Developing State of Wealth**

Modern economic growth, which began in England in the eighteenth century and has spread only very unevenly, is the phenomenon that usually has been the subject when people have spoken of economic growth since Schumpeter (1883–1950). In the United States today, economic growth is considered the normal condition, and so growth is built into expectations. In fact, however, economic growth has not been the normal condition through a great deal of history, and in some places, even in the United States, it still is not. It may or may not be the normal condition here or there in the future.

In particular, economic growth was not the normal condition in the ancient world, where our understanding of citizenship began to develop (Manville 1990, chap. 1). As Heichelheim points out, it is true that the
ancient world saw extensive commerce in both cheap and luxury goods; and it is true as well that the craft workshop or *ergasterion* system became widespread and apparently included some division of labor, and that there were large capitalists, especially in Ptolemaic Egypt (Heichelheim 1958–1970, chaps. VI and VII). And so some of the conditions for economic growth (Schumpeter [1912] 1934, 66) were there: there were some new or better goods to be made; there were new markets to be opened; there were new business organizations, sometimes state owned or regulated; and there were ready sources of supplies of materials. But at least one requirement for economic growth was not present, since even in the larger *ergasteria*, craft production seems to have remained dominant; and so there does not seem to have been large-scale introduction (diffusion) of radically new methods of production.

Although there is no way of knowing whether all these ingredients of economic growth will be present in the future, or how continuously, one finds in the liberal republics of the West today a fairly strong disposition in favor of economic growth—a disposition to which opinions attach themselves. In fact, economic growth has become almost an official national purpose in some of these countries and even beyond them. Many of these countries, especially in the European Union, have governments that are dominated by bureaucrats and technocrats who view the promotion of economic growth as their profession if not their vocation. And so the expression ‘economic growth’ carries a favorable emotive meaning for many people in official circles and among the hangers on. Some periodicals, such as the *Wall Street Journal* and *The Economist*, have adopted a pro-growth ideology as part of their editorial position.

The pro-growth ideology, however, has not been adopted universally. It was challenged in the nineteenth century by Karl Marx, who was more concerned with work than with growth, and the Greens and other Marxists continue to challenge it. In the English-speaking world it was challenged by William Morris (1834–1896), among others. Morris was concerned that economic growth, with its apparent requirement for labor specialization, was likely so to deprive workers of satisfaction in their endeavors that these workers would lead appreciably less happy lives than if they were engaged in craft work. And indeed, the obsession with economic growth was challenged by Mill himself, who contrasted the progressive state of wealth with the stationary state of wealth in saying, “I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of
capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition” (Mill 1899, 2, 336).

The ideology of economic growth continues to be attacked today on several fronts. One need not take a hard-and-fast position about the value or likelihood of future economic growth, fortunately, to study where it occurs and how it interacts with citizenship.

Economic Growth and Citizenship:
The United States, Today and Tomorrow

The United States remains an unusually instructive place to study economic growth because, in the post-dot-com world, it is the place where the impact of new technology on growth, in the form of electronics, gradually is beginning to become clearest (Litan and Rivlin 2001). Here, wealth and indigence continue to interact with citizenship through the medium of political culture in Daniel Elazar’s sense—“the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded” (Elazar 1984, 109). The three American political subcultures that Elazar identifies—individualism, traditionalism, and moralism—differ markedly in the way they address the expectations that citizens will share about participation in positions of initiative and command. According to Elazar, the individualistic subculture, which dominates the Middle Atlantic, consigns participation to professional politicians, while the moralistic subculture of the upper Midwest favors broad citizen participation, and the traditionalistic subculture of the South looks to the appropriate elite (Elazar 1984, 122). While in principle, wealth and indigence do not affect eligibility for participation in positions of initiative or command across these subcultures, in fact wealth and indigence do affect participation in these positions, and in different ways. In the individualistic subculture, since politics is viewed as just another way to get ahead in life, the indigent may seek participation aggressively, while the wealthy pursue their private interests; in the moralistic subculture, where devotion to public affairs is spread more widely, the expectation is more likely to be that some public service will be required of almost everyone; and in the traditionalistic subculture, the wealthy who have the leisure to do so may be expected to step forward when their turns come up, like it or not.
In the United States, since wealth can be inherited, one effect of differences in wealth is the increasing prominence of political families in office even in nontraditionalistic political subcultures, such as the Humphreys in moralistic Minnesota. The view that exceptional political abilities would be transmitted by heredity might have seemed “shockingly undemocratic and un-American” in some circles as late as the mid-twentieth century. But that situation has changed. As Stephen Hess has noted,

in mid-twentieth century, suddenly, surprisingly, shockingly, American political life seemed to be largely peopled by such unique [dynastic] families. They were all around us; we could hardly avoid them—Kennedys, Lodges, Longs, Tafts, Roosevelts. The current United States Senate alone contains seventeen members who are in some manner dynastically connected.

This trend may be because public service is becoming a family tradition, as it has long been in Great Britain; or because politics is becoming a “rich man’s game” and the dynasties can usually afford to play; or because Americans vote for a son under the impression that they are voting for the father—or grandfather; or because we feel that the “People’s Dukes” will keep their hands out of the till; or because there is some ability which can be transmitted through the genes; or simply because the voters have a sneaking weakness for dynasties. (Hess 1966, 1–2)

Hess in this excerpt sets the bar high for qualifying as a dynasty—so high, in fact, as to exclude the Rockefellers. For him, in order to be a dynasty, a family must have had “at least four members, in the same name, elected to federal office,” and he found twenty-two such families. Many more families are added when the qualification is dropped to include those with three or more members who have served in Congress (Hess 1966, appendix B). Still more might be added if the qualification were broadened to include women under their married names and those serving in state or municipal government as well as in organizations such as independent authorities which, though not funded directly from general revenue, are linked closely to traditionally constituted jurisdictions. As Donald Stokes has pointed out,

Whereas the Second World War generation came to think that the public interest was distinctively the responsibility of government, the newer generation does not equate public with government and takes a much livelier interest in the role of the independent and private sectors and of public-private partnerships in achieving public purposes. Implicit in this new outlook is the belief that the root distinction between public and private is not the difference between the public and private sector but the difference between the pursuit of public interest and of private gain. (Stokes 1996, 163)
While the concept of the public interest does remain problematic, it certainly is true that the inheritors of families with a tradition of public service now may be more likely than in the past to pursue positions of public eminence outside government. Thus there are likely to be more politically influential families, and they are likely to be more difficult to trace than the ones that meet Hess’s criterion. The dynastic effect may be much larger than it seems. Hess, now at the Brookings Institution, advises me that little additional work has been done in this field beyond a partial update of his book, which appeared in 1996. The recent spate of sometimes polemical books on the Adams, Bush, and Kennedy families does not seem to have altered the state of our knowledge materially.

In Virginia and other traditionalistic states, one expects the first families to be important in politics. On the other side, in the individualistic subculture, those who have less promising prospects in business have less to lose or more to gain from entering public life, and so they may be more likely to seek nominations or appointments at quite an early age. As Elazar noted,

“The individualistic political culture holds politics to be just another means by which individuals may improve themselves socially and economically. In this sense politics is a business like any other, competing for talent and offering rewards to those who take it up as a career. Those individuals who choose political careers may rise by providing the governmental services demanded of them and, in return, may expect to be adequately compensated for their efforts. . . . Some who choose political careers. . . . believe that an officeholder’s primary responsibility is to serve himself and those who have supported him directly, favoring them even at the expense of the public. In some political systems, this view is accepted by the public as well as the politicians. (Elazar 1984, 115)

Thus, wealth and indigence may affect expectations about who will share in positions of initiative and command and about how they will behave, which may vary from one political subculture to another.

Further, wealth and indigence may interact with influence in its relation to citizenship—Influence in Banfield’s sense, which is the ability to get others to act, think, or feel as one intends (Banfield 1961, 3). Wealth allows those who are not engaged in deliberation themselves to attempt to affect the course of deliberation in legislatures and even to affect the actions of judges. And wealth also may allow those who otherwise would not be likely prospects for positions of initiative and command to put themselves forward.
Wealth and indigence may become more or less important as interest in a political unit such as a city, state, or nation declines. As turnouts of eligible voters fall off in some jurisdictions, it may take less wealth than it once did to influence the voting faithful who remain to vote in a way that will determine who succeeds to the important positions.

Citizenship in a Stationary State of Wealth

Where a jurisdiction sees little or no economic growth in the sense used here, the relation of wealth and indigence to citizenship may be quite different from what it is in the United States. National economic growth in the technical sense is not universal even today, not even in the Western Hemisphere. Some Latin American countries are characterized by low output per capita and low or negative growth rates (Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón 2004, tables). From 1975 to 1998, for example, according to the World Bank, Haiti saw a negative growth rate of almost 2 percent annually, and Nicaragua of over 3 percent (Thomas 2000, 11). Some countries also experience great wealth disparities. It is not clear that economic growth will spread evenly across Latin America in the foreseeable future. For political actors in these countries—people who have to do something now and tomorrow, not just opine about the indefinite or timeless future—lack of economic growth presents a serious challenge to encouraging citizenship in its original sense and even in its attenuated, modern sense.

In Ecuador, for example, the link of wealth to citizenship was dramatized recently by a change in government in which a populist leader came to power after the elite president closed the banks to prevent a run on them (Mahuad 2002). Here was a situation the president could not control by ordinary political means that might be appropriate in a growth economy. Many Ecuadorians who were less dissatisfied with their situation in the past have come to consider themselves indigent because they now are able to compare themselves with other people in the hemisphere, especially the citizens of the United States, via electronic communications. Since they are not able to consume at the level of some of their neighbors, they believe and are encouraged by political entrepreneurs to believe that there is something wrong with their elite leaders. Yet there remains a question whether these people have as much interest in economic growth as do citizens of the United States, and whether growth to levels comparable even with those of other
Latin American states is either achievable or desired for the near-term future. Under these conditions, one alternative to citizen participation is revolution and the populist strong man. And yet that alternative reflects little clear thinking about how the relation of wealth and indigence to citizenship can be managed where the larger part of the population has comparatively little wealth and not much near-term prospect of attaining more.

Charles Wolf, Jr., describes this situation, which he calls macrodecoupling, as “quintessentially a problem of political economy, rather than of economics.” He goes on to say,

Macrodecoupling arises because political power rests with the voting majority, while a minority provides most of the tax base. The result is an opportunity and incentive to expand redistributive programs since the “demand” depends on the majority, while the supply of revenues comes from the minority. . . . The result of macrodecoupling, in the absence of restraint by the majority, can be erosion of the mainsprings of investment, innovation, and growth, if the lower-income majority’s temptation to redistribute before-tax income weakens the upper income minority’s incentive to invest and innovate. It may be equally true that, unless the upper-income minority’s affluence and the resulting distributional disparities are restrained, social disharmony, resentment, and antagonism will not be [restrained]. (Wolf 1993, 43–44)

Wolf sees macrodecoupling as an issue in large jurisdictions. Recent research has suggested, however, that macrodecoupling affects smaller jurisdictions as well, especially older urban jurisdictions in the United States. These jurisdictions may attract comparatively indigent people from areas that provide them less in the way of services and amenities (Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport 2000). If so, then it might be expected that these attracting jurisdictions would become dominated by the indigent and would find it difficult to achieve much in the way of economic growth.

Thus the relatively stationary state of wealth and indigence is likely to foster different expectations about who should serve in positions of initiative and command and what their behavior in these positions should be—different from what one would anticipate under conditions of economic growth.

Political Economy and the Future of Citizenship

In this chapter so far, I have examined citizenship at its Greek origin, in the Enlightenment, and in the extended present. I have addressed
the pertinence of political economy to citizenship under different economic conditions. These different conditions might be described in Schumpeter’s terms as approximations to equilibrium or departures from equilibrium (Schumpeter [1912] 1934, 64). I have suggested also that the relation of political economy to citizenship is filtered through political culture. My approach thus has been both conceptual and historical.

In this section I suggest what might reasonably be expected to happen to citizenship if wealth, indigence, economic growth, economic stability, economic decline, and political culture continue to interact as they have in the recent past, and indeed for a very long time.

Since civic activity does not produce the material necessities of life, these material necessities must be provided outside civic activity—that is, through productive units such as households and firms. Citizens who have accumulated capital through hard work, thrift, or fraud will continue to have the leisure to share in positions of initiative and command; whether they actually do so will depend in part on the pull of their business activities and in part on their preferences. The indigent will continue to find it difficult to share in these positions unless their sharing is compensated at least as well as the other opportunities that are presented to them in the private market. Further, it is highly likely that political culture will continue to affect the way citizens respond to the incentives of productive private activity and participation in civic activity. Where civic activity itself is considered a path to personal wealth, as in individualistic subcultures such as that of Philadelphia, some of the otherwise indigent will have an incentive to pursue it; where it is considered commendable even though it may impose an economic cost on the individual, the indigent will be discouraged from participating but may do so all the same; where it is considered a responsibility of the well-to-do, there will be little room for participation by the indigent.

The behavior of both wealthy and indigent citizens, of course, will differ from relatively market-oriented societies to relatively communistic societies, and it is to be assumed that relatively communistic societies will continue to emerge, not because they perform well economically but because political entrepreneurs will continue to appeal to the indigent, and their appeals will be heard.

Since representative government brings with it an attenuation of the notion of citizenship, sharply reducing the supply of positions of initiative or command, though perhaps not reducing the supply of admin-
istrative positions, it should not be surprising if the issues associated with good citizenship and departures from it recur in representative governments, notwithstanding that these governments are spoken of as popular.

Conclusion

In sum, political economy continues to be germane in addressing the future of citizenship. As in antiquity and in the Enlightenment, there are and probably will continue to be differences of wealth and indigence among the residents of any jurisdiction. These differences allow some to contribute more than others to preserving the citizenship and to participating in the public life of the civic unit. Antiquity and the Enlightenment offer remarkably explicit examples of dealing conceptually with differences in wealth and indigence. These conceptual analyses remain valuable today especially because they have few parallels in our own time, having been displaced for a while by economics-based policy analysis, even though situations apparently similar to those that the older analyses address are with us still.

Although the circumstances of these earlier eras are different in some ways from our own, and care is needed in the present state of our knowledge to avoid overstating similarities, the lesson that both wealth and indigence will find political voices is clear enough. Although, largely because of economic growth, history so far has largely spared the United States the severe conditions experienced by many other nations in which the interests of wealth and indigence clash, perhaps understanding these examples will make it easier to come to grips with the political economy of citizenship in both cases—the progressive state and in the stationary state—as these are found in combination, and sometimes in interdependence, throughout the world.

It is entirely possible, of course, that the environment of political economy will be altered radically. A worldwide epidemic or war could interrupt the Enlightenment period of economic growth on which the international economy still feeds. Populations, too, could decline severely or change their composition. The residual population, with its dominant culture, might have interests other than economic growth. Kingships or something like them, benign or malevolent, could reappear, as they have before. All these things might occur. As even the
American founders themselves finally came to understand, the economy and social order they labored to bring about probably would be ephemeral, as all others had been before them (McCoy 1980, 239). The political economy of citizenship is unlikely to lose its pertinence, however, since the remnant still will have to deliberate and evaluate, and those who are at greatest liberty to do both will be, as they have been, those who have at least some assets.

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What actions, whether on the part of the state or on the part of private citizens, might illegitimately exclude some human beings from participation in a liberal society as citizens in good standing? Our discussion of these questions is informed by what we take to be a distinctively ‘liberal’ conception of citizenship. Our use of this term is not meant as an appeal to a particular conception of citizenship that is defended by political liberals in opposition to a conception held by political conservatives. Rather, we mean in great part to appeal to a broadly Millian understanding of liberalism.\(^1\) Essential to this understanding is that political morality is animated by a normative conception of the person as one capable of rational self-governance in pursuit of a meaningful life. This central commitment has important implications for the kinds of considerations that are relevant for the justification of the rights, privileges, and duties associated with being a citizen in good standing. The latter are to be justified by those values that persons conceived of as capable of rational self-governance, as such have good reason to want to see promoted and protected. Different liberal states may vary in the specific terms of citizenship; but what makes a conception of citizenship embodied in the practices of a particular state a legitimate liberal conception of citizenship is that both the rights and the duties associated with being a citizen in good standing are justifiable by appeal to liberal values. Insofar as exclusion from these benefits and protections can be justified at all, in this view they must be justified by appeal to these liberal values.

This liberal conception of citizenship, so defined, that informs our discussion here can be contrasted with those conceptions that do not appeal to liberal values. Some conceptions of citizenship may, for

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\(^1\) The locus classicus here is, of course, *On Liberty* (Mill 1998). For a contemporary articulation of this Millian idea, see Joseph Raz (1986).
instance, be better comprehended as answering to a particular ethnic understanding of citizenship. What is fundamental, in such a view, is that the contours of citizenship be justifiable by appeal to those interests that persons may have as members of a particular ethnic, national, or religious group. Other conceptions of citizenship need not even share this individualism. A conception of citizenship may be grounded in ideals that have to do with the intrinsic value of a particular state, or of a kind of state, in contrast to the liberal view, which sees the state as justified to the extent that it serves the interests of its citizens.

In this chapter, our aim is to go some way toward articulating, in terms familiar from moral theory, our own understanding of liberal citizenship. In particular, we draw on a general Kantian understanding of morality, one that holds firm to the ideal of the individual as a rational self-governor. Our goal is not to articulate fully this conception of citizenship and its moral foundations, but we will endeavor to defend its relevance by using it to illuminate certain practical disputes concerning the appropriateness of excluding some people from citizenship, with all that such exclusion would entail for the rights and privileges of individuals.

Two Conceptions of Liberal Citizenship

State Citizenship

In order to understand what it is to be a full citizen in good standing of a liberal society, it is important to distinguish between two relevant and distinctive points of view. Each is guided by its own criteria for withholding or denying recognition as a citizen.

The first point of view is that of the state in its role as a legitimate authority. To maintain one’s status as a citizen in good standing in the eyes of the state, what matters is that one conform to the general duties and assume the specific obligations associated with the role of the citizen. Conforming to liberal values requires only that one not act in ways that are contrary to liberal values. One need not understand one’s deepest commitments as expressed, even in part, by liberal values.

2. This ideal of the individual appears throughout Kant’s moral and political writings. See, for example, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. For a contemporary development of this Kantian ideal, see John Rawls’s revised edition of A Theory of Justice (1999), particularly § 40.

3. See Raz (1986, chaps. 1 and 2) for the model of state authority we employ here.
What matters is that one does what is required by liberal values even if one does not take one’s reasons for action as being informed by liberal values.

‘Conformity’, as we are using the term, should be read broadly to encompass not just ways of conducting oneself but the kinds of reasons one is prepared to accept as the appropriate currency of public justification. For instance, though legislators may privately conclude that certain policy initiatives are required by biblical teachings, they cannot appeal to this conclusion as part of a justification to be offered to citizens qua citizens. Rather, they are constrained to appeal only to those kinds of considerations having to do with the legitimate interests of citizens as persons capable of leading quite rationally self-governed, meaningful lives. Of course, this in no way constrains the terms of interpersonal justification between people in their dealings as private citizens. The state as such does not have a compelling interest in requiring that one maintain liberal values in one’s private dealings as a condition of maintaining one’s status as a citizen in good standing. In fact, that there be a zone of privacy in which the state does not require conformity with liberal values is itself in service of those very values. Even illiberal people have an interest in rational self-governance.

It helps to note that the justification for the state demanding conformity only with certain standards of self-regulation on the part of its citizens is not because the state sees itself as merely a neutral referee between competing conceptions of the good. The liberal state, in our view, is definitely a partisan actor favoring liberal values. Respect for its own values, however, requires that the state respect the autonomy of citizens regarding fundamental questions of value, to the extent that doing so is consistent with the duty of the state to be guided by the requirements of respect for all citizens as persons. For the state to demand or to exact more than conformity in the public arena would require that the state be prepared to act in ways that failed to respect its own values, since conformity on the part of citizens with certain standards is all that is required to protect the possibility of public life regulated by liberal values.

Finally, we take it to be a significant feature of our account that there may be citizens who are required to conform to liberal values in their dealings with others in the public sphere even as they are entitled to

4. The idea that the state is supposed to be a neutral referee between competing conceptions of the good is prominently found in Rawls’s *Political Liberalism* (1995).
be guided by illiberal values in the private sphere. This combination suggests that these citizens are suffering a kind of cognitive dissonance in their thinking about how it is appropriate to relate to others. We think this is a correct, but unobjectionable, implication of our view. If anything, we think this fact speaks in favor of our view, as the sense of inner conflict that many feel in thinking about matters in the public sphere is something to be made sense of, not ignored.

**Social Citizenship**

One may well be recognized by the state as a citizen in good standing yet not be recognized as such by one’s fellow citizens in their guise as the ‘body politic’. In our view, social recognition as a citizen in good standing need not follow from being a citizen in good standing in the eyes of the state. This is so also because, in an important way, the criteria for recognition employed by the state are constrained by concerns about the abuse of authoritative coercive power. This is not a concern in the case of the body politic, since it does not wield such power. To the extent that the body politic does wield a kind of coercive power, it is through what Mill calls ‘social disapprobation’, and, as painful as being at the receiving end of social disapprobation may be, it does not have the same normative significance for one’s duties and entitlements that authoritative disapprobation carries.⁵

One way in which this difference expresses itself is that the body politic is free to demand of citizens that they not only conform their conduct in the public sphere to the kind of conduct mandated by liberal values but that they actually act from liberal values. This demand can be read in two ways. In the weaker of the interpretations, the demand is merely that one’s conformity with liberal values spring from actual acceptance of those values. The stronger interpretation requires more. It requires not only that one accept liberal values but also that liberal political values and ideals constitute part of what one takes oneself to stand for.

Our understanding of social citizenship necessitates the stronger interpretation, because the weaker interpretation does not adequately cohere with what we take to be the very value of social citizenship. The value of social citizenship can be understood by contrasting it to the value of state citizenship. State citizenship, by itself, confers merely a

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⁵ See Book 5 of Mill’s *Utilitarianism*. 
sense of being ‘included’ among those who are the legitimate subjects of a particular state authority. It does not confer, as such, any sort of sense of belonging, along with the other subjects of that same authority, to a distinct community.

Social citizenship, on the other hand, is valued as a way of binding together citizens, who already are in some sense united, if for being subject to a common authority, as a community, that is, bound together by their shared identification with a distinct way of life.

This claim, that social citizenship requires one to presume liberal values to be in part what one stands for, or is about, should be distinguished from the claim that social citizenship requires that one’s comprehensive worldview be one that would be labeled ‘liberal’ in a colloquial sense. Our submission is only that the aspect of a person’s comprehensive normative worldview that concerns how the state ought to relate to citizens and how citizens ought to relate to one another as “fellow citizens,” must be constituted by what are defensibly liberal value commitments. In no logical way is this inconsistent with other aspects of one’s understanding of value being ‘conservative’ (here as well, in a colloquial sense). There is no tension, for instance, between a person’s believing that the proper valuing of sexual intimacy requires the kind of commitment that is exemplified by marriage and that person’s being liberal to the core in its attitudes concerning political morality.

The moral psychology of recognition by the state as a citizen in good standing is quite different from that of recognition by the body politic. To understand oneself to be in good standing in the eyes of the state legitimates a self-understanding of oneself as someone who has certain privileges and entitlements and who is bound by certain duties in virtue of one’s citizenship. One understands this status, however, as merely a matter of law; like being a shareholder in a corporation. Shareholders enjoy certain benefits by virtue of being shareholders. In addition to monetary benefits, however, they are entitled also to a voice in the governance of the corporation, and they can be held responsible for shouldering the burden of the liabilities and costs associated with that very corporation’s wrongdoing. Being a shareholder has nothing to do, on the other hand, with how one sees oneself as a person. If, say, those who oversee the management of the corporation engage in wrongdoing, the deed redounds to their personal discredit. That discredit does not, in general, transfer to the discredit of the shareholders. Likewise, mere inclusion as a citizen of the state carries with it no implications
for how one sees oneself as a person; nor do the wrongful actions of the government redound to the discredit of those whose relationship to the state is merely one of having state citizenship.

Recognition as a citizen in good standing by the body politic, on the other hand, is to share in a sense of social solidarity with one’s fellow citizens. Not only does one regulate oneself in the public sphere, guided by liberal values, but one also sees oneself as indeed standing for these values in unity with one’s fellow citizens: liberal values are, from the point of view of this kind of social citizenship, what we as a society, we as an individual and a member of that society, stand for. When individuals self-identify with being a citizen of the state in this deeper sense, they see themselves to be not merely shareholders, not even emphatically stakeholders, but rather as something much closer to fellows in a noble order.

Social citizenship, then, is bound up in one’s own conception of one’s identity in a way that state citizenship is not. For example, it does not make sense for someone who perceives herself merely as a person who possesses state citizenship ever to feel betrayed by the state. Betrayal entails a violation of a substantive relationship between betrayed and betrayer. The sole relationship between the mere possessor of state citizenship and the state, however, is formal, and thus it cannot stand as the basis for legitimate sentiments of betrayal.

Things are quite different when it comes to social citizenship. In this case the relationship that exists between the possessor of social citizenship and the rest of the body politic is more than a mere formality. It is one of solidarity in a community dedicated to shared, morally noble ends. When a member of this community violates these shared values in relation to another member of the community, that member wrongs not only the victim but also the wider community, the values and ideals of which the member’s conduct now also betrays.

**Exclusion in the Liberal State**

In this section, we utilize our framework from the last section as a basis for discussing the ways in which a person may be excluded, both legitimately and illegitimately, from the ranks of liberal citizenship.

A person may be excluded from the ranks of the citizenry either by the state or by the body politic. Let us call exclusion on the part of the state *authoritative exclusion*. What makes an act of exclusion authoritative is not the obvious fact that the mechanism of exclusion involves
the threat or use of the state’s coercive power but rather the fact that the mechanism of exclusion in such instances involves the use of a state’s authority. ‘Authority’ confers on the state the power to make legitimate certain ways of conducting oneself in the public sphere. It is one thing to be excluded by the use of coercive power: the end result is merely one of being excluded, without therefore making it right that one has been excluded. It is altogether another matter to be faced with authoritative exclusion, because the end result is being excluded in the right way and/or for the right reason.

There are a variety of ways in which the state might exercise its power authoritatively to exclude. A primary example is through the expressive power of punishment.\(^6\) When the state punishes, say, a murderer, it not only removes a threat from the body politic, it also authoritatively repudiates the criminal person as an offending individual not deserving recognition as a citizen in good standing. We take, in our view here, this kind of authoritative exclusion to be entirely justifiable. We do so because the murderer’s own judgment concerning appropriate conduct was inconsistent with conformity to liberal values in the public sphere. This example also suggests a more general account of how the state is normatively constrained in its use of its own powers of authoritative exclusion; that is to say, authoritative exclusion can be justified to the extent that it is in the service of liberal values.

A fortiori, we hold that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the liberal state’s proselytizing on behalf of its values. As long as doing so is consistent with due respect for the core values involved, we take it to be appropriate and indeed obligatory for the liberal state to inculcate these core values via education, through enforcement. In schools, the liberal state can promote liberal values as correct, in addition to promoting adherence to them as principles that regulate public life. On the other hand, the state cannot compel students to accept liberal values so long as they adhere to them as precepts regulative of public life, nor should the state treat these students as lesser student citizens on account of their not accepting those liberal values.

In our account, then, there is nothing intrinsic to the idea of ‘exclusion by the state’ that is in and of itself illegitimate. What does make exclusion sound like a bad word is its historical connection to exclusion on nonliberal grounds. Here the history of the United States is

instructive: consider, for example, the period of history during which slavery was legal. In this case, the state did flagrantly violate its very own stated commitment to liberal values by treating Africans in America (not yet called African Americans) in a way inconsistent with its commitment to liberal values. Claims to the effect that, as a matter of science, these Africans on American soil were not of an appropriate kind permitting them to be counted as persons in the eyes of the liberal state seem to have been an exercise in misguided self-deception in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Now let us turn to the matter of exclusion by the body politic. The body politic does not wield authoritative power. Therefore, while the body politic can exclude a person from its membership, it lacks the power to legitimate this exclusion authoritatively. What it can do, though, is diminish the sense one has of belonging to the body politic. This, too, is a power that is subject to moral constraint. We can discern the nature of these constraints by contrasting it with that of the moral constraints with regard to state exclusion: the state can exclude someone only on the basis of one’s not conforming to liberal values. In contrast, the body politic may exclude on the basis of someone not accepting these values. The crucial importance of this difference will be seen in the examples reviewed in the next section.

Cases

In what follows, we consider a number of cases where issues of authoritative and social exclusion arise. Our aim is not to offer an exhaustive discussion of these cases or of the merits of the facts involved. Rather, we mean to examine these cases through the lens of the theoretical framework that we have outlined so far in this chapter. We invite those with a better understanding of the details of the cases to flesh out the implications of viewing them through the lens of our conceptual framework.

Morally Unacceptable Exclusions

The Pledge of Allegiance

Let us begin by examining a recent controversial case involving the U.S. Pledge of Allegiance. The pledge is worded as follows: “I pledge alle-

7. For distinctions between “applicability” and “acceptability” in a Kantian ethical sense, see Ciprut (2008).
giance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” The relationship between the pledge and exclusion is as follows: when a willingness to affirm the pledge is taken as a condition of being a citizen in good standing, the pledge serves to exclude all those who cannot affirm it in good conscience.

Reciting the pledge can be put forward as a condition of being a citizen in good standing by, say, the state’s compelling it on civic occasions, such as public ceremonies, the beginning of the school day, and so forth. At these civic events, citizens come together as citizens. Reciting the pledge is thus reasonably taken to be a mark of being a citizen in good standing.

That this practice can be justified is doubtful. Were the state to compel the recitation of the pledge, the state would be demanding of its citizens an avowal that includes belief in God as a precondition for being considered a citizen in good standing. This would clearly be a violation of a core liberal value, namely, the value of respecting liberty of religious conscience.

The American state does not in fact compel the recitation of the pledge; it does, however, present the recitation of the pledge as a normative ideal that ought to be followed unless one shows a valid reason for not doing so. An individual’s reason for not doing so may count as a valid motive for not participating, if such an explanation appeals to “why the recitation of the pledge (in this example) would constitute the violation of an important core value”: one’s ‘liberty of/in religious conscience’, in this instance.

This manner of presenting the pledge exculpates the state from charges that the state is excluding some persons from being citizens in good standing on grounds that are inconsistent with citizens being able to exercise their most important liberties. However, the fact that the state is presenting the pledge as ‘normative’ in the first place creates additional obstacles for those who have valid reasons for not reciting it but who nevertheless want to be recognized as citizens in good standing by their fellow citizens. In presenting the pledge on normative grounds, the state is clearly exercising its authority to endorse a particular social conception of citizenship. In principle, this social conception of citizenship does not exclude anyone from being a citizen in good standing. In practice, however, it does serve to exclude from being recognized socially as citizens in good standing those who have good reason for not participating in the rite of the pledge and who choose
to exercise that right. This is especially true in areas where there reigns a widespread if mistaken belief that a personal recognition of God is a precondition for, or good proof of, having the “correct” values.

Even if one is not prepared to accept our claim that in practice not reciting the pledge serves to exclude some from social citizenship, it is hard to deny that, at the very least, it does create for those who choose not to recite it an additional obstacle on the way to gaining social recognition as citizens in good standing. In circumstances when, and settings where, saying the pledge is a norm associated with being a good citizen, it is difficult to make of one’s abstention a purely private matter. Even an appearance of silence draws attention and makes hesitation or a neutral stance appear to be a negative decision. Absent a clear liberal justification for advancing the pledge as a norm, the creation of such burdensome consequences by the state vis-à-vis all those recognized by its own lights to be citizens in good standing is illegitimate as such.

In general then, we think the state ought not be in the business of demanding pledges of its citizens, or for that matter of imposing endorsements of social ideals of citizenship. To the extent that it does so, the state decidedly ought not include religious content in any such pledge. This leaves open the question of whether or not the civic body may endorse a version of the pledge as a rite of citizenship, and if so, what sort of pledge might it endorse. We do not discuss this issue but point out reasons why it is just as unacceptable for the body politic, insofar as it views itself as advancing a liberal conception of social citizenship, to include the “under God” clause in any pledge it may elect to advance as a normative instrument. To exclude any person from social citizenship on grounds other than those that are relevant to the promotion and protection of liberal values, especially when the exclusion is based on the exercise of a core liberty such as ‘freedom of (or in) religious conscience’, is to betray the very values at the heart of any liberal conception of social citizenship.

Let us be clear about what we are saying: we are not suggesting that it is inconsistent with liberal values for someone to believe that his or her state is somehow ‘under God’. Nor are we insinuating that it is inconsistent with liberal values for someone (or for a group of people in a religious context) to pray to God on behalf, or for the good of, ‘the country’. What we are saying is that it is inconsistent with liberal values to advance a conception of what it is to be a full-fledged citizen that requires one to exercise one’s liberty of religious conscience in a par-
ticular fashion, even if that mode happens to be the only fashion favored by the greatest majority.

**Sometimes Permissible Exclusions: State Security and Public Order**

In the preceding section we dealt with a case in which exclusion is morally unacceptable. In this section we consider a case in which exclusion, both on the part of the state and the body politic is at least sometimes permissible. Such cases lie in the area of the so-called liberal paradox. This area concerns how the liberal state ought to deal with individuals and with groups in its midst that are hostile to liberal values and to the liberal social order itself.

At times, the struggle with illiberalism has been against fascist groups whose stated aims have been to replace the reigning liberal order with a decidedly illiberal one. An example is the Nazi view limiting personhood\(^8\) (and a fortiori citizenship) to those seen as Aryan. Other forms of fascism also adopt what we call ethnic citizenship, where citizenship depends principally on things such as one’s group provenance, ethnicity, or race.

Fascist views are illiberal in two different ways. First, they are illiberal in that citizenship is reserved for individuals of a particular race or ethnicity. It is inconsistent with liberal values to put forward either an authoritative definition or a strict social conception of citizenship that excludes on these particular grounds. Quite apart from how they exclude persons of the “wrong” ethnicity, fascist states are illiberal even toward the very persons whom they deem fit to be their citizens. This is because of the collectivism and corporatism inherent in fascist thinking. An ideology is collectivist in the sense and to the extent that it believes ‘what matters’ ultimately to be the collective, such as the German Volk, and not the individuals who are a constituent part of that particular collective. An ideology is corporatist (or statist, for that matter) to the extent that it believes what ultimately matters is the state itself, and not the citizens of that state.\(^9\)

In their collectivism or corporatism, fascist states place no value whatsoever on individuals (whether they are citizens or not) and see them and their liberties as instruments in service of ‘the people’ or ‘the state’. This is directly opposed to the views of the liberal state,

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8. On the notion of personhood, see David Williams, chapter 5 in this book.—Ed.
9. Such a view is certainly suggested by certain readings of Carl Schmitt (1986).
which values itself only insofar as it guarantees the liberties of its citizens, who are valued simply by virtue of their capacity for rational self-governance.

Despite the numerous ways in which the two conceptions differ, communist ideology and fascist ideology share a core connection via collectivism or corporatism. What matters in communist ideology is not the individual and his liberties, and what matters in fascist ideology is how the people fare as a collective, and hence, perhaps foremost, how the state itself fares.

The continuing challenge faced by the liberal state and the liberal society is how to deal with illiberal groups that are overtly hostile to the liberal political and social order. Here too, U.S. experience vis-à-vis communism is instructive. Throughout the 1950s, quite understandably, communism was viewed as a threat to the liberal social order, in the light of the coercive additions to and expansions of the Soviet bloc.

What made McCarthyism objectionable was not its opposition to communism. Indeed, it is entirely appropriate for the liberal state authoritatively to condemn communism, given communism’s lack of concern for the rights and liberties of individuals. What made McCarthyism so objectionable was not what it was objecting to but the manner in which it pursued its central objection. Among others, it failed to distinguish adequately among those associated with the Communist Party, specifically between those who wished to overthrow the liberal social order and those who wished to promote it through their association with it, thereby the better to address the deep racial injustices reigning in America at the time. McCarthyism, in effect, was illiberal for excluding from full citizenship those espousing left-leaning liberal politics, admittedly during very controversial times as to ‘inside/outside’ implications.

In our view, then, the ‘liberal paradox’ is no paradox at all. We think it would be better described as the ‘liberal challenge’. The challenge is to defend the liberal public order against real threats without at the same time violating core liberal commitments. For example, one of these core commitments is to guarantee persons accused of a crime the right to confront their accuser and to receive a fair and open judicial treatment. While it may be very tempting to disregard these basic guarantees in the name of defending the liberal public order, it is nothing but a temptation to be resisted and by far not a paradox waiting all too expediently to be resolved.
Questionable Exclusions

Homosexuality on Social Squares
In this section we discuss two matters concerning directly both authoritative and social exclusion on the sole basis of sexual orientation and the issue as to when such exclusion is and is not permissible in accordance with liberal values. The first has to do with the status of state recognition of same-sex marriage. The second has to do with the place of homosexuals in the military forces of the liberal state.

The relevance of this example to our project derives from the attention drawn to the fact that it is the defense of the liberal public order that justifies certain cases of exclusion in the liberal state. This is in marked contrast to other bases that have been offered as grounds for authoritative exclusion. For instance, the authoritative exclusion of homosexuals has been argued for as being integral to the defense of a public morality that is, however, not defined wholly in terms of a commitment to liberal values. Others have appealed, as a justification for this kind of exclusion, to respect the democratic will, even when doing precisely that may conflict with liberal values.

Our view is that the exclusion of homosexuals from entering into an authoritatively recognized marriage cannot be justified as playing a role in the defense of a liberal public order. The reasons why this is so do not, however, easily generalize, as we will make amply clear by considering the case of the exact role of homosexuals among the military forces of the state.

As we have argued earlier, a liberal public order is one that does not exclude persons from citizenship on the basis of how they exercise their basic liberties. We do recognize, however, that there is room for legitimate exclusion on the following grounds:

1. The state may put forward a conception of what it is to be a citizen in good standing, which excludes those who do not accept liberal values as regulative of public life; and
2. The body politic may exclude those who do not accept liberal values as the normative ideal that ought to regulate any state as such.

Given this framework, it is illegitimate for the state or the body politic to put forward a conception of what it is to be a citizen in good

standing that excludes homosexuals as such. This is because the liberty to choose one’s own mate is fundamental. It would be a severe interference with individual liberties if, as in Plato’s Republic, the state were to dictate ‘with whom’ we could partner. Moreover, choice of a same-sex partner is entirely consistent with both an acceptance of liberal values as regulative of public life and with accepting those values as the normative ideal for public life.

It is thus unjustifiable for both the liberal state and the liberal body politic to exclude people from full citizenship solely on the grounds of choice of a same-sex partner. But this is exactly what the state does when it authoritatively endorses a form of marriage that disallows same-sex unions.

We are not challenging the kinds of reasons offered in support of a state-endorsed restrictive understanding of marriage. It may well be true that the weight of history supports such a restriction, or that a majority of people in the democratic state are in favor of it. And while these types of considerations can legitimately be put forward in a variety of public contexts, they are not relevant here. Put more simply, the liberal state cannot succumb either to the tyranny of history or to the intolerance of the majority as a basis for excluding some from the full benefits of citizenship.

We recognize the fact that many object on religious grounds to state-endorsed same-sex marriage. The state is barred from recognizing objections based on religious grounds. However, other things being equal, the state should endeavor to ameliorate the dissonance that citizens sense between their commitment to the liberal public order, on the one hand, and their loyalty to their private religious views on the other. To do so is certainly in the interest of defending a stable liberal political order that unequivocally commands the respect of as many citizens as possible.

Such an order can best be established by the state’s removing itself from the business of marrying people altogether. By endorsing a liberal view of marriage, the state unnecessarily sides with some religions’ views on marriage only to disagree with others’ views. If the state were to limit its area of concern to the regulation of domestic partnerships, then the state could both preserve a liberal public order and maintain the conditions of its stability.

The state regulation of domestic unions on liberal grounds will, of course, have implications for what counts as a legitimate domestic union. For example, the liberal state justifiably might bar marriages
(those that involve young teenagers, for instance, who are unable to consent), regardless whether effectively so or not.

We find it conceivable that the liberal state could justifiably favor certain forms of domestic union over others, but only to the greater extent that they are consistent with liberal values rather than with illiberal ones. This, however, provides no basis whatsoever for the state’s favoring a traditional and restrictive view of domestic union over one that allows for same-sex marriage. Similar comments apply to the liberal body politic as well.

Our view, then, is that neither the state nor the body politic may exclude on the basis of choice of same-sex partner. We do not equate or conflate this view with the mode of thinking that sees the state conceptually barred from invoking sexual orientation and finds in this very perception good reason for excluding some persons from participating in certain state institutions. The relevance of this point will become clearer as we turn from same-sex marriage to the status of homosexuals in the military.

**Homosexuality in Military Circles**

In the liberal state as well, the military serves the vital role of defending the state, its citizens, and the liberal values represented by that society. It has been claimed, though, that having openly gay individuals in the military detracts from the military’s ability to fulfill these vital functions on account of the discomfort said to be manifested explicitly by much of the military on prospects of serving with openly gay individuals.

There are at least two sources for this discomfort. First, there are illiberal attitudes toward homosexuals that are both grounded in and materialized from a belief that they have no role in public institutions such as the military. Although such illiberal views would ordinarily have no standing whatsoever in the eyes of the liberal state, it may make a difference that much of the military, as well as the pools from which the military are drawn, do seem to hold on to such illiberal views; and that such conceptions would therefore detract from the ability of the military to perform vital functions in defense of the liberal political order if it were to allow openly gay individuals to serve alongside and among heterosexual personnel.

Second, one might be uncomfortable in serving with openly gay persons not merely because one holds illiberal values about public institutions generally but also because of the dramatically diminished
realm of privacy that one enjoys while serving in the military forces. Military personnel are compelled to share close quarters with others, more so than in any other realm of public life except perhaps correctional settings. Some might feel discomfort sharing close quarters with someone who may view them as a potential sexual partner, and thus, they object on these grounds to serving with openly gay individuals. This would be akin to the objection a woman might advance when being compelled to share close quarters with a potentially aggressive heterosexual man. As such, it does not so much evince illiberal attitudes toward men as it reflects concern for individual privacy and for a preference to be left alone in the pursuit of one’s will.

We take it that there does exist an objection to serving with homosexuals that in and of itself is not obviously inconsistent with respect for liberal values as precepts regulative of public life. Still, in excluding openly gay individuals from the entire military, the state is doing much more than protecting an important realm of privacy. The current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in the U.S. armed forces does reflect some measure of recognition that there needs to be a balance struck between the certainty that all military personnel need their privacy and the likelihood that gay personnel can serve honorably in the armed forces.

We remain suspicious, however, as to whether this represents a fair balance of interests. We do so because it does not discard the perils inherent in the suggestion of authoritative disapproval of homosexuals. As a matter of practice, if not of principle, the policy suggests that homosexuality is visualized as shameful and, therefore, as something to be swept under the rug in the public arena. What we would advocate is that those more familiar than ourselves with the workings and the culture of the military toil in imaginative fashion toward finding avenues of honorable service for openly gay persons, even as they continue respecting the legitimate interests in privacy of nonhomosexual military personnel. There are, after all, many ways of participating in military life that do not call for the close sharing of tight quarters. And even when circumstances so compel, the military has a gift for finding ways by which the legitimate privacy interests of both male and female personnel can be respected. There is no obvious reason for homosexual military personnel not to be very similarly accommodated. And while proposals of this kind may involve certain restrictions on the many ways in which openly gay individuals might serve in the military, an inclusive accommodation of this kind strikes us as a more transparent approach than the current practice, which suggests that
those who are truthful about their homosexuality have no place in the military whatsoever.

Our overarching point here is that at any moment there can be a variety of contexts in which (in the name of defending the liberal democratic political order) the state could and should be perceived to be amenable to and capable of recognizing as grounds for possible exclusion those considerations which on face value ought to be deemed anathema to those who remain committed to liberal democratic values.

Conclusion

Any discussion of the ethics of ‘exclusion from recognition as a citizen in good standing’ is best conducted within the framework of a broader political philosophy. We have adopted a largely classical liberal political philosophy in which the role of the state is that of advancing the interests of its subjects, in particular their interests in leading rationally self-governed, meaningful, lives.

The specific values and concrete interests that this abstract commitment leads us to identify as salient we have referred to in this chapter as ‘liberal values’. In our view, it is with reference to these liberal values that questions of authoritative exclusion are in need of being evaluated.

Moreover, we contend that attending exclusively to the specific ways in which the state can exclude some people from citizenship does not take into account an important manner in which individuals may be excluded from recognition as citizens in good standing. In our view, the value of citizenship in a liberal state has two distinct facets. The first is that of standing in a certain relationship vis-à-vis the state. That standing entitles one to benefits just as it subjects one to duties that are and remain exclusively within the authority of the state to confer and in the purview of the state to demand. The second is that of standing, together with others, in a community of citizens united in a shared form of life, and in part of which a commitment to liberal values at an intersubjective objective level plays a central role (see Williams, chap. 5 in this book¹¹).

One can be excluded from citizenship not only by the state but also by one’s fellow citizens in their guise as the body politic. The moral

¹¹. See also Williams (2008).
character of this latter kind of exclusion, which we refer to here as social exclusion, cannot be accounted for in terms specific to forms of authoritative exclusion. This is because state actions are authoritative and hence carry an aura of legitimacy that social disapprobation associated with exclusions by the body politic per se does not.

The difference between the two types of exclusion is most evident in their ramifications for the self-conception of those so excluded. While authoritative exclusion has implications for whether one is entitled to see oneself as included among the citizens of the state, it does not have obvious implications for one’s sense of belonging to a community in terms of which one identifies oneself. It is precisely this sense of belonging that is undermined by social exclusion.

To the extent that an exclusionary practice is justified, what social and authoritative exclusions have in common is their need to be justified by an appeal to liberal values. In the latter part of the chapter, we briefly examined various ways in which an appeal to liberal values justifies certain exclusionary practices and condemns others.

Though our discussion has been conducted in abstract terms, we believe that much of what we suggest is concretely corroborated and thus helps to complement the more elaborate approaches to citizenship studies of inclusion, exclusion, and belonging laid out in other chapters of this book.

References


This chapter examines the language policies of three very different polities—France, the former USSR, and the United States—to see how the concept of ‘citizenship’ and its relationship to language play or played out in them. Each of these three states has (or had) a different notion of how language and citizenship are interconnected. Hence, each policy became embedded in a particular notion of linguistic culture. One thing these polities shared is that they underwent revolutions, after which their ideas about language and citizenship changed. In the cases of France and the USSR, the change was deliberate, and it was crucial to the execution of the revolutionary program. In the United States, the connection between language and citizenship evolved slowly, especially as immigration from non-English-speaking countries grew during the nineteenth century (Kloss 1977).

Language Policy, Language Planning, and Language Ideology

It would probably be useful first to define in some way what is meant by language policy and in particular to understand how it differs from language planning, with which it is often confused. I prefer to view language policy (roughly, decision making about language) as rooted in what I call linguistic culture, which I define as the totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, myths, religious strictures, and all the other cultural baggage that speakers introduce from their culture into their dealings with language. Linguistic culture is concerned with the transmission and codification of language as well and has bearing also on the culture’s notions of the value of literacy and of the sanctity of texts (Schiffman 1996). Thus, language policy, though it primarily

1. Some people define all this as language ‘ideology’, but I am not happy with the way that term is usually used in the literature, preferring my own formulation for many
reflects explicit, written, overt, de jure, official, top-down decision making, also involves implicit, unwritten, covert, de facto, grass-root, unofficial ideas and assumptions that can affect the outcomes of policy-making just as emphatically and definitively as the more explicit decisions. Confident that their explicit decisions are the correct ones, policymakers often tend to see the implicit factors (which are deeply embedded in the ‘unconscious’ linguistic culture) as problematical. Why? Because these factors are pesky, petty, and even emotional, and they thwart the well-laid plans of the decision makers, who usually purport to ‘know best’ what is needed.

Most definitions of language planning (e.g., Cooper 1989, 30–31) assume that the natural outcome of language planning is language policy—that, truth be told, language planning is language policy planning. This is then conceptually abbreviated not to policy planning but to language planning, in turn backfiring to the mistaken assumption that language policy is a deliberate, future-oriented activity carried out by government agencies or language academies. This unfortunate conflation of one of the possible outcomes of language planning with the activity of language planning as a whole has led to a neglect of the study of language policy per se, except within formal theoretical frameworks that aim toward universality when emphasizing individual cases and, thus, eliminate idiosyncratic cultural contexts.

Some scholars use the term language ideology (e.g., Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998) to refer to what I call covert policy; but I find this usage inadequate for handling all the phenomena dealt with here. Ideology, I submit, is part of covert language policy, as in the particular case of the elaborate, systematic, well-formulated, state-sponsored political and philosophical conceptions of policy once displayed by Soviet practices and featured even now in French language policy. But I do not find it applicable to all cases, and certainly not to the U.S. situation, where complex ideologies are not present. Despite being fraught with unspoken, implicit, and covert ideas about language (see Mertz 1982), language policy in the United States does not feature anything as complex as the ideologies of Marxist Leninism.

reasons I was happy to discuss in the framework of the Cross-Campus Conversations at Penn seminar (see Ciprut, chap. 1 in this book).
Territorial versus Personal Rights, Tolerance and Promotion

With these notions as a backdrop, it is useful to think of language rights (or rights enjoyed by individual citizens) as dichotomized along a number of dimensions, such as territorial versus personal rights and tolerance versus promotional uses.

Territorial rights are those that can be enjoyed or exercised only within a particular part (or subjurisdiction) of the larger state (or territory). Thus, in the United States, the state of New Mexico has made Spanish official to the extent that it can be used by legislators in the New Mexico State Assembly, even though this right is not enjoyed by Spanish speakers in adjacent territories such as Arizona or Texas. Similarly, the French language enjoys certain territorial rights in Louisiana but not in Missouri or Maine. In the former USSR, languages other than Russian had territorial rights only, while Russian speakers could expect to enjoy their ‘rights’ throughout Soviet territory.

Personal rights are rights to services that are portable anywhere within the polity. Previously in Canada, French was a territorial right (only in Quebec and parts of New Brunswick), but this was then extended to be a personal right, portable to any Canadian province, even into predominantly English-speaking provinces. In the former USSR, Russian speakers had personal rights and could expect to use their language anywhere in the Soviet Union. Speakers of other mother tongues in the USSR did not have those personal rights, but solely territorial rights.

Tolerance versus Promotion

In his typologies of language policy, Kloss (1977) makes another useful distinction, between policies that merely ‘tolerate’ any given language and policies that promote a particular language or languages. U.S. policy is tolerant of languages other than English, he claims, even though this tolerance has in fact fluctuated over time.

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2. There is often a dichotomy between rights enjoyed by individuals to the use of a particular language and the rights of groups to the use and maintenance of a particular language. The American context and U.S. law constantly reiterate the former and abjure any notion that groups have rights. In Europe, there is more of a tendency to focus on linguistic minorities (often referred to as “nationalities”) and their rights.

3. I have dealt with these issues in my Moldova paper (Schiffman 2002a) in an attempt to show how linguistic tolerance in the United States not only fluctuates but can expire.
Citizenship

We also need to have a clear idea of what ‘citizenship’ means, especially in terms of how any particular language is or is not crucial to that very concept of citizenship. In some polities, language is not a crucial issue for persons born in the territory of the policy, because for that polity, citizenship is automatic. But knowledge of or proficiency in a particular language may be crucial in the acquisition of citizenship—a consideration that plays out differently in different polities.

Language Policy and Citizenship in France

Any Anglo-Saxon who has ever visited France is aware that French linguistic culture is somehow different from Anglo-Saxon culture, and self-consciously so. Americans admire French culture, cuisine, couture, and other aspects of French life but sense, whether or not they understand and speak French, that French linguistic culture is not the same as theirs and that they may never be able to comprehend it fully.

Without going into great detail on this point, we can isolate a number of historical differences between “English-speaking” culture and French culture, some of which go back to old historical enmities between France and England and some of which are rooted not in enmity but in a different conception of the connection between language and the state.

The French Revolution and the French ‘Citizen’

The French Revolution did many things besides abolishing the privileges of royalty: it took away the lands and the properties of both the nobility and the Church. It also created the idea of le citoyen—the citizen. Before 1789, ordinary people were either in a state of serfdom or in servitude to those with greater power, with the exception perhaps of artisans, tradespeople, and city dwellers, who could lead a relatively autonomous life of sorts, enjoying some rights but all too few privileges. As noted in the 2004 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, “The National Constituent Assembly completed the abolition of feudalism, suppressed the old orders, established civil equality among men (at least in metropolitan France, since slavery was retained in the colonies), and made more than half the adult male population eligible to vote, although only a small minority met the requirement for becoming a deputy.”
Before the revolution, however, a notion had developed, aided by the monarchy, of a special role for the French language. In the seventeenth century, under pressure from both the Spanish and the Italian languages, which seemed to be making inroads into French linguistic space, the French Academy was established. At first independent, then under royal sponsorship, the Academy’s role was to guard the French language, by any and all means, from corruption and incursions by other languages. Over time, the idea began to cross the minds of many in France that the French language had inherited some kind of special status, perhaps the universal equivalence of classical Latin. This claim to ‘classical’ status was magnified by the close connection the Académie enjoyed with the French monarchy, admired throughout Europe for being the most elegant and refined royal regime the world had ever known. Thus, the ‘brilliance’ and luster of the French monarchy were taken to ‘illuminate’ the language, literature, and indeed all the culture of France—so much so that, when the monarchy fell, the status of the French language was not affected by the revolution. In fact it was enhanced, since various revolutionaries saw in the French language an ideal vehicle for disseminating the ideas of the French Revolution. These leaders campaigned actively not only in an effort to further the language but also to uproot any attachment anyone in France might entertain to any nonstandard form of French, not to mention any other tongue, dialect, idiom, patois, or whatever else happened to be vulgarized on the terreir (Schiffman 1996). Residual linguistic varieties were seen as relics of feudalism at best, but more often as expressions of separatist loyalties or, worse still, as evidence of reactionary and counterrevolutionary tendencies.

During the early months of the revolution, its ideas were disseminated by whatever means possible—by translating the texts of the laws and decrees emanating from Paris, for instance. Eventually this tactic was deemed to be less effective than theoreticians such as Abbé Grégoire and others had envisaged. Translation, they felt, was working against their basic revolutionary goals. They concluded that proper participation in the revolution required a form of communication that was clear and rational. Only standard French would do. Grégoire (de

4. “[The] Académie française, or French literary academy, [was] established by the French first minister Cardinal de Richelieu in 1634 and incorporated in 1635, and existing, except for an interruption during the era of the French Revolution, to the present day. Its original purpose was to maintain standards of literary taste and to establish the literary language” (Encyclopaedia Britannica online, Web site).
Certeau et al. 1975), Robespierre, and the likes of Barère felt that no other tongue offered the lucidity, rationality, and clarity of standard French. So, all other forms of language were belittled as mere idiomes, patois, jargon, and argot, for being muddied, irrational, unclear, and inadequate. On January 27, 1794, Barère addressed the La Convention to drive the point home: “The language of a people ought to be one and the same for all. Our enemies had made the French language into the language of the courts; they vilified it. It’s up to us to make out of it the language of the people, and to honor it. . . . Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hate for the Republic speak German; counterrevolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us smash these instruments of damage and error.” Then came the best part: “Citizens, you hate political federalism. Abjure linguistic [federalism]. Language ought to be one, like the republic.”

Thus, from the French Revolution there emerged the notion that the French language, previously a cosseted and privileged instrument of royalty, could become the language of ordinary French people, but only if kept intact, free of any regional taint. Pure and unsullied, it would convey the noble ideas of the revolution to all, and it was not only the right but the duty of all citizens to learn it, for failure to do so would compromise the ideals of the revolution and open the door to counter-revolution, anarchy, and chaos.

It is interesting to contrast this idea about language with ideas in other revolutionary traditions. To Anglo-Saxon (and other) eyes, the idea that a monarchical view of language could be transformed into a revolutionary one and that nonstandard and regional forms of language should be ‘smashed’ and abolished is a strange one. American ideas about government and about language view decentralization and federalism as democratic, and the language of the ‘people’ as emanating from the people—not handed down from the capital. Soviet ideas about language similarly involved abolishing the monopoly of Russian and allowing many regional forms of language to blossom, instead of

5. La Convention was the postrevolutionary legislative body of the time.—Ed.
trying to eliminate them. Ironically, and as various analysts have pointed out (Brunot 1966), the French Revolution was a triumph of the monarchic language policy and the royal view of language even as the monarchs were being frog-marched to the guillotine.

As for the present, nothing seems to have changed. Bourdieu (1982), who sees language usage as a kind of linguistic ‘exchange’, specifically discerns a kind of folk-Whorfian worldview (Mertz 1982) at work in the imposition and performance of the French language policy model. Today, teachers in French schools are on the front lines, as it were, working constantly to “inculcate a clear faculty of expression and of each emotion” through language. They work to replace the patois—for them, nothing but a confused jumble—with standard French, the only ‘clear and fixed’ medium that deserves to be in their pupils’ heads, if they are to perceive and to feel the right things in the right way, just as their teachers do. The task of teachers of French is “to erect the common conscience of the nation.” For Bourdieu, this is typically a Whorfian (Humboldtian) theory of language: it sees in scholarly action an endeavor fostering “intellectual and moral integration” (Bourdieu 1982, 32). Thus, teaching language is a kind of ‘mind control’: instill the standard language in the heads of children and you reprogram them to think clearly. It is no wonder, then, that Anglo-Saxons simply cannot think clearly about anything: they have an inferior instrument residing in their crania and nothing will do short of uprooting and replacing it with a ‘rational, clearer, and more lucid’ tool—the French language.

**Ethnicity versus Nationality: The Soviet View**

Though the Soviet Union has collapsed, its language policy was an important one. It influenced other policies not just within the Soviet bloc, but also in several other parts of the world. But one would consult Soviet documents in vain if one were looking for references to concepts of citizenship, or for connections between citizenship and language. Гражданство, the term for ‘citizenship’ in Soviet parlance, is useful only when speaking of becoming a Soviet citizen. For other uses, there exist more important terms. Гражданство highlights the salience of citizenship as a ‘state’, a condition or situation, not a process or activity; it embodies the dichotomy between the voluntary effort (see

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8. I have claimed, for example, that language policy in Independent India was a ‘clone’ of Soviet policy, although with certain differences (Schiffman 1996).
Urban, chap. 13 in this book) toward acquiring citizenship and the crude fact of being born into it.

The Soviet census distinguished between narodnost’ (ethnicity) and natsional’nost’ (nationality). The former was determined by what language was spoken, the second by what ethnic group one declared oneself to belong to, even if the corresponding ethnic language was not in use. Thus, although a Ukrainian living in Soviet Russia might declare her natsional’nost’ to be Ukrainian, she would declare her narodnost’ to be Russian if she did not speak Ukrainian. Comparisons of data over time—especially of percentages of declarations of narodnost’ and natsional’nost’ across censuses—tend to show different totals. This discrepancy indicates that some groups, even as they were losing their ethnicity (i.e., language), might have continued to declare themselves to be members of the nationality in question. For instance, Georgians or Armenians living in Russia tended to assimilate to Russian (and were thus Russian by narodnost’), but they would still declare themselves to be Georgians or Armenians by natsional’nost’. Russian speakers tended to be most retentive of language, while other groups varied in this respect: Ukrainians scored low on Ukrainian language retention; Jews scored even lower than other groups because of the loss of the Yiddish language in favor of Russian, but also because there was no territory in which Yiddish was ‘official’—although they continued to be classified as Jewish by ‘nationality’. As a category, nationality was determined by the natsional’nost’ of the father—of relevance in mixed marriages ending in death or divorce, where mother and daughter now happened to reside “elsewhere” and declared a different language.

From the Language of Nationality to the Nationality of Language

In the USSR, language was the main criterion of nationality, but loss of language did not necessarily mean loss of nationality. There were two main thrusts of Soviet policy regarding language, on the one hand, and language ‘rights’ on the other:

1. Early policy involved developing various languages that did not have literary traditions, or had not been used for ‘modern’ purposes; and using them for mass schooling and communications, in public and professional life. The covert goal was to sovietize the population. This was particularly true during the NEP, the New Economic Plan, in the period from 1917 to 1928.
2. From 1938 on, the policy aimed at universalizing the knowledge of Russian. With this came forced cyrillicization of former roman or Arabic scripts. Covertly, this was a policy of ‘russification’; overtly, it was used to glorify, to unify, and to prepare for impending war with Germany. As Leprêtre (2002, 4) explains:

[T]he logical ground of Bolshevik policy towards nationalities after the Revolution—the korenizatsiia—constituted a formula according to which those nations whose collective rights had been denied and repressed during the Tsarist period should have access to the free exercise of these rights within the general framework of the building of socialism in order to reach by themselves the conclusion that national sovereignty was not by itself a solution to all the national, cultural, social, political and economic problems of development. The final goal was therefore the merger of all nations into a single socialist community, once all national cultures had had the opportunity to bloom during the period of construction of socialism. All this was stressed by Stalin at the 16th Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1930.

**Marrist Ideology and Soviet (Marxist) Policy**

From 1930 until 1950, Soviet linguistics, and therefore all ideas about language, became dominated by a theory developed by a ‘linguist’ named N. Y. Marr. This theory involved certain relationships between language and the ‘basis’ and the ‘superstructure’ of society, which Marxist ideology defines as follows:

- The basis is the economic structure of society at a given stage of its development.
- The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, and philosophical views of society and the political, legal, and other institutions corresponding to them.

According to Marrism, language belonged to the superstructure of society. Language, Marr held, is of the same type of superstructural social value as painting or art in general (and therefore can be manipulated by humans, and changed to fit the exigencies of theory). He believed all languages in the world to be descended from one

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9. The term *korenizatsiia* meant the ‘taking root’ of language, the ‘indigenization’ that would allow a bourgeois society to form. Marxist ideology held that this had to happen, and that it then had to be repudiated after it was realized what an impediment it was. But subcultures could not go from the ‘feudal’ stage (where they were subservient to some other group) to the socialist stage without passing through the bourgeois stage.

10. Marr was the son of a Georgian mother and a Scottish father who died when he was very young; he was thus raised within Georgian linguistic culture and developed ideas that were strongly influenced by it; this seems to have appealed to Stalin as well, which explains why the latter espoused this rather outrageous ‘theory’.
protolinguistic megafamily, divided into three subfamilies: the Hamitic, Semitic, and Japhetic (from which the Kartvelian or Caucasian and many other languages descended. The ‘Japhetic’ elements eventually began to ‘appear’ (to be discovered by Marr) in the most diverse languages; the Japhetic languages turned out to be ‘related to’ (or perhaps the precursors of) all languages; and hence relationship by origin—genetic relationship—lost all meaning. In the end, Marr rejected the whole notion of genetic affiliations, next attempting to link Marrism with Marxism intimately. He held that since all languages were essentially Japhetic, linguistic differences could be eliminated and all languages eventually allowed to merge, in the same way that the state would naturally ‘wither away’ and all peoples would just as effortlessly merge—under Soviet sponsorship, of course. But which language would all languages merge into? And what would such a language look like? More precisely, which single language would emerge as the universal tongue, as a lingua franca? The answer was simple: it would not be a blend of all of the languages of the world; it would resemble—what else—Russian!

Early Soviet language policy purposely allowed the development of individual linguistic groups, which were supposed to pass through the stage of bourgeois development (‘bourgeois nationalism’), only to realize the futility of the bourgeois nationalist stage, and finally to jettison it all. At first, citizenship did not require a particular language adherence or knowledge. Only gradually did it become clear that the Russian language was going to be pivotal for citizens of the Soviet Union. And Russian did become the language made available to all, for having that just-right ‘personal’ status that all the other languages lacked, and also for being the ‘Big Brother’ from which all other languages were supposed to borrow not only the wherewithal but especially also the scientific and technological terminology that they lacked.

Remarks as to factual contradictions discovered between Marrism and the established truths of linguistic science were countered by the assertion that Marrism was ‘Marxist linguistics’, and therefore it should not be surprising that Marrism would find itself engaged in an ideological struggle with ‘bourgeois linguistics’—‘incompatible with Marxism’. 11

11. “When Marr’s hypothesis on linguistic kinship led to a contradiction of the facts of linguistic scholarship, he sought to eliminate this contradiction by declaring all ‘traditional’ . . . linguistics antiquated and incompatible with Marxism” (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (15), 1977, 492).
In 1950, Stalin suddenly repudiated Marrist theory, on the grounds that “(a) A Marxist cannot regard language as a superstructure on the base. (b) To confuse language and superstructure is to commit a serious error. . . . N. Y. Marr introduced into linguistics the incorrect, non-Marxist formula that language is a superstructure, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula” (Stalin 1950, 196–199, 203, 229).

Even though early Soviet policy was tolerant and supportive of linguistic differences, and Soviet citizenship was not contingent on a knowledge of Russian at first, things would change drastically when overt prerevolutionary (and covert postrevolutionary) impulses to russification resurfaced. On the one hand Marrist ideology, on the other hand paternalist russification under the Big Brother leadership of a Russian people long used to being first among equals, would claim to have achieved a homogenization belied by the implosion of the USSR in 1991. When all the old hostilities and tensions between various national groups reemerged in all their old virulence and new vengeance, the Soviet Union died alongside Soviet ideology. Bourgeois nationalism had not, after all, withered away under the reign of socialism. Totally masked and long suppressed, hostilities among various groups would start from where they had left off. No sooner was the suppression lifted than the nasty old tensions reemerged.

**U.S. American Language Policy and Citizenship**

Concepts of American ‘citizenship’ evolved slowly after the American Revolution. It is difficult, therefore, to locate explicit statements about citizenship and its relationship to language, especially in the period immediately after the American Revolution. Citizens were persons either living on the territory of\(^{12}\) or born in the United States subsequently. Both American and British tradition abjured the French (and other continental) ideas about the need for language academies, so

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12. We must note that persons of African descent were not considered full citizens but only ‘partial’ citizens, mostly so that the southern states could benefit from the census count and increase their proportional representation in Congress (see Kumar and Silver, chap. 3 in this book). The American Indian, too, was relegated to a vague status that was not cleared up until later; note the evolution of the term ‘second-class citizen’ and how this came to be evoked again and again as questions about the rights of nonwhite males arose, time after time, in the course of U.S. history.
even though there did take place a debate about founding some kind of American academy in the early years (Heath 1977), nothing came of it. Any suggestion that a particular language was necessary for being (or becoming) a citizen, inexistent in the early years, would develop later, however. After the smoke cleared in 1783, those whose mother tongue was not English must have amounted to more than 10 percent of the U.S. population. True, these ‘citizens’ had done nothing to acquire their citizenship. They were citizens by virtue of birth in the territory, an idea not taken for granted in many other parts of the world.

As Shirley Brice Heath has noted (1977, 270), the founding fathers purposely chose an open-ended language policy: “they recognized that decisions on language choice and change would be made at the local and regional levels by citizens responding to communicative needs and goals they themselves identified. Moreover, early political leaders recognized the close connection between language and religious/cultural freedoms, and they preferred to refrain from proposing legislation which might be construed as a restriction of these freedoms.”

It was in the later nineteenth century (when large-scale immigration began to bring many noncitizens to American shores) that ideas about what was required to become an American citizen began to develop. As more and more frequently would-be citizens arriving in the United States were not speakers of English, the “tolerance” perceived by Kloss at one time began to diminish. And I, for one, find that U.S. policy has been less tolerant than Kloss has perceived it to be. True, at one time, tolerance was granted, as in the use of Spanish in California after 1848, but later it can be seen to have reached a limit. In the California constitution of 1879, when language tolerance was at a low point in other parts of the country (e.g., in Ohio and Illinois), the rights hitherto granted for use of Spanish were swiftly abrogated (Schiffman 2002a).

Kloss astutely observes that in the United States, there has existed an ill-defined notion of ‘pioneer’ status—persons residing in a space that later became U.S. soil, or before such territory turned into a U.S. state, had rights of (or received tolerance for) status and even of language if it differed from English. Pre-1776 Germans in the state of Pennsylvania, the Dutch in New Jersey, and Germans in the Ohio

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13. Kloss (1977) makes some estimates based on the kinds of family names given in the first census of 1790, but of course no questions were asked in that census about mother tongue. He identifies some speakers of Dutch, German, French, Spanish, and Amerindian languages, but concludes that probably about 90 percent of the U.S. population spoke English.
Valley (before Ohio and other territories became U.S. states), as well as Spanish speakers in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and elsewhere (before those territories became U.S. states), Hawaiians in Hawaii, and Russians in Alaska would all be accorded status.

But over time, this tolerance expired, especially where the group in question seemed to be asking for more than it was perceived to deserve (see Kumar and Silver, chap. 3, and Gutiérrez, chap. 9, in this book). Groups that asked for not much else than being left alone, such as the German-speaking Mennonites in Pennsylvania, were shown more tolerance, for example, than Spanish speakers in California, especially late migrants to the territory, who claimed the same priority rights as those extended to pre-1848 Californios. This was perceived as somehow un-American. In the discussions leading to the crafting of California’s constitution of 1879, one can read comments suggesting that “[these people] have had ample time to be conversant with the English language if they desired to do so” (see Crawford 1992, 53). It is clear that English speakers viewed tolerance for Spanish to be applicable to a ‘catching-up period’ during which Californios could learn English, the more effectively to participate in citizenship. The idea that the right to use Spanish somehow had been granted in perpetuity was unthinkable, especially if it applied to Spanish speakers who came after 1849.

The Rise of Know-Nothingsm

During the nineteenth century, a movement developed in the United States that was called ‘Nativism’ at first and later ‘Know-Nothingsm’. It arose when immigration from Ireland began in earnest. As the Irish were Catholic, it acquired a taint of anti-Catholic, antiforeign rhetoric that at times reeked of general xenophobia and racism. Although some Irish immigrants spoke Gaelic and not English, Irish immigration did not at first stimulate much concern about language differences. But later, with the arrival of Germans in large numbers, and of other groups from southern and eastern Europe who were not only not Protestant but not even Christian, Know-Nothingsm was to tackle these issues head on. Kloss documents the development of nativism as a movement stimulated by issues over schooling and over whether community taxes should go to support education in schools run by Catholics or in

14. The movement was characterized by their critics as such, and the party took on the name ‘Know-Nothing Party’ and wore it with pride.
institutions using languages other than English. A U.S. public school movement developed in the 1830s and 1840s. Along with it arose the notion that the role of schools was to Americanize the children of immigrants in order to turn them into good ‘citizens’. Gradually, the idea that this had to occur through the medium of English gained common currency. And so these two issues, citizenship and language, came to be joined at the hip.

Mertz (1982) documents the rise of a ‘folk-Whorfian notion’, or the perceived necessity for noncitizens to learn English in order to qualify for citizenship. Her study shows that this idea gained wide currency in popular culture, was raised in the courts, and became law without ever being discussed in Congress. In the United States, immigration law has been primarily nonstatutory, that is, it has evolved through precedent: precedents eventually become statutory, and the statutes then confirm what has been arrived at by precedent. By 1897, the test for American citizenship had to be taken in English—no other languages were to be allowed. As Mertz (1982) puts it:

A folk theory of the effect of language on thought underlies decisions made in U.S. courts regarding language law. Previous work on folk theory has shown an internal structuring by which a premise entails subsequent terms, consistent within the framework of the folk theory’s logic. An analysis of metapragmatic statements in U.S. case law materials reveals a crudely “Whorfian” premise from which a common folk theory of language builds. This theory, evident in judges’ decisions and dissents, predicates the ability to understand U.S. political concepts on fluency in English. Because becoming a “citizen” requires

15. Prior to about 1840, taxes were raised for education but given out to almost anyone who applied to run a school; after 1842, during a crisis over this issue (and over Irish Catholic schools) in New York, a trend developed that resulted in schools being run by school districts created for this purpose. Various communities did various things to create these schools, or simply to take over extant schools, or to laicize them if they were religious schools. But they did not immediately anglicize schools that were operating in another language, though this did happen later. Other states followed suit, and the American public school movement was born, with a curriculum that was (supposedly) nonsectarian but not necessarily in English, though English was the rule for any new schools to be created (Kloss 1977; Schiffman 1996).
16. The ‘Whorfian hypothesis’ was an idea, propounded by Benjamin Lee Whorf and attributed also to Edward Sapir, according to which language structures determine thought, so that ideas developed in one language cannot easily be found parallels for in another. A ‘folk-Whorfian’ notion is therefore a Whorfian hypothesis that develops in popular culture.
17. There are some exemptions, for example for persons over a certain age or who are so young that they cannot read; and it is also true that the law can be applied capriciously so as to exempt certain persons while arbitrarily requiring it of other, less desirable candidates.
comprehension of these political concepts, the folk theory links identity as a
U.S. citizen with the ability to speak the English language. The appearance of
a “Whorfian” premise in this folk theory also lends support to the suggestion
by cognitive anthropologists that scientific theories are typically systematized
adaptations of folk theories.

Thus, in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, it was
ruled that translations of U.S. political concepts into other tongues
could not be deemed to be equivalent to those documents in their
English original. Mertz writes, “The fundamental . . . tenet of this folk
theory is that languages shape the range of conceptualization of their
speakers.” He notes that “U.S. political concepts were thought to be
inextricably entwined with the English language; the concepts could
not be understood unless one spoke English.” Indeed, “[t]he funda-
mental impossibility of translation of these concepts into other lan-
guages appears as an underlying assumption in [the] 1897 case: ‘It
needs no argument to establish that a translation is not identical
with the original. No matter how similar it may be in meaning, it is plain it
can not be identical [. . .]. A copy of a Finnish, Russian, or German
translation would not be a copy of the constitution’” (Supreme Court
of Wyoming 1897, 153).

As we can see, this supreme court decision is not substantiated by
research based on fact. It arises from a folk theory, according to which
it was simply true, and in ‘need of no argument’, that knowledge of
American political concepts obtained via another language was not the
same as knowledge of these concepts acquired via English. Kloss docu-
ments the correlation among the decline of German immigration (which
apparently went unnoticed, even as it peaked in 1882), the increase in
immigration rates of non-Germanic groups, and the rise of the folk
notion (which firmly cemented the logic, already inherent in the public
school idea of ‘Americanization’) that children needed to learn English
first and that the presence of another language ‘in their heads’ was
anathema to being able to conceptualize American ideas. The similarity
of these ideas to those entertained by the French (Bourdieu 1982) about
the need to displace other, “inferior” linguistic systems is striking.

By 1906, the folk theory had been codified in U.S. statutory law: “The
Nationality Act of 1906 required aliens seeking naturalization to speak
English; this stipulation was codified in the Nationality Act of 1940.
The additional requirement of literacy in English was added by the
Internal Security Act of 1950” (Mertz 1982). It is under the weight of
the cataclysm of World War I, in the role of German-language schools
and the rights of German Americans to use their language in religiously supported parochial schools, that the U.S. law takes a decisive turn. The United States entered World War I in April 1917, and almost immediately anti-German feeling rose to such a pitch that the German language was prohibited in many states and in practically all educational institutions, whether public or private. Some states prohibited German while others prohibited German for “regular subjects,” and yet others for “all non-English instruction”; yet some prohibited non-English in elementary schools only. In many of these strictures, it was not by legal measures that the ban on German took place but by gubernatorial edicts, or via ‘resolutions’ of legislatures, or even by decrees of the so-called State Councils of Defense, a kind of civil-defense body created in various states.\(^{18}\)

From April 1917 onward, and even after the war ended, ‘foreign’ languages would continue to be chased from the elementary schools, in state after state, and relegated to high school instruction only. At that juncture in U.S. history, little more than 5 percent of the population ever attended high school. Foreign language instruction was basically being withheld from 95 percent of the population. The hidden assumption was that ‘foreign’ language learning was not an indispensable part of any child’s education, though it might be useful for adults, especially those who were college-bound.\(^{19}\)

Note that English never was a “foreign” language in the United States—only all the others are. After the end of World War I, the ‘Americanization through Schooling’ campaign intensified under a slogan stressing the ‘right of the child’ to an education ‘in English’. Not all German-language schools took this lying down. A teacher named Meyer, who taught in a Lutheran parochial school in Nebraska, decided that even if regular classes had to be taught in English, no law prohibited him from tutoring a child in German in after-hours.\(^{20}\) He was

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18. In Iowa, the bans were by the governor’s proclamation; in South Dakota, by the State Council of Defense; and in Nebraska, by resolution of the legislature.  
19. See also Haugen (1956) for early ‘research’ on the harmfulness of bilingual education.  
20. “Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court of Hamilton county, Nebraska, under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had not attained 262 U.S. 390, 397] and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is based upon ‘An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska,’ approved April 9, 1919” (Meyer v. Nebraska, June 4, 1923, FindLaw 2000).
wrong. The state of Nebraska took him to court. The Lutherans fought back.

The Nebraska District of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod filed suit against the state of Nebraska in a case that was first known as *Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie*, then, after it reached the U.S. Supreme Court, as *Meyer v. Nebraska*. The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled against the Lutherans (Nebraska Reports 104, 93–104). The Lutherans took the case further. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June 1923 (*Meyer v. Nebraska*) that forbidding the teaching of a language other than English until the eighth grade was a violation of the constitutional right to liberty under the 14th Amendment. The court struck down similar Ohio and Iowa laws. Kloss refers to this as the ‘Magna Carta’ of the private ‘nationality’ school. Yet one would be well-advised to ask what it is that the decision had in fact allowed if the de jure ruling could not be matched by de facto practice.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision did not rule on the grounds of group rights (a claim by a national minority to its native language), nor did it justify its ruling on the basis of the right of an individual (be it a parent or child) to use a native language—something a court in Europe certainly would have done. The decision protected merely the right of a child to learn *any* desired ‘foreign language’, the right of parents to have a child learn *any* subject matter as long as it was not a ‘threat’ to the state, and, not least, the right of language teachers to exercise their profession.

Note that the court defined instruction (not in a father tongue, but) in the “mother tongue” (if said tongue was other than English) as “foreign” language instruction. The constitutional protections granted extend to all, ruled the U.S. Supreme Court—both to those who speak English and to those who speak any other tongue. Language rights were individually protected, but, as Kloss notes, only for adults. In the United States, children do not have a right to language maintenance, only to second-language learning. And it is a personal right, not the right of a group or of a group confined to a territory.

The net outcome of the five- to six-year hiatus—when the teaching of ‘foreign’ languages was forbidden, between 1917 and 1923—was that, even if the rights denied were ultimately guaranteed and restored, English had meanwhile become the medium of instruction irrevocably adopted, for lack of practicable alternatives, in all schools. And as Kloss points out, it is a peculiar phenomenon in America that a loss to English is never regained. No immigrant group that assimilates to
English ever shifts back to another language, nor do such a group’s institutions.

After 1923, both parochial and public schools continued to teach most subjects in English even if some of the parochial schools in some denominations did revert to their language of origin—but solely for religious instruction. Some schools and churches (such as the German Evangelical Synod, previously known as Die Evangelische Synode des Westens) saw the handwriting on the wall and switched partly to English as of 1922 and completely so by 1929 (Schiffman 1987, 1996).

It is curious that Kloss views this court decision as an example of linguistic tolerance, as the granting of a right, when in fact the victory was pyrrhic. As I stated in the Moldova paper:

Kloss’ analysis of tolerance, therefore, is that the U.S. was basically and generously tolerant towards linguistic minorities, except in times of war, or in extremely isolated instances of xenophobic acts directed at individuals who also, he claims, were in most cases not Caucasian. That is, linguistic intolerance was linked with racial and/or ethnic intolerance, but alone, there was not much linguistic intolerance. Kloss even goes so far as to say that the decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, which overturned various state statues and decrees legitimizing intolerance and oppression of non-English languages (1923) established a precedent for and legitimized or enshrined tolerance. [...] He sees it as legitimizing rights ... temporarily abrogated, and giving linguistic minorities freedom to continue this “Narrow Sphere” right. What he does not see, and in fact does not understand, is that though the Supreme Court overturned the statutes and restrictions, it did not (nor could it) do anything to nullify the intolerance that existed in American society, and was the original root cause of the anti-German bans during the war period. (Schiffman 2002b, 254)

Put differently, the bans on language use were part and parcel of the folk theory that Mertz delineates: they ‘temporarily’ interrupted the right to learn or to use a particular language. But in fact the outcome was the permanent ban against “foreign” languages in elementary education and a general lowering of tolerance for other languages. The fact that the United States entered a period of isolationism following World War I, a period that witnessed witch-hunting and red-baiting and the reemergence of the Ku Klux Klan and other nativist groups, somehow concretized the notion that English and citizenship were

21. This did not happen without an internal battle, as I have tried to show in Schiffman 1987; in some cases the fight was vicious, and the 1922 decision itself left much bitterness behind.
inexorably connected. No legislation or decree to officialize English was ever necessary. Then and now, cultural mores, racial attitudes, and ethnic prejudices have a way of taking charge in such instances. The fact that native-born Americans are not at all required to learn what foreign-born candidates for citizenship are required to know is rather illuminating. Native-born Americans are not required to be literate, not even required to know English, or to be capable of defining concepts such as ‘polygamy’ or ‘anarchy’, as was made clear in yet another citizenship case, that of Vasicek v. Missouri, but such arguments fall on deaf ears. As Mertz (1982, 376) notes: “It is of no avail to urge that the native-born need not possess these qualifications. The alien is only entitled to citizenship when he proves he possesses the statutory requisites (U.S. District Court, District of Oregon).”

More is required of candidates for citizenship than of certain applicants for driver’s licenses in states such as Alabama, where speakers of English who happen to be illiterate are provided with helpers who can read the test for them. One may ask why those fluent in Spanish and literate in languages other than English may not be allowed to enjoy comparable assistance (Schiffman 2002b).22

Citizenship in America would seem to involve certain assumptions: being born on U.S. soil and having the English language firmly set in one’s head have definite advantages over being born elsewhere and being able to handle abstruse concepts in another language. That this assumption is based only on folk belief systems is beside the point. The bias is now enshrined in U.S. immigration law, by precedent and by statute, and nothing is about to change that.

Conclusion

The connection between language and citizenship by now must be all too evidently different and variable when France, the former USSR, and the United States are compared. In France and the USSR, language was dealt with in no uncertain terms from the earliest revolutionary periods. France required (or sought to impose) knowledge of standard French as a prerequisite to the success of the revolution. Stepping back from the Czarist period, where Russian had been required and almost all other languages banned, the Soviet Union initiated a short-term relaxation of the unforgiving ‘Russification’ policy exercised by the

22. This is cited at http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/public/alabama.html.
Czars, only to allow russification to resurface and ultimately to become one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, once ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ could take the lid off the seventy-year-old ethnic tensions. In the United States, however, the connection between language and citizenship did not emerge early on and took more than a century to evolve, and during that process, a folk theory of the connection between language and thought emerged. The contextually induced practical obligation for newly minted U.S. citizens to become proficient in the English language arguably did somewhat successfully substitute for language legislation and for the officialization of English, the scores of people still incapable of making use of English after many long years of residence on U.S. soil notwithstanding.

References


Supreme Court of Nebraska (1919) *Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie*, Nebraska Reports, 104:93–104.


Consciousness

Consciousness is a central feature of everyday human experience. Regarded by many as an essential, even precious, part of human nature, consciousness appears to impact the way people lead their lives. The premise of this chapter is that the future of citizenship rests, at least in part, on the conscious, subjective point of view that people take toward themselves and each other as technology alters the world in which they live.

In this chapter I develop this premise by describing personhood in terms that refer to the everyday subjective awareness that accompanies being a person. Then, contrasting personal identity and social identity as distinct aspects of the experience of personhood, I consider how these two forms of identity might support an inclusive, and even universal, peoplehood. Finally, I consider the pressures that might motivate the development of a universal peoplehood and the kind of polity that would be required to sustain that type of development. A great deal of humanity’s future may well rest on whether subjective experience is of itself a force powerful enough to produce the steps of political and cultural evolution necessary to meet the challenge that human creativity has provided.

Personhood

Individual Experience

Sentience and volition are elements of scientific puzzlement and human mystery. How they happen, what they are for, and what they imply about human nature seem to defy reasonable scientific conjecture and
indeed any other basis for consensus. Although a great deal is known about the brain circuitry that underlies conscious experience, the actual site of consciousness—the destination of information arising from the underlying circuits—has not been penetrated at all. No serious neuroscientist contends that consciousness resides in individual neurons, but if not, where does it reside? Our current understanding of the brain is like the understanding we would have of telephones if we did not know they were used for communication. Our understanding of volition, and in particular our grasp of free will, bumps up against the prevailing scientific practice of depicting reality with cause-and-effect models, whether they be deterministic or stochastic. However, despite their scientific untidiness, sentience and volition are a sufficiently universal part of the experience of human living that they count as recognizable features of personhood.

_Sentience_

Sentience includes one’s awareness of things humanly perceived as “outside” the person and of things perceived as “inside” that same person—commonsense designations of location that are freely used in spite of being philosophically vague. Sentience thus includes awareness of one’s individual personhood as it appears in outer and inner worlds: both as a living thing whose attributes include qualities such as “age” and “attractiveness” in public outer-world view and as a thing experiencing “happiness,” “satisfaction,” “sinfulness,” and “despair” privately inside. Most important, sentience includes the experience of “aliveness in the present moment.”

_Volition_

Volition refers to a sense of personal agency, both through the capacity to initiate behavior and through the ability to regulate the flux of information that appears to come from inner and outer worlds. Volition means the experience of being a prime mover, of personally choosing and willing, of directing thoughts and influencing cognitive acts as well as behavioral ones. Whatever the reality behind this experience—whether it is explicable in physical terms or requires something more

1. A critical overview of that field is offered by Gur, Contreras, and Gur (2008).
2. For an insightful discussion, see Guyer (2008).
sublime—the experience of volition is a normal part of awareness. To lack the experience of volition, to experience oneself as a puppet or robot, or not at all in control of one’s thoughts and behavior, is a mark of psychopathology.

The Sovereign Self

More problematic still is the experience of “being,” that is, of existing in the here and now, apparently outside of time (for the “now” is timeless and unchanging), with a capacity to examine the state of outer and inner worlds and, with both in clear view, to undertake the task of resolving their sometimes conflicting demands. One’s awareness of being is no easier to understand than sentience or volition, but it does add another dimension to human consciousness, a dimension of sovereignty over a single human life. That aspect of human being that manages a person’s process of living I call the sovereign self, and I regard it as operating from someplace outside both the inner and the outer worlds of experience. I refer to this possibly metaphorical place outside either world as the “great divide of consciousness,” a place from which the sovereign self directs attention to events perceived in both outer and inner worlds and from which decisions can be made about the importance and priority of events in each.

The sovereign self and the great divide of consciousness refer to aspects of ordinary subjective awareness without denying the mystery of their underlying reality. Whether there are such things is not a question for this chapter, which instead asks how the ordinary if mysterious attributes of human experience—having a point of view, being aware of both inner and outer worlds, and managing one’s (civic) life in the context of both—might impact the future of citizenship.

Between Personhood and Peoplehood

The Concept of Identity

In this section, I explore a framework for relating the future of citizenship to the possibility of a universal peoplehood. I show that, from the point of view of the individual, the sheer possibility of a universal

3. For an ethical perspective on the self as it affects personhood in social context, see Williams (2008).
peoplehood is neither fanciful nor remote. In the final section of the chapter, I discuss what is required of a polity that is to nurture and sustain those who choose to be its citizens. The possibility of a universal peoplehood, as seen from an individual’s point of view, emerges from the distinction between individual and social identity and from the ability of the individual aptly to prioritize them. I show how the concept of identity can provide a bridge between an individual as sovereign self and that same individual as a member of a collectivity, a “people” particularly. I then explore how a practical bridge might be built and conclude with some evidence that it can be successfully used.

The Two Facets of Identity: Personal and Social

Personal identity is a half-century-old psychological concept introduced by Erik Erikson (1963, chap. 7). Erikson saw it as a central focus of adolescence and quite insightfully contrasted it to role confusion. For him, personal identity was a personal choice, not something dictated by circumstances. In terms of the “play the hand you’re dealt” metaphor, personal identity involves the choice of the game as well as the ongoing decision of how to play the cards one holds. In the language of the decision sciences, the game of identity is an infinite game, one in which rules can be changed at any moment. In current parlance, whether, when, and how to play are at the discretion of the sovereign self. And just as there is no rational solution to infinite games, there is no normative solution to identity formation. One’s personal identity is an individual matter, not subject to external review.

For Erikson, one’s circumstances offer a variety of roles to play. Some are optional, such as parenting or being a musician, while others, such as tax-paying and wearing clothes, are rationally demanded, in light of the consequences of not conforming to certain socially prescribed roles, including those of citizenship. Within a wide range of possibility, the choice and priority of roles are strictly up to the individual’s sovereign self, even if the choice might appear from the outside irrational, such as the choice of extreme sports—or indeed of martyrdom. The ingredient that places the individual outside circumstances, that guides the choice of the game as well as the way it is played, is the individual’s actualizing potential, a vital element of individual personhood that is advisory to the sovereign self. A basic staple of personality theory, the

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actualizing potential is sometimes called the “inner guidance” or “navigational” system, providing information that defines the direction of optimal personal growth available to an individual in the circumstances of life. Psychiatrist Karen Horney (1950, 17) made the point well: “You need not, and in fact cannot, teach an acorn to grow into an oak tree, but . . . given a chance, its intrinsic potentialities will develop . . . the human individual . . . will grow, substantially undiverted, toward self-realization.” The actualizing potential gives direction to discretion and provides the values that underlie one’s individuality, and therefore one’s personal identity.

Social identity, on the other hand, is something Erikson described as identification, an alignment of belongingness to distinctive types and groups, whether based on gender preferences, religion, nationality, ethnicity, social or intellectual class, or some other classification. Social identifications both ascribe and prescribe: they assign to the individual a fixed collection of attributes that sets one off from others, and they specify behaviors (of commission or abstention) that are required by group membership. Conflict among roles is often resolved by prioritizing, imposed from the sovereign self level, often by establishing the personal importance of the explanatory narratives on which the roles are based. It is also sometimes the case that role conflicts are resolved by creative synthesis, in which a way of satisfying both is found, as in the case of teacher-researchers. Whether done by synthesizing or by prioritizing, resolution of role conflicts involves intervention from the sovereign self level. Accordingly, in the final analysis, therefore, social identity is a secondary expression of personal identity.

Peoplehood

Atomic Ingredients and Molecular Boundaries

The boundary of personal identity is the wall of utter privacy that surrounds the sovereign self reigning from what I have called the great divide of consciousness. The boundary of personal identity cannot expand its span or extend its reach to incorporate anyone else’s personal awareness: humanity does not do mind-melds or in any other way commingle its individuals. By contrast, the boundary of social identity is elastic. It may be expanded to include a variety of the self’s relevant others or contracted to exclude them, depending
on which narratives\(^5\) are favored and which are discounted by the sovereign self.

The possibility of a universal peoplehood, then, rests on the question of how elastic the boundary of social identity is and what means are available to stretch it farther. Put another way, the very possibility of a universal peoplehood rests on an important question that interrogates voluntary self-management (see Urban, chap. 13 in this book): Does one have a say in the identifications one accepts and in the priorities assigned to them?

**Stretching Peoplehood’s Boundary**

Empirical work on the elasticity of the peoplehood boundary began with Allport’s (1954) formalization of the contact hypothesis, according to which intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice when four conditions are met: the groups (1) must have equal status in the contact situation and (2) must uphold common goals; (3) there must be no competition between the groups; and (4) the contact must be authorized by the leadership of each group. The hypothesis is clearly testable and has been widely explored in the half-century since it was put forth. And although various proposals for tweaking it have been advanced, in the main, it has held up to scrutiny (Pettigrew 1998).

Recent research (Eller and Abrams 2004; Gonzalez and Brown 2003; Pettigrew 1997) has focused more directly on interpersonal dynamics in the intergroup context, with modest success. These various research models have dealt with identity (in the social, not personal, sense), either manipulating group identity or using a situation’s “friendship potential” (Pettigrew 1997) as a means of characterizing a targeted interpersonal relationship. Mutz (2002), on the other hand, has proposed a model for building “political tolerance” that contains distinct cognitive and relational pathways. Using both survey and research laboratory methods, she verified the ability of the cognitive pathway to foster the development of political tolerance, also showing that “intimacy” in a survey study and perspective-taking ability in a laboratory situation were both associated with (modest) gains in political tolerance. Taking changes in political tolerance as evidence for elasticity of the boundaries of social identity, Mutz’s work makes clear that both

\(^5\) For an insight-arousing theoretical perspective in cultural-anthropological context, see Urban (2008).
cognitive and interpersonal variables have measurable effects. Similarly, taking the likelihood of a reduction in intergroup prejudice as evidence for elasticity, the half-century of work on the contact hypothesis supports the same conclusion.

There is no suggestion in the research literature that the limits of elasticity for social identity have been reached, and it may well be that taking the influence of personal identity into account would help humanity move closer to that limit and shed light on whether a high-priority, universal peoplehood is a realistic social possibility. Basically, both Mutz’s observation (“close personal ties with those of differing political views contribute to greater political tolerance”) and Pettigrew’s work (in sum, relationship intimacy contributes to the success of the contact hypothesis) support the possibility that exploring the elasticity question from the standpoint of personal identity may produce relevant information.

A direct approach to the possibility of a universal personhood would focus on the sovereign self level of individuality—precisely, that is, where personal identity is formed and choices of priority are made. And although Mutz doubts that “within the context of a short-term laboratory experiment, one [can] forge cross-cutting friendships and evaluate the effects of their intimacy,” she does recognize the value of the understanding of political tolerance that would result. I now turn to the task of developing a well-rationalized, short-term experimental approach that meets Mutz’s conditions and describe some results of its use.

**The Psychological Basis for a Universal Peoplehood**

When Harry Stack Sullivan (1953, 32) in his one-genus postulate declared that “everyone is much more simply human than otherwise,” he took care to add the clarification, “Man—however undistinguished biologically—as long as he is entitled to the term human personality, will be very much more like every other instance of human personality than he is like anything else in the world.” Sullivan argued that conscious experience, particularly of anxiety and of deep personal relationships, is more broadly human than the particulars of any culture, politics, or religion, or for that matter age or gender. Sullivan’s postulate extends to questions that every human being faces, including questions of what is important, what is worth taking a risk for, and what, if anything, one will absolutely not sacrifice to expediency.
Interpreted at the level of personal identity, H. S. Sullivan’s postulate provides a rationale for a universal peoplehood—a community of sovereign selves that is sturdy and broad-based—taking precedence over all the elements of social identity that form the basis of what may legitimate a people as a “political” entity, along with the many stories that maintain that collective identity. The assertion of a common humanity derived from the fact of personal identity does not imply a cloned humanity conforming to common answers to the challenge of personal identity. None other than Henry Kissinger (1994) rightly and succinctly ridiculed the notion of “a universal man living by universal maxims, regardless of the past, of geography, or of other immutable circumstances.” But Kissinger was clearly speaking of social identity, not personal identity. Sullivan’s postulate applies to personal rather than social identity and extends the hierarchical dual (social) identity model proposed by Gonzalez and Brown (2003) to the domain of individual, opening the way for personal identity—a construction of the sovereign self—to govern priorities among the stories that compete for primacy in the realm of social identity. Political narratives do not in themselves support allegiance to a peoplehood, they require the importance that personal identity confers upon them. In effect, the personal empowers the political.

In fact, Maslow (1972, 74), one of the founders of humanistic and transpersonal psychology, was placing Sullivan’s idea in a political context when he suggested that

The only thing that is basic and central is human specieshood. Once this is accepted, then all the other differences can be accepted in a cultural pluralism or a racial pluralism or a religious pluralism without doing any harm and actually enriching life. But when they serve as walls to cut human beings off from each other, or to cut the human species in walled-off subspecies, then of course they are very dangerous and frightening and have to be destroyed.

Maslow takes a “humanistic” view of human specieshood—the view, essentially, that human beings possess a sound, trustworthy, and prosocial actualizing potential, which guides, among other things, the very formation and workings of personal identity. This humanistic assumption is no less plausible, and no less supportable, than other state-of-nature proposals of a more atavistic cast. Indeed, although humanistic psychology has taken many a rap for its “Godlessness” and has been lambasted on this account for everything, from banality to hubris, its dedicated agnosticism may prove an advantage where the boundary
of peoplehood needs to be stretched in a way that does not encourage people to kill one another on the basis of whatever belief system replaces a Godless one. Taking a humanistic view of personal identity as the basis for Sullivan’s postulate and constructing a network of political, cultural, and religious narratives on it, the outline of a universal peoplehood can come into view: as an optimal vision of peoplehood, the individual constituents of which contribute their personal talents and proclivities to the culture and polity that organizes their efforts to self-actualize. I call this humanistic interpretation of the one-genus postulate the principle of sovereign equality. It is an idea based on the centrality of personal rather than social identity, in lucid acknowledgment of everyone’s need to confront and resolve the succession of problems inherent in managing a human life throughout that life’s own cycle, as Erikson (1963, chap. 7) so eloquently delineated. The principle of sovereign equality asserts that, stripped of individual differences in talent, ambition, and circumstance, we are all much more simply human than otherwise and of equal dignity and worth as human beings—nothing more and nothing less.

**Putting the Principle of Sovereign Equality to Work**

Carl Rogers (1961) put the humanistic one-genus postulate to practical use in a highly influential system of psychotherapy founded on the idea of trusting the actualizing potential—both the patient’s and the therapist’s—to guide the therapy in a pro-individual and also pro-social manner. His method depended on trusting the actualizing potential of both parties in the therapeutic alliance, not just because of its availability but also for the value of its contribution to both the individual and the species.

Rogers believed that what a psychological counselor had to offer was an inquiry into the domain of the client’s sovereign self: what parts of the domain are clear and open to inquiry, what parts are hazy and might be sharpened, and what parts are hidden from the client’s sovereign self view. Although the essentials of Rogers’s technology for engaging a client at the sovereign self level are easier to describe than to implement (as so many psychotherapy techniques are), Rogers (1961, 397) summarized the essentials this way: “Very briefly, we have found that the therapist is most effective if he is: (a) genuine, integrated, transparently real in the relationship; (b) acceptant of the client as a separate, different person, and acceptant of each fluctuating aspect of
the client as it comes to expression; and (c) sensitively empathic in his understanding, seeing the world through the client’s eyes.”

In terms of the framework developed here, both items (a) and (c) in the summary invoke the perspective of the therapist’s sovereign self looking out in both directions, perched on the great divide of consciousness. But to be “genuine, integrated, transparently real” requires that the therapist be resolved (at least within the context of therapy session) in his or her identity and fully open to whatever images and intuitions appear in awareness. “Sensitively empathic” means that whatever comes into the therapist’s awareness during the therapeutic conversation must be used to develop the therapist’s understanding of how things look to the client as the client reflects on how life seems when seen from his great divide of consciousness. It is this view, represented within the framework of the therapist’s own experience, that guides the therapist’s conduct of the conversation.

Item (b) of the summary is an expression of the principle of sovereign equality. “Acceptance” (recognition of another sovereign) refers to the basic humanity of the client and not to specific acts, whether cognitive or behavioral. Thus the purpose of the therapy is to encourage the client to summon and possibly reevaluate the view from his or her own great divide and to consider which parts are fine and which need management, taking the actualizing potential as well as other considerations into account.

The techniques of Rogerian conversation in many ways can be, and massively have been, taught. But there are also elements that must be created afresh, in each and every relationship, in the course of the Rogerian conversation: specifically, the very meanings that sovereign selves exchange as peers in the course of their unique interaction. The Rogerian sovereign self engages the client’s sovereign self and maintains communication in a context of existential outlook: one of humanistic values, guided by the principle of sovereign equality.

Rogers (1961, 397) summarized the results of his methodology this way:

Our research permits us to predict that if these attitudinal conditions [in the therapist] are instituted or established, certain behavioral consequences will ensue... the client will become more self-directing, less rigid, more open to the evidence of his senses, better organized and integrated, more similar to the ideal which he has chosen for himself. In other words we have established by external control conditions which we predict will be followed by internal control by the individual, in pursuit of internally chosen goals.
In this framework, and not surprisingly, the client becomes more like Rogers himself, at his humanistic and existential best.

The control conditions to which Rogers refers are not nearly as external as one might wish, because their essential ingredient—a sovereign self willing to engage openly in a deep, well-structured relationship—is the most internal aspect of any person’s experience. Rogers’s methods demand more than technique from the therapist; they demand true openness and intimacy in the sovereign self relationships.

The result Rogers claims when his conditions are met is just the sort of thing that stretching the boundary of a peoplehood to include more members would require. These are things eminently consistent with the political purposes behind the contact hypothesis: the reduction of intergroup prejudice and the development of political tolerance. Thus, the conditions which Allport specified for an effective functioning of the contact hypothesis are remarkably similar to those Rogers offered for an effective therapy: both imply respect between the participants, common goals, and a cooperative effort to meet them. And while Rogers’s conditions are aimed at supporting therapeutic discourse and Allport’s at civil discourse, both in effect support the principle of sovereign equality, thereby helping to stretch the extant boundary of universal peoplehood.

**Expanding the Reach of Rogerian Conversations**

What could supplant Rogers, or fully engaged Rogerian therapists, at mass-scale levels of mutual acknowledgment and exchange, since this is a necessary condition if his methodology is to make a significant contribution to the possibility of a universal peoplehood following from the principle of sovereign equality? Rogers based his method on a principle that he believed held up as well outside the psychotherapy situation as strictly inside of it. He held that all communication at the sovereign self level, adequately informed by each participant’s actualizing potential, produces the positive result he claimed in the quotation above and also demonstrated empirically in psychotherapy situations.

I have empirically explored the possibility of arranging Rogerian conversations at the sovereign self level of interaction among randomly constituted, anonymous pairs of students drawn from several courses in personality psychology I have taught. Back-and-forth communication about a series of five topics, each framed in the terms of existential
and humanistic psychology, was structured to support the experience of a Rogerian sovereign self outlook. The system that arranged these conversations, called the Learning Module, was designed to serve as an experiential laboratory attached to a lecture course in personality psychology. Always voluntary and nearly always elected by the students, the laboratory was announced as a means to learn, and to use, the concepts of existential humanistic psychology authentically, by actually experiencing what they were about. The argument was made that this is the best, indeed the only, way to learn the parts of personality psychology that address subjective experience.

Since 1998, students in classes ranging from 70 to 150 students in size (as well as several distance learning classes of about 20) have been randomly assigned to anonymous partnership dyads for a 6-week experience of structured communication mediated by the Internet. Messages composed off-line and in private were entered onto response forms that each member of a partnership dyad completed. The response forms controlled the topic of discussion over a series of five topic cycles, each of which began with descriptions of every participant’s view of some aspect of personal life as seen from his or her own great divide of consciousness, next moved on to an assessment of how clear and complete that view appeared to be, and then proceeded to an opportunity to do something about what the expressed view revealed, ultimately concluding with a report on how well the self-management experiment actually worked. Throughout the process, partners filled out identical response forms that were automatically exchanged as soon as corresponding response forms could be received at a common server.

Within each of the five cycles, several structured messages were exchanged. Each cycle’s first message always dealt with a specific topic, with the second message sharing an experience from the participant’s own life, one seemingly similar to that written about by the partner. In most cycles there was a third message that commented on how well the experience shared in the second message fit with the participant’s original narrative. This is unusual conversation to be sure, but it does operationalize the process Rogers invented and uses a partner to supplant Rogers, thus permitting Rogerian conversations to take place on an extradyadic, indeed, larger and further enlargeable mass scale.

The messages were monitored for appropriateness of content, often sporadically after we found that students were viewing the laboratory constructively. In one of the informal investigations of the Learning
Module process, a variation in monitoring was introduced: half the pairs received frequent detailed comments on how well the partnership was progressing from a Rogerian point of view, while the other half were simply given an overall rating of progress ranging from “Excellent” to “Good.” There were lower categories, but they were needed less than 3 percent of the time. A number of measures of the impact of the Learning Module were examined to see if the quality of monitoring made a difference. Differences between the two groups were small and of marginal statistical significance, but if anything, they did favor the relatively unmonitored partnerships. Apparently, three is a crowd, and attention to a third party commenting with helpful intention did distract focus on the partnership itself. This finding supports the practicality of establishing Rogerian conversations on a mass scale.

The final response form of the last cycle asked several questions about the module experience. One asked for a categorical response (on a scale of 0 to 5) to the question “What is your overall assessment of the Partnership, start to finish?” prior to the request to explain why that category was chosen. The possible responses ranged from 5 (“you wowed me! Our Partnership has taught me a whole new way of looking at things from my (Sovereign Self) perspective”) to 4 (“you have made a major contribution to me and my ability to participate in a (Rogerian) Conversation. Thanks!”), down to 0 (“My (Sovereign) Self felt isolated and alien throughout”). The mean response was 4.44, and 40 percent of the 96 respondents chose 5.00 (although decimals for more qualified intermediate responses were permitted). The second question was, “How sincere and authentic did you find your Partner’s messages to be? From your (Sovereign Self’s) point of view, was your Partner really engaged in the Cycles, or faking it?” For this question, response 5 was “I think my Partner made full, sincere, and effective use (of messaging) throughout,” and 4 was “I was sometimes unsure of my Partner’s sincerity and authenticity, but I had no trouble resolving ambiguities in a positive direction.” The average response was 4.77, with 71 percent of respondents choosing 5.00 and 82 percent choosing 4.00 or above. Participants were asked to explain their rating; these were consistent with the categories chosen.

On the instantiation of the Learning Module, where the extent of outside monitoring was explored, some further questionnaires were administered before and after the module experience. Because the Cycle 5 responses were to be sent to the anonymous partner, one might wonder if the enthusiasm was fully sincere. Confidence that it was
sincere is provided by analysis of responses to the before-and-after questionnaire, which participants knew would not be shared. The questions themselves were developed by a corps of ten tutors assigned to oversee partnership communications: having been participants in earlier module sessions, they devised a questionnaire designed to show before-and-after changes in participants’ outlook on a variety of measures. The topics of the other questions revolved around personal feelings of well-being or distress, attitude to others, personal autonomy, and the like. Thus, while there was a strong change in feelings toward the anonymous partner (based solely on the Rogerian conversation permitted within the system), there was little consistent change in a variety of other feelings and opinions.

Another questionnaire, this one devised by Dan Rosen and derived from Buddhism’s Eightfold Noble Path, assessed changes in Buddhist attitudes toward life. This was of particular interest, owing to the generally Eastern flavor of humanistic psychology, but also because of the broadly Buddhist outlook used in Cycle 3. No change in outlook could be detected using this questionnaire, either.

All of the before-and-after questions were analyzed by partnership dyads to see whether the answers partners gave were more alike after the Learning Module experience than before. The difference in correlations between answers given before the experience and after it addresses the question of whether Rogerian conversations, evidently successful in establishing relationships between participants at the sovereign self level, also led to a more general convergence of opinions. The answer was clear: they did not. There is no evidence in the Learning Module data that guided conversations between sovereign selves, based on Rogerian principles, lead to groupthink. This observation is consistent with the Rogerian principle of supporting the autonomy of the individual at the sovereign self level.

Particularly informative was the question regarding whether, once the module experience was over, partners wanted to meet each other

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6. The questions, based on the tutors’ own relevant past learnings, were designed to show differences in outlook based on the Learning Module experience. Comparative analysis of before/after differences did reveal systematic before/after differences ($F = 1.903, df = 37, 2736, P < 0.001$); the top four differences, with $Z$ scores of 3.25, 2.98, 2.36, and 1.33, were reflected in the answers “I think my Partner will put a lot of effort into the Learning Module”; “I think I will have much in common with my Partner” to the questions “How ethical do you believe your Partner will be?” and “How well do you think your Partner will accurately express their feelings verbally?” Tellingly, no other questions had $Z$-scores above $±0.164$. 
in person, via an exchange of email addresses. Of the forty-five partnerships, sixteen were in agreement about wishing to meet, fourteen in agreement not to so face each other, and fifteen did not agree on whether or not to do so. This split among partnerships is typical of reactions whenever the module has been used. Some insight into why participants did not want to meet came from an analysis of the explanations provided: most of those who did not want to meet their partner felt they had come to be known in great depth during the module’s exchanges and were unwilling to risk being openly exposed. In other words, it was one thing to address another sovereign self in the framework of a Rogerian process but another thing to develop sufficient trust in one’s other, and in the anonymous channel, to want to look that other in the eye, following an encounter that required total openness of the self.

Empowering the Contact Hypothesis

A half-century of critical application in a variety of counseling and consulting situations suggests the general effectiveness of the Rogerian template. And the Learning Module has added the possibility of using an electronic channel to shape a Rogerian discourse that can connect large numbers of people in constructive conversations at the sovereign self level. The contribution the Learning Module makes to implementations of the contact hypothesis is twofold: (1) it provides topics that focus on the heart of the contact hypothesis by providing a direct experience of the principle of sovereign equality, and (2) it demonstrates that, as a practical possibility, Rogerian conversations can be established using simple and widely available electronic technology.\footnote{For a forward-looking discussion of the normative underpinnings, see Christians and Cooper (2008).}

The Learning Module in its present form has too many special features to permit a broad generalization about its effectiveness. In general use, the specifics of Learning Module topics therefore would need revision to replace the didactic elements of the Learning Module with a more generic introduction to the Rogerian principles reflected in the module’s design. The success of Rogerian methods in a variety of counseling situations and the utility of the existential/humanistic framework on which Rogerian principles are based in a broad range of human-potential and transformational seminar programs suggest that
a successful reformulation of the module’s specific content could be achieved. As matters stand, the Learning Module has demonstrated the possibility of combining Rogerian and electronic technology to strengthen the bonds between people in a way that could support progress toward a universal primary peoplehood based on the principle of sovereign equality.

As the central subjective feature of individual identity, the sovereign self is a stubborn fact of human experience, regardless of whether it is regarded as real or illusory. Rogerian conversations at the sovereign self level provide a small but steady force that expands the boundary of peoplehood. And just as the flow of water from individual raindrops erodes mountains and carves up continents, so can the initially modest if potentially torrential flows of sovereign-level conversation alter both the boundary and the priorities of peoplehood, notably increasing the influence of personal identity on public and political behavior. A steady and persistent force of this kind facilitates the evolution of supportive structures in the polity and is not likely to produce the catastrophes that sometimes accompany broad and deep social change.

**Polity**

**Peoplehood and Polity**

Robert Wright (2000) has convincingly argued that evolution’s arrow points in the direction of increased complexity of organization, which supports the development of specialized parts within greater wholes, be they single cells or the organisms they make up. The specialization of parts is coextensive with the development of communicational links that coordinate their individual actions, and these links are integral to organizational complexity. By analogy in the case of a polity, it is easy to think of each and every individual member as a specialized part—an organ—of the system and to regard the polity as a mechanism for coordinating the nonredundant features of the systemic components and possibly also for aligning their common strengths in the name of the common good. The corpulence of Hobbes’s Leviathan comes to mind.

Whereas framing the analogy in terms of the *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1654) is helpful when thinking of a polity as an organic aggregate, a

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8. For a trenchant discussion, see Cameron (2008).
system of peoplehood derived from the principle of sovereign equality has its basis in a view of human nature that is in sharp contradiction to Hobbes’s vision. In particular, the principle assumes a sovereign self, which operates with the guidance of an actualizing potential that is sound and trustworthy, benefiting both the individual’s lifelong development and that individual’s society as well. People as we know them live in cultures, under systems of law and custom that provide a set of ground rules governing social roles and interactions among individuals. Human nature seems to need a culture. The question is what kind of social system would evolve from the communication process I have called Rogerian conversation.

**What Drives Evolution in Polity?**

Species evolve when their continued existence is threatened: change does not happen without a motivating force. If polity is to evolve in the direction aimed at by Allport’s contact hypothesis and by Rogerian conversations, there must exist sufficient threat to upset current paradigms that privilege social identity. What needs to evolve is a new priority of identities where personal identity, now supported by the principle of sovereign equality, provides the primary political story, subordinating, not abolishing, the exclusionary narratives of social identity.

Unfortunately, a force sufficient to produce this kind of social change may well be contained in another of modern technology’s gifts: the destructive power of the munitions and war machines under human control. Little physical strength is required to unleash weapons, whether conventional arms or the now-imaginable weapons of mass destruction. Machines and chemicals that can destroy the capacity of the planet to support human and animal life likewise may come under the control of one or several individuals, and all that would be required to use them is the folly and the impulse to push the button. Highly leveraged, technology-based destructive power provides a motivating force for social change because the survival of the species, at least of its habitat, is at risk. With the coming of age of very advanced weapons of mass destruction and the leveraging of destructive power individuals can wield, the end of our species (although arguably not the end of days) becomes a reality easily imaginable. By leveraging destructive power and making distance irrelevant, technology thus has loaded all of humankind into the same frail vessel.
Well beyond the destructive force of weapons and machinery is the corrosive influence of human disregard for the suffering of others. Our planet is capable of providing food, shelter, and safety, as well as medicine, livelihood, and entertainment, to far more people than it currently houses. But that fact presumes the human will to disseminate these necessities and accoutrements of desirably dignified lifestyle, which of itself requires a Lincolnian realization that a nation cannot and should not remain half-slave and therefore half-free—or indeed even part slave and part free.\(^9\) Indifference to the suffering of another sovereign self is inconsistent with the humanistic instantiation of the principle of sovereign equality that is promoted by Rogerian conversations. Indifference\(^10\) constitutes an obvious counterforce to the expansion of the boundary of peoplehood.

It appears, then, that technology provides a motivating force for the evolutionary development of polities and also of relations between their citizens. Through electronic communication, technology provides a means of meeting the threat, as well as for motivating the necessary steps. It is worth asking what would be demanded of a polity that would serve a universal peoplehood, to see whether it might plausibly progressively evolve from current political forms, or necessarily if perhaps hastily and thus incompletely emerge from a radical struggle.

**Demands on the Polity**

Rogerian conversations provide pressure toward an inclusive peoplehood supported by a polity based on individual identity and the principle of sovereign equality. Fortunately, the nations with the bulk of motivating destructive power are also the nations that possess the advanced technology and the legal frameworks that genuine Rogerian conversations need and demand. A self-gathering community of people within technologically advanced nations, willing to bind themselves to the principle of sovereign equality, might well produce whatever new cultural and legal structures should be necessary. The basis for crisp movement toward an emergent structure is alive and well; it awaits a community large enough to demand it and resolute enough to secure it.

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Technologically advanced states already accept the rule of law, and it is unlikely that an emergent polity based on the principle of sovereign equality could do without it. It seems likely that new laws would continue to permit hierarchical and exclusionary structure, as well as competitive enterprise, even if in regulated ways consistent with an overarching principle of sovereign equality. In practical terms, this means that the polity would place limits on the difference between maximum gains and losses, on the order of those propounded and tested in Axelrod’s (1984) classic simulation study of iterated games. Axelrod demonstrated the superiority of a “nice tit-for-tat” strategy eminently congruent with the principle of sovereign equality. In an emergent social structure based on the principle of sovereign equality, each sovereign self would be held responsible for managing the outcomes, both advantageous and disappointing, that are the result of decisions made. Respect for the sovereign self also means understanding that, within reasonable bounds, each individual sovereign self bears responsibility for the consequences of actions taken. The polity is responsible solely for maintaining societally tolerable boundaries of success and failure.

The polity would also have to provide for those who, by dint of age or diminished capacity, could not fully participate as citizens. By protecting all its members from the material damage that could be done by those unwilling to work within the framework of its laws and customs—for example, by seeking competition for prizes outside Axelrod limits—the polity would protect its members from excessive misfortune and from the corrosive effects of indifference to the fate of others. If a polity is to support a universal peoplehood, none of its members can be thrown overboard.

Demands like these are not inconsistent with features of the most powerful and successful contemporary polities. The kind of gradual attitudinal shift that arises from Rogerian conversations could well propel current political systems upward on a positive evolutionary path.

The Ensuing Benefits of Citizenship

Citizenship, meaning membership in a polity of people who honor the principle of sovereign equality, can only be a matter of choice (see Urban, chap. 13 in this book). And as long as membership is elective, no political or cultural force can subvert allegiance to the principle of
sovereign equality, although circumstances can and may influence the expression of it. Two benefits arise. One is the positive respect among members that the principle of sovereign equality establishes, and the other is the pride of holding a citizenship that has been freely chosen rather than circumstantially imposed or resignedly accepted.

Not least, a major consequential benefit arises from the simple fact that a polity that supports a universal peoplehood based on a membership that is elective must, almost by definition, also support and nurture a diversity of individual interests: this is a source of structural complexity, as it is also a source of societal strength. Thus, for some citizens, the polity will seem to be a place where one finds the zest of playing competitive games. Although the Axelrod limits of game theory are less extreme than those that characterize polities at this time, maintaining them is probably more a matter of political rhetoric than of direct material or social consequence. Culture and competition play a strong role in determining the value of competitive outcomes, and there is no reason to doubt that the Axelrod limits are ample. For other citizens, on the other hand, satisfaction may arise from pursuing a calling, whether spiritual, artistic, scientific, political, or any other self-expressive trajectory consistent with the principle of sovereign equality. The inner world is more influential in governing activity of this kind than is the outer world; working relationships are likely to be few, if deep, and cooperative; and the audience for a product may be limited even if endeavor produces a product. The polity must accommodate all individual preferences within the extremes of competitive, creative and altruistic endeavor. The genius of the emergent society would arise from its very provision of sustainable personal environments.

Underlying this possibility is, of course, the modern humanistic assumption that, if fully open to self-reflective experience, most people will exercise their apparent free will in a pro-social manner that is of personal benefit as well. The validity of this assumption may well depend on the polity that provides the environment in which the assumption is tested. Laws are needed to support, not supplant, the basic regard each citizen must have for every other citizen: a respect grounded not in what they do or what they have but in a sense of kinship arising from the fact that every person is responsible for the management of a particular human life, in whatever circumstances prevail. Circumstances and abilities differ widely among individuals, but the task of managing a single human life requires reconciling the sometimes conflicting demands of inner and outer worlds and respond-
ing to the meaningful things that unite them. The task requires sovereign self involvement, and in just that sense, everyone is on a par.

**Consciousness and the Future of Citizenship**

In this chapter I have argued for the possibility that citizenship’s future depends on the personal view people take of themselves and of each other. I have tried to show that technical means, both psychological and electronic, are available to encourage a consciousness of inclusion capable of furthering the evolution of the world’s political systems in a direction that permits every individual to thrive in circumstances that each responsibly chooses. Political growth that stretches the boundaries of social inclusion will diminish the prospect of a catastrophic collision among exclusive boundaries of social identity defended by the overwhelming and cheap lethal power available to individuals those boundaries cultivate. The necessary evolutionary political steps will follow quite naturally and nonviolently if current psychological know-how is used to develop, and indeed to maintain, an inclusive boundary of social identity based on the principle of sovereign equality and prized for its support of the experience of individual personhood under the initiative of the sovereign self.

Common concern for the fullness of conscious personhood, the kind of fullness that includes awareness of a personal identity, is not the only force that will shape the future of citizenship, although it may be the most humane and promising one. Culture and custom, the elements of social identity, are necessarily conservative: as enduring social constructions, they are vulnerable to change by the erosive force of disrespect. Thus, opposition to the development of a strong, inclusive peoplehood may well come from cultural and institutional forces that oppose threats to their boundaries and protect the privilege of their elite stewards, usually at the expense of the other individuals they include. An argument for a profound change in peoplehood must address several barriers to change, from vested interest to canard. Positions of privilege based on wealth and heredity represent vested interests fondly cherished by those they favor. Religions that make some persons appear godlier than others and that justify theological domination present yet another obstacle. But the common assumption that boundaries between peoples are a necessary condition of peoplehood may itself be a canard. At best, it is an untested hypothesis, at worst a deadly one.
Despite—indeed, owing to—reactionary forces in play, gradual change is possible so long as communication channels can be arranged. Closed societies guard their interests by restricting communication, but there is always leakage at the margins, and this can slowly erode systems that place social identity above individual identity, whether or not they acknowledge such a fundamentalist commitment. Here the question turns technological once again: how fast, how effectively can Rogerian conversations be adopted, if intentionally tailored to reach and suit people in exclusionary systems? When it comes to establishing the principle of sovereign equality, what counts is not the logic or elegance of the messaging system but its effectiveness at providing a compelling self-transformational experience of Rogerian communication.

The argument of this chapter has been that citizenship, defined as voluntary membership in a polity based on respect for the conscious life of each of its members, is a plausible consequence of letting the experience of personhood provide the basis for a peoplehood and for an emergent polity to support it. If such a citizenship is to happen at all, it is likely to emerge from a step (or two) of cultural evolution based on a communication technology that fosters relationship at the sovereign self level, justified by the necessity—itself not a canard—of avoiding the destructive forces that technology has made available to humankind.

The future of citizenship may thus be tied to the future of consciousness itself, and vice versa: if polities destroy themselves and their citizens, consciousness as we know it is destroyed as well. Widespread contact among (conscious) personal identities may well be what is needed to sustain awareness, encourage civic-minded vigilance, and prevent collective catastrophe. If so, then human consciousness can finally be regarded as a functional necessity of human nature and not as an irrelevant if fascinating curiosity of at best questionable practical importance.

References


The chief question of this chapter is whether the economic, social, and cultural forces animating globalization will have a long-term, appreciable effect on citizenship in general, and more specifically on existing political theories about citizenship. A good deal of writing on citizenship argues that the concept itself needs to be broadened to include forms of citizenship that extend beyond the conventional version, characterized by the individual and the nation-state as central units of analysis. The question then becomes, are such calls for new conceptual frameworks warranted?

Before attempting to answer this question, I want to briefly take issue with a common approach to the study of citizenship. I find the attempt to isolate positions on, and assign approaches to, the topic of citizenship from opposing camps and models, such as liberal versus republican, to be a less than constructive exercise. There are two reasons for my skepticism. First, the degree of overlap among the three main models, liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism, often tends to annul the claim that differences between the models are consequential. Second, there are no authoritative versions of each model of which to speak. Instead, a hodgepodge of liberalisms, republicanism, and communitarianisms has emerged from different sets of past contexts, traditions, and conditions. Without internal consensus within each category, comparison across categories becomes problematic. That said, I recognize and acknowledge the benefits of laying out in brighter contrast the different degrees of emphasis that clearly do exist between and among the models. Thus I shall adhere to convention by distinguishing among liberal, communitarian, and...
republican citizenship while nonetheless finding it more accurate to regard the relationship among them to constitute, as it were, concentric circles or nesting dolls, with liberalism encapsulated inside communitarianism and the latter ensconced within (democratic) republicanism.

The conclusion I draw regarding the prospects for a new model of citizenship is threefold. First, the nation-state will remain the principal locus of citizenship for the foreseeable future, although with some internal reformulations. Second, the idea of global citizenship should not replace conventional citizenship models, although it does offer normative and descriptive advantages that can add to the explanatory power of each of the three traditional models. Third, the concept of global citizenship offers relatively little in pragmatic utility for officials charged with vitally important duties such as protecting national security. In particular, the proposed new global versions of citizenship might best be regarded as constituting rhetorical or heuristic strategies, useful, on occasion, for generating new, more broadly oriented ways of thinking about political and citizenship issues but not as transformative frameworks with the capacity to supplant existing models. Similarly, while one can expect modifications over time in the ways citizens reimagine their relative position and fit in the global framework, one ought not take for granted that they are likely to move in the direction of the globalizing terminus and away from the nation-state terminus of an imagined citizenship continuum. To the extent that such modifications do occur, they cannot be justifiably construed as constituting a novel, global formation of citizenship.

Before I look at global citizenship, a brief overview of the three conventional models of citizenship should be helpful.

The Conventional Models

The Westphalia Agreement that ended the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 marked the closing stages of the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire and codified the emergence of the nation-state as the sole structural

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1. Admittedly, if the nation-state were somehow eventually to erode away—a theoretical possibility some advocates of global citizenship contend should not be prima facie ruled out—my opinion would have little salience, but since such a development does not appear imminent, I am prepared to take my chances and maintain the position I have outlined.
embodiment of broad, nonlocal citizenship. It has several components or norms (Brubaker 1998, 132–133). These include first, an all-or-nothing character: there is either full citizenship or noncitizenship, with no gradations in between (except in temporary circumstances, such as a status of prenaturalization); second, the predication of “state” on “nation”: the formal entity known as the state should consist of a unified underlying nation, with a common language and principal values, no matter if acquired at birth or through assimilation; third, the idea that citizenship formally ought to be limited to one nation-state, since dual or multiple citizenship lends itself, in spirit and fact, to divided allegiance; and fourth, the attendant duties and obligations that go along with nation-state citizenship, which may and do vary from nation-state to nation-state.

In the post-World War II era increasing criticism has been directed toward this model of nation-state citizenship, viewed by some as outdated in an era of far-reaching and deep sociopolitical changes. The claim is that novel developments are superseding an exclusive focus on the nation-state as the cynosure of citizenship. These developments include heightened international economic, cultural, and social connections; political transformations, such as the ascendancy of the European Union; the emergence of transborder problems, including environmental degradation and AIDS; the rise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) attending to each respective issue; and mounting awareness of the rights and claims of indigenous peoples.

**Liberal Citizenship**

Liberalism is a theory which holds that all persons, in virtue of our very nature, are endowed with fundamental rights that may not be restricted by the state. It has an ontological basis, the wellspring of which is to be found in Enlightenment values. Of course, these values did not emerge de novo. They are undeniably tied to religion, specifically Christianity. From its origins, Christianity emphasized the importance of the salvation of the individual soul. Martin Luther accentuated the importance of independent, individual thought and action with regard to matters of ecclesiology. The demise of feudalism and the ascent of the middle class intensified the prominence of the individual,

a process that culminated in John Locke’s promulgation of a formal liberal doctrine in 1689.3

Enlightenment values hold that all individuals are inherently free, equal, independent, and rational. From this it follows that all humans are capable of exercising the rights and judgments limited to the privileged few until then. The belief, and the assertion, that all persons are free and rational gives rise to the logical demand that they be treated as capable of, and entitled to, maximum discretion on fundamental (and not so fundamental) life-choice matters.

Within this framework, citizenship is necessarily rights based, where each person is free to pursue one’s own definition of the good. Most contemporary liberals, such as Rawls (1971, 1993), Dworkin (1985), Ackerman (1980), Barry (1995), Larmore (1987), and Nagel (1987), have said that this requires state agnosticism or muted neutrality with respect to defining the good life. This position of neutrality is supported for different reasons. For example, Dworkin argues that coercing individuals to sublimate their wishes for the common good reduces individuals to mere means, thereby undermining their intrinsic dignity as moral persons. Rawls avers that only liberalism respects “the fact of pluralism” (1971).

Under a liberal administration, citizens must be permitted by government to exercise their right to seek and to realize their self-interest, restricted only by the mandate to do so within the law and within a frame of understanding allowing others to exercise their own quests. Accordingly, government must limit itself—or be limited—in terms of the constraints that it may place on individual exercise of rights. In Hobbes’s phrase, freedom is predicated on the “silence of the law” in a liberal polity (1968, 271). Put another way, the liberal state represents “the attempt to create a private sphere independent of the state . . . by freeing civil society—personal, family, religious, and business life—from unnecessary political interference” (Held 1995, 50).

The main lines of liberalism emphasize a focus on the individual rather than on group or state (see Kumar and Silver, chap. 3 in this book) and on the inherent possession of certain supreme rights by the individual, particularly freedom and equality, but also minimal state

3. Lockean liberalism is one version of contractarianism, the notion that government, and by implication citizenship, is the culmination of an agreement among the people to forgo certain liberties in return for protection by a newly created state. By virtue of its ontological nature, Locke’s social contract theory differs from Hobbes’s in that the latter model rejects the notion of inbuilt rights that is a hallmark of the former.
interference with enjoyment of individual rights; the state as internal
dispute regulator, as protector of property, and defender of the peace;
the totemic status of private property as validation of maximum liberty;
basic obligations owed by the citizen to the state, such as compliance
with the rule of law, paying taxes, and serving on juries; a mandate for
citizens to respect the rights of others; and a clear requirement that the
state explicitly and formally guarantee individual rights.

Despite this constellation of features (mostly) agreed upon, there is
substantial variation among the worldviews (let alone the details) of
certain prominent liberals. One need only think of the pairing of
John Rawls and Robert Nozick, or of Senator Edward Kennedy and
Milton Friedman. Contrasts such as these respectively mimic the
halves of Isaiah Berlin’s theory of positive and negative liberty (1969).4
Similarly, libertarianism may be thought to be representing the out-
side edge of liberalism on the right, with social liberalism as practiced
in Scandinavia, for example, representing the outside edge of libera-
lism on the left.

A number of deficiencies have been attributed to the liberal citizen-
ship tradition. One is epistemological. Liberalism rests on the source
principle that “the people” above all implies individuals. This monistic
guiding standard has been challenged on the ground that it is not fun-
damentally true in all or even most cases (Parekh 2002, 33–36). For
example, Indians and Chinese, among others, would claim that indi-
viduals qua individuals are necessarily rooted in arrangements of social
relations. Other alleged shortcomings of liberalism include a dispro-
portionate weight on individual rights and a concomitant lack of stress
on civic duties and political engagement (Bell 1994; Tam 1998); failure
to consider the legitimacy of group and subgroup identity as a political
classification (Kymlicka 1995); and tolerance for gross material inequal-
ities among citizens, coupled with an overemphasis on the pursuit of
private wealth (Dahrendorf 1999). It is in fact in large response to the
perceived shortcomings of liberalism that the two key alternative
models of citizenship discussed next have gained (or regained) partial
ascendancy. Yet nothing in liberalism necessitates or unduly fosters
any of these alleged deficiencies. For example, under a liberal regime,
citizens are not ipso facto put off from political participation. In fact,
the plethora of get-out-the-vote campaigns and widespread easing of
already undemanding voter registration requirements in liberal coun-

tries such as the United States should belie the claim that liberalism per se is responsible for sagging levels of citizen involvement in the political process. Moreover, these are not problems confined to contemporary liberal systems. The Athenian polis—avatar of citizen-centered political engagement—was often forced to encourage citizen participation by increasing pay for both jury duty and for civic attendance in the assembly (Sinclair 1988). The medieval Italian city-republics too had their participatory deficiencies: fines had to be imposed to deter absences from council meetings, and “[p]olitical action by . . . citizens continued to be essentially spasmodic throughout the eleventh century” (Waley 1969, 17). In other words, what is of central concern here may be human nature, not the supposed defects of liberalism.

**Republicanism**

Republicanism has an even more ancient lineage than liberalism. Its origins stem from the Greek city-states, both Athens and Sparta—and from the Roman republic as well. Later on, Machiavelli was a most important expositor (Bock et al. 1993).

Historically, republicanism has laid emphasis on the standard of limited government in the company of an active civic realm. A central premise has been the need to create a political order that normatively and structurally precludes the domination of citizenries by single or several masters, internal or external (Pettit 1999). This precept consists of two constitutive strands, the first emphasizing political participation as foundational to preserving liberty and the second emphasizing the rule of law as foundational to preserving liberty (Honohan 2002, 16). Republicanism thus entails a vigorous and virtuous citizenry always attentive to the potential exercise of capricious power. Operationally, republicanism may be viewed as an obligation to protect the liberty of citizens from would-be usurpers, including, and especially, the state itself. To safeguard freedom from foreign enemies, primacy is placed on national defense. To protect freedom from internal usurpation, the common good is emphasized—the most emphatic manifestation being the need to ensure justice—lest any one part of the citizenry amass inordinate power and ultimately exercise dominion over other elements of the system.

Republicanism censures the unalloyed individualism alternatively condemned and praised as a hallmark of liberalism and embraces egalitarianism (see Cameron 2008).
collective sharing and civic participation in government. It sees individualism as potentially menacing, as a self-interested, egocentric pursuit likely to harm others in addition to thwarting the overall good. Thus, while the republican ethos hinges on the values of respect for and service to one’s political community, it does so not solely or even primarily as an intrinsic end but rather as a means to help preserve liberty.\(^6\) Since republicanism does not primarily concern itself with individual rights, its conceptualization of citizenship can be thought of as a compound of rights and action, in many ways the former flowing from the latter (even though the modern notion of rights was neither known nor utilized by some of the progenitors of republicanism, the Hellenes themselves\(^7\)).

Republicanism reaches past liberalism’s near-totalizing emphasis on individual rights by obliging citizens to play active roles in their own respective communities (however defined), as well as in politics and government (at whatever levels). In the eyes of its supporters, it gives life to liberalism and repositions it toward a higher level of engagement in a far more significant sphere, the community. Yet life in the republican community is not anodyne; in fact, “there is no cozy warmth in such a community . . . [as] citizens are called to stern and important tasks which have to do with the very sustaining of their identity. There may be, indeed there ought to be, a sense of belonging but that sense of belonging may not be associated with an inner peace and, even if it is, it is not the kind of peace that permits a relaxed and private leisure, still less a disdain for civic concerns” (Oldfield 1990, 5).

As noted, each of the models of citizenship is ideationally variegated. Thus, within republicanism, a strain exists that downplays the stern perspective outlined in the preceding paragraph and instead emphasizes the positive role of government in the vouchsafing of rights to citizens, who still are expected to play active roles in the community. In this view, governments are constituted by full citizen participation, and they necessarily exist to bestow rights that are created rather than innate (innate rights, by contrast, are a central dogma of liberalism). Developed by T. H. Marshall in 1950, this account features a threefold taxonomy of rights: civil (liberties, i.e., individual freedoms); political (the rights of political participation); and social (manifested as socio-economic subsidies) (Marshall 1987).

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6. Liberalism does take account of the potential hazard of rampant individualism, but in a way that might be viewed as tautological. It argues that cumulative pursuits of self-interest by definition result in the common good.
7. I thank Jose Ciprut for referring me to J. J. Mulhern, who made this latter point.
As might be expected, advocates of republicanism generally support military service, usually at the national level. But there are “localist” or “states’ rights” republicans in the United States who regard the national government with suspicion. They oppose standing armies; at best, they support state militias and National Guard units.\(^8\)

When it comes to republicanism’s place in the catalogue of citizenship, I am in agreement with Viroli (2001), who asserts that in addition to antedating liberalism, republicanism subsumes it as well: liberalism, for Viroli, “is a doctrine derived from republicanism in the sense that it has taken several of its fundamental principles from republicanism, notably that of the defense of the limited state against the absolute state.” He continues: “From a theoretical point of view liberalism can be considered an impoverished or incoherent republicanism, but not an alternative to republicanism” (2001, 58). I would, however, offer a more benevolent assessment of the relationship between the two: say, liberalism as a partial, abridged, or abbreviated republicanism.

In sum, republicans tend to view their model (at least partly) as a corrective to liberalism’s deficiencies, especially an alleged excessive attentiveness to the individual. They view liberalism as weakening connections among citizens, or as never allowing potential connections to develop. They see in liberalism a pattern of self-reference and self-absorption that ultimately raises the possibility of the very demise of self-governance (Dagger 2002, 153). In short, they argue that the atomizing, centrifugal forces of liberalism can only be restrained via an active practice of duty-based citizenship, one resolutely in the republican tradition of putting the common good first and individual good second.

Communitarianism

Communitarianism resembles republicanism in its emphasis on group-centric citizenship. Generally recognized as a relatively contemporary movement, it has antecedents that actually go back several centuries. One early exemplar was Herder, whose unique version of nationalism foresaw communitarianism’s grounding of the political in the nonpolitical: in group culture or in group ethnicity, for instance. As Kohn (1973, 326) puts it,

\[^8\] I thank Jose Ciprut for referring me to Rogers Smith, who stressed this point.
[Herder] directed attention to pre-political, pre-rational foundations—the mother tongue, ancient folk traditions, common descent, or the “national spirit.” These nonpolitical criteria created an ethnic-linguistic nationalism, which differed from the territorial state-nationalism in the West. This more intimate and more unconscious nationalism corresponded to the “spontaneous” or instinctive ancestral community. Subordinating political criteria to the ties of inheritance and tradition, Germans, Italians, and Slavs in their efforts to build their nation-states insisted that people speaking the same tongue or claiming a common ancestry should form one political state.

Communitarianism has a bit of an identity crisis, at least in the eyes of some. For example, David Miller wonders whether “it really provide[s] a new perspective on politics, or is it merely a rhetorical device by which fairly standard liberal (in the U.S. American sense) or social democratic (in the European sense) policies can be sold to the electorate” (1999, 170). For Miller, communitarianism runs the risk of collapsing into totalitarianism if precautions are not taken: “It is one thing to invoke community as a moral ideal . . . [i]t is another thing to say that the state can legitimately enforce communal values, using the coercive apparatus at its disposal to oblige us to behave as good citizens” (1999, 170).

Notwithstanding communitarianism’s resemblance to republicanism, there are differences, if sometimes only of emphasis, between the two models. First, for the republican, the polity must always command the highest level of loyalty. For the communitarian, the deserving body is more apt to be a nonpolitical entity: society as a whole, a neighborhood, or a cultural, religious, or ethnic group that predates the political community. Consequently, unlike supporters of liberalism, for whom the political community “is derivative of its members, who are always individuals; and unlike supporters of republicanism, for whom primacy of the political community supersedes individual rights; [for communitarians] political community is often seen to be rooted in a prior cultural community” (Delanty 2002, 160).

Second, in contrast to republicans, who emphasize the protection of liberty, communitarians home in on elevating the moral good of the community (as well as on providing genuine societal benefit) through such activities as volunteerism, charitable works, fostering community pride, and the like. Third, communitarians, while accentuating

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9. While in what follows, I do make the assumption that a meaningful demarcation between republicanism and communitarianism is possible, a plausible argument can be made that these are perhaps distinctions without a difference.
“attachment to collective forms of life,” nonetheless “are extremely reluctant to abandon what they see as the central importance of the rights-based account of the autonomous individual” (Oldfield 1990, 6).

Many republicans would not evince the same reluctance. As is the case with liberalism and republicanism, communitarianism sports its own compilation of alternative versions. Nikolas Rose, for one, takes note of the different conceptualizations of community of a number of communitarian thinkers: “Etzioni-style communitarianism as political cure-all; Fukuyama-style community as trust relations for economic success; Himmelfarb/Gingrich-style community as neo-conservative politics of the remoralization of America; [and] multicultural-style demands for communities of identity” (2000, 98–99). Miller argues that there are three salient forms of communitarianism: that of the left, an “egalitarian communitarianism,” espoused by continental social democrats and left-thinking Americans; that of the right, recognized as “authoritarian communitarianism,” today diminished in popularity but still with adherents; and “liberal communitarianism,” exemplified by, among others, Will Kymlicka (Miller 1999, 171). Liberal communitarianism evokes liberalism’s double pillars of individual definition of the good and autonomous choosing but embeds them within communal contexts. For Miller, communitarianism of the right “sees community [above all, nationality] as a source of authority” and argues that individuals must “subject [themselves] to the customs and conventions it embraces” (Miller 1999, 176). This could translate into, for example, an anti-immigrant ideology that fears dilution of nation-state core values and cohesive, unifying national myths. Miller perceives a communitarianism of the left as championing voluntarily selected community membership (instead of tradition-driven or authoritatively oriented communities), as well as communities that are formed on the basis of equality of status for all members (Miller 1999, 177).

While communitarians understandably would characterize their backing for their worldview in an affirmative fashion, it is nevertheless true that communitarianism is in large part a protest against what are said to be the excesses (or the deficiencies) of liberalism.\(^\text{10}\) For example, communitarians dispute the importance of liberal neutrality: for them, self-determination must not serve as an absolute value. Instead, a com-

\(^{10}\) Stephen Holmes (1993, 178) argues that communitarianism is nothing but a protest against liberalism.
munitarian state should give preference to certain ways of life over others, in particular those that match the community’s overall way of existence. Matteo Gianni contrasts communitarianism favorably to liberalism, seeing the latter as primarily (and thus inadequately) rule-oriented and the former as content-oriented (Gianni 1998, 40). For Gianni, liberalism promotes “rights and more inclusive political procedures,” whereas in regard to communitarianism, “it is only through the practice of citizenship that it is possible to reach a common content and thus to eliminate exclusion from the political community” (ibid). In addition, however, liberalism often is held to be insufficiently cognizant of people’s intrinsic sociability as also of the resultant criticality of the interconnecting forces of community. As a case in point, Michael Walzer (1994) charges that liberalism is too “thin,” that is, too focused on individual rights, with inadequate attention paid to social context. In its stead, he advocates a “thick” concept of citizenship, or a normative emphasis on the proverbial sense of belonging to a community and on being steeped in concomitant duties and responsibilities to the very community, all of which may compel individuals to forgo their own particular interests for the well-being of the group at large. Michael Sandel (1982), too, has similarly argued that communities are “constitutive” of what it means to be a person. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), in turn, has written extensively of the need to situate human actions within various traditions, which themselves are proxies for their respective communities of origin. Numerous other communitarian thinkers echo and embellish these sentiments, the collective upshot of which is that community is indispensable for helping human nature flourish and that theories that ignore or deemphasize community inevitably lead to an impoverished understanding of human beings (Barber 1984; Bellah et al. 1995; Etzioni 1996; Taylor 1992).

But, Delanty (2002) suggests, the supporters of communitarianism fail to recognize that even though the communal impulse is undeniably part of human nature, the various groups within which sociability is manifest are themselves socially constructed, and thus undeserving of a priori preeminence over similarly socially constructed political communities. Further, implicit in the concept of community championed by communitarians is an unjustified assumption of “a pre-established and relatively harmonious consensus based on shared cultural values and traditions [wherein] . . . [c]ommunity has . . . come to stand for ‘unity’ and conflict for its absence.” The true case is quite different: “groups are temporary, deterritorialized, and cross-cutting.
Moreover, they are internally differentiated, fluid, and dissensual. They are not based on primordial, or essentialist categories . . . and cannot be reduced to the relatively fixed categories that are typical of communitarian thought” (Delanty 2002, 171). The sociological ignorance on which communitarianism depends thus (at least in part) should invalidate the “assumption that politics and citizenship must rest on an underlying social order that is prior to the political” (Delanty 2002, 159).

In sum, communitarianism is held to champion a common good that, by definition, transcends individual concerns, desires, and priorities but does so through procedural safeguards for the articulation of individual rights.

**Alternative Models of Citizenship**

Largely as a result of globalization, cross-border problems, new political arrangements, and heightened awareness of the rights of native peoples, the 1990s saw a renewed and expanded interest in the academic study of citizenship (İşın and Turner 2002, 1). A variety of theories, models, proposals, and normative exhortations regarding citizenship surfaced. These can be arranged into two main sets. The first, focusing on particularized aspects of the term, dwells on feminist, political, indigenous, social, multicultural, legal, economic, sexual, educational, environmental, and mediatic citizenships and their studies (Hudson and Kane 2000). The second is broader in orientation and covers an array of terms: global, world, international, extranational, transnational, denationalized, postnational, deterritorialized, transcultural, unbounded (etc.) citizenship and their study. It is with this latter category of concern in mind that I write what follows.

**Global or Cosmopolitan Citizenship**

The idea of a widely encompassing notion of citizenship has a sundry bloodline, beginning in the fourth century B.C.E., when Diogenes called himself a citizen of the world. Roman Stoicism and Augustine’s earthly city can be thought of as early embodiments of cosmopolitan philosophy. In the modern era, the Enlightenment thinkers clearly adopted a cosmopolitan orientation (while still advancing the case for individual rights), but for many theorists today, Immanuel Kant’s work represents the seedbed of the contemporary cosmopolitan worldview, even though he steered clear of formally advocating the establishment of a world
government (Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999). More recently, the end of World War II and the birth of the United Nations offered, for some, the possibility of a new era likely to augur cosmopolitan, even universal, citizenship.

Today as in the past, there is no consensus on the ideal makeup of cosmopolitan citizenship. In fact, there is substantial divergence among its supporters regarding its composition. For its proponents, this absence of ideational fixity is one of its positive features, as it allows “its advocates to search for evidence of its influence or applicability in a . . . divergent range of situations and circumstances” (Williams 2002, 11–12).

In the strongest form of cosmopolitan citizenship, the nation-state is viewed as anachronistic, a relic of a different time, when limited horizons were the order of the day. Should not, then, these days, citizenship, too, accordingly be reassessed? The result is a reconceptualization that severs exclusive linkage of citizenship to nation-state. In the new model, the purview of citizenship is extended to regional—and potentially even global—frames of reference. Such extensions could take more than one form; for example, in one case, an authorized organization or forum could pass final judgment on disputes between states, or even serve as a recourse for aggrieved citizens with claims against their own nation-states. And another possibility is multilayered citizenship, analogous to the national, state, and local tripartition of citizenship in the U.S. American federal system but reflective of dimensions beyond the nation-state.

Less drastically, cosmopolitan citizenship endorses the addition of an “outward-looking” perspective to traditional, nation-state-oriented citizenship, with the extra, even crucial, requirement of citizens to be mindful of—and to challenge if and when necessary—the supranational implications of their own governments’ policies and decisions, or those of international corporations (Stokes 2000, 237). Cosmopolitan citizenship “might include the corporate professional circuits that are increasingly forms of partly deterritorialized global cultures” as well (Sassen 2002, 282). Yet another perspective sees a blossoming international civil society comprised of cross-national, issue-oriented NGOs. And still another slant might be, in essence, global citizenship by default: decisions made by one particular sovereign nation could have reverberatory effects on citizens in other countries, as when refugees

11. For a detailed discussion, see Heinemann-Grüder (2008).
fleeing from oppressive government policies in one nation and moving into a neighboring state have an impact on citizens of the host country, or when foreign-exchange policies pursued in one nation may impose on citizens of other nations. Or yet, acid rain, or the excessive harvesting of rainforests, or a decision by one nation to build a nuclear power plant near the border of an adjacent country may have varied impacts on the citizenry in the recipient polity’s environment (Held 1995, 17–18).

From this large array of standpoints, a core cosmopolitan tenet emerges: accidents of birth, or fortuitous outcomes under certain circumstances, should not deprive individuals of fundamental rights and protections. As one advocate insists, “The idea of cosmopolitan citizenship is worth defending for this reason alone” (Linklater 1999, 40). From this perspective, no matter if they are civilian war victims, tortured political prisoners, imprisoned dissidents, hungry children, starved adults, or persons at higher risk of environmental pollution, people worldwide are entitled to certain securities and minimal standards of living that have the moral force of obliging outside involvement when national efforts are absent or insufficient. However, the nature of this potential intervention generates a good deal of the debate about cosmopolitan citizenship. One camp might support reliance on international institutions such as the United Nations, a second could favor NGO advocacy, and a third might well call for involvement by individual nations, as was the case when Liberian citizens urged the United States to intervene in the Liberian civil war in 2003. Suggested remedies for realization of the first and second scenarios include “direct elections to the United Nations General Assembly and . . . a second UN chamber which represents individuals and INGO[s] [international NGOs] directly” (Linklater 2002, 328). Yet no matter the specific approach, the conjoining of universal rights and universal duty by each mirrors the same commingling, although with different levels of emphasis, within liberalism, communitarianism, and democratic republicanism. It is this mimesis, I argue, that largely undermines the need for a “new” model of citizenship, such as cosmopolitanism.

**Criticisms of Cosmopolitanism**

Cosmopolitanism is open to a number of criticisms, the totality of which I believe essentially voids its potential value as a new model of citizenship, without thereby necessarily diminishing the very real
benefits that flow from taking into account a more cosmopolitan worldview. The first objection is that cosmopolitanism is notionally inexact, more so than are the conventional models of citizenship, notwithstanding that, as we saw, some of its supporters profess this to be one of its strengths.\textsuperscript{12} When a model variously subsumes both the abolition and the retention of the nation-state, one must question its theoretical usefulness.

Second, cosmopolitanism is burdened with practical vagueness, so that even if a consensus were to take shape around one or more of its versions, it is unclear how implementation could take place. The procedural and substantive difficulties of instituting practically any form of formal global citizenship seem reasonably self-evident. This is not to say that such impediments could never be overcome, but one can hardly be blamed for expressing some justifiable doubt.

Third, the theory of global citizenship is at odds with real-life practice, a disjunction that shows no imminent signs of reversal. Two examples should be considered. First, the EU template is frequently cited by proponents of cosmopolitanism as a harbinger of better—that is, more global—things to come. Yet the EU has primarily functioned as an economic entity since its inception, with no specific citizenship duties to speak of, and citizenship rights that still are perfunctory compared with those in vigor in the member nation-states. Moreover, nations within the EU are not hesitant to reject compliance with EU mandates or agreements if they are deemed contrary to national interests. Despite these present-day limitations, there can be no denying that EU citizenship may—or, as supporters of cosmopolitanism insist (with a little “push and lift”), can—mutate into a full-size version of its contemporary self, one that increasingly takes on more of the accouterments associated with genuine citizenship. In short, who is to say it cannot go further? From my perspective, I readily acknowledge the potential for such an evolution to occur at some point in the future. But all we can do for the moment is consider the evidence before us. Using that touchstone, it seems we are beyond the phase of merely trading assertions about what will or will not happen in this or that particular case. There is a record to go by, on which it should become the fair burden of agents of cosmopolitan citizenship to offer just grounds for their optimism.

\textsuperscript{12} Many of its backers would unabashedly acknowledge—without thereby feeling diminished—that global citizenship is a paradigm in search of a precise content.
As a second example, let us consider the former Soviet bloc. Cosmopolitanism’s advocates rarely offer direct reference or even some allusion to the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Far from embracing a broader vision of citizenship, those watershed events all pointed in precisely the opposite direction. Some peoples demanded that formerly integrated parts of countries disaggregate and stand alone as properly recognized formal nations. And within these (re)emerging nations, it became apparent that western liberalism was the societal template earmarked to replace previous rule under a central command model. Cosmopolitanism’s supporters cannot simply ignore these developments if they wish to impart credibility to their rhetoric.

Fourth, clear-cut, practicable proposals on how to generate a more global framework in individuals and national subgroups have not been readily offered. Those few that have been presented verge on the platitudinous: “[A]ll human beings should act as if they are co-legislators in a universal communication community... [This] would place powerful moral and psychological constraints on the wrongful exercise of state power” (Linklater 1999, 1). Alas, there is no reason to believe that such a transformative reorientation is in the offing. And when heightened NGO involvement is suggested as a conduit to expanded global identification or even citizenship, questions must be raised about accountability. After all, the much maligned (democratic) nation-state, for all its recognized faults, still is answerable to the citizenry, and it is removable by legitimate means when conditions become unacceptable or intolerable for the citizenry. No such relief mechanisms have been proposed, to this day, for nonelected NGOs.

A fifth criticism is that some cosmopolitan mindsets in the past have abridged allegiance to the nation-state, the consequences of which have been intensely harmful. One proponent of this argument, Michael Walzer (2002, 126), finds that “cosmopolitanism, in its Leninist and Maoist version... teach[es] an antinationalistic ethic” that, along with hypernationalism, is “dangerous.” Charles Taylor asserts that its advocates seem “to be proposing cosmopolitan identity as an alternative to patriotism. If so... [they are] making a big mistake... because we cannot do without patriotism in the modern world” (Taylor 2002, 119). Gertrude Himmelfarb (2002, 76–77) writes that “Cosmopolitanism... obscures, even denies the givens of life:... tradition, community, and nationality... [Moreover it] is utopian... [and while] the nation-state has its own deficiencies and evils... they... are remedia-
ble within the framework of a democratic polity and a secure legal system.” Miller, too, makes a number of points in this vein, the first of which is empirical: “[N]ational identities . . . enabled large masses of people to work together as citizens. One test of this argument is to see whether we can find states whose members lack such common identities but are nonetheless democratic. The search will, I confidently predict, be in vain” (1999, 68). Another line of reasoning is theoretical: “[W]hy [should] the international enforcement of citizens’ rights . . . be preferred to domestic enforcement[?]” Instead of setting up international courts of human rights, why not ensure that each state has in place an effective constitutional mechanism for protecting the rights of its own citizens?” (Miller 1999, 74–75). Thus, cosmopolitanism does lack the unifying aspects of the nation-state that flow from common experiences and that yield a sense of palpable allegiance, one of internalized mutuality and willingness to sacrifice.

Another criticism is that, for the foreseeable future, any form of cosmopolitanism would simply perpetuate inequalities and expand power imbalances perceived to be endemic to contemporary social and political arrangements. Amy Gutmann suggests, cosmopolitanism “is another form of nationalism, this time on a global scale” (2002, 70). And as Iris Marion Young (1990) claims, universality would be more apparent than real in a cosmopolitan world, in light of the male-dominated public sphere of the nation-state.

A seventh criticism is the prospect of philosophical incoherence. Supporters of cosmopolitan citizenship are, I think, more likely to adhere to a postmodernist worldview than would the detractors of cosmopolitanism. Yet a number of postmodern thinkers have made “diversity” claims and identity politics—by definition, a politics of difference—mainstays of their worldview. The result is that universalism is championed as a quality of global citizenship, while particularity is paraded as a trait of subglobal citizenship. And therefore, postmodernists who defend global citizenship are left proclaiming that universalism and particularity should be features of citizenship. While one may well argue that this is not necessarily a contradictory stance, not all interlocutors will be persuaded.

An eighth objection is that in a world of finite resources, cosmopolitanism is impracticable. To wit, when Linklater (1999, 36) states that “the cosmopolitan argument is that world citizenship can be a powerful means of coaxing away from the false supposition that the interests of fellow citizens necessarily take priorities over duties to the rest of
the human race,” no thought is given to identifying the source of the capital outlays that would be needed to put such a directive into long-term, sustainable, selfless practice.

Ninth, cosmopolitanism seems most likely to come to pass when least needed—and least likely to come to pass when most needed. Again in the words of Linklater, “The obligation to create new forms of political community arises where several societies are like-minded in the sense of having broadly similar conceptions of citizenship. . . . Different arrangements are required when dealing with societies which have radically different systems of government” (Linklater 1999, 51). Hence, one must presume that the commonalities referred to are those of liberal democracies and the “radically different systems” are non-democratic states. While this intrusion of realpolitik is welcome, left unsaid is both the source of this obligation and the recognition that the protections to be provided under a cosmopolitan setup are for the most part already present in, and enjoyed among, those like-minded would-be constitutive states.

A tenth objection is that what passes for globalization is in point of fact an accelerated version of time-honored interstate relations. The world’s historical record is replete with references to international trade, immigration, regional alliances, treaties, and transnational cultural and religious expansions, besides and beyond empire. And it is true that technological advances in transportation and communication amplify the impact of these developments in the present day. But the differences in degree (not in kind) hardly lend themselves to the reification of a new class of citizenship. Protests might be raised that these developments are not simply more of what has passed before, that they are also qualitatively different, so much so that serious consideration should be given to a broader, more capacious form of citizenship. In the words of one who believes there do exist qualitative differences between contemporary phenomena and earlier occurrences, a new “international order [does exist] involving the conjuncture of: dense networks of regional and global economic relations which stretch beyond the control of any single state . . . ; extensive webs of transnational relations and instantaneous electronic communications over which particular states have limited influence; [and also] a vast array of international regimes and organizations which can limit the scope

13. Many anthropologists, evolutionary biologists, and moral philosophers would undoubtedly challenge this contention.
of action of the most powerful states” (Held 1995, 20). But on close inspection, this enumeration invites some doubts. For example, the claim that in the globalizing world “economic relations . . . stretch beyond the control of any single state” would certainly be contested by critics of the allegedly hegemonic United States. And one need not be a U.S. detractor to point out that many countries peg their currencies to the U.S. American dollar; that the vicissitudes of the U.S. stock market catalyze similar movements worldwide; and that in the Western Hemisphere, dollarization, either de facto or de jure, is a supported tendency. Additionally, the claim that there exist “extensive webs of transnational relations and instantaneous electronic communications over which particular states have limited influence” ignores the reality that this has been the case since the invention of the telegraph (leaving aside that the accuracy of this claim is weakened by numerous charges that U.S. control over the content of the Internet is crowding out other countries and cultures). And the United Nations and related agencies would surely have reservations about the assertion that “a vast array of international regimes and organizations [exist] which can limit the scope of action of the most powerful states.”

A final objection to global citizenship can be traced to Robert Dahl: “[T]he larger the unit [of government], the greater the cost of uniform rules, the larger the minorities who cannot prevail and the more watered down is the control of the individual citizen” (Dahl 1967, 959). Dahl goes on to affirm that size alone should not necessarily restrict or nullify the possibility of legitimate citizen involvement in a given polity—hence his idea of “appropriate units of democracy as an ascending series, a set of Chinese boxes . . . each not inherently less nor inherently more legitimate than the other.” The point to take away, however, is that something intrinsically important to the functioning of a democratic polity is inevitably lost whenever larger units of political demarcation are established.

Conclusion

I submit that the most practical way for citizenship studies to proceed is to accept the centrality of the nation-state into the foreseeable future. But I recognize that nation-state citizenship has been altered by globalization, although certainly not to the degree claimed by the strong advocates of cosmopolitan citizenship. The most realistic and in my opinion most beneficial course would be to continue to push for the
universalization of an ever greater array of rights within the context of existing nation-states. Moral suasion and economic incentives are preferable, but international intervention by force might be warranted, if on a case-by-case basis. The application of this approach comes into evidence, for example, when the United Nations supervises elections, and when INGOs take up the case of dissidents and political prisoners or stage international concerts to benefit starving children and AIDS victims.

This approach stems from the human proclivity of demonstrating concern for all disadvantaged people, not just for one’s next-door neighbors. At the same time, it does recognize that people insist on allegiance to meaningful, unifying entities such as the nation-state, notwithstanding long-known problems. It appeals to our higher human values while pragmatically recognizing the limits of our capacity to overcome logistical and philosophical obstacles to consolidation at the nation-state level. To say that in an inevitably imperfect world, it is the least imperfect of the approaches to citizenship is not to undermine it with faint praise. It is, rather, one way of rendering homage to an approach predicated on the human capacity to forge workable solutions to real dilemmas and concrete challenges while affirming the moral mandate and the real need to try to do more.

References


Spanish jurists Joaquín Herrera Flores and Rafael Rodríguez Prieto in a recent publication (2003, 48) argue, “We cannot understand citizenship in the contemporary world . . . if we do not contextualize it within the spaces in which it is situated and the times that mark its possibilities and rhythms. For us, space does not simply coincide with a physical place. It is, in fact a social construction of relations.” Many chapters in this book explore how the construction, experience, and representation of citizenship expand spatial relations and enlarge possibilities of collective action. This chapter examines instead division and conflict as lived, represented, and challenged in two major global cities, Barcelona and Hong Kong. The idiosyncrasies and struggles of peoples in these spaces over time allow us to explore the processes that link the past and the future of citizenship to difference and dialogue in the evolving compound complexity of civic togetherness.

Some of us in this book examine problems in citizenship arising from movement and overflow (e.g., Teune, chap. 10, and Urban, chap. 13), from limits on participation (Kumar and Silver, chap. 3), or yet from issues of inequality for those who find themselves ‘divided’ or ‘displaced’ in global society (Fetni, chap. 8). Insofar as this book looks into the future of citizenship, whether from the perspective of a global model (Urban, chap 13), a project of collective identity (Williams, chap. 5), or one of shared rights and responsibilities (Rubin, chap. 12), the social (re-)construction of differential rights and responsibilities linked to ‘minoritarian’ populations raises important epistemological and ethical questions. Can and should individuals and groups be citizens to greater or lesser extents? Does differentiation necessarily mean inequality and injustice for such individuals and groups within any larger whole—a city, a nation-state, or some more nebulous public sphere? Do varieties of difference permit combinations of loyalties and
identities (‘hybridities’) or multiple representations of categorizations, which may diverge even from one individual actor to another? And can freedom to choose one’s own individual and group identity permit citizens to explore and to adopt connections to place and polity, each of which may directly challenge entrenched hegemonic models and expand visions of global citizenship?

Differentiation among citizens in some sense is without question fundamental to cities, nations, and states. Children, for example, may have some legal status as citizens at birth (perhaps even before birth, as has been argued in the United States), but adolescents’ exercise of rights often depends on age and mental maturation. Only at a socially defined responsible stage in life do political citizenship (national service, voting), economic independence (profession), and cultural markers of adulthood (driver’s license, drinking, marriage) become intertwined. This model of assimilation through civic pedagogy resonates with the lives of other differentiated individuals who may have fortuitously or voluntarily elected to ‘become’ citizens, say, in the way immigrants or refugees are ‘absorbed’ by a polity as a result of territorial shifts, transnational movements, or treaties, among other causes.

Yet not all differentiated citizens are destined to become ‘equal’ over time. Forced migration, colonialism, enslavement, and global readjustments of boundaries have created unwilling and unequal participants in civic projects. In some cases these shifts have also legitimated long-term constraints on subordinate populations. Even though Hong Kong’s Chinese majority gained expectations of service and took increasing responsibility for representative government under late colonial rule, for example, they never attained equality with Britons (except through individualized exceptions), let alone rights to determine their own future.

Other sociocultural categories, such as gender, remind us of the per- duration of compelling categories of inequality in human societies. Women have symbolized cities and nations as mothers and daughters for centuries. Yet their public voices, familial responsibilities, image, and individual rights have been differentiated from those of men in ways that challenge any vision of simple assimilation or compromise among citizens, even before questions of sexuality or family status arise.

Many differences seem to suggest a complex intermediate level of negotiated relations. Categories of race, ethnicity, or language—whether
applied by a ‘host’ society, cherished by specific groups, or redefined along the boundaries of social interaction and movement—provide important elements in evolving definitions of differentiated citizenship. Here, Barcelona, the ethnonational capital of Catalonia, has challenged centralist-assimilationist models of the Spanish state even while evolving as a complex, fragmented, and even divided global city.

As Greg Urban notes in chapter 13, class also provides an important and creative global discourse about belonging. Whether resulting from conquest or from social divisions on the basis of property, capital, or income, interclass relations provide a dynamic component to urban societies. Class and development issues have reshaped differentiated rights and visions among citizens in both Barcelona and Hong Kong.

These themes of difference and response redirect us to the “possibilities and rhythms” of space and time and to the centrality of concrete places like ‘the city’ in understanding and reconstructing citizenship (see Alguacil 2004; Castells 2000). In cities, differences among citizens become embodied in institutions, in sites of work and of residence, in public rituals, and in cultural representations. And these differences become enmeshed in everyday relations, conflicts, interpretations, and exchanges among citizens. While constrained by definitions of citizenship at the level of the state, cities allow their inhabitants and analysts to explore incorporative dynamic relations and hybridity even more palpably so.1

In cities, differentiated citizenship nonetheless may endure for centuries: the Jewish ghettos in Europe and the global travails of gypsies show that interaction does not necessarily result in tolerance or inclusion. Still, as citizens, cities, and states explore processes of incorporation and the costs of maintaining divisions, vital aspects of differentiated citizenship may change with surprising speed. In the last half-century, for example, many North Americans have experienced multiple civil rights campaigns that have opened political, economic, social, and cultural participation to an ever widening range of people who had been formally differentiated and excluded. Despite lingering prejudices, embodied in quotas, glass ceilings, stereotypes, or overt discrimination, women, blacks, gays, the differently abled, Latinos, Asian

1. New York City, for example, has allowed nonnaturalized legal immigrants to vote in school board elections. Its citizens and media even have discussed extending these voting rights to general civic elections, recognizing rights of place over rights of state within the framework of the law (Worth 2004).
Americans, and other groups and individuals now visibly engage in governance, education, the media, and other spheres of public citizenship in ways impossible, maybe unthinkable, immediately after World War II. Yet these gains may also face tests on account of new immigration or growing fears from the globalization of local fears.

This chapter draws on historical and sociocultural data from two global cities to illustrate more clearly what differentiated citizenship means, the multiple perspectives from which it is used, and its modifications over time. This close look allows us to examine multiple identities, changes, and representations, with a view toward exemplifying these otherwise inexhaustibly complicated processes. Barcelona, as city and as capital, has been a center for rethinking local and global citizenship within its nation, Catalonia, and its state, Spain. In modern Barcelona, which I have studied in place and off-site for twenty-five years, collectives long part of Spain have forced profound revisions and redefinitions of the responsibilities and the attributes of being at once Catalan, Spanish, and European. Political and economic claims, moreover, have converged with issues of language, culture, and memory in this bimillennial city. And complicating these processes have been flows of immigrants—most recently, thousands of Third World immigrants—who share space but not culture and rights, and whose incorporation continues to fuel civic debates.

Colonial and postcolonial Hong Kong, by contrast, exemplifies processes of differentiation and change based in conquest, movement, political economic development, and global connections. In this case, the adaptations and continuities of the colonized population comprise redefinitions of race, class, and nation, and evolving perceptions and conceptualizations of multiple loyalties at the edges of empires. This case also discloses links between diasporic identity and minoritarian status, underscoring the potential for transnational experiences to redirect loyalties from father- or motherlands to multiple homelands.

Both Hong Kong and Barcelona have experienced political-economic processes that have put many citizens (indeed, ‘the majority’, in both cases) into subaltern positions. In the history, society, and culture of these two cities we see actions and representations (by a variety of citizens) through which entrenched social relations of citizenship are radically reconstructed. Both cities encapsulate transnational connections that, over time, complicate divisions and civil rights. And both cases amply demonstrate the unceasing interplay of politics, economics, social structure, and culture that will continue to temper citizenship in
the future. In the past year, millions of people in each of these two cities have taken to the streets to bear witness to their profound civic concerns, local and global. The *communitas* of these mass demonstrations, as Victor Turner (1967) defined it, does not deny differentiation; rather, it helps us perceive and explore dimensions of hope born in urban tensions.

**Ciutadins de Catalunya: Redefining Citizenship in Place and Memory**

Visitors to contemporary Barcelona constantly laud the style and confidence of the city and its people. The successful 1992 Olympics, the 2002 Year of Gaudí, and Forum 2004 (www.barcelona2004.org) all have highlighted Barcelona’s culture, history, and identity on a global stage. Involvement in the past, present, and future of the city has been fostered by Barcelona’s city administration and by the Barcelona-based Catalan governments, as well as by local financiers, mass media, museums, academies, and the other institutions that constitute an urban growth machine strongly invested in the pedagogy of citizenship. Managing economic strategies for global positioning, reviving and remodeling festivals and institutions, hardwiring and disseminating citizenship electronically, and festooning lampposts with glorious slogans such as “*Barcelona, més que mai*” (Barcelona, more than ever) all assemble into a grand project devoted to creating a united, active citizenry. These actions are underpinned by exhortations, such as those by socialist mayor Pascual Maragall, in a municipal manual on citizenship, *Civisme i Urbanitat* (roughly, ‘Urbanism and Civility’): “To be citizens of Barcelona constitutes a source of pride. We are citizens of the capital of Catalonia, of a city twice millenarian. Of a city that has given to the world artists, scientists, thinkers, teachers, architects, designers, engineers, union organizers and businessmen . . . universal renown . . . now each one of us must enjoy our city, making it still more civic and cultured” (1993, 5).

This pedagogy of citizenship has transformed erstwhile uneasy relations with the Spanish state into a more abstract discourse on the individual, the city, the nation, the continent, and the world. Thus, Forum 2004 sought to build on what Barcelona is becoming. More than a Spanish city or a national capital, Barcelona and its citizens will become a European global center, where worldwide flows intersect with localizing diversity, offering novel learnings (Castells 2000).
Such innovative practices of active citizenship in contemporary Barcelona make it difficult to believe that only a few decades ago, a centralistic state regime branded this region, its culture, and its people a source of dangerous separatism, finding reason to harshly circumscribe civic rights throughout Catalonia. After the Spanish Civil War, the victorious regime of Francisco Franco saw Catalonia as a defeated enemy. As the state controlled sweeping political and economic development, it could limit Barcelonins even in their local practices of language and culture. Catalan struggles for autonomy within Spain continued through the end of Franco’s dictatorship in 1976. These struggles in turn laid the groundwork for an urban renaissance, whose manifestations permeate discussions, political actions, public exhibits, reconstructed streetscapes, and the mass media (DiGiacomo 1986; McDonogh 1999; Woolard 1989).

Barcelona’s resistance to Franco also emerged from a longer history of tensions between city or nation and the Spanish state. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Barcelona was the center and capital of lands that stretched from the Iberian Peninsula and Balearics over the Pyrenees, and across the Mediterranean to Italy and Greece. Catalan law, literature, architecture, piety, and trade constituted monuments of urban glory, able to create a distinctive cityscape for Barcelona and an intercontinental heritage that continues to shape differentiated citizenships even in times of great political flux.

While these historical foundations of shared place and identity are critical to understanding Catalonia’s subsequent cultural and political evolution, the diversity of the city itself in the medieval and Renaissance eras has had a profound impact that must also be taken into account since Barcelona has hosted foreign merchants and scholars and a reputed Jewish enclave over many centuries, during which nobles, churchmen, merchants, and representatives of multiple guilds competed for power in a constantly changing city and state. The evolution of the oligarchic category of ciutadins honrats (honored citizens) in the early modern period, for example, as scrutinized by James Amelang (1986), attests to significant differences in civic roles, rights, and representations within Barcelona. Contrasts among those who might be citizens by birth, by assimilation, by adoption, or even honorifically so now reverberate through important contemporary discussions being held in other Spanish cities and territories, as well (Herzog 2003).

In the early modern period, Catalans contributed to the foundations of a united Spanish peninsular state through the dynastic marriage of
Ferdinand of Aragon and Catalonia with Isabel of Castile and Leon. Catalonia’s position and its sphere of influence in the Mediterranean deteriorated, however, as the Castilian Empire grew in the New World and American gold began funding religious-political wars across Europe. Also, political citizenships within the state began to shift when Catalans rebelled against the monarchy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As historian J. H. Elliott (1963, 548) has written, after the second rebellion in 1705, “the Crown of Aragon was systematically stripped of the privileges it had preserved for so long and Catalonia became a mere region of the Spanish state.” In short order, the parliament and the municipal council of Barcelona were abolished, the university moved, construction beyond the walls banned, and many other restrictions imposed on Catalan rights and culture.

Yet shifts in political citizenship fueled changing economic opportunities. Catalans found markets within the Spanish Empire that revived agriculture. Burgeoning factories churned out mass goods for colonial and Spanish consumers. By the mid-1800s, Barcelona and Catalonia had become major industrial centers, rivaling northern Europe and far outstripping the rest of Spain.

This renewed local wealth and power spurred a rebirth of language and literature, a florescence of art and architecture, and concomitant discussions of citizenship befitting a cosmopolitan city, a reemerging Catalan nation, and a changing Spanish state. By the end of the nineteenth century, public debate, popular action, and mass media were placing new emphasis on the intersections of multiple (political, economical, and cultural) differentiated citizenships across place and time. Moreover, Barcelonins not only looked back to earlier glories but also created new civic models, places, and identities (McDonogh 1986).

Nationalism, as a process of envisioning and communicating a new community, took on varied forms, from a romantic reconstruction of the Catalan past to an unabashed, outright rejection of Spanish authority. Conservative theorists, for example, chose to imagine the nation to be a natural familial extension of the rural family homestead (masia) of the Catalan heartlands, thereby fostering a hierarchical citizenship that separated Catalonia from the state while sanctifying divisions of class. Owners were portrayed as patriarchs of a unified Catalan family in which workers would participate as children (McDonogh 1986; Prat de la Riba 1978). This paternalistic ideology was inoculated into the landscape of Barcelona via Antoni Gaudí’s Expiatory Temple of the Holy Family (Sagrada Familia), which purports to atone for the sins
of the workers while modeling an ideal society around the divine family.

Barcelona discussions were scarcely homogeneous: Leftists sought to redress local issues along alternative global visions of class and justice. Anarchist visionaries, who have been historically strong in Barcelona, went on to promote ideas of a society without property and nations in which all men and women would be equal. In the heady debate that ensued, conservative projects vested in the leadership of new elites often clashed with worker interests and actions. And thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, Barcelona had become notorious for its inter-class violence, including the bitter widescale urban rioting in 1909, still remembered as the “Tragic Week” (Kaplan 1992).

Nor were discussions over difference and citizenship exclusively local. In Spain, other national movements among Basques and Galicians learned from Catalan strategies and debates. Meanwhile, some Catalans also sought to compare their political and cultural citizenships in light of the changing panoramas and opportunities among European and colonial forms of nationalism.

Citizenship and nationhood dominated fierce debates in Barcelona throughout the twentieth century, during periods of social and intellectual ferment interrupted by centralist dictatorships. When street violence broke out after World War I, the Barcelona haute bourgeoisie drifted toward a more centralized rule that sacrificed some of the few rights gained by earlier generations. Under the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939), renewed debates led the president of the Generalitat (the reestablished Catalan government) to proclaim independence before renegotiating rights of difference within the state. Even during the Civil War, resistance to Franco intersected with internecine urban conflict among communists and anarchists over society and governance.

Franco’s dictatorship, which as a general rule repressed Spanish political rights, specifically identified most Catalans as enemies of Spain and restricted all public representations of a differentiated Catalan community. Barred from education and from public life in its own homeland, the oppressed Catalan’s language became identified with a differentiated citizenship in opposition. Metaphors of the fascist and Catholic state were imposed on Barcelona; some partisans of the new centralism even spoke dismissively of “Judeo-Catalans,” thereby exploiting the facile parlance of Spanish anti-Semitism to moralize differences within the state. Meanwhile, the Sagrada Familia became part
of a Eucharistic Congress that projected the legitimacy of the Franco regime to a global audience.

Barcelona’s industrial preeminence still meant that immigrants from all parts of Spain filled inner-city tenements, industrial suburbs, and burgeoning satellite cities. Castilian-speaking immigrants encountered a world in which Catalan national and cultural attributes like language had become less publicly visible but not less profoundly significant in differentiating urban populations. Waves of immigrants exacerbated the divisions between middle-class Catalans, who saw their culture and polity repressed, and laborers of the left, who balanced sweet allegiance to home region with bitter daily economic struggles. Meanwhile, imagery of the spaces of immigrants—be it the infamous inner-city barrio chino or suburban industrial sprawl—reinforced mythic associations of one’s Other with crime, poverty, and social turmoil (Maza 1999; McDonogh 1999). Commentator Francesc Candel’s phrase, “els altres catalans”—“the other Catalans”—seized this division well (Candel 1964, 1986; Candel and Cuenca 2001).

The transition from Franco to democracy reopened debates about Catalan identity and the meaning and integration of “other Catalans” in a new political community. As Kathryn Woolard (1986, 1989) notes in her work on bilingualism, and on politics and identity in Barcelona, politicians seeking to rebuild Catalan institutions and political rights often carefully sought formulas helpful in finessing ambiguous convergence over and around divisions of class and ethnicity, toward the vaguest concepts of citizenship. Thus, when one of them, Josep Tarradellas, returned from exile to reestablish the Generalitat, he carefully greeted the welcoming crowds inclusively, as ciutadans de Catalunya (citizens of Catalonia), not exclusively, as “Catalans” (Woolard 1986, 56). Similarly, in seeking support for the statute that would legalize autonomy once again, politicians rallied voters with slogans like “Es català tothom que viu i treballa a Catalunya” (All those who live and work in Catalonia are Catalan). Such rhetoric led Woolard to remark, “These slogans suggest that there is only one relevant ethnic identity in Catalunya, but by their very insistence they betray the existence of more than one” (Woolard 1986, 57).

Language, culture, and personalities configured newly positive redefinitions of differentiated (Catalan) citizenship played out on a shifting political stage. Analyzing political divisions and rhetoric in the same period, Susan DiGiacomo has argued that ethnicity and class posed special problems for Catalan socialists, who needed to link the
aspirations of a Castilian-dominant working class to a new vision of
democratic Catalonia. Ultimately, their ambivalent message resulted in
grave problems in the 1977 parliamentary elections: “They lost because
they believed they no longer had to convince the working class to vote
or to articulate clearly the link between socialism and Catalanism, and
because they failed to convince Catalan voters that they were a Catalan
party” (DiGiacomo 1986, 85).
Socialists, having learned from this lesson, dominated Barcelona
thereafter. Pascual Maragall, the grandson of a prominent Catalan intel-
lectual of the turn of the century, renewed inclusive civic pride via
urban revitalization and global recognition, capped by the 1992 Olym-
pics: he has been elected president of the Catalan Generalitat. While
Catalan socialists continue to vie with parties like Esquerra Republicana
(the Republican Left) and conservative Catalanists, the urban political
discourse that has emerged in the last two decades generally agrees on
the aggressive development of the city and nation, despite divergences
over the relation of national culture and rights of the state (McDonogh
1999). Local relations have also evolved with the integration of Barce-
lona and Catalonia into a changing Europe, where identities may play
Spain off against a supranational citizenship.
Citizenship is not just shaped by leaders and policies, however.
Although the fervor of the post-Franco transition has long dissipated,
issues of place, culture, and identity remain present in the city. In 2003,
some 1.5 million people marched in Barcelona to oppose the war in
Iraq, in which the Spanish government, vigorously supported by
Catalan conservatives, had allied itself with the United States. In the
face of a global issue, Barcelonins manifested a strong collective civic
voice, coordinated with demonstrations around the world. In 2004,
sadder mass demonstrations filled the same streets, this time with citi-
zens ready to show solidarity with the rest of Spain, after the fatality-
inflicting terrorist bombings in Madrid.
Yet emphatic claims to rights of place and space aside, global flows
continue to redefine the meanings of minority statuses. By the mid-
1980s, Barcelona’s participation in the changes sweeping Europe and
the globe brought other newcomers into the city—Muslims, Arabs,
sub-Saharan Africans, Latin Americans, East Asians, and South Asians.
This highly noticeable influx challenged the perception of community
on the part of the “citizens of Catalonia.” Until recently themselves
identified with a place of repressed culture and political rights, now
some Barcelonins began to find reason to manifest growing resistance
to what its news media much too often portrayed as an “invasion” by refugees and an assault by overt poverty, crime, and drugs. While newspapers sometimes disseminated happy images of Afro-Catalan schoolchildren hand-in-hand reciting poetry in Catalan, urban Arabs and Africans continued to face police harassment, mass media stereotyping, verbal and physical abuse, and intense scrutiny in areas such as the barrio chino. In the meantime, Filipinas became stereotyped as domestics and Gujaratis, Pakistanis, and Chinese as shopkeepers or restaurateurs. One journalist even chose to compliment Gujaratis as “the Catalans of India,” given their evident industriousness (McDonogh 1991, 1993, 1999).

Shifting population flows, political economic transformations, and new discourses on difference led Catalan commentators to reexamine the connections between cultural citizenship and political economic rights. A 1987 editorial wondered, “It is a sign of the times that to be European no longer means to be white. But will being Catalan no longer be a synonym for speaking Catalan? Is it possible that non-Spanish immigrants will be integrated through the culture of the country and not through the superimposition of Castilian in Catalan? Will immigrants who, not being Spanish, lack the a priori ‘since they are in their own country they can’ attitude, still undertake Castilian?” (Cardus Ros 1987). Immigration in this citation insinuated a risk to local Catalan distinctiveness, a threat to the delicate balance between the polity and the Castilian state, and a potentially problematic byproduct of and for a budding “new Europe.”

Seventeen years later, this tension between local citizenship and branded outsiders continues within a wider discussion of Spanish and European frontiers and citizenship. Continuing his decades of work, Frances Candel has identified first-generation immigrants, who now include many Latin Americans and South Asians, as “other Catalans of the 21st century” (Candel and Cuenca 2001).

The Barcelona Forum 2004 used cultural diversity as an organizing theme for a mega-event intended to make of Barcelona a global platform for debating cities and their future. Yet the meanings of diversity remained elastic (www.barcelona2004.org). Diversity certainly provided the topic of forums, Web-based discussions, and citywide activities. Celebratory features included markets for global goods (featuring toil, and environmentally sensitive coffee) and a potpourri of artists ranging from the Peking Opera and Mikhail Baryshnikov to Teatro Zingaro, Caetano Veloso, and Pina Bausch. Such acute concern with
imported diversity evoked the dilemmas of curious civilization, so characteristic of the European tradition of world fairs: the rich metropolis’s encounter with the domesticated other, framed as the object of a global pedagogy, not as the foundation of global citizenship.

This new otherness also posed potential new contradictions. In the summer of 2002, Manuel Trallero, writing in the major daily *La Vanguardia*, provided a telling portrait of Romanian gypsies camped out on the northern fringe of the city, where developmental construction for Forum 2004 had centered. Trallero’s story grappled with historical images of gypsy marginality created over the centuries out of Spanish and Catalan representations and legal and social divisions. For him, the place was “a gypsy camp, but here there are no bears dancing to the sound of tambourines or seers who read cards in a cart, nor cigarette girls like Bizet’s Carmen who ensnare us with a single gaze. Here there are no stereotypes, nor folklore, only garbage and shit; thus, there is no room for literature” (2002, 27). His report on this gypsy displacement highlighted contradictions of culture, power, place, and citizenship: “this is Barcelona’s schizophrenia: driving immigrants away from *Plaza Catalunya* by force and then contracting Manu Chao for the Feast of Our Lady of Mercy to sing about them in the same place . . . They expel the gypsies, with no alternatives and prepare the stage to celebrate multiculturalism a few meters away” (2002, 27).

The haunting presence of difference and inequality became evident again in 2003, when reports decried a decline of Catalan as a spoken language among youth. These reports coincided with renewed demands that immigrants learn Spanish only. The dependence of contemporary Catalonia on imported labor in turn inspired a conservative pro-natalist campaign that revived multiple issues of religion, nation, and gender and sparked controversy over the entry of immigrants and the possibilities of keeping alive the welfare state without their contributive support. Meanwhile, protests by labor organizations, *SOS-Racisme*, and leftists against the new and restrictive applications of immigration laws pushed representation and practice toward a vision of newer and more inclusive transnational communities. But difference continues to be a template for exploring tensions around revitalized Catalan citizenship, inside the still unfinished transformation of the Spanish state, for a Catalonia now finding itself within an expanding Europe and for a Barcelona at the very heart of globalization.

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As these examples illustrate, citizenship in Barcelona and in Catalonia has evolved over millennia, producing traditions, monuments, events, and memories that fortify place and people within Spain and in Europe. The political-cultural status of Catalan citizens in Barcelona became differentiated through minoritarian relations with a centralist Spanish state. Yet the economic power and cultural vitality of the city and region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries helped its people regain individual and collective rights, as well as national autonomy. Even today, differentiated citizenship entails new choices and newer negotiations about social relations anchored in the realm of the city, region, and nation. Past tensions recreated citizenship in the face of both the Spanish state and the urban divisions of ethnicity and class. The city and nation now face unknown global challenges even as they build on a strong heritage of images, myths, memories, and compromises.

**Global Hong Kong: Differences at the Edge of Empires**

Great Britain took the island of Hong Kong from China in 1841 as spoils of the First Opium War. China ceded additional territories on the mainland by the Convention of Peking in 1860, and Britain leased the once rural New Territories for 99 years in 1898. The British saw Hong Kong as an entrepôt, not as a place for recreating China or incorporating Chinese as British citizens. An 1893 British guide to the Crown’s colony reveals the divided world of the colonizer in its introduction: “For ages prior to the year 1841, [Hong Kong] existed only as a plutonic island of uninviting sterility, apparently capable of supporting the lowest forms of organisms. To-day it stands forth before the world with its City of Victoria and a permanent population of over two hundred thousand souls—a noble monument to British pluck and enterprise” (Hong Kong Guide 1893, 1982, 1). One hardly can tell that almost all the population referred to in the text were Chinese. This underscores how the colonizer weighed difference in the colony. As historian Steve Tsang summarizes the situation, “the British had little interest in governing the local Chinese beyond the stability and good order deemed conducive . . . even essential . . . to trade and prosperity” (2004, 66).

While Chinese have contradicted this “barren rock” myth of origins, they too have been uneasy about the territory’s liminal status. As the critic Poshek Fu (2003, 51) notes, mainland elites came to see Hong Kong as “beyond the pale of civilization” and “a cultural desert,”
despite its increasing importance in the twentieth century. Nonetheless, Chinese from nearby Guangdong had already poured into and through Hong Kong, contributing to its growth, wealth, culture, and diasporic connections.

These Hong Kong Chinese, even when mere sojourners, not only were differentiated from the colonizing population, they transformed the meanings of citizenship in a China hitherto embedded in bonds of place, race, culture, and state. Whereas the territory of China has grown by incorporation of new lands and peoples over millennia, place has been also the ground for the formation of a people and a state articulated through the role of the family as an overarching concept of unity, presided over by the emperor. Emigrant Chinese sometimes were even treated as traitors in the Ming and early Qing dynasties. Yet their experiences and bonds soon showed potential for reshaping modern China itself. Moreover, while ties to place might change with distance, even in diasporic China, family and related concepts of race have remained fundamental tenets of “being Chinese” in postimperial China. As in Barcelona, in Hong Kong too language constitutes a unifying feature; although spoken languages differ inside China and in the Chinese diaspora, an ideographic writing system is shared by most Chinese (see Schiffman, chap. 4 in this book). Race, family, history, language, and connection to the homeland became constitutive elements of being Chinese abroad, whether in Hong Kong or in situations of reinterpreted identities as transnational minorities linked to China via Hong Kong.

By the turn of the twentieth century, colonial Hong Kong offered a more active place for rethinking China. Sun Yat-Sen, future “father of China,” studied in Hong Kong and used it as a base for his nationalist activities. From Hong Kong, local associations of migrants returning from California and Australia supported the Chinese revolution of 1911 with volunteers and with money. Jung-Fang Tsai (1993) has argued that, after 1911, Hong Kong’s Chinese citizens—laborers as well as wealthy merchants—remained attentive to China’s postimperial politics and thus to their own national identity, through manifestations such as strikes, donations, and active intellectual discussions.

But the divisions of colonial society remained omnipresent. Residential spaces, activity, language, education, institutions, and race constituted barriers in everyday life. Although wealthy Chinese and Eurasians eventually were invited to participate in civic governance, the Peak, a salubrious site overlooking Victoria Harbor, would exclude almost all
Chinese (except servants) for decades. Only the Japanese conquest of Hong Kong in World War II upended the haughty colonial ideologies of race, power, and segregation imposed by the British and more or less accepted by many Chinese (see Tsang 2004).

After the 1949 revolution in China, Hong Kong became a refuge for Chinese of various classes fleeing the newly founded Communist regime. Waves of immigrants and their children who stayed in Hong Kong brought labor and capital to transform extant local production capacities, helping to create Hong Kong’s economic boom in succeeding decades. At the same time, however, the refugee crisis forced the British colonial government to grapple with problems of the Chinese as newly resident subjects by expanding public services in housing, education, health care, and other fields. Both processes laid the foundation for a new if still distinctive citizenship of rights for Hong Kong Chinese.

The colony and its peoples moved rapidly from Third World status to First World levels of lifestyle, economic power, and opportunity in a colonial political setting that still allowed Chinese residents little if any representation or voice in public life and governance. B. K. Leung (1996) has suggested that the emphasis placed on family as a fundamental unit of organization and support by the basic Confucian structure of traditional Chinese society in fact facilitated British strategies of rule, because the family sphere overshadowed the need for recourse to activist politics in Hong Kong. Yet Tsai’s investigations of Chinese activism (1993) tend to suggest a sharp awareness of politics in China—an acuity that has long complemented the differential development of Hong Kong itself. Certainly the riots of the 1960s worried Britain, if only because Hong Kong Chinese echoed the tumult of the mainland’s Cultural Revolution. These disturbances also showed the latent force of localized demands, and that spurred further reforms leading to the recognition of Chinese as citizens. These newer measures ranged from expanded government support for public housing to the establishment of Cantonese as an official government language.

Over the next few decades, Hong Kong Chinese could expand their activist roles as consumers, cultural producers, and protestors, with a growing sense of belonging to a hybrid space in which they created new identities. Hong Kong cinema, for example, helped to banish the stigma of “made in Hong Kong” labels, thanks to action movies that reframed Hollywood genres and art films able to triumph worldwide at many film festivals. Industry gave way to finance, and capital in turn
secured the consumption and information services that made Hong Kong’s glittering skyscrapers emblems of a global city. Although formal participation in governance remained limited, a distinct Hong Kong identity did emerge during these decades. Still, cultural analyst Matthew Turner could not but ponder in the early 1990s whether “an identity that can be possessed can also be taken away, just as the Hong Kong people have been ‘divided,’ [and] constituted as a ‘community,’ only to be resolved, reconstituted and dissolved again with the ebb and flow of politics . . . [C]ultural identity, like democracy, cannot be given by lawyers, politicians, or professors—it must be made.” Absent clear political citizenship, he argued, “‘life-style’ presents itself as a site of resistance for local identity. It is perhaps all the better for being unarticulated yet at the heart of the Joint Declaration, for life-style can be expressed but it cannot easily be censored” (1994, 31).

The Joint Declaration to which Turner refers marked a very clear turning point in Hong Kong’s governance and citizenship as the end of the lease on the New Territories in 1997 approached. Despite British claims to ‘ownership’ of Hong Kong and Kowloon, it had become evident after World War II that Britain would neither press for Hong Kong’s independence nor seek to control the colony indefinitely. The future of Hong Kong, even in British eyes, lay with a changing Chinese state. By the 1980s, Britain and China had begun direct negotiations—without any presence or participation by the Hong Kong Chinese—over Hong Kong’s future. The Joint Declaration of September 26, 1984, mapped out Hong Kong’s “reunification” with China on July 1, 1997: British colonial rule would hold with the cooperation of China until 1997. Thereafter, Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region for 50 years, with considerable autonomy under its own Basic Law. Under the general principle of “one country, two systems,” this arrangement thus would “unify” China as “a nation” while allowing Hong Kong and its people to be different in their economic system, as well as in some aspects of their legal and political action. These guarantees would take on new meanings when a China that seemed to be moving toward economic openness crushed political opposition in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (see deLisle, 2008).

Meanwhile, much to the irritation of the Chinese government, the British, promptly upon their agreement to return the space to China, began to enhance participatory rule in Hong Kong. Quickly, Hong Kong Chinese took on new responsibilities in voting for the Legislative Council, although that parliamentary body was still vetted by the
appointed governor-general. Such partial democratization, which thus produced a multiracial legislature of and for Hong Kong Chinese and non-Chinese residents, entailed a new collective vision of citizens’ rights and responsibilities that differentiated Hong Kong from both China and Britain. Nevertheless, the first elected chief executive of Hong Kong would arrive only after reunification, when a select group of delegates on the mainland chose Tung Chee-Wah, a Shanghai-born businessman with close ties to the mainland, to head the Special Administrative Region. Parallel circumstances and developments in Macau/Macao-SAR have been described elsewhere (Ciprut 1999, 2000).

Hong Kong Chinese negotiated the 1997 transition in various ways. Some saw Hong Kong in its historical role as a vanguard and place of criticism for China: Victoria Park has hosted massive protests on each anniversary of the Tiananmen uprising. Emigration or the quest for dual citizenships, literally as passports to security, cropped up on cinema screens and in conversations across the city, especially after the events of Tiananmen and ensuing insecurities about being part of China. Coinciding with newly liberalized immigration policies in the United States and Canada, emigration would help produce new Hong Kong-based populations and ramified interest groups worldwide.

But 1997 did not become the apocalyptic moment that (especially foreign) voices in the media had so clearly predicted. Elections, laws, and authority continue to be debated in Hong Kong today, but in ways distinct from mainland political practices. This debate illustrates the strengths and capacity of the people of Hong Kong to develop into a different postcolonial mode of citizenship, now as part of China. Discussions over changes to the Basic Law that would limit freedoms inherited from British common law, for example, brought thousands of protesters into the streets in 2003 and 2004. As in Barcelona, this physical manifestation of acute consciousness of community in place mingles hybrid cultural citizenship and economic rights, in a very intricate political legal definition of difference from China proper.

Hong Kong, like Barcelona, has faced other global legacies of diversity, often shaped by colonial rule. Britain, for example, had allowed people from other (especially South Asian) colonies to settle in the territory; some descendants of these were to find themselves in the legal limbo of statelessness on the eve of 1997, since Chinese had stressed family and race over residence when defining citizenship. Though British presence and influence diminished after 1997, expatriates from
North America and Australia continue to constitute a distinctive global population of urban residents, amid Chinese who also hold dual citizenships. Finally, Hong Kong’s economic success has shown, as that of Barcelona’s did, that lower-status job opportunities attract global immigrants, including the more than 140,000 women from the Philippines—contracted sojourners all—caring for the households of middle-class Chinese and other well-to-do families but enjoying few local rights. Yet the dialectic of difference now spurring the most interest emerges from China. Hong Kong citizens’ success and freedoms, evident to mainland visitors and disseminated through movies and television broadcasts that cross political borders, make Hong Kong a source for differentiated views and unprecedented perspectives from which to reconceptualize mainland Chinese citizenship. This process has long been encouraged by regional implementation of the important economic reforms launched in China in the late 1970s, under Deng Xiaoping. Shenzhen, for example, across the border from Hong Kong, has become a successful economic development zone in which experiments with capitalism encourage investment on the part of diasporic Chinese, as well as by foreign investors based in, or acting through, Hong Kong (Smart and Smart 1999). New wealth in the Pearl River Delta has promoted new experiences, fostered new social understandings, and encouraged a new political conduct of citizenship (Ciprut 2000). Shanghai and Beijing ultimately may eclipse Hong Kong and other cities in the south. Yet the dialogue about what the state should be and do, and the questions of what rights and privileges citizens may achieve in such a framework, resonates with the history, experience, and vision of Hong Kong as a place and people apart. Beijing’s assertions of wider control over Hong Kong in 2004 suggest that a “one country, two systems” model may also impose limits on difference. But these differences too will be debated in Hong Kong—and in China, and in Taiwan, and even in the far-flung diaspora communities of the Chinese—for years to come.

Conclusions: Rethinking Differentiated Citizenship

These comparative case studies of differentiated citizenship in two world cities illustrate both how people become divided and how they develop a range of responses—interpretive, grassroots, and above all social, economic, civic, and political—by virtue of which new under-
standings and practices of citizenship may come to alter such divisions over time. Differentiated citizenship is likely to continue to represent a fundamental statement of power and place: about who may claim what rights, where, when, how, and why. As the two cases suggest, such differences are often complex, unstable, and provocative. Hence, beyond precedence and preeminence, what emerges in both examples are city-states of sorts in search of means to resolve their conflicts at compound levels of interactions, with complex local, statal, national, and global implications.

Barcelonins and Catalans held to the land that they cultivated and transformed even as contexts, definitions, and rights of local and national citizenship kept changing in the Spanish state and in far broader contexts as well. Their rightful claims to place were long constrained by the power of the state, which they dared to challenge and to transform. Thus, Barcelona has become a model for European citizenship and an alternative answer to emergent global questions.

Long before empires collided in Hong Kong, China had formed as a people, as a linguistic and cultural community, and as an empire, in a hierarchy of places within which the Chinese could afford to perceive themselves to be “the center of the world.” In this framework, the global dispersal of the Chinese, in and through Hong Kong, created a tension between attachment to place and culture and attraction to the possibilities offered by newer places, where Chinese would discover latitude for minority participation and for new economic and cultural identities. The modes of citizenship that emerged in Hong Kong through such compound-complex confluence now come to offer innovative means for imagining novel prospects for citizenship in China proper.

Focusing on the city as a place of difference need not signify isolation. On the contrary, modern cities will continue to constitute pivotal spaces within a globalizing framework of shifting traditional relations. For differentiated citizens, place may be a transnational point of origin or destination, a refuge, a memory, a vision, or an opportunity. But a city is also a space for multiple encounters and for changes that can reinvent the order established by the state. The global movement in which cities increasingly participate entails daily flows of goods, information, and people on a worldwide scale, and this trend suggests that encounters of differences in world cities are likely to become ever more intense. True, these changes markedly stimulated violence and exclusion in the past, but they have also forced new visions of community
among many erstwhile irreconcilable entities, in the very mentality that Gómez’s book, with which this essay began, refers to: “The challenge of citizenship . . . is to reconstruct the city at human scale” (Alguacil 2004, 36).

Time is central to understanding differentiated citizenship. An assimilation model, so often evoked for differentiated communities in many different societies, tends to proffer gradual ‘progress’ in the long march to citizenship. The process of defining and synthesizing difference more often than not involves struggle and negotiation over long years, but offers multiple modes of voluntary coexistence. These lengthy processes also may foster periods of intense debate, as in the course of Hong Kong’s return to China or during the transition from Francoist rule to liberal democracy in Barcelona, through which recognition of difference stimulates analysis, synthesis, and change.

Differentiated citizenship also forces us to examine the complex nature of power. Political, economic, social, and cultural change often affords different respective stimuli and rhythms, whose intersections are critical. The renaissance of Catalan industry and trade in the nineteenth century stimulated new visions of national citizenship and newer cultural production. Economic productivity in Hong Kong underscored new visions of rights and responsibilities of citizenship even before the formal political shifts of the 1980s and 1990s. And everyday urban encounters, as well as mass responses to social and political issues make room for volitional coalitions to form and to reform across lines of historical differences.

Finally, relations of time, space, power, and community are embedded in local as well as global representations and reflections, evoked through media, architecture, but also and especially through voices from among the citizenry, as shown to be the case for both of the cities and cultures here compared. Ideas of race and inferiority, and of moral worth and loyalty, are elements pivotal in discourses on difference. Visions of human diversity do provide values for global citizenship just as they stimulate debate over a new city—in the streets of Hong Kong and at the Forum 2004 in Barcelona, for example.

Thus, as these cases suggest, the history, the features, and the many experiences of differentiated citizenship must be taken to be not mere descriptors of, but also as challenges for, better futures. As a dialectic in place and over time, differentiated citizenship ushers in not a bleak choice between costly inequality and faceless assimilation but a range of possibilities for building new spaces and new societies in arising
futures, wherein the experiences, aspirations, and even the conflicts of civic spaces offer hope for human potential, worldwide.

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This chapter explores the current parameters of debate on citizenship as a relationship between the individual and the state, in Arab states and across the Muslim world from Morocco to Iran. The specific conditions shaping the notion of citizenship in each state in the geographic span of the Arab-Muslim world are diverse, but one can account for the basic commonalities determining the debate on citizenship in these states. Why do most individuals who call these nations their own think of themselves more as subjects of God (Allah) than as citizens of the state (Dawla)?

The discussion here examines the notion of citizenship beyond proof of documentation, in terms of the internal dynamics that shape the idea into a value-laden behavioral mentality and set in motion the rising tension between the state and the individual, especially when governmental authority, power, and legitimacy are challenged. This tension has led to upheavals in Arab societies and to the rise of Islamism, culminating in demands for an Islamic state as a solution to the failure of secularist states to satisfy the basic rights of individual citizens. Lack of adequate responses to the social, political, economic, and cultural conditions of the individual has caused much antagonism in the relationship between the person and the state. The ensuing debates on whether the religious notion of umma—the idea that all Muslims are a nation; the principle of a world Islamic community of believers; not a secular image of citizenship or a “construed” sociopolitical civic identity—should prevail have come full circle to haunt the doubters.

Addressing the divisive yet urgent question of the future of democracy and citizenship in Arab-Muslim states requires discussion of four basic observations. First, the concept of citizenship does not exist in Islam. Second, the concept was introduced into Arab-Muslim states by colonial powers, through the adoption of secularism and the
emergence of the nation-state. Third, the socioeconomic failure of secular government in the Arab-Muslim states that did try to modernize the masses led to ethnopolitical alienation among individuals and between individuals and the state, as amply illustrated by some of the policies of a number of these states within the geographic span under discussion here. Fourth, the preachers’ call for a return to the umma is, generally, more a consequence of failed secularism and misguided economic policies than a call for Islamist supremacy. These basic four observations form the backdrop to preferences in the Arab “street” that increasingly seem to favor Islamic subjecthood over U.S.-made or Western-style citizenships, in the wider context of heated political discussions across the modernizing Arab-Muslim states today. Anti-Western, militant, Islamist activism does indeed find fertile ground among the Muslim masses dissatisfied with their state. The convergence of differently motivated disgusts greatly magnifies general discontent, at times working to complex conflated extents that prohibit differentiations by newer observers. In this sense and to that extent, discussion would not be complete without an additional, fifth, factor of observation. For our corresponding scrutiny here, aiming as we are in this chapter at a thorough exposition of the dilemmas shared by all in the Arab-Muslim world today, the Algerian case is pivotal and serves as basis for comparison.

Umma, Citizenship, and Islam

The first observation postulates that the notion of citizenship is not found in traditional Islam. Some Muslim scholars, such as Abu Al-ala Al-Mawdudi (1977), Haitham Menaa (1997), and Al-Gabanji (1997), dismiss the notion’s right to exist. Even as a construct, they view it as harboring an obstacle to the spread of Islam, if only because it fails to account for the personal relationship sustained with Allah by Muslim men and women. These scholars view the worldly elements held to account for a nation, such as language, race, territory, history, and shared sociopolitical goals, as nonessential factors in determining an individual identity or a sense of belonging. In this worldview, it is first and foremost their faith that qualifies Muslims for membership in the umma: Al-Mawdudi views citizenship and nationality as nothing more than istilahat al-jahylya’a (concepts of ignorance).

As another Muslim scholar, Allam Iqbal, has put it, “Our hearts belong not to India, or Rome, or Damascus . . . our only homeland is
Islam” (Nagavi 1984, 9). This thought was echoed by other Muslims—Saeed Jamal, for instance, who thinks that “[f]or Muslims, there is no nationality except Islam” (Nagavi 1984, 9). The late Imam Khomeini, revolutionary leader and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, attacked the idea of nationality by emphasizing that for Muslims, nationalism produces all misfortunes (Nagavi 1984, 9). But none of the authoritative Islamic sources make the universal mission of Islam clearer than the Quran: “You are the best of nations, raised up for the benefit of men: You enjoy what is right and forbid what is wrong” (3:109). The Prophet Muhammad’s mission, according to the Quran, was universal, not tribal or national: “And we have not sent you but to all men as the bearer of good news and as a warner” (34:28).

One can go even further and label Islam a party of God (Hizb Allah). Anyone who believes in Islam’s ideology can become a welcome member of this universal party. Faith and belief form the bases for the Muslim umma, the mechanism of authority that has manifested itself from the early days of the Islamic state and whose supreme powerful expression reflects God’s will over his servants (Khadimihii), those faithful citizens of the Muslim state. For Islam is a \( \text{din wa dawla} \) (religion and state) whose common goal and raison d’être are to respond to the umma’s needs in light of the complexity of societal life, by securing the propagation of Islamic values, unity, and justice. This divine goal could not be achieved without the hermetic separation of the sacred and the profane, to reinforce the conviction that there already does exist an Islamic citizenship, one based exclusively on loyalty and faith to the Universal State of Islam. The very notion was exploited, arguably to more or less worthy ends, by pan-Arabism in support of secular nationalist—not spiritual, not even religious—self-interests.

All the more so during the reign of Muhammad, who, as Rasul-Ilah (God’s prophet), was supreme head of the first Islamic state. His death, in 632 C.E., placed on the very shoulders of the umma the great debates over political authority and issues of individual and collective rights, the legitimacy of which the Prophet himself attributed to the source of Islamic law, the Holy Book Quran, and the Sunna (the words and deeds of the Prophet, recorded during his life and after his death, intended to guide the successors in administering individual freedoms and group rights (Kelly 1984, 56). Although at the time, the existence of the Islamic state, acknowledged as such, would have been self-explanatory, today, terms such as theocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, and universal
nomocracy are used to denote the nature and to assess the structure of the first Islamic state.

Introducing several approaches and models to address questions such as, “What is the source of power in Islam?” and “Does Islam have a theory of state?” Mahdi Mozaffari (1987, 23–24) has greatly furthered the debate over Islam’s stance and perspective on issues of citizenship. He claims that his models of the Islamic state apply to Islam throughout its history. They attempt to measure “the degree of Islamicity” in each regime and to determine “the extent to which a system is totally Islamic, partly Islamic, or hybrid” when assessing its capacity to reconcile Islamic and secular thinking.

None of the models advanced by Mozaffari is more to the point, more apt, and more illustrative of a proper and genuine Islamic state than the Medina model, depicting the first Islamic state—founded, developed, and administered by the Prophet himself. It was followed by the caliphate, the imamate, and other models, some of which apply to today’s Arab-Muslim states. The Medina model is named after Medina, a city north of Mecca in Saudi Arabia to which the Prophet migrated when he fled Quraysh with his companions. In this model, the Prophet proposes to his tribe a new umma, one different from what their forefathers had: an umma under God’s authority, with Muhammad as its supreme leader (Mozaffari 1987, 23–24).

Regarding the Medina model, a key question is how the Islamic state in the early days of its existence addressed the rights of the shakhs (the individual) at a time when the focus was on the umma (the collectivity) as the basis of core political and legal institutions. Several principles that constituted the nucleus of individual rights—equality, justice, and freedom—were integrated into the Islamic Holy Constitution (the Quran) to ensure the rights of every Muslim. These principles are central to the debate on how the lack of democracy in the Near East and in Muslim-Arab states shapes not only the social, political, economic, and cultural discourse but the very meaning of being a citizen, in light of the expectations associated with the practical aspects of that concept. The violation of these rights in some Muslim-Arab states can be, and often is, perceived today as having triggered the rise of mass discontent—fueled, spread, and exploited by militant Islamists in the Arab-Muslim world—both as a challenge to Arab-Muslim states and as a menace to their allies and supporters in the East and West.

Equality, justice, and freedom, widely thought to have been practiced among Muslims throughout history, constitute the kernel of the hopes
of Arab Muslims today in their struggle against political regimes that deny them the very rights and privileges that follow from these principles, even in exclusive societal contexts of religious homogeneity. The denial of these rights to Arab Muslims by their own governments debases the meaning of Islamic citizenship in an Islamic state, and even more acutely so in Arab states, where these basic rights are ignored or manipulated by leaders in the name of internal security or regime stability. Islam’s recognition of equality among Muslims regardless of color, race, or gender resides in the Quran’s emphasis on the human 
\textit{nafs} (soul). Islamic principles of equality before the law and of equal access to the Islamic state’s social services attest to the fundamental importance of these constitutional principles in Islamic governance—much in contrast to what seems to be going on in those Arab-Muslim states today, where social, political, and economic, inequalities linger. Ironically, the very concept of Islamic justice and the universal Islamic aspiration for it are partly what fuels the adoption of militant Islamism among the Islamic masses in countries where they are the majority, and in modern non-Islamic nations, where generally Muslims are a minority (see McDonogh, chap. 7 in this book).

Conversely, the Islamic precept of freedom stands for the final responsibility of Muslims to participate in the political process and (through honest criticism) to hold Islamic authorities accountable for their public actions and inactions. Yet none of the Arab-Muslim states today allows freedom of the press or the right to dissent without dire consequences for those few individuals who dare attempt to exercise them. This unfreedom-become-injustice hence puts Muslim individuals and Muslim authorities at loggerheads, culminating in frustration and despair for individuals while at the same time widening radical and reactionary support for Islamist militancy and for “fundamentalism” among the Arab masses.

Although Islamic ‘citizenship’ in practice can be conferred on Muslim subjects only, and whereas the religion of the Islamic state was conceived to be homogeneous before the era of conquests and the periods of empire, Islam’s respect for individual freedom has come to encompass an array of rights, accorded to a number of Muslims, and of privileges extended to non-Muslims. Responsibility of the Muslim state toward its non-Muslim subjects comes in three categories, based on the residence of the individual: non-Muslims living inside the exclusive sovereign span of the Islamic state, namely, ‘the House of Peace’ (Dar al-Islam), or even within territories controlled by the Islamic state,
enjoy special privileges but are subject to all of the obligations and responsibilities incumbent on the Muslim citizens of that Muslim state. Entitlements and duties encompass protection by the state and the obligation to pay income taxes, for example. Those non-Muslims penetrating the jurisdiction of the Islamic state on business—traders and merchants—are protected by the laws as visitors or as temporary residents. But non-Muslims living outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamic state, beyond Dar al-Islam, namely, in the Dar al-Harab, or ‘the House of War’, are conceded special protections as provided by the laws of war (Kurdi 1984, 57).

The Quran abounds with verses that emphasize the basic principles of justice, equality, freedom, and respect among Muslims. During the reign of the Prophet, and in the caliphate period that followed, the Muslim state remained committed to implementing these principles, as a fundamental rule of Sharia (Islamic religious law). The failure of the Arab-Muslim world to uphold the rule of Islamic law continues to cause alienation and growing hostility in state-person relations within and between these countries, causing regret and resentment in exile, where inability to turn to Islamic law in the non-Islamic lands of migratory destination gives alienation special meaning in lack of assimilation.

**Colonialism, Secularism, and the Nation-State**

In 1699, the three great Muslim empires—the Ottomans, Sufavids, and Mughals—began to decline. The Muslim state and its institutions, founded by the Prophet and sustained by the caliphate system, now began to give way to European domination. Starting in 1798, Napoleon’s short occupation of Egypt was of great significance, especially in light of the fact that, except for the Christian Crusades, this was the first time a European (non-Islamic) power was gaining control of the Muslim heartland (Kelly 1984, 137–156). With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a close interface between Europe and the Arab-Muslim world of North Africa and the Near East became historical reality, redefining over time not merely the relationship between these two political worlds and religious universes but even more emphatically so the future of the Arab-Muslim state in fast-modernizing global settings.

Division of the Muslim territories into Western subsystems of international political organizations, and correspondingly arbitrary nation-
states, put an end to the umma as a monolithic political entity. The secularist ‘yeast’ of the Western state was introduced into Arab lands of the East, where Islam had been for long the single, exclusive, determining factor in state-person relationships (Kelly 1984, 173). A Muslim who had lived as an unquestioning subject of Allah in the territories ruled by the caliphate (embodied in the throne of the Ottoman Empire) suddenly became a subject of a foreign (i.e., non-Islamic) state through drastic changes imposed by French and British occupation of the Fertile Crescent, under a mandate from the League of Nations.

The large span of the former Ottoman Empire was transformed very quickly into distinct states by the victors. But a mode of government that supported self-determination and liberal democracy never could or did appear in these new states, not least due to internecine conflicts and internal contradictions inherent to systemic complexity, further complicated by the society’s long attachment by default to its faith as an indigenous source of identity, but also in a resolute show of religious fortitude and of ideological opposition—as a network of parallel government. This dual front forced occupiers of Arab-Muslim states to seek to reconcile their exogenous ideals of Western liberal democracy with the endogenous tenets of localized popular cultures. Despite the evident necessity to rebuild Islamic civil society during the period of transition from colonialism to independence, no palpable progress was made anywhere toward this goal except in Turkey proper. In none of these societies could individual rights be freely asserted by the “liberated” citizens of Arab-Muslim states despite early efforts to such effect in Algeria, Tunisia, and, yes, Libya. The few finally ousted occupiers then, and the postcolonial West since, have encouraged and self-servingly somehow still continue to back regimes and policies that hamper civic responsibility and condone government unaccountability inside the once colonized and the now sovereign Arab states.

Muslim disillusionment with and resentment toward the West had begun with the very first encounter between Europe and the Arab-Muslim nation under Ottoman tutelage. Yet it became very clear after years of secularist experimentation with Westernization in the postcolonial era that any success in democratic emancipation would be limited and highly dependent on charismatic leadership or overtly paternalistic rule. With the introduction of nationalism and the demise of Islamic government, Christian Westernization and capitalist secularism were allowed to enter as safeguards for individual liberties and civil rights. But liberal protection required an effective legal system based on
Western law. Such a system failed to appear in states where both colonizer and colonized continued to condone the parallel practice of the Sharia, whether out of consenting convenience or in deference to local tradition, depending on the occupier’s best interests of the moment.

Yet wherever Islamic law was viewed as nonconducive to change and modernization, and wherever whenever possible otherwise, colonial powers did introduce European laws into Arab-Muslim societies that for many centuries had relied on Islamic customary laws (Sharia) for the daily regulation of their social and economic transactions. The West viewed Islamic laws as devoid of formal rationality, judged along the lines of Weber’s legal typology, which consists of four conditions: rational, irrational, formal, and substantive. Of these four, the dyad combining the formal and the rational depicts a legal system based on logic, objectivity, and recognizable legitimacy for law making. (Fetni 2008). In this context, formal rationality best describes the Western legal system, highly vaunted by the European powers and their allies in Arab-Muslim states as ‘nec plus ultra’ for the irreproachable functioning of consolidated state systems in general and of newly established polities in particular.

Under these circumstances, in many Arab-Muslim nations Sharia law (Quran and Sunna) gave way to “national law”—a secular system of law “inspired” by religion. The Muslim legal system, it would seem, simply had to change, or surely it would fall apart. Such conviction at the very top of the leadership of the Muslim state would lead to a definitive break with Sharia rule in Turkey if to profound reticence in other Muslim countries. The new nations in the Arabian Peninsula, for instance, allowed Sharia law to remain practically intact. The trend with much greater appeal for most Arab nations, however, was a combination of the Western legal system and the Sharia, such that social transactions of a public financial nature would be subject to Western law and human relations of a private or familial nature would remain subject to Islamic law. Under the same jurisdiction, individual rights were also to be split between religious and secular law, the latter to govern political and civil rights. It would have been much easier, at least from Western perspectives and for the purposes of social change, to subject both purviews to Western law. In many postcolonial Islamic societies, such as Algeria, which had endured total French colonial control for 132 years, from 1830 to 1962, even fuller assimilation was attempted, at least in theory, with high aims and hopes of reproducing
French institutions in letter and spirit and of developing a working model of the French legal system practicable in Algeria. For the French, as Roberts has explained, assimilation was construed to signify “an exact reproduction of the minutiae of administration in every branch” in order for Algerian subjects to begin to be treated with a Western sense of equality (cited in Wieschoff 1972, 92). But disillusionment with this policy of total assimilation was felt so deeply that even those who supported it at first, including Farhat Abbas, a historical leader of the Algerian Revolution, had to admit, “When an Algerian says he is an Arab, the French lawyers respond, ‘No, you are a Frenchman.’ When he asks for the same rights as Frenchmen, the same lawyers respond, ‘No, you are an Arab’” (quoted in Belkherroubi 1982, 72).

Historically, the Arab-Muslim peoples have seen their political, social, and economic rights severely restrained, not only by colonial and Western powers but also by their once colonized, now independent leaders. This has impeded the exercise of citizens’ rights recognized by domestic legislations and reconfirmed by international human rights declarations. Also, it has limited these peoples’ personal potential to become good citizens, equipped with a liberal ethic of political consciousness. The various policies and governing modes adopted by most Arab political authorities throughout the years have even barred citizen-subjects in Arab-Muslim states from active participation in their own political process. Repressive governmental measures caused dissatisfaction with and alienation from authoritarian regimes that, for internal and external motives, continued to manipulate their people’s history, culture, and religion, the better to control the masses. Deliberately or not, time and again, these regimes relied on external powers and on mimetic strategies when compelled to define the parameters and perimeters of individual rights. If one adds to this the alien forces of globalization and the desecularizing effects on these societies, one will find street masses willing to fight for a world where long-yearned-for justice, equality, and freedom ought to prevail. This fact puts most, not all, of the Arab-Muslim regimes on a collision course with their citizen-subjects, a large and growing number for whom Islam has become—and is becoming—end and means in their struggle for a self-empowering version of belonging that can augur a semblance of citizenship. Despite many striking differences among Arab-Muslim nations’ internal and external dynamics that jointly determine the way in which governments prefer to rule, one thing does become evident: it is a lack of political and civil rights that fully characterizes the sense
of utter unfulfillment sensed by most citizen-subjects in these states. Add to this the failed economic pursuits and developmental strategies toyed with for decades, and to a large extent one can understand the current turmoil in this devastated region of the world.

**Failure of Development Experiments by Arab-Muslim States**

Examining the stark failure of certain public policies and their impoverishing effects on some Arab-Muslim states may help to elucidate the existential dilemmas of Arab-Muslim citizen-subjects today. Failed policies include the positions of many Arab-Muslim states regarding the integration of Islam in political and legal institutions and the conduct—both—of agrarian and industrial development. I use Algeria’s experience centrally, the better to compare developments in many other Arab-Muslim states, toward possible model-theoretic generalizations in my conclusion.

**Legal Transplantations and Islam**

Today, most Arab-Muslim citizens’ rights are determined by legal systems, which integrate Western legal principles more or less aptly and in which indigenous laws reflect Islamic traditions. Substantive borrowings from Western legal traditions are seen in the constitutions of almost all these states, from Morocco to Turkey. Even in states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, where Islam is the primary source of law, Western influences are perceivable not only in financial and transaction laws, but also in the very techniques employed to codify the laws of social relations, including those ruling on family and inheritance.

Since the concept of citizenship was introduced with colonial or Western legislation, each Arab-Muslim state has tried to reconcile Islamic and Western laws when trying to combine national sovereignty and international rights—much despite themselves—given the West’s endogenous interests and exogenous influence. For example, the status of today’s Algerian citizen is defined by the constitution and the specific legislation adopted at independence in 1962. Yet it was French colonial power, not Algeria, that introduced the concept of citizenship at the time it installed French colonial legislation. At independence, extant legislation was strictly scrutinized by Algeria. Those provisions found to be contrary to its national sovereignty were eliminated as
stated in the body of Law No. 62–157 of December 1962, of which Article 1 stipulates explicitly: “The legislation in force on December 31, 1962 is extended until further notice; except for those of its provisions that are contrary to national sovereignty.” Article 2 strictly prohibits application of any colonial law likely to interfere with the democratic freedoms of Algerian citizens—a wishful emphasis on the civil and political rights that even sovereignty would fail to encourage the state to achieve, long after gaining national independence. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, which, as territories once administered by the French Ministry of War, experienced colonialism only partly, Algeria endured 132 years of total colonialism under the control of the French Ministry of the Interior, which administered the territory as if it were governing a province in mainland France. This regimen left its marks on the economic and social structure of Algeria, which, unlike France, ached from chronic underdevelopment, a deficient pool of human resources, illiteracy, low standards of living, very high unemployment, and an utter absence of industrialization.

Algeria’s independence was compromised even further by Franco-Algerian cooperation after the Evian Agreements of Independence. Although, under these agreements, Algeria was to have the freedom to adopt a political system of its own choosing, it remained for a very short period economically integrated into the capitalist system, even after declaring “socialism” as its choice for constructing the new state. The average citizen supported the leadership’s policies out of a desire to live independently under a system supposed to reflect the culture and tradition of one’s own community, especially after more than a million and a half souls gave their lives for independence in a struggle that united all factions and even the most diverse political groupings. Dissension among the Algerian leadership did arise upon independence, but the political choices embodied in the Algerian Revolution and in its Islamic heritage were said to be the main ingredients needed to build the independent state and its legal system. Everyone agreed.

The policy of reconciling Islam with modern indigenous needs, pursued in Algeria, was evident not only in the North African nations of the Maghreb—Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt—but also in some of the Arab-Muslim states of the Mashrek—Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. Jordan’s 1952 Constitution proclaimed it an independent Arab state, with Islam as state religion and Jordanian citizenship determined by the Trans-Jordan Nationality Law of 1928, the latter a fruit of the British
Mandate legislation (Davis 1997, 69). This document, though emended later to incorporate the changing realities in the Hashemite Kingdom since, draws its inspiration from the 1928 law even today.

Attempts to reconcile Islam with the newer realities facing Arab-Muslim citizen-subjects have extended beyond the legal system to government policies and plans designed to modernize and change the national economies, the better to promote civil rights, to enhance economic rights, and to give credence to conventional claims that political democracy cannot exist without social and economic justice. Let us now examine some of these failed policies, which, however well intended, have had nefarious effects on Arab-Muslim citizen-subjects, and especially on their individual relations with their state.

No policies in any of the Arab-Muslim states can illustrate the hardships they can impose on the people better than the policies that governed the agrarian and the industrial economic sectors in a period when most of these nations were witnessing a population explosion. For example, of all the political phases that independent Algeria has gone through, Houari Boumediene’s epoch (1965–1978) stands out as the most challenging, for the institutions and the welfare state that it could create but sadly also for the economic hardships that would ultimately accrue. That epoch generally helped to cement the state’s relations with persons by responding to claims for individual economic rights. Promotion of civic and economic rights under Boumediene led to lesser criticism of his policies by Algerian Islamists, who chose to direct their bile toward the negative moral and ethical facets of modernization. Like the plans of Nasser in Egypt, Assad in Syria, and Hussein in Iraq, Boumediene’s strategy focused on reconciling Islam and socialism in his development plans. With a wave of policies targeted at state control of the national economy, Boumediene relied heavily on nationalization of the means of production in a variety of economic sectors. He invoked Islam as moral justification for implementing socialism. A devout Muslim, he challenged Algerians and also Muslims worldwide by declaring, during an Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974, that reading Quranic verses would not feed a hungry people: “Men do not want to go to paradise with empty stomachs” (Balta and Rulleau 1978, 349). Sadly, Algerians would learn that capitalist oil and gas exports, and natural resource mismanagement, too, would fail to feed the totality of the fast-growing “socialist” Muslim population.
Agrarian Policies

Production and productivity have been lowest among the otherwise many priorities of the agrarian policies of Arab-Muslim states. Mainly, politically more pressing concerns—equity and political stability—supplanted economic efficiency in promoting the state’s sociopolitical ideas. Agrarian reform was promoted in all the Arab states, but the most dramatic reforms were in Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Iran, each with its very own successes and its particular shortcomings.

Algeria’s definitive attempt to reconcile Islam with socialism was via Boumediene’s agrarian revolution, implemented to mobilize the peasantry and politically to reestablish it as principal agent on the rural and national scenes. His approach to drawing the peasantry into the polity the more extensively to modernize and to transform the existing order from within reminds one of Apter’s (1965) mobilization system, which emphasized government intervention and central planning in the modernization process. In this process, new values are created by political leaders to the end of legitimizing authority and helping to achieve the paramount objective, that of securing total allegiance to the state development plan by the citizenry. Algerians, so long systematically denied access to the land under colonialism, rallied behind their government’s agronomic plan, which advanced the principle, ‘land belongs to those who till it’. The until then widely practiced Khammassat (sharecropping) system began to be vociferously condemned for being exploitative and unacceptable in an independent country aspiring to uphold the dignity of the individual, especially in the wake of a colonial system that had reduced Algeria’s citizen-subjects to second-class membership status in their own national habitat.

Boumediene believed that a reform with sociocultural goals of such magnitude had to be reconciled with Algeria’s dual Arabic and Islamic heritage if it was to significantly transform the nation’s rural potential. For Boumediene, as later for Khadaffi in Libya, Islam embodied basically the same ethics as socialism. Achieving the sociopolitical goals of the agronomic reform hence was to create the very basis of Islamic socialism, which purportedly drew its roots from the early days of Islam. Algeria under Boumediene—like Egypt under Nasser, Syria under Assad, Iraq under a young Saddam Hussein, and even Morocco under King Hassan—saw in socialist ideals a reconfirmation of the tenets of Islam. As Raymond Vallin suggests, “We may say that after
the seventh century, the urban spirit of ‘free enterprise’ won out over Bedouin collectivism and that the present form of Muslim socialism is not, after all, so different from certain tendencies of early Islam. The difference is that the earlier theoreticians of collectivism have been disavowed by the orthodox consensus [which championed the rights of private property]. . . . Thus, the antibourgeois Islam again appears, the Islam of Medina when Muhammad and his successors were fighting the Mecca oligarchy” (Vallin 1964).

Boumediene’s “Islamic socialism” abolished Khammassat, ending the patron-client arrangement that had characterized the land tenure system for 12 years after “independence” in 1962. “We will never accept that some own factories in big cities and use the Khammassat to farm their land by sharecroppers who are unable to assure a decent existence for their families,” argued Boumediene (Balta and Rulleau 1978, 189). The principle of “land belongs to those who till it” would allow the new national agronomy to ‘resymmetrize’ citizenship. Land redistribution would be associated with creation of agricultural cooperatives through which both economic and political objectives would be achieved. Collectivization would guarantee “prevention of the exploitation of the individual” (cited in Bouzidi 1976, 301) as Engels had formulated it. Land reform would also serve as a means by which state policies could be centrally, thus even more effectively, implemented in the agricultural sector, leading to reduction of the traditional feudalistic land arrangements that had characterized economic relations in Algeria, in most of the Maghreb, but also in states such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Land reforms implemented in the 1950s and 1960s by all these states had aimed at transforming traditional feudal structures radically. Even Iran’s White Revolution under the Shah had sought to limit monopoly by landlords. In Egypt, landlords quickly circumvented the property size-reduction policy by transferring land and chattel to family members. In Syria and Iraq, government officials seized control of the expropriated land, negating any meaningful successful redistribution. In Algeria, bureaucrats—former landlords themselves—were assigned the task of implementing the agrarian revolution, on the assumption that they would know best what to do, how not to do it, and why. Of course, they did everything they could to ensure that the whole reform would ultimately collapse. And in short order it did. With population explosions, and increasing consumption, decreased food production ensuing from failed economic policies accelerated mounting political instability in most regimes.
Industrialization

For most Arab-Muslim states, industrialization was a master key to social development, manufacturing was a leading sector, and their linkage proved a stimulus to economic growth in other sectors. And for many Arab-Muslim leaders, the driving force behind acquiring turnkey, ready-to-function industries were mirages of prestige, projections of national might, and economic power—not the mere promotion of the welfare of the individual (Wilson 1995, 39). Absent a public-minded modernization policy, such as the one Atatürk had farsightedly installed in Turkey, nationalism and myopic industrialization would quickly become infamous bedfellows in Nasser’s Egypt, Hussein’s Iraq, the Shah’s Iran, and Boumediene’s Algeria, to mention a few states, in less than 50 years (Wilson 1995). These policies had negative tactical and strategic impacts on agricultural production. They fueled a redirection of investments from agriculture to industry, thereby intensifying rural-urban asymmetries and leading to a major slowdown in national socioeconomic development. This much too inordinate focus on a few allegedly modernizing industries as a precondition for agricultural development was doomed in the long run in most Arab-Muslim states and in many Third World countries inspired by the former Soviet Union’s overtired ideological model of centrally planned development. Such hollow development strategies led Algerians to a political-economic crisis of unimagined magnitude, forcing them in 1988 to question whether such misguided secularism would ever help them to achieve social justice, a foremost goal sought by a populace that had endured the hardships of colonialism for more than a century.

The Islamist Challenge

 Atatürk, the shah of Iran, and Bourguiba in Tunisia were not socialists. The most socialistically inclined among the Arab-Muslim leaders were self-styled nationalist modernists who, while identifying with the best of Western-educated modernists, relied on Islam in some way, the more ably to justify their public policies and choices for development without surrendering to the exigent dictates of religious fundamentalism. Nation building in these societies could not have been achieved or sustained without adapting Islam to national requirements and vice versa. Leaders such as Boumediene in Algeria, Nasser and Sadat in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Assad in Syria fall into this ambiv-
alent category. Unlike al-Turabi in Sudan, who rejected modernity and called for steadfast adherence to Islam, these nationalist modernists held off their own Islamists, through populist policies, personal charisma, and oil money in a few cases. Algeria is a case in point. Plentiful revenues from oil and gas, Boumediene’s charismatic leadership, and the populist largesse of a welfare state did postpone social and political unrest, but only for a short time. Boumediene’s death, in 1978, ushered in a transition from socialist programs to a liberal political economy. Yet only 10 years later, by 1988, Algeria found itself facing a future auguring Islamism as a religio-political alternative to an utterly failed secularism aggravated by manipulative nationalism and by misguided economic policies, analyzed extensively by Martens (1975, 197–204) in a deep scrutiny of the Algerian model of development. Boumediene’s successor, Colonel Chadli Benjedid, who had assumed the presidency in February 1979, had been a stopgap choice. He lacked the charisma, intellect, and vision that had served Boumediene well for controlling society, leading the state, and governing Algeria.

Gestures by the new president in his early years in office, such as the release from prison of Boumediene’s opponents, or the inclusion in his government of a few Islamist supporters signaled the end of Boumediene’s long-held policy of preventing Islamists and other rival groups from challenging his socialist policies (Willis 1996, 20). In post-Boumediene Algeria as in post-Nasserite Egypt, Islamism grew even more quickly after the early 1980s, spreading to more segments of the population and spurring even broader demands for implementation of the Sharia. At first, Benjedid’s regime tried to work together with the religious groups, desperately hoping that elements of the groups could be incorporated into the state’s institutional framework. Such policy was not necessary in the ruthless Ba’athist regimes of Syria and Iraq, not needed in a (rare) progressive state such as Qatar, and very hard to implement in post-Sadat Egypt.

Benjedid was praised by his own minister of religious affairs for trying to “re-establish the hierarchy of values by placing faith in Allah above any other allegiance” (cited in Willis 1996, 77). In 1986, Algeria adopted a new constitution. It referred to Islam as a religion of humanism and progress. The regime would compromise these spiritual principles by capitulating to the palpably growing power of Islamist exigencies on many worldly fronts. This became especially evident on the introduction of the Family Code in 1984, which trampled on the rights of female Algerian citizens in matters of marriage, divorce, and
employment. The increasingly expressive Islamist movement became quite alarming to the state when it began to attract the militant activism of young men, similar to other Islamist movements elsewhere in the Muslim world in general, and in the Near East in particular.

The 1990s would see a marked increase in the number of young men meeting at mosques, leading Richard Parker comparatively to reminisce: “in Boumediene’s time, mosque attendance [in Algiers] was like church attendance in Moscow—the old, the infirm and the idle made up the congregation” (Willis 1996, 85). In Muslim spheres, the pervasive trend of youth finding refuge in religion has been attributed also to increased feelings of existential confusion and political alienation exacerbated by failed economic policies; making of that age cohort a primary source for armed Islamist recruitment (Willis 1996, 85).

For most Algerians, Boumediene’s vision of the “just society” would not materialize even under Benjedid’s new Islamism-appeasing leadership. Hence many would find a viable alternative in the Islamist movement, whose agenda was often replete with rhetoric capitalizing on popular concerns over the lack of egalitarian justice and the absence of the spirit and letter of Islamic law. It became all too clear for many that, without the rule of Islamic law, the privilege of being a member of a Muslim state would mean little. In Algeria, as in most of the other Arab-Muslim states, the rule of law is ink on paper. Unless and until the gap between written rule and practiced law is bridged, legitimate progress and change cannot occur. But if secular law in nonreligious societies inherently does contribute to progress, if only by providing for stability through, say, higher-level integration of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or historical differences in inclusive, pluralistic ways, why then should religious law fail to achieve the same results at least in the highly exclusive, nonpluralistic Islamic societies? Law provides guidelines for safeguarding a people’s natural expectations by creating a sense of legal security conducive to a state of mind favorable to change and accommodative of progress. Such a sense of security induces Muslim men and women to be industrious and hopeful that the fruits of their labor would be protected, leading to safeguarded savings and secure investments in Muslim states. Islamic governments engaged in programs of reform would do well to pay very serious attention to the rule of law in general and to Islamic law in particular, absent any mature modern secular institutions to look up to and pending government-inspired, grassroots-supported decisions and actions disposed to favor and able to establish the irrevocable separa-
tion of mosque and state in both national and international public affairs of state.

Manifested in fairness, in equality of treatment before the law, in respect for citizen’s rights, and in minimal government corruption, legality is central to the problems plaguing regimes in Arab-Muslim states today. Questions of legitimacy only exacerbate this problem. Algeria is no exception in failing its citizens through its disregard for the rule of law and its mishandling of the economy and society. State-promised returns to ambitious investment targets and to programs of industrialization have yet to produce results. The cancellation of Boumediene’s socialist programs, Benjedid’s “ouverture”—a mentality of economic openness similar to Sadat’s Infitah (glasnost’) in Egypt—added more nails to the coffin of Algeria’s hopes. The ensuing spiral culminated in increased public anger, which strengthened Islamism as the only perceivable way out of this unbearable mess in the long run.

High rates of population growth in Arab-Muslim states during the 1980s, coupled with high unemployment, especially among the young, produced societal disasters in many of them. Nearly 75 percent of Algerians aged 16–25 remained jobless (Willis 1996, 99). The pursuit of social and economic egalitarianism espoused by Boumediene promptly evaporated in spirit, word, and deed on Algeria’s shift to explicit economic liberalization. The people’s agony from the successor regime’s failure to treat its subjects as conscious and deserving individuals, and the state’s chronic impotence in meeting its responsibilities vis-à-vis its citizen-subjects, generated a hostile environment of mistrust and a social setting devoid of hope. In sum, a paternalistic state failed in its self-assigned patronizing mission by zealously holding back the creation of a grassroots civil society from within. As was the case in all other oil-exporting Arab-Muslim states, the collapse of international oil prices in 1985–1986 would deprive Algeria of 40 percent of its oil and gas revenues, obliging it to accumulate a significant international debt. This shock debunked the decades-long strategy favoring heavy industrialization at the expense of agriculture—a daunting experience for a state that in 1963, one year after its newly gained independence, was still producing 93 percent of its domestic food requirements, and yet two decades later, in 1984, had to import 60 percent of its alimentary consumption (Middle East, July 1987, pp. 6–10).

The implications for Algeria of its failed economic policy were huge. For a people with expectations and self-confidence born in the struggle
for independence after 132 years of total colonialism, the failure was an unbearable affront from within. Islamism took it upon itself to defeat the state’s failed secularist policies, reportedly to rid the people of corrupt regimes, but clearly also to challenge their Western supporters. The same reaction could be sensed in the Iranian Revolution, which did serve as an external stimulus for the Algerian Religious Party F.I.S. (Front Islamique du Salut) in its opposition to the dominant F.L.N. (Front de Libération National), the revolutionary party that has ruled Algeria since its independence. In 1988, Islamist militants began to use violence in their endeavors to overthrow the regime and replace it with an Islamic state, which in the opinion of many almost by definition should help to restore justice, equality, and fairness in shared respect for the rule of law—Allah’s law—in the land of Islam.

Today, the F.I.S.’s fundamentalist Islamic doctrine remains on a collision course with the F.L.N.’s secularist nationalist aspirations based on the Algerian state’s current structure. The F.I.S. sees the Algerian state as embodied in, and appropriated by, the F.L.N.—in violation of Allah’s commandments. In 1990, the Islamist candidates of the F.I.S. ran for elections under the motto “To vote against the FIS is to vote against God.” They captured municipal elections that year, and the national election in 1991, by presenting themselves as the “divine” expression of the popular will, hence of the umma as one. The people’s disenchantment with the failed secularist regime was not tantamount to total endorsement of an Islamic state, yet the momentum toward a theocracy—reminiscent of the 1979 revolution in Iran—took off with such speed and magnitude that it aroused deep fear and great anxiety among many segments of the Algerian society. Ultimately, the military intervened. This plunged the nation into a civil war that has claimed over 120,000 Algerian lives since. And although in the 1990s, some progress was made in an attempt to create a civil society through limited democratic reforms, Algeria today is as vulnerable as ever to the rise of violent extremism and fundamentalism. This vulnerability stems not only from the state of domestic affairs but especially also from the ever-growing disenchantment of the populace with the harsh realities of a globalizing international political economy, which millions of Muslims perceive as hostile to their religious worldview, but also lacking in promise for solutions to their deepening daily problems of a secular nature. The dejected masses perceive in a return to first source—the umma of Islam—the only rational answer to their persistent plight.
From Being a Noncitizen to Becoming a Subject of Allah: Again?

As its consequences began to extend beyond the political borders of the Islamic states, the rise of Islamism in Arab-Muslim states has refocused the international community’s attention on both security issues and citizenship matters. At first, major states in the West dismissed the whole thing as irrelevant or insignificant to their own domestic and international affairs. But realities changed drastically and quickly, especially after the acts of terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam against the United States on September 11, 2001. In the Arab-Muslim states, where Islamism is growing ever faster among the less educated masses, the phenomenon is marshalling social and political forces of unprecedented magnitude, scope, and ramification, requiring urgent attention. With Islamism on the rise in the Near East, North Africa, and beyond, fueling the sociopolitical discontent of those left behind and mobilizing the attitudes and actions of the young, the poor, and the alienated precisely in the lands where such constituencies are turning into a disquieted majority, Arab-Muslim regimes now more than ever are facing a new generation of political players, who—relatively nonviolently, if quite successfully—have begun to challenge the legitimacy of their state and the competence and integrity of their indigenous rulers.¹

The prospects for political Islam’s success in creating powerful Islamic states are limited, even if political Islam already has thoroughly shaken the political structure of subjecthood and the systemic foundations of peoplehood in the nation-state, and—if self-servingly only—also the notion of voluntary membership (see Urban, chap. 13 in this book) in many of the Arab-Muslim states. This tremor has forced Western powers to support and directly or indirectly to join the fight against armed Islamist militancy. It would behoove the West, in the long run, to try to understand and respond to the domestic dimensions of indigenous Muslims’ outrage against usurpatory authoritarianism in many of these states, however. Alarmed by the growing emergence of violent Islamist political groups, the West has selectively cooperated with and even supported and protected certain strategically allied Muslim regimes. Some Western academics have joined in the campaign to discredit Islamism as the destructive arm of a typically reactionary Muslim ideology that opposes progress and breeds only hostility

¹. In this sense, Natan Sharansky’s (2004) “Conclusion” (pp. 272–279) in The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror is a remarkable acknowledgement of such bottom-up reforms, if for his own reasons.—Ed.
toward modern Western concepts of freedom and liberty. In a thesis on
the clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington (1993, 23–43) tried to
make it clear that democratization is a nonstarter in Arab-Islamic states,
and that otherwise, relations between Islam and the West, too, sooner
or later are bound to precipitate confrontation and possibly armed
conflict.

True, several aspects of Islamism may tend to inhibit change or retard
progress and Western-style democracy. Yet failures in Arab civil societ-
ies do not stem solely from qualities intrinsic to Islam as religion, nor
are they exclusively characteristic of its attending politicocultural exi-
gencies. After all, were most of these states not integrated into an
international system very tightly controlled by the West? As Esposito
has noted (Sisk 1992), “Talk of democratization troubles both autocratic
rulers in the Muslim world and many Western governments. . . . For
the leaders in the West, democracy raises the prospect of old and reli-
able friends or client states [somehow] being transformed into more
independent and less predictable nations.”

Mainstream Islamists view this position as a Western-backed local
conspiracy to deny them political, civil, and economic rights, which can
only cater to the interests of the West and the purposes of their accom-
plishes in charge of dynastic Arab-Muslim regimes. Personal rights com-
patible with democracy are praised and aspired to worldwide. The
debate need not be reduced to philosophical contentions as to whether
Islam is compatible in spirit, word, and deed with modern democratic
citizenship, an issue already scrutinized by, for example, Vatikiotis
(1987) and Perlmutter (1992), among others. Rather, it should be ele-
vated to the practicalities of political analysis as to why democratic
institutions have not taken root in these societies. This chapter has
attempted to do just that.

Not merely domestic but also especially international dynamics are
at work in the profound alienation inside Arab-Muslim states of subject-
citizens’ aspiring to just freedoms. Such internally direct, externally
indirect usurpation of citizenship rights and privileges in one’s own
country lends credence to the much-rumored and much-feared conse-
quences of Westernization qua Christianization of Muslim Arabs. In
the eyes of the long disenfranchised, such ominous possibilities lead to
perceiving Western-style, made-in-the-U.S.A. democracy as an alien,
even inimical political ideology, somehow smuggled into the country
in increasing doses and in different guises, with the self-serving com-
plicity and lowly consent of indigenous political elites bent on stifling
civil unrest, mainly by outwitting it (Vatikiotis 1987, 73) through maneuvers of preemption at any cost.

To conclude, I see the future of citizenship in the Arab-Muslim states as continuing to resonate on a democratic impulse, the inner and outer limits of which will generate, and be engendered by, complex ideological/political confrontations, socioeconomic tremors, and deep ethnocultural disenchantments—within and between formerly secularist postcolonial states, but also across the international system—observed through the lens of Third Worlders to be vehemently inimical to the empowerment of the weak, the muted, and the abandoned of the globe. This shared impression leads even the most open-minded Islamists to view with suspicion the benefits of globalization and the much-touted if eminently debatable standards of international justice.

Against this backdrop of compounding international preconditions and domestic prerequisites, millions of Muslim citizen-subjects across the Arab-Muslim world ride the pendulum, currently swinging away from citizenship under earthly rulers to subjecthood to the Almighty, for lack of justifiable confidence in the rule of tyrants, who have failed the very citizens they purport to lead by example. The long oppressed Muslim masses that see in religion an exit, absent the political means to rediscover themselves, are those most vulnerable to the longer-term designs and midterm schemes of militant Islamists, for whom religion is, more often than not, put more simply: politics by other means.

References


In recent years, a growing number of political theorists, social scientists, and social critics have called for a revival of liberal notions of national citizenship and a concomitant reinvigoration of civil society. Advocates of this argument occupy positions that span the ideological spectrum, but the forces behind the clamor in favor of a ‘return to citizenship’ are remarkably similar (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). The intensification in the late twentieth century of the forces of economic globalization and the simultaneous eruption of ethnic and religious strife in many places around the world have contributed to this concern. Foremost, however, it is the mass movement of displaced peoples from one space to another that has encouraged a fundamental reassessment of the potential that a reenergized and novel form of citizenship may hold for mitigating the asymmetries of power that have increased between the dominant native sectors of society and newcomers from around the world.

Students of immigration and citizenship in the United States are in the midst of a similar process of reassessment. The demographic revolution caused by mass migration and the fractious ‘multiculturalism’ that has accompanied the ongoing population changes together have stimulated calls for the rebuilding of a common, transcendent, civic culture—a “national community” of sorts—based on strong notions of national citizenship. Its advocates argue that some form of revitalized citizenship presents the best strategy for fending off what, in the U.S. context, has been widely decried as a dangerous trend toward the politicization of ethnicity and other particularistic—and therefore potentially undemocratic, even antidemocratic—forms of social affiliation.

The recent surge in the study of citizenship has been laudable. But a growing number of skeptics question the actual performance and
potential of the institution of citizenship as a guarantor of equality and social democracy in a rapidly changing world. These critiques have diverse origins and different emphases, but several general lines of argument are discernible. On the most fundamental level, skeptics such as Philip Cole (2000), Bonnie Honig (2000), and Engin İsin (2002), among others, have focused on what they identify to be citizenship’s core contradiction, the very idea that any self-constituted community of citizens should require a group of noncitizen “outsiders” to give the institution shape and meaning. They argue that whether identified and constituted as “foreigners” or as “internal minorities,” the presence of a disfranchised other is a necessary component of the idea of a bounded citizenry. Wherefore, although advocates of liberal political regimes almost always portray the institution of citizenship as universalistic and egalitarian, critics retort that citizenship’s categorization of people as “insiders” and “outsiders” raises what Cole calls “an irresolvable contradiction between liberal theory’s apparent universalism and its concealed particularism” (Cole 2000, 2). As Cole sees it, “with its universalistic commitment to the moral equality of humanity, liberal theory cannot coherently justify these practices of exclusion, which constitute ‘outsiders’ on grounds any recognizable liberal theory would condemn as arbitrary. And yet . . . [ultimately] the existence of a liberal polity made up of free and equal citizens rests upon the existence of outsiders who are refused a share of the goods of the liberal community” (Cole 2000, 2).

Another important group consists of of critics who acknowledge the democratic potential inherent in some dimensions of citizenship yet focus on the specific kinds of exclusions that liberal notions of citizenship have generated and fostered over time. More frequent among scholars in the fields of feminist studies, cultural studies, interdisciplinary ethnic studies, critical legal scholarship, and other fields, this line of analysis pays particular attention to the role liberal forms of citizenship have played as repressive mechanisms of social sorting, control, and discipline that have led to the systematic exclusion of groups and individuals on grounds of race, national origin, ethnicity, culture, class, and gender (Behdad 1997; Gotanda 1991; Lowe 1996; Omi and Winant 1994; Smith 1997).

However, the most compelling critiques of national citizenship focus on the question of how noncitizens themselves have grappled with the contradictions of citizenship. Individuals who have been categorized as occupying a social location outside a community of citizens—for
example, unauthorized economic migrants, refugees, and other diasporic elements—have long been portrayed as anomalies, out of step with political modernity. The tendency to categorize outliers in this way is, to a large degree, a logical outcome of the ascension of the nation-state and of its institutions as the primary forms of political organization in the modern world. As the world political system crystallized into a collection of distinct nation-states and national citizenries over the course of the nineteenth century, individuals and groups falling outside that system of classification came to be portrayed as deviants from the emerging norm. As more and more peoples and territories became consolidated under such regimes, “in between” categories came increasingly to be seen either as temporary anomalies or as comprising persons occupying a status completely beyond the pale of citizenship (as has been the case with certain indigenous populations, Gypsies and Jews among them, in certain countries, at one time or another). By depicting persons and whole groups as outliers, the expectation was created that liminal populations of the kind could not but ultimately conform to the established order of sociopolitical categorization, either by enduring endless social ostracism as shunned minorities within the new order or by becoming incorporated into the community of national citizens. For officially authorized and “irregular” transnational migrants alike, eventual adjustment of status was expected to occur either through juridical mechanisms of deportation or repatriation (at one extreme), or through naturalization, amnesty, or the formal granting of asylum (at the other extreme). By definition, therefore, noncitizenship status came to be seen at best as a temporary aberration and at worst as an unnatural deviance.

Over the last two decades or so, however, critics of the institution of national citizenship have questioned many of these premises by tracing the genealogies of various forms of citizenship and paying particular attention to the question of how noncitizens have perceived their own position in societies being consolidated along these lines. As was the case with the other critiques of the historiography of immigration and citizenship, this critical change in perspective has spawned a variety of approaches to the question of the role of noncitizens in the history of citizenship. The most obvious observation in this regard is that from antiquity to the present, noncitizens have always existed alongside citizens. Critical scholarship of the evolution of systems of citizenship also notes that the first great age of national consolidation and broad establishment of the institution of national citizenship (ca. 1810–1929)
also witnessed the greatest displacements and transborder movements of populations in world history. In other words, critical scholarship argues that while it is indisputable that territorial nation-states and regimes of national citizenship increasingly did become the norm over this long period, the consolidation of sovereign nations always unfolded in dialogical tension with the mass movement of foreign populations into and through those territories. Stimulated primarily by the tremendous forces of dislocation attending the evolution of global capitalism, the circulation of massive waves of different peoples across political borders constantly challenged and disrupted the continuing evolution of supposedly homogeneous nation-states and their purportedly bounded citizenries. Uneven economic development around the world has tended to perpetuate this dynamic over time.

The second major feature of critical scholarship is its emphasis on the inevitable antinomies and alterities created in the process of the consolidation of nation-states and national citizenries in the context of the expansion of global capitalism. Revisionist scholars recognize that significant numbers of noncitizens eventually did become the citizens or the officially authorized ‘resident aliens’ of receiving nations, but they reject the implied linearity and inevitability of the process. Pointing out that noncitizens have always been permanent components of most advanced industrial and postindustrial societies, they have tended to reject dominant single-nation-centered narratives of incorporation and assimilation in favor of analyses that explore the political tensions, contestations, and the parallel social spaces created by mass movements of populations. They also focus particular attention on the alternative political logics and different senses of social affiliation generated among people who have felt the full brunt of the exclusionary forces associated with the simultaneous rise of national citizenship and capitalism. Arguing that for much of their history industrial and postindustrial societies have actively reinforced this process by selectively abrogating their sovereignty and condoning the massive use of both authorized and unauthorized foreign labor, these scholars have trenchantly exposed the hollowness of political discourses about the supposed sanctity of bounded citizenries. By emphasizing the ongoing process of abrogation and the contradiction evident in the continued mixing of different peoples inside national spaces, this critical scholarship has begun to expose a much more complex historical terrain in which noncitizens often questioned the premises of dominant forms of national citizenship, sought to change its specific forms, and sometimes
actively rejected it. Such scholars argue that the almost continual cir-
culation into and through sovereign nations of noncitizen outsiders has 
created a dynamic situation in which dominant narratives of national 
citizenship are being constantly challenged and many alternative ways 
of “being political” are actively explored (Beck 2004; Beck and Willms 
2004; İşın 2002).

Contemporary theorists have developed a number of appellations to 
describe the shape-shifting interstitial social arenas in which noncitizen 
populations explored different ways of being political as they negoti-
ated the transition between points of origin and destination. Some have 
described these arenas of social activity as the “space of flows” (Castells 
2000, 406–409), the “third space” (Bennett and Bhabha 1998; Bhabha 
1994, 36–39, 1998; İşın 2002, 42–51; Soja 1996) or “diaspora space” (Brah 
1996, 181). Some have perceived the process to involve a “sociospatial 
reconfiguration” (Rodríguez 1996, 23) or the context to provide space 
for “social sovereignty” (Ong 1999, 239). Still others have deemed these 
arenas of transnational social (re)production to comprise spaces of 
“cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2004; Beck and Willms 2004), “denizenship” 
(Buff 2001; Hammar 1990; Soysal 1994), or “cosmopolitan denizenship” 
(Zollberg 2000). Each of these terms has its own inflection and specific 
application. Taken together, however, these conceptualizations repre-
sent recent attempts to capture and explain the unique subnational and 
transnational social spaces noncitizens have carved out in societies 
otherwise organized as sovereign territories governed by exclusive and 
bounded national citizenries. Thus, these concepts are also endeavors 
to articulate the complex ways in which human beings caught up in 
various kinds of diasporas have tried to negotiate the difficult transi-
tion between different formal systems of membership by devising con-
ceptual frameworks that allow them both to describe their situation 
and to make rights claims, despite their tenuous and ever-changing 
social circumstances.

This chapter seeks to build on this important critical work by explor-
ing the period when such contestations over issues of migration and 
citizenship first emerged in the United States in their modern form, 
roughly in the half-century of mass migration between the 1880s and 
the onset of the Great Depression. I argue that then as now, noncitizens 
ever adopted a unitary position on the question of citizenship. Indeed, 
as is true of noncitizens in the current epoch, citizens at the turn of the 
twentieth century often operated from logics that were at cross-
purposes with the conventional politics of citizenship and national
consolidation. I draw on revisionist historical scholarship about the shifting nature of citizenship over the course of the twentieth century to argue that, although noncitizens could never ignore the state’s institutional power to shape and constrain their actions, they quickly gained skills and developed an array of strategies rooted in their cultures of origin and in their unique understanding of transnational contexts to negotiate their transition into novel environments, to sustain themselves and support their families abroad, and, according to one analyst of this dynamic process, to “spatially reorganize their base of social reproduction” (Rodríguez 1996, 23). Although this complex strategy of negotiation, adjustment, and social reproduction often did include the pursuit of naturalized citizenship, conventional political organization, and the struggle to achieve civil rights within the dominant political system, it also involved resistance and even curt refusal to accept the premises of the dominant order. Based on their firsthand experience with the arbitrary and discriminatory dimensions of citizenship and their growing savvy as members of an increasingly internationalized labor force, the strategies of resistance and refusal explored and articulated by noncitizens during this crucial period provided much of the vocabulary required for the struggle over the meaning of citizenship and rights for the remainder of the twentieth century. My primary goal in this chapter is to provide an overview of the evolution of debate and dissent in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. By exploring some of the alternative strategies noncitizens devised and pursued then, however, I also hope to provide some insight into similar forms of political expression currently being utilized by millions of authorized and unauthorized noncitizens struggling to gain rights and recognition while facing very similar circumstances in the United States and elsewhere at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

“Noncitizen Americans”

In the spring of 1940, the community activist and labor leader Luisa Moreno traveled to Washington, D.C., to give a keynote address on the status of noncitizen workers in the United States at the annual meeting of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, a left-leaning immigrant defense organization. An immigrant herself, Moreno had a deep understanding of the plight of such people. After leaving her native Guatemala as a young woman, Moreno had spent most of her life in the United States, working in a variety of occupations in
different parts of the country, including stints in cigar manufacturing, farm work, canning, and food packing. Based largely on her experiences working alongside noncitizen immigrant workers in such jobs, she eventually became a union activist with the United Cannery, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA). Through her union activity, Moreno with time also involved herself in Latino community politics, becoming a founding member in 1938 of the short-lived but profoundly influential multinational pan-Latino coalitional organization, *El Congreso de Pueblos que Hablan Español*—the Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples (Larralde and Griswold del Castillo 1997; Ruiz 2004).

Moreno used the experiences she gained in her dual capacity as a labor organizer and a Latina ethnic community activist to frame her speech about the people she revealingly referred to as “noncitizen Americans.” While Moreno’s primary intent was to object to the U.S. government’s decade-long campaign to deport and otherwise harass the huge population of noncitizen Latino workers in the United States, her ultimate objective was to alter public consciousness more generally about the critical role noncitizens of all ethnic backgrounds continued to play in the economic development of the country. She did this despite the repressive political atmosphere of the period and the potential threat to her own status in the country (indeed, some years later, Moreno was deported to Mexico for her political activities in the United States). Despite the risk, Moreno took every opportunity to try to educate others about the broad implications of the emergence of a borderless economy and about the ambiguous position noncitizen transnational workers occupied in that new economy.

She pointedly asked her audiences to consider the implications of the ongoing exploitation of large numbers of noncitizen workers in a society that otherwise touted itself as a liberal democracy. “Has anyone counted the miles of railroads built by these same non-citizens?” she asked. “One can hardly imagine how many bales of cotton have passed through [their] nimble fingers.” She then came to her central point. “These people are not ‘aliens,’” she argued, for “they have contributed their endurance, their sacrifices, youth, and labor to the nation’s economy. Indirectly, they have paid more taxes than all the stockholders of the country’s industrialized agriculture . . . and other interests that operate or have operated with the labor of immigrant workers.” Moreno drove her point home by comparing the systematic exploitation of undocumented workers in the United States with the human
rights abuses that had accompanied the rise of fascism abroad. She concluded her address with an accusation and a stirring challenge. “A people who have lived twenty or thirty years in this country,” she insisted, “tied up by family relations with the early settlers, with American-born children, cannot be uprooted without the complete destruction of the faintest semblance of democracy and human liberties for the whole population” (Moreno [1940] 1996).

When Moreno gave her speech in 1940, immigrant and ethnic activists like her had not yet developed a closely reasoned framework to analyze and explain noncitizens’ ambivalent and contradictory status in U.S. society. However, her words and the organizing activities of other ethnic activists of the time provide an indication of the extent to which years of massive population movements to the United States had begun to stimulate new thinking within the nation’s growing noncitizen population about complex issues of identity, citizenship, and the shifting nature of the nation-state itself. Analysis of their activities in this volatile era provides evidence that Moreno and others had begun to envision a new kind of society encompassing formally recognized citizens and a growing underclass of marginalized noncitizens. In other words, ethnic activists of the era insisted that the rapidly changing nature of the global economy demanded that old categories of belonging be challenged in favor of a new order that recognized the permanence of noncitizens in modern societies. Thus, Moreno and individuals like her sought ways to diminish the distance between citizens and noncitizens by building new coalitions based more on class solidarity, cultural affinity, and the fact of permanent domicile than on the accident of national origin or citizenship.

Moreno’s activities also provide a glimpse into the growing divergence of opinion on such issues that had emerged not only between noncitizens and representatives of the U.S. government but also among the country’s growing ethnic populations themselves. At all levels, U.S. government officials were intent on passing new regulations to restrict immigration and to sharpen the distinctions between citizens and noncitizens already in the country. Feeling the pressure, much of the nation’s ethnic leadership often followed suit, and pressed their constituents to conform to dominant forms of behavior and comportment. In sharp contrast, noncitizen activists like Moreno had begun to explore alternative positions that rejected the imposition of these narrow definitions of civic membership as arbitrary, anachronistic, and out of keeping with democratic traditions.
A Clash of Worldviews

The inventive dissenting positions on the politics of citizenship that noncitizen activists like Moreno began exploring in the interwar (1918–1942) era were direct outgrowths of the immense social pressures that had been building in the United States and the other immigrant-receiving nations since the mid-nineteenth century. Born of the huge dislocating forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, the restructuring of local economies around the world triggered unprecedented waves of human migration. At first, these mass movements were mainly instances of “internal” migration as millions of uprooted rural peoples moved from the land to the factory in urban areas inside their countries and regions of origin. Over time, however, these same forces gave rise to much larger transnational flows. Spurred by rapid advances in modern communication and transportation technology, and stimulated by demand for cheap labor in developing regions around the world, millions of migrants began to traverse continents and oceans to find work, flee social and political turmoil, or simply seek adventure abroad. Much of this migration occurred with the sanction of state authorities. But from the outset, officially authorized migration stimulated a notable parallel flow of autonomously organized and officially unauthorized (hence “illegal”) migrants who ventured abroad for the same reasons (Cohen 1995; Davie [1936] 1983; Ferenczi and Wilcox 1929–1931).

The movement of such large volumes of people across international frontiers through an interlocked and expanding sphere of capitalist exchange inevitably created simmering social tensions between members of these moving diasporas and the sedentary self-defined “natives” of receiving societies. Of course, some sectors of receiving nations, intent on wringing profits from the labor-cost savings provided by an expanding pool of foreign workers, greeted the circulation of migrants and, although to lesser degree, even the influx of permanent immigrant settlers. But others saw the rapid demographic and cultural changes that accompanied this global flow of strangers as a serious threat to conventional ideals of social-political order and

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1. Claims to native status were almost always deeply problematic dimensions of the imagining of national communities. As Renan first observed more than a century ago, and as a number of commentators have noted since, concepts of nation and nativity often required mass amnesia with regard to the actual histories of the peopling of territory and the suppression of extant populations (Bhabha 1990; Hobsbawm 1990; Renan [1882] 1990; Said 1993).
economic stability. By the 1870s and 1880s, the growing perception of crisis led to the first calls for significant restrictions on both immigration and access to citizenship (Stratton and Ang 1998; Zolberg 1997a).

The United States’ gradual move to restrict immigration and access to citizenship provides example and context for the palpable drift toward similar goals among other immigrant-receiving nations over the same period. The bellwether ban on further Chinese labor migration in 1882 was the first big salvo in the U.S. restrictionist campaign, but pressure in this direction continued to build for the rest of the nineteenth century. Ethnic lobbying and diplomatic concerns in the U.S. executive branch slowed these developments for a time, but the forces of immigration restriction began to score a number of important victories after the turn of the century (Gyory 1998; Higham 1955; Zolberg 1997b). For example, in 1902 Congress extended indefinitely the ban on Chinese labor migrants. Five years later, under mounting pressure from U.S. congressional leadership, Theodore Roosevelt’s administration reluctantly followed suit by negotiating new limitations on Japanese labor migration via pressures on the Japanese government to accept a series of executive agreements collectively known as the Gentlemen’s Agreements of 1907–1908. In 1917, Congress passed even more restrictive legislation by demarcating a huge “Asiatic barred zone” that in effect halted migration from the rest of Asia and much of the Pacific region. After the armistice, movement in the general direction of systematic exclusion continued. Mexican workers, who had been heavily recruited in the Southwest and Midwest during World War I (largely to serve as replacements for increasingly scarce Asian labor) were now pressured to return to Mexico—a smaller-scale precursor to the even more systematic repatriation campaigns that were to spur Moreno’s protests a decade later. With postwar immigration numbers exceeding even those of the peak years of the prewar era, the U.S. Congress subsequently passed the first comprehensive national origins quota system in 1921. This experimental legislation was revised, toughened, and codified with the passage of the omnibus Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 (Divine 1954; Higham 1955, 300–331).

The passage of the 1924 law firmly established white supremacy as a guiding principle of U.S. immigration and citizenship policy for the next forty years. In an era dominated by U.S. imperial adventures in the Caribbean and the Pacific, the rise of Jim Crow in the South, and
the ascension to prominence of the pseudo-science of eugenics, the racialist and nationalist logic undergirding the exclusionary 1921 and 1924 acts made obvious sense to those who were intent on defending what they considered to be the racial and ethnic purity of the nation, no matter how dubious such notions of racial and cultural homogeneity were in U.S. history. It is useful to note here that while the primary purpose of the Johnson-Reed legislation was to stem the flow of undesirable foreigners from abroad, legislators also hoped to refine and bolster techniques of identification, classification, discipline, and control over the racialized “domestic minorities” that were already permanent components of U.S. society.

This was made abundantly clear when Congress set out to establish and implement the national origins formula mandated by the 1924 law. To ensure that baseline U.S. population calculations would result in the maximum representation of individuals Congress believed to be fit for entry, and to preserve the nation as what one U.S. senator had once described as “a closed white corporation” (Smith 1997, 307), legislators simply excluded from their estimation of the population of “the inhabitants [of] the United States” a long list of proscribed minority populations. According to the enabling legislation, the baselines figure were to exclude “immigrants from the New World and their descendants; any Asians or their descendants; the descendants of [what they called] ‘slave immigrants’, and . . . descendants of ‘American aborigines’” (Daniels and Graham 2001, 21–24; Ngai 2004, 21–55). The deliberate skewing of the baseline U.S. population in this manner laid the foundations for the subsequent statistical distortion of the national-origin immigration quotas. It also allowed the nation’s leaders to achieve two key objectives in one stroke. This brilliant strategy of simultaneous encompassment and exclusion reinforced the notion of ‘white native’ as the normative model for the American citizen-subject while also ensuring that those considered ‘external’ and ‘internal’ outsiders were reidentified, circumscribed, and effectively effaced from the polity.

The Generation of Alternative Perspectives

This overt manipulation of the criteria for national membership proved devastating over the short term to potential migrants abroad, domestic minorities, and noncitizens already residing in the country. However, the bureaucratic sleight-of-hand exhibited in the national origins legislation tended to block from view the extent to which such repressive
measures helped to produce powerful antinomies in the very populations these measures were designed to control. One could argue—as many a historian of migration has—that the fortuitous sequential combination of legislative reform, economic depression, and world war allowed the white nationalist proponents of immigration restrictions to achieve at least their short-term goals of slowing the demographic transformation of American society and reinforcing their own hegemony as the enfranchised public. That fact, however, obscures at least four important structural features that worked to undermine efforts to shore up the boundaries of the ‘white republic’.

First, despite best efforts to wall off difference and to wish away undesirable peoples, the fact remained that tens of millions of noncitizens were already permanent residents of the country. Second, as much as national leaders may have wanted to pretend that the nation was now hermetically closed to potential contamination from abroad, subject populations continued to maintain attenuated versions of the transnational networks as well as geographically expanded ‘translocal’ notions of community that they had established in a previous century of circulation and settlement. This was particularly true of groups with already established deeply rooted transnational networks that intimately linked them to places of origin, as in the case of ethnic Japanese and Filipinos, and especially in the case of ethnic Mexicans and diasporic Chinese.

Third, the unique circumstances of their existence often encouraged such individuals to develop very different outlooks on the entire question of cultural and racial difference, and of the significance of difference in their political or juridical status, be it as racialized “foreigners,” “aliens,” “denizens,” or other branded categories. In the specific juridical context of the United States, such great flexibility in outlook was strongly reinforced by the citizenship provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified in 1867 and subsequently upheld in numerous cases by the Supreme Court). Under this constitutional amendment, any children born to individuals inside U.S. boundaries are U.S. citizens by birthright. This juridical anomaly complicated even more the already intricately complex questions on the changing nature of ‘community’ by creating a huge and growing number of mixed-status households. As Moreno had argued, by the early 1930s it was now common to find households representing the full range of potential membership status designations. For families whose membership might now include any combination of native citizens, naturalized
citizens, officially authorized resident aliens, and persons who had entered U.S. society without any form of official authorization, the tightening at such a time of immigration and naturalization regulations only highlighted the seemingly whimsical arbitrary nature of such status distinctions.  

Lastly, while legislative efforts to tighten the borders against external influences had the short-term effect of slowing circulation by noncitizens into and out of U.S. territory, this outcome tended to obscure the fact that the global socioeconomic forces that led to the mass displacement, exodus, and transnational circulation of diasporic populations were not likely to cease, despite (temporary) suspension during the years of the Great Depression and World War II. The rate of circulation and settlement did slow significantly between the 1930s and early 1950s (especially when compared to the huge influxes of population in the first decades of the twentieth century), but this period proved to be a very brief deviation from the secular long-term trends since the early nineteenth century. This became clear as early as 1942, when the U.S. government negotiated with Mexico the establishment of the Bracero Program.  

Resumption of government-sanctioned recruitment of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers under the guise of such an ‘emergency’ foreign labor program provided strong indication that the close interdependence of geopolitics, trade, communication, capital, 

2. The significance of the uninterrupted presence of noncitizens becomes clear when one considers that the proportion of the foreign-born as a percentage of the total U.S. population never dropped below 12–15 percent for the entire period between 1860 and 1930. Looking at the population of the country’s ‘foreign stock’ (the combined number of foreign-born and U.S.-born children) makes the impact even more obvious. In 1920, the foreign stock made up fully a quarter of the total U.S. population; more than half of its unskilled and semiskilled work force, and significant majorities in many of the major cities (Carpenter [1927] 1969; Hutchinson 1956; İśni 2002, 220–221; Kuznets and Rubin 1954).  

3. Under a series of emergency foreign labor programs that collectively became known as the Bracero Program, more than five million contracts were extended to Mexican, Caribbean, and Latin American workers in the period between 1942 and 1964. As had been true in the first period of mass labor migration to the United States, this officially authorized labor migration had the tendency to create a corresponding volume of unauthorized labor flows. The surreptitious nature of such population movements make them difficult to measure, but some analysts trust that unauthorized workers may have outnumbered contract workers by a ratio of four to one over the life of the program. Thus, while official immigration statistics for 1930–1970 show a marked decline in the number of foreign-born residents, these statistics mask the continuous presence of huge numbers of noncitizen workers throughout the period in question. For a discussion of the ‘hidden demographics’ of this period of immigration restriction, see, for example, Craig (1971), Samora (1971), and Cockcroft (1986).
and labor that had integrated the burgeoning American economy into the world system over the course of the long nineteenth century was gaining new momentum, with greater force, even before the end of World War II. The tacitly accepted explosion in the circulation of undocumented workers that followed almost immediately only further underscored the depth of this interdependence. The volume of officially sanctioned, legal, immigration would not approach the high-water mark of the 1920s again until the 1990s, but the U.S. government did countenance a huge and growing circulation of millions of authorized ‘temporary’ workers and a shadowy, equally large pool of undocumented persons. This constant circulation of people, though largely hidden from view and also from official enumeration, institutionalized the systematic exploitation of noncitizen labor—a practice that has deep historical roots and has continued largely unabated ever since.

**Denizenship and the Politics of Refusal**

These intrinsically interrelated factors played out in complex ways. On one level, they helped to reinforce in different denizen populations very complicated senses of community, affiliation, and self-understanding often deeply at odds with the social perceptions and political agendas of both the U.S. government and the self-defined “white native” population. This different kind of self-understanding and self-positioning derived from the experience of what Zygmunt Bauman (2000) has called “liquid modernity”—the mixed experience of displacement and mobility, of crossing different physical, political, and cultural boundaries, and of ultimately just having to grapple with issues of adjustment—that for some approached the status of internal exile. The constellation of ideas that arose from these complex and often bewildering experiences was necessarily much more fluid than the constraining ascribed statuses which the governing elites attempted to impose on noncitizen residents during the period of restriction.

That such a situation was commonplace in all these dispersed and mobile populations is not at all surprising. After all, some extended families already had participated in various transborder networks for decades, while some had practiced it over generations. In response to the severe dislocations imposed on local communities by capitalist restructuring around the world, individuals had long sought employ-
ment abroad as a way to provide for themselves and for their families in those rapidly changing circumstances. Thus, for many, what may have begun as a temporary and regionally focused expedient came to be seen as one more option, or an extra life strategy, in a social environment increasingly constrained by diminishing opportunity for livelihood in places of origin. Over time, the establishment of toeholds abroad, and the expansion of community that this implied for people at both ends of these elastic transnational circuits, allowed for the establishment of new avenues for social reproduction and maintaining social status. The increasing circumvention of state controls ended up making the status of citizenship less relevant in daily life. The noncitizenry’s tenuous existence in the interstices of one or more societies and, in many cases, its participation in occupations wholly within the ‘gray’ (informal) sectors wedged into the more formal structures of the regulated economy, dictated that its members behave in ways that made them think of themselves as “other” than members of an inclusively bounded, broader-based ‘citzenry’.

In the very process of transplanting multinodal communities in this way, various diasporic populations created and recreated their own alternative, parallel, quasi-autonomous social worlds, usually physically located in concentrated neighborhoods and enclaves, in which they often constituted significant social majorities. It was in these intermediate social spaces that they also began to lay claim to a very different kind of status, a different form of membership in receiving societies.

As I have suggested, when discussing the history of Mexican and pan-Latino migrant populations (Gutiérrez 1998, 1999, 2004a,b), and as other observers (e.g., Hsu 2000; Kosak 2000; Kurashige 2000; Lee 2003; McClain 1994; McKeown 2001; Park 2004; Salyer 1995) have noted of other groups as well, movement in and through these spaces often also provided a virtual crucible within which such marginalized individuals forged alternative senses of identity and community. In the process, they constituted themselves into what the political theorist Nancy Fraser and others have termed ‘alternative publics’, or even ‘counter-publics’. This allowed a certain freedom of movement, debate, and political engagement in the face of efforts to keep them silenced and subordinated in existing hierarchies of power and status (Fraser 1992). Formed in the marginalized social spaces so traversed, these counter-publics embodied a synthesis of their common experiences in transnational zones, thus helping to generate new ideas about an ‘earned
membership’ status located ‘outside’ the emancipation and the equality supposedly provided by national citizenship.  

These massive processes of improvisation in the face of the contradictory pulls of national political consolidation and global economic restructuring manifested themselves in various ways. As astutely noted by the social historians Maldwyn Jones (1960) and Frank Thistlethwaite ([1960] 1991) some years ago, and by many other scholars since, the incidence of circular migration and the linked phenomenon of avoiding naturalization were two of the most obvious manifestations of instrumental, strategic behaviors that ran against the grain of generally accepted popular assumptions of the inevitable transition from “alien” to “citizen” in any migration process. Such behavior also showed the much larger stage on which transnational circulation of populations now took place. While it is true that large proportions of various diasporas occurring in the period between the 1880s and the onset of the Great Depression did in fact settle permanently in the United States, huge numbers—more than one-third of the gross flow, by most reliable estimates—eventually left the country, after stays ranging from several months to several years, although for some populations, rates and proportions of circular (return) migration were even higher.

4. This is not to argue that economically motivated transmigrants, let alone political exiles or refugee populations, somehow were able to slip the coercive bonds and constraints imposed on them by the legal, administrative, and military systems of existing nation-states. Nor am I suggesting that such people were immune to the ideological pull of nationalism or its institutions in shaping their own attitudes and orientations. To the contrary, over the course of the nineteenth century—and particularly in the period between the two world wars—the interlocking systems and technologies of physical and ideological control became the macrolevel organizing principles of modernity. As I suggest below, however, the position of the United States as a prime mover in the expansion of global capitalism ensured that the forces of globalization would continue apace, generating additional massive transnational population movements, the uninterrupted ‘mixing’ of peoples, and thus the ensuing and ongoing challenges to the consolidation of a bounded citizenry from both the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.


6. For some populations, rates of circular or return migration were significantly higher. For example, the incidence of return during the 50 years of unprecedented mass migration before the global economic collapse of the 1930s were estimated to range from 20 to 30 percent of the gross migratory flow originating in the United Kingdom, France, Finland, Portugal, and Spain; from 30 to 40 percent of Mexicans; from 50 to 80 percent of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Greeks, and mezzogiorno (southern) Italians; and even higher rates for Chinese and Japanese. For obvious reasons, Russian and East European Jews and Turkish Armenians tended to have the lowest rates of return.
Reluctance among many noncitizen residents to naturalize offers another strong insight into the ambivalence many transmigrants perceived and apparently felt as to the net present value of U.S. citizenship, although propensity to naturalize varied widely by national and regional origin. According to one estimate, at the turn of the twentieth century (for men at least 21 years of age and residing in the country 10 years or more), rates of naturalization ranged from a high of 75 percent for immigrants from northwestern Europe—Germans, Irish, British, and Scandinavians—to a low of 10–50 percent for members of the ‘new’ waves of migration, comprising Italians, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Magyars, Croats, Slovaks, and Greeks. Then as now, nationals from countries adjacent to the United States—Mexico and Canada—exhibited the very lowest propensity to naturalize (Abbott 1917, 249–252; Gavit 1922, 207).

The motivations for engaging in circular migration and refusing to naturalize were as complex and varied as the aspirations animating people to settle and pursue citizenship, but many migrants had begun transnational sojourns with every intention of returning. For these ‘conservative adventurers’ (Cinel 1979, 1982, 1991), or ‘target earners’ (Brettell 2001, 100; Piore 1979), transnational migration was a fundamentally instrumental method of achieving defined ends—usually the accumulation of some kind of financial stake abroad before heading back home. Such circuits often simply represented a broader extension of smaller, regional migratory circuits that unemployed or underemployed persons had long followed in Asia, Europe, and parts of Latin America.

But for many others, participation in extensive global networks marked the arrival of an important new, larger-scale adaptive strategy that enabled members of these vast wandering working-class populations to negotiate the dramatic social changes simultaneously brought about by global economic restructuring and ongoing political consolidation of nation-states at both ends of these circuits. By the end of the nineteenth century, the first signs of the common contemporary phenomenon of native locations serving as nurseries and retirement centers could be seen already in villages as diverse as those in southern Italy, Punjab India, the Pearl River Delta of South China, and Mexico’s central plateau. The working populations departing such places had to tread carefully when negotiating the huge constraints imposed on them by the parallel evolution of state institutions and global capitalism. But international laborers worked around all these constraints, devising
strategies that allowed them not only to survive but in many ways also to begin to extend the boundaries of their communities across international borders. Despite the brutal conditions often faced in places of destination, these expanding transnational social fields nevertheless provided financial ways of supporting families ‘back home’, of maintaining intact old intimate and mutually interdependent relationships with loved ones and business associates in the places of origin and upholding meaningful participation in expanded or reconfigured transnational communities, which now came to include nodal points that spanned oceans and continents. Of course, the hostile contexts of reception in which they toiled—the exploitative working conditions, the legal and extralegal harassment, and the often outright hateful attitudes exhibited toward them—tended to reinforce this proclivity. Under the circumstances, a decision to remain primarily focused on kith and kin abroad, to remain culturally insular in host nations, and to circumvent the structures of authority wherever possible made perfect sense.

But what of those denizens who, through choice or circumstance, ‘settled out’ of such migration circuits? It is relatively facile to point to the incidence of circular migration, the related reluctance to engage the machinery of naturalization and formal citizenship, and the continued financial remittances and psychic investment in major cultural rites of passage in locations of origin as evidence of the resiliency of migration networks and innovative cultural adjustments and improvisations made on the fly. The question of how noncitizens negotiated their here-and-now existence in foreign lands is far harder to comprehend, however. Much of the conventional historiography of migration tends to adhere to the somewhat teleological argument that the overwhelming majority ultimately adapted, accommodating themselves to their new environments by becoming more socialized to local norms and, by implication, eventually coming to accept their new status as ‘Americans’. However, this too pat acceptance of the power of the host society to reduce and completely transform immigrants into something ‘new’ obscures the degree to which diasporic populations remained deeply invested not only in the sociocultural tools and values they carried with them but also in the cultural networks that, by their very nature, transcended the ascriptive categories imposed on them by the exclusive machinery of national citizenship.

One of the keys to succeeding in this kind of strategy centered on the local institutions that members of these circuits developed
wherever they alighted. As they attended to the unique needs and unusual demands the processes of transnational migration produced, members of these circuits put into place organic institutional structures and practices that reproduced locally elements from worlds left behind. Away from ‘home’, and in most cases blocked from complete access to the institutional structures of the society of destination, displaced populations originating in Asia, Europe, and Latin America developed complex community institutions and self-identifying social practices that served as effective alternatives or proxies to national citizenship.

Ranging from the landsmanschaften of the Jews, the Verienswesen of the Germans, the informal paese clubs and more formal societas di mutuo soccorso of the Italians, the mutualistas of the Mexicans, the rotating credit associations of the Japanese, to the tremendously intricate networks of village, surname, lineage, and sworn brotherhood associations established by the Chinese, each of these voluntary, autonomously established organizations served specific functions. Some helped organize renewable loan associations. Others served as local employment clearing houses. Still others were organized primarily as social centers, serving to celebrate culturally specific observances (although sometimes in conjunction with observance of American holidays, such as the Fourth of July). The importance of such places as social centers is hard to overemphasize. These organizations provided havens in hostile environments where people could socialize with familiar faces in familiar surroundings, enjoy special kinds of food and entertainment, converse, exchange news, and read in native idioms. As social centers, many of these sites served also as important places where serious deliberation about homeland politics and community issues (defined in the expanded sense of multinodal transnational community) could be pursued and even heatedly debated. Practically all of the numerous national and religious subpopulations provided basic forms of mutual accident and death benefit insurance. And the desire of people of many different nationalities to have their remains treated in customary fashion, and even to have them eventually shipped ‘home’ for final burial, speaks to the relative power of home place orientations versus alternative notions of potential solidarity. Together, the tens of thousands of such organizations and associations that were established as community extensions into the U.S. territory provided the social scaffolding that allowed noncitizens to function and even prosper in their new environments. In sum, what the formal machinery of the nation-
state could or would not provide, citizens created for themselves, in spite—but also because—of their formal standing before the law.\footnote{7}{See, among others, Ichioka (1977), Harney (1979), Hernández (1983), Ma (1984), Soyer (1997), and Bieto (2000).}

Some observers have argued that the emergence and maturation of these vast networks of alternative institutions were simply examples of the ‘Americanization’ process at work. For them, the formation of voluntary associations by diasporic populations and others was seen as a key transitional step on the path to acculturation or socialization eventually conducive to the ‘cultivation of citizenship and the generation of democratic values’ among newcomers (Eberly 2000, 3).\footnote{8}{See also Higham (1978) and Glendon and Blankenhorn (1995).}

And admittedly, this was true for a large number of ethnic groups and individuals. As the pressure for conformity to Anglo-Saxon norms increased after World War I, self-appointed leaders of these ethnic populations, many of whom were American citizens by birth, scrambled to organize in ways they believed would gain them a seat at the table of what they viewed as American mainstream politics. They not only kept repeating they were American citizens but sometimes even seemed intent in outdoing reactionary groups like the American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution in their zeal to demonstrate how sober, patriotic, loyal, and law-abiding they were. In case after case, ethnic advocates adopted defensive postures during and after wartime crises by establishing organizations founded on principles of loyalty, patriotism, and ‘good citizenship’. By ostentatiously accepting the premises of Americanism proffered by ruling elites during this period of intense jingoism, they hoped to carve out for themselves political space, and only thereafter, via their sole intercession, some place for their constituents as well.

The central problem with this approach was that, in accepting and focusing on the exercise of a bounded sense of citizenship defined at the top, these efforts by many groups and individuals necessarily also excluded a great number of the constituents they claimed to represent. As was to be expected, moves in this direction only intensified the rifts already apparent inside these populations, along lines of class, nativity, language proficiency, or generation. The lexicons of mutual derision that emerged in each of these populations (heard even today in virtually all ethnic immigrant populations) followed in lockstep. Mexicans
castigated pretentious Mexican Americans as *pochos* (‘faded’, or culturally bereft) or *vendidos* (sell-outs), while Mexican Americans returned the favor by describing Mexican immigrants as *los recien llegados* (the recent arrivals) or *surumatos* (a derisive term for the poor from the south). Cantonese Chinese had their own version of this intramural name-calling, with some immigrants referring to Chinese Americans as “*ABCs*” (American-born Chinese) or *juk sing* (‘hollowed-out bamboo’, i.e., useless or worthless), while more than one among their U.S.-born co-ethnics taunted their ‘recent arrivals’ as country bumpkins.

The internal rifts in ethnic populations were usually difficult for outsiders to discern but spoke volumes about the ongoing political struggle occurring in virtually each and every such group. Although it is true that powerful forces of acculturation have transformed huge numbers of immigrants into what is now the common catch-all category of ‘ethnic Americans’, it is important to remember that experience in the pressure cooker of the interwar era led members of these same groups in very different directions. Some remained primarily oriented toward the politics of homeland nationalism, as was the case with many Japanese, Chinese, Irish, Jewish, and Mexican nationalists in exile.⁹ Others looked to international socialism. Yet others took paths that led to U.S. residence but entailed harsh critical dissent, resistance, and, in some cases, outright refusal to accept what many had come to see as false promise in the dominant notions of American citizenship. Given what the legal scholar Neil Gotanda (2001) and others have aptly described as the ‘impossibility’ of conventional politics for members of so many of these racialized and vilified populations, this outcome is hardly surprising. Facing the intractable paradox of an immigration policy predicated on notions of the exclusion of ‘outsiders’, on the one hand, and on the other hand grounded in practices of citizenship that suppress ‘minority’ populations already residing inside and all over the U.S. territory, very different groups of transmigrants had already begun to imagine and experiment with at least as many different ways of redefining and reinventing their status within U.S. political borders.¹⁰

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¹⁰ This reminds me of Jorge Luis Borges’ reference in his poem “*Nubes*” (Clouds) to those who depart, seeking to convert, only to find themselves even more like whom they were: “Somos los que se van. La numerosa / nube que se deshace en el poniente / es
One of the most important insights reached by persons associated with such grassroots organizations and institutions was a growing awareness of how their presence in the United States disrupted the logic of the exclusive, homogeneous, ‘national community’ envisioned by the framers of the 1924 immigration statute. The pervasiveness of an exclusive and increasingly racialist nationalism in the country by the mid-1920s notwithstanding, it began to occur to the many finding themselves in these overlapping diasporas that noncitizens had always constituted a huge permanent component of U.S. society. Today, this might appear to have been a simple insight, but it provided the basis for the gradual crystallization of social and political imaginaries that ran very much against the grain of dominant constructions of social membership in the first decades of the twentieth century.

In its most elemental forms, growing recognition of the emergence of a new, internationalized division of labor, of a permanent presence of noncitizens as an organic feature in modern North American life, produced the most instrumental kinds of reactions. Some immigrants, as did a Finnish resident after passage of the 1924 statute, reacted with irony or cynicism when confronted with claims about the universality and equality inherent to the institution and practice of American (U.S.) citizenship. Facetiously commenting on what he clearly believed was a common attitude among the American-born, the Finn sarcastically noted that “America is a free country; we [just] do not need any kind of [dissenting] opinions here” (Wyman 1993, 123). And a contemporary of his would rephrase these sentiments in an interview: Americans were fine as long as “you think the way they want you to think” (Wyman 1993, 123). In the notoriously fractious working-class Jewish population, even more scathing critiques were overheard, particularly in regard to the ways dominant discourses of ‘American democracy’ helped to obscure the fundamental social dislocations, inequalities, and asymmetries of power generated by the even more powerful and pervasive forces of American capitalism. Throughout this period, the intense debates that wracked the resident Jewish community over

cita traducida con cuidado para el ritmo. Aquí lo que el poeta quiere transmitir, en línea con su genial hibridación de lenguaje, es la idea de que la traducción es una tarea que requiere un cuidado especial, que debe ser llevada a cabo de manera que respete tanto la estructura como el contenido del original. La traducción debe ser una tarea que busque no solo transmitir el significado de la obra en su idioma original, sino también captar la esencia de la misma.

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issues of assimilation, socialism, and Zionism would provide further evidence of the profundity with which different groups systematically were thinking through critical approaches to citizenship. The issue of national citizenship remained central to all these discussions but it occurred within the context of a much broader philosophical debate over the even deeper issues of orientation, affiliation, and the shifting nature of political community (Grinstein 1959; Howe 1974; Kosak 2000; Sorin 1985).

Explorations of the implications of a permanent social presence of noncitizen played out in other important arenas, too. As several pioneering studies have recently shown, implications of denizenship were explored most systematically by Asian residents, who confronted an array of legal disabilities comparable in severity to those faced both by Native Americans and Americans of African descent.

As the web of juridical constraints on the actions of Asian noncitizens grew progressively tighter in the period between the 1870s and the 1920s, the affected groups and individuals began to develop new coping strategies. To achieve this, they probed inconsistencies in the framing, interpretation, and enforcement of law; jurisdictional disputes between local and federal authorities; and wide variations in the structures of local labor and social relations and practices. Through trial and error, these explorations exposed sufficient numbers of legal loopholes to allow noncitizen Asians to continue to survive in American society despite the constant harassment they had been used to facing since the California Gold Rush.

Examination of the type of litigation brought in American courts by members of such populations in the last years of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century amply demonstrates the contours of what was in essence an incipient legal strategy of denizenship. Until a few decades ago, the better known legal scholarship on litigation (brought by noncitizens and when individuals had their citizenship challenged by others) focused primarily on the landmark Supreme Court citizenship cases of the period (Chuman 1976; Kim 1992, 1994). More recent scholarship has helped reveal that while these cases collectively do represent an important chapter in U.S. constitutional law, litigation brought by immigrants in this period focused for the greater part not on constitutional questions but rather on prosaic

nuts-and-bolts economic disputes: debt collection, contracts, property, divorce or inheritance matters, and other ordinary daily business transactions. Given their status as part of what had become a tremendously diverse internationalized proletariat, Asian residents’ efforts to litigate such matters represented rational attempts to seek redress despite the absence of the legal protections offered by citizenship status. These endeavors also divulged a shrewd understanding of the fissures that sometimes opened where the legal and juridical systems collided with the unforgiving logic of capitalism.

Over time, the basic struggle to earn a living required that noncitizens and their representatives develop more innovative strategies if they were to maintain even the most tenuous place in society. The protection of earnings and property (see Mulhern, chap. 2 in this book), however meager, was central to this process. As racial nationalists challenged their very right to exist, Asian immigrants began to bring litigation of relevance, drawing on their historic experience as labor migrants. Grounded in the fundamental notion that they were ‘guests’ of the United States (more accurately, ‘guest workers’) on U.S. territory, ‘Asian’ denizens argued that they should be extended the same rights and privileges to work and earn a living as those afforded noncitizens from elsewhere in the world. The more aggressive claims to political rights attaching to citizenship—bearing a U.S. passport, exercising ‘the franchise’, enjoying civil rights deriving from the Constitution—remain a critical and central part of the history of the struggles of Asian diasporas in the United States, although they represent but one dimension of a larger and much more complex political debate (Chan 1991; Wong 1998; Zhang 1998).

For a great many other immigrant litigants, resort to action in U.S. courts marked efforts by noncitizens not so much to gain access to the narrowly construed political rights of citizenship but to secure a broader set of social rights in an increasingly diverse multinational society that in many ways transcended U.S. citizenship, particularly when it came to the right to work, the protection of hard-earned private property, and maintaining cultural practices as human extensions of multinodal communities. For litigants in these gray areas of the law, these struggles included the customary handling of the dead (including the transfer of remains to countries of origin). They extended to issues of unfair fees and discriminatory taxes on what they viewed to be legitimate business activities—local, regional, or transnational—and to the ban placed on their testimony in court (which often prevented them from protecting
their livelihoods and property). They broached areas of activity and concern that noncitizens considered critical to their lives regardless of their formal standing before the law. The point is that, by bringing these actions and making equity claims against the state, such noncitizen denizens, while tacitly acknowledging the juridical disabilities and hurdles to civic participation that constrained them in some areas of their lives, nevertheless aggressively claimed rights in other domains. This was a crucial, essential move.

By recognizing that the permanent physical presence and enduring economic significance of large numbers of noncitizens required that the law flex to accommodate this seeming contradiction—as gradually and begrudgingly they did—U.S. courts first acknowledged, and then slowly expanded the social and legal space of, denizenship in American society. Judicial action to clarify the murky area where the contours of citizenship and otherness intersect remained for a time ambiguous, inconsistent, and for the most part inadvertent. In the longer run, however, the courts’ favorable rulings, especially in the areas of personal property rights and the right to earn a living, narrowed some of the substantive distinctions between citizens and noncitizens and provided important legal precedents for the future. This more elaborate legal recognition of denizens also added another dimension to the ability of transnational migrants to operate in a rapidly industrializing society without benefit of, or need for, U.S. citizenship. After extensive probing and experimentation in the years that followed, advocates of aliens’ rights sought to pursue and to exploit this political and legal tack even more aggressively in their efforts to carve out a public and private space of entitlement for noncitizens even as they tried to pry open the doors to formal modes of U.S. citizenship.

And it is here that individuals like Luisa Moreno and other noncitizen dissenters came to the fore. Moreno and activists like her did show respect for some of the ethnic Americans displaying conservative positions in the politics of citizenship, but disagreements inevitably added to the kinds of fierce intragroup frictions simmering at other levels of their interface. The exact sources of intraethnic political divisions varied slightly from group to group. But the conflicts that emerged between self-appointed ethnic leadership groups and dissenting voices like Moreno’s almost always were about questions intrinsic to the cultural community’s boundary lines, disputes over leadership, and especially the definition and meaning of citizenship as such. Here, in microcosm, was being waged an elemental struggle, played out over and over for
the rest of the century, as noncitizens sought to reconcile their own ambiguous position in society with others’ subscriptions to a sense of social reality firmly grounded in the dominant structures and ideologies of American nationalism. Politically centrist American ethnic leaders valiantly tried to assist newcomers by introducing them to what they considered to be the best path to pragmatic adjustment in U.S. society, but by insisting on their version of ‘100 percent Americanism’ they often prematurely and profoundly alienated the very people they claimed to seek to integrate.

People like Moreno tended to reject this strategy as a potential path to democratization, for several reasons. Because they recognized the extent to which noncitizens had always played a central role in the economic development of the country, they operated from the basic belief that this would likely persist as long as the United States continued to dominate the world’s economy. They drew on this insight to argue that therefore, citizenship should be thought of as something to be earned, rather than something bestowed by an accident of birth in a particular country. Building from a logic similar to that pursued by many Asian litigants in U.S. courts, Moreno and others like her used this point to argue that, instead of insisting that noncitizens be put under pressure to become citizens, the limitations of citizenship should be recognized and the institutional structures accordingly modified to accommodate the increasingly complex statuses that had been created by decades of transnational migration and by the expansion of a permanent denizen population. In the process, such activists insisted that U.S. citizenship be re-formed in ways that would help shed its racist and racialist features, while at the same time arguing that the status of denizen be raised to a level of importance commensurate with the contributions made by noncitizens in the United States to the U.S. national commonwealth.12

This position represented much of the logic put forth during the 1930s and later self-consciously by multinational labor unions such as the UCAPAWA, multinational pan-ethnic human rights organizations such as the Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples, and many other ethnic advocates. True, such a position departed radically from the mainstream political views of the time. Though many centrist American ethnic organizations of the period pursued strategies of

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12. For an insightful empirical comparative analysis of how the Mexican diaspora can also affect the democratic process ‘back home’, see Massey and Pérez (2008).
‘Americanization’ to the extent of barring non-U.S. citizens from their rolls, the UCAPAWA and the Congreso explored newer ways for incorporating productive, law-abiding, tax-paying noncitizens into U.S. society, without benefit of citizenship. They also advocated reforms such as bilingual education, women’s rights, and the right to organize unions. Some went so far as to suggest that denizens be given the right to vote in local elections on issues of importance to the community: access to public education, property tax rates, elections of school boards, the passage of school bonds, even community policing, union representation, public works, and public health. While only a few activists arguing for such structural reforms also advocated the scrapping of the institution of national citizenship, Moreno and others insisted that the institution as such be changed and readjusted to fit the realities of new circumstances.

Conclusion

Like so many noncitizen activists of her day, Luisa Moreno’s career as a labor and community activist proved to be short-lived. Citing her former membership in the Communist Party and her continuing “leftist agitation” into the 1940s, the U.S. government instituted deportation proceedings against her in 1948. After a protracted and expensive legal struggle, Moreno was forced to leave the country for Mexico in 1950. She died in her native Guatemala in 1992 at the age of 85 (Ruiz 2004, 19).

From the vantage point of her own era, it might seem that Luisa Moreno’s energies on behalf of the United States’ noncitizen population were misspent: after decades of steady expansion, the country’s noncitizen population was indeed contained for a while by the enforcement of the 1924 immigration law, the deepening depression, and ultimately the outbreak of World War II, all of which combined to break an almost uninterrupted pattern of migration and settlement dating to the end of the Civil War. As a result, beginning in the late 1920s and for the 40 years to follow, the foreign-born population in the United States did begin to show a slow numerical decline. Dropping from a high of nearly 15 percent of the population in 1910, the foreign-born

13. All of these political demands were laid out in the platform of the first meeting of the Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples in Los Angeles in 1939 (see Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples 1939).
proportion contracted to 11 percent of the U.S. population in 1930, shrank to less than 9 percent in 1940, and dipped below 6 percent in 1950. And by 1970, the proportion of foreign-born dropped below 5 percent of the total population for the first time in U.S. history.

However, as I have suggested in this chapter, the decline of the United States’ officially acknowledged foreign population in the middle third of the twentieth century tended to obscure the persistence of several important factors. The most crucial of these was the extent to which the U.S. economy remained tied to the global economy and ever dependent on foreign labor. The establishment of the Emergency Farm Labor Program in the early 1940s provided the first sign that the same economic forces that had stimulated mass population movements at the turn of the century had regained momentum even before the end of World War II. And by the mid-1960s, the complex structural forces that in the 1940s had helped to restart the massive circulation of foreigners through U.S. territory were once again operating in full force. Ironically, two liberal reforms—the abolition of the Mexican farm labor program in 1964 and the scrapping of the national origins quota system in 1965—helped intensify this process. By eliminating an employment option that many Mexican, Central American, and Caribbean families had come to count on for survival, the termination of the Bracero Program almost immediately stimulated a spike in unauthorized migration. And although the 1965 immigration reforms replaced the ‘national origins’ system with worldwide numerical ceilings on authorized immigration, family reunification components of that law inadvertently stimulated new forms of chain migration. Exacerbated by population disruptions caused via local conditions but also through a long sequence of U.S. military and economic interventions in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and elsewhere, millions of people once again began leaving their places of origin to seek work or refuge in the United States.

The effects of these powerful forces can be seen in the dramatic demographic transformation of U.S. society since 1970. Although the ratio of the foreign-born to the U.S. population has not yet reached the peak levels set in the 1910 census, in absolute terms the United States now has more foreign-born residents than at any time in its history. After reaching a low of fewer than 10 million individuals (or about 5 percent of the total) in 1970, the foreign-born population grew to at least 14 million (or 6.21 percent) in 1980, reaching nearly 20 million (about 8 percent) in 1990, surpassing 31 million (more than 11 percent)
in 2000. And by 2004, the number of foreign-born U.S. residents had reached an astounding 34.2 million (about 12 percent of the total U.S. population), the largest number ever recorded. Should the U.S.-born children of these individuals be taken into account, the dramatic effects of this demographic revolution can become even clearer in their persisting dynamic: the foreign-born and their children now constitute more than 23 percent of the total U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).

The resumption of high levels of both authorized and unauthorized migration has created an extremely complex and unstable social and political situation, rekindling an intense debate over citizenship. As was true in the 1920s, the recent spike in the country’s noncitizen population has greatly increased public anxiety. Intensified by public uncertainty in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, this concern about the changing composition of U.S. society has stimulated reactions among components of U.S. citizenry that in some cases sound identical to those articulated in the 1920s. At the extreme, advocates of immigration reform have called for the sealing of U.S. borders, the imposition of a moratorium on all further immigration, and even the abolition of the birthright citizenship provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. However, President Bush and his supporters have adopted a much more cautious and conciliatory position on the question. While acknowledging both the security and rule-of-law dimensions of the current situation, George W. Bush’s by far stronger commitment to free market principles has led his administration to emphasize both the nation’s central place in the global economy and the continuing demand by U.S. employers for access to foreign labor. Consequently, instead of proposing draconian measures, the Bush administration has floated plans to implement some newer version of a “guest worker” program. The U.S. president has also contemplated the extension of a certain kind of legal amnesty to undocumented residents willing to regularize their status under the existing provisions for U.S. national citizenship.

The current impasse on this simmering controversy places in sharp relief the continuing pressure being exerted on the state and on its project of protecting a stable community of citizens in an epoch of global migration. It also powerfully underscores the persistence of the struggle over a sense of belonging and over issues of membership, legitimacy, and political rights first given voice by activists like Luisa Moreno some seven decades ago. However much the dominant sectors
of society would like to see outsiders kept within the rigid confines of the narrow space delineated by the older, state-centered categories of political affiliation and orientation, massive and rising numbers of transmigrants and denizens continue to engage in debate and action over their status on much the same political terrain explored in Luisa Moreno’s time. And while many pursue conventional strategies of social incorporation and political integration, others noticeably continue to follow logics deeply at odds with these goals. Like their predecessors a century ago, such individuals are following the instinct to survive. They are just as intent now as they were then in carving out a space for themselves in society, no matter what their formal standing before the law. The proliferation of increasingly elaborate transnational networks (particularly among Latin American transmigrants qua denizens but also among other groups), the expansion of foreign-language media, and the steadily rising volume of remittances to places of origin all provide compelling evidence of the persistence of autonomous social, cultural, and economic forces that continue to operate outside the effective control of the state and of its institutions.

The reality of such factors as central components of modern life cannot but raise important (and urgent) questions about the perceived value of national citizenship for people engaged in these categories of transnational activities. By voting with their feet in the ways they always have, and by continuing to build organic institutions that continue to serve as proxies for the functions of citizenship, it may be that contemporary noncitizens are not the deviants or aberrations they have long been portrayed to be. To the contrary, the reemergence of these forms of behavior and action over the past thirty years may be providing a template for the eventual emergence of both subnational and supranational forms of social organization that may well become increasingly common in the future. In a fast globalizing international economy across which national outsourcings of jobs and production facilities go hand-in-glove with the structural exploitation of both noncitizen workers and racialized ‘minority’ citizens, it becomes increasingly obvious to contemporary citizens and noncitizens alike that the effective gap between working people who possess citizenship rights and privileges and those who do not has narrowed significantly. As in Moreno’s day, today as well, the diminishment of the objective value of national citizenship provides context for much of the social restiveness among contemporary national citizenries in highly advanced
countries such as the United States as it also goes long ways toward explaining how it is possible for some components of the U.S. working classes to agitate for immigration restrictions, for newer controls on access to citizenship, and for outright expulsions of unauthorized non-citizen workers even as other segments elect to make common cause with them by forming new organizations like the Service Employee International Union (SEIU) or like UCAPAWA some seventy-five years ago, by self-consciously deciding to organize workers regardless of their citizenship status.

The existence of such divergent positions among working-class populations that otherwise seem to be so similar in composition and in social standing provides insight into what might now be considered an intractable social dilemma. With perduring stark economic disparities still dividing postindustrial societies from slower-developing regions of the world, it is hard to imagine the powerful forces that impel and propel transnational labor migration abating any time soon. Therefore, while it may be remotely possible to envision a reinvigorated version of bounded national citizenship eventually amenable to enfranchising and empowering individuals currently kept outside the institution's protections, the palpable likelihood of the continued circulation of foreigners into and through national spaces will certainly continue to present severe challenges to the viability of that very institution or system. And given that higher probability, it is perhaps time to take more seriously Moreno's arguments about the expansion of the rights of denizenship, or even some new, regionally based, multinational form of membership, as forward-looking alternatives to increasingly archaic notions of de facto membership in single national entities. The extant and still very Westphalian national polities are obviously a very long way from being able to consider such a radical change in perspective, but the imperatives of a global age may eventually dictate a move in more manageably heterogeneous, more inclusively humanizing directions.

References


Battles over citizenship, especially these days, are at the core of the dynamics of democratic political development. They are integral to worldwide processes that keep reconstituting political systems, destabilizing some, strengthening others, as democracies under pressures seek to include more individuals more equally and also to extend their rights. These developmental processes loosen the conventional links between territory and citizenship, thereby enabling local individuals to forge complex relationships with global associations, networks, and institutions. The relative weakening of the concept of territory as a normative principle enacted by group pressures and state hierarchies allows novel, competing associational and organizational claims to emerge. With global development, states become intermediaries between the local and the global. They increase, if cautiously, the number of their distinct subcategories under both rubrics, citizens and subjects, rather than providing a single ‘fit for all’. States are also expanding the ways in which a variety of citizenships can be attained, indeed even purchased. Owing to their global moral standing, human rights cut through local territorial boundaries, wrenching changes within authoritarian, antidemocratic states as individuals gain greater exposure to and recognition or acceptance of their status as human beings in a global society in addition to being citizens of a specific state, nation-states being usually inclined to show little or no tolerance for additional allegiances or multiple identities on the part of their constituents.

The ongoing redefinitions of citizenship, by ever faster-paced global political developments, find their reasons to be in the Second Democratic Revolution of 1989, which began to fold into an ambiguous cusp of change both the Westphalian nature of states and the Cold War configuration of the international system. These alterations are now
fashioning a three-tiered political world, thus constituting a locality, country, and global system. By 1989, the rise of the modern, secular, inclusive state capable of dominating the world was a nearly completed human project of huge magnitude. Since 1989 a global political economy has begun to encompass an evolving federation of most of the world’s territorial political systems, one increasingly explicable by general regional demarcations identifying a different Europe, a closer-knit North American area, a bigger Southeast Asia, a reemerging Central Asia, and a few other reconfigurations of the world’s areas. States with a commitment to nationhood have upheld citizenship as their fundamental organizing principle since the French Revolution of 1789. This often has meant and allowed the total stripping away of the civic morality of the individual citizen in losing contests over civil rights. Citizenship’s subservience to authority often has demanded nearly total severance from competing identifications with locality, birthplace, blood, or belief. Although the secular state fell short of fulfilling its logic of exclusive loyalty, it did become the winning political force of the twentieth century, quite successfully destroying the power of all political contenders, particularly the historical might of empires. This was accomplished either by terror and subjugation or by bonding individuals and groups henceforth by way of legal norms rather than, as hitherto, mainly through familiarity, trust, and recognition or acceptance of common fate—the makings of the Hellenic sense of community in ancient Greece.

Locality was the very foundation of agricultural societies in both empires and states. The village as the principal functioning social and economic base of territorial order remains a unit crucially important even today in the world’s two most populous countries, China and India. Once brought together regionally, villages and localities turned into nations over the last few hundred years, and in many areas did so in the past few decades only. Birth and blood still exercise influences on political organization even in modern and strong states, although with diminishing promise for political privilege. Indeed, no modern state has been able to boast national economic development by retaining a significant part of its economy at levels of village-scale production, just as no state has been able to attain autonomy on an international level while undergoing internal conflict among inimical or contending domestic religious or ethnic groups. And despite their many attractions as modern secular entities, newly established states never have been able to obliterate the older alternative identities they inherited. Many of them either never seriously tried, or tried and failed, to secure
replacement of the privileges based on locality and birth by the more inclusive principle of citizenship. Before the state could achieve ubiquitous, unchallenged success, it was superseded by the emergence of an ever more inclusive globalized world system that offered multiple new alternatives to an unmitigated citizenship in a single state.

Conflicts about citizenship are a direct although not the sole consequence of the emergence of the world as a total urban system in an epoch of globalization. That fact became undeniable around 1975, following the declaration of a truce between the two contending superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which had been waging ideological wars in Southeast Asia. It became all too obvious after the collapse of the last great empire, the Soviet Union, in 1989. The globalization of production and distribution began to exercise an overwhelming economic force as China regained its productive modality by favoring industry over agriculture (see Fetni, chap. 8 in this book) and joining the world as a center of manufacture and trade. Next, the global economy spread to the other great world population center, India, before beckoning to Iran and a few other populous countries in the Middle East and Africa, still somewhat not quite ready to join.

In Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Asia, these recent global changes came as a great shock to those political elites and supporters with newly found footing in states pursuing a strictly national and still not even remotely global agenda. Their anticipated moment of ascendance to honor as leaders of states is threatened by a surge in global urbanity. Moreover, their sporadic efforts to claim legitimacy in the control of their citizens are at odds with their taste for dynastic successions vying to transfer political grip from father to son. Having never really had a nation or state to govern, a few seek to perpetuate their rule through military force, societal closure, and affordable recourse to dual-use technologies enabling them to engage in wars of rage and terror against destabilizing intrusions by globally engaged political and economic centers of power. Political leaders in some of these emerging states vacillate between the prospects of joining the community of nations and the temptations of seizing opportunities to acquire empire.

Citizens in the Modern State System: Past and Future Contexts

The analytic perspectives still used today to explain citizenship can be traced to the legal origins, in 1648, of the modern territorial state in Europe: sovereignty over territory, developed as a dominant principle
of European political order after the religious settlements ending the Thirty Years’ War in the middle of the seventeenth century. That territorial principle of political organization and secular membership gave primacy to the modern state system as the moral foundation of the international order and if for that reason alone cannot remain intact forever, as the world order alters. Territorial integrity had become the sine qua non of the legitimacy of the sovereign after Westphalia. Once the competing claims of religion and the clamor of subjugated local political groups could be effectively stifled, the prerogatives of the European sovereigns quickly became absolutist. The moral claims of some states were assigned the virtual status of a state religion. Kings in Protestant states often acted as the religious sovereign as well (Anderson 1974).

With the quasi-totalizing purview of the territorial sovereign, patriotism (a demonstrable version of citizen loyalty to the state-as-country) emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Patriotism demands exclusivity of identification with a single political system situated on a well-defined territory across which the sovereign exercises its absolute claim over all property, labor, and life. The extension of the principle of territory to patriotic citizenship reached maturity on the sweeping inclusion of heterogeneous populations into a single state space that would serve to define, and sometimes even to claim to incorporate, all groups on its territory as a single nation, along a process still understood poorly, if at all. Belief in virtue was transferred from institutions endowed with celestial status to those wielding political authority and capable of deploying very earthly means to exercise it, if need be. By default, the nation emerged as sacred often in ways evocative of special supernatural relationships intimately tied to extraordinary historical events going back many generations, often to times so ancient and places so remote that they actually became functionally extramundane, where not mythical.

The triumph of ‘nation’ as ‘supreme agent of citizenship’ was to become palpably evident on the transformation in France of an army of mercenaries into one made solely of French ‘citizens’. Commitment to nation became the defining test of citizenship and the dominant principle of legal recognition based on the French Revolution of 1789 on Napoleon’s astute move to turn an army traditionally raised by forced draft, and based on a sense of obligation remunerated by money, into one composed of ‘citizens with duties’ (Dolman 2004). It is these citizens’ armies that would ultimately contribute to an expansion of
popular claims to citizens’ rights. Expectations for citizens’ rights and
duties in a modern secular state would become commonplace when
the European wars came to a virtual halt at the turn of the twentieth
century. International institutions were created to assess the legitimacy
of states and even to confer rights of sovereignty upon them. The
modern state spread throughout the world, and especially so after
the end of colonialism, in the second half of the twentieth century.
Very quickly, an ecumenical system of states would take hold
worldwide.

Today, a cluster of moral rights and obligations articulates the role
of citizenship within nation-states in a system of national laws sup-
ported by international institutions and practices. In the broadest and
most elementary sense, a citizen is a recorded member of a state. Inter-
national norms, and now increasingly global dispositions, have mean-
while come in conflict with the simple, monopolistic tenets of exclusive
membership in an overly jealous state. Post-Enlightenment notions of
citizenship have become so conflicted with the sheer reality of sus-
tained global developments that today they are greatly aggravating the
problems inflicted on civilians by border alterations resulting from
wars, by the status of illegitimate states, the illegal activities of govern-
ments, or the causes and effects of unregulated migration. Thus, in an
epoch when almost all of the world’s population resides in one or
another territorial niche able to confer political rights of citizenship of
some kind, unparalleled global developments and an ascendant ideol-
ogy of human rights continue to blur even more the traditional relation-
ships between citizen and territorial state.

The two failures that eroded the legitimacy of secular states as moral
agents in the eyes of their own citizens are the states’ lack of success
in reducing conflicts inside their borders and unstable peace with their
neighbors. To these can be added chronic chaos in the processes of
economic growth. Many of the new states, but also some of the long
established ones, have not been able to meet their asserted moral
responsibilities for transcending their internal conflicts based on differ-
ences in ethnicity, regions, religion, or class, no matter how arguably
diminished by policies of common education and language those dif-
fferences may have been. The state remains ‘incomplete’, a failure in
its own terms, hardly able to provide a firm foundation either for a
peaceful world order or for an easy beginning to internal democratic
governance. And to be frank about it, whatever the claims about the
virtues of nation-states and the good feelings about citizenship, the
twentieth century—the heyday of the state triumphant—was murderous. By one conservative estimate, states either murdered around 170 million of their own people on their very own territory or allowed around that number to be killed in wars with neighbors in the course of the twentieth century (Rummel 1997). That is a huge amount of human blood, even if the percentages of politically intended killings by authorities in the twentieth century pale in comparison with killings in religiously motivated or specifically genocidal conquests undertaken in earlier centuries.

The perspective on the future of citizenship is that the world at this moment is going through a major political reconfiguration driven mostly by global developments if meanwhile also propelled by political processes directed toward a different world order, grounded in newer visions of human development, above and beyond the barriers of nations or states (Teune and Mlinar 2000). Indeed, the world is going through a process of “federalization” (see Kincaid 2008) enabling global and regional centers. As new regions appear to form, older ones are either simply receding or becoming even stronger. Urbanization is occurring at rapid rates, and especially so in the potentially great aggregations of human wealth such as China, India, and Iran. There are massive downward pressures on birth rates after more than two centuries of relatively continuous growth, and notable reductions in the substantial differences among the survival rates of populations across different regions of the world. Localities are acquiring new political meanings in regional and global political economies. Peoples around the world are establishing direct personal relationships with each other rather than using the formal impersonal channels permitted by their own governments acting as self-arrogating intermediaries. These human contacts are fostered by global political movements, including those favoring environmental improvements and world peace. These new person-to-person relationships weaken existing national identities, offering novel networks for diverse combinations of identities.

New technologies do affect all changes, but by themselves cause only a few. Two main indictors of modern economics are growth and its distribution. Technology is estimated to account for about 50–80 percent of growth (Lave 1966; Teune 1988). Knowledge and wealth certainly help to explain much about what kinds of political communities are formed and which succeed in competition with others. It is becoming evident that the complex processes currently redefining the world and
its peoples are beginning to be explained more fully by politics than by technologies and economics. But political interpretations, too, more than ever are beginning to be mediated in significant if little understood ways by modern communication (McDaniel, Kuhn, and Deetz 2008) and by organizational technologies in this era of global development. Yet it is politics that ultimately will allow states to view their territorial niches as frozen, not as bases to expand from, or to be used for the subordination of others to uniquely self-serving pursuits of even greater security and unlimited wealth.

**Political Community and Citizenship: Matters of Scale in Processes of Globalization**

Citizenship as membership in political communities also depends on the significance of these communities, and here the problem of size (or scale) is critical. For most purposes of political participation—justice, a sense of belonging, and recognition of individuality for dignity—small units are generally better than large ones. To achieve security internationally and to ensure a foundation to provide for individual wealth and collective ‘goods’, larger-scale systems are necessary. This, however, depends on the ‘environment’, that universe of neighbors and institutions outside particular communities and countries. With globalization, the external environment of territorial political communities can be made by far more secure through political institutions than by anachronistic hardenings of borders. Wealth can be guaranteed by access to variety through economic institutions rather than by extensions or expansions of territorial political controls.

How do political communities form and who are their members? The mythologies of political communities still in existence are difficult to separate from the facts (see deLisle 2008; Shlapentokh 2008). Speculation is the mainstay of theories about the formation of political communities, more so perhaps than those about tribes and headmen (Jacob and Teune 1964; Krader 1968). One finds personal flashes of historic import in creations by a Genghis Kahn and a few other great founders. Citizenship based on community, however, requires personal relationships, and reciprocal ones at that, but above all security of person and of family. That was inherent in tribal and kinship groups. That is and remains the first order of business in any political community.

Whatever the human condition prior to the dawn of agricultural societies, terror from nature and continual war must have been part of
it (Keeley 1996; LaBlanc 2003). In a world of small communities and larger empires in the making, the most obvious solution to problems of security was bigger political communities held together by centralized power inside and alliances outside, with clear-cut rules for hostile engagements (Teune 1992). The solution to problems of war with one’s neighbors, or to invasions by ascendant aggressive centers, or even to destruction by natural forces resided in the integration of the small political communities into larger ones and also in the consolidation of those that could take on the potential traits of large states. Such was the unstable world of international relations at the end of the nineteenth century. And it led to massive killings in the wars of the twentieth.

Between the sixteenth century and the conclusion of the twentieth century, political consolidations in Europe reduced the number of recognized political entities from many hundreds (depending on definition) to twenty-five or so by 1989, except for the fleeting moments of great empire, such as the one created by Napoleon and those aspired to by Hitler, and Stalin, or those just as temporarily concocted by a few forgettable others. War and suppression were the means necessary for developing nation-states of scale nearly everywhere, and especially in Europe. Creating a European Union that transcends nation-states, does away with proclivities to war—through social purpose, economic design and political will—and forgoes the impulse to imperial subordination through military force constitutes a historically unprecedented project of worldwide impact.

The emergence of newer regions has been greatly facilitated by globalization. But the momentum of a global system can supersede a world of regions. Today, locality with familiarity and engagement with globality can coexist, with pride of place still reserved for the foundational myths and the procedural accomplishments of nation-states and historical regions, much as is the case in the preservation of the fading relevance of the once all-powerful parishes and dioceses of the Catholic Church.

Just as the nature of citizenship depends on the scale of the system from which it derives and on the relationship of that system with other systems of equal or greater scale, so the value of citizenship is augmented in more developed systems, rising even further as territorially defined local political systems begin to acquire greater regional import and global reach. In the past two centuries or so, the value of citizenship became progressively linked to exclusive political claims advanced
by ascendant states of the European type. This political development eroded the viability of imperial notions of internally multiple allegiances and weakened the commitments—made by sizeable communities—to universal religions such as Roman Catholicism embodied in ‘the Church’. The secular state wielding sovereignty over territory became a mark of modernity. And citizenship based on bonding with land came to supplant citizenship inhering in family and blood.

The space of the state as the exclusive, necessary, and sufficient purview of citizenship has begun to be challenged by greater prospects for multiple-state citizenships around the world, by limited-rights citizenships in international organizations, and by memberships in political groups and organizations transcending the territorial limits of the state. Yet at the same time that the norm of territorial citizenship is being extended and strengthened, the very notion that an exclusive territory can define citizenship is giving way to global developmental pressures to deterritorialize citizenship, or at least to make the concept of territory far more complex through multiple and temporary citizenships, such as those being considered and promoted by the EU in its ongoing efforts to redefine world politics.

Already, international and regional political agencies, including the EU, advocate the principle of land over family as a more efficacious and just principle of citizenship. Much in the way of a uniquely numbered postal location (Zip Code) inside countries today, affirmation of citizenship by reference to country of registration at birth would ease the bureaucratic international triage of the multiple citizenships of tomorrow (Kondo 2001).

The Logic of State Development: The Incompleteness of the Territorial State

No territorial state can claim to have completed the evolution inherent in the logic of its development, namely, its ultimately total hierarchical control over its predefined territory. The pursuit of internal territorial control by states facing resistance from external competitors, sacred and secular in character and motivation, has made the state an unwitting accomplice of the very forces that endeavor internally to limit its control. In seeking to gain the upper hand vis-à-vis external forces, the state has had to yield entry to the very ideas, knowledge, corporations, and institutions that could undermine its absolute internal control. Through such concessions, the state could usher in the wherewithal
needed to achieve security internally, and relative control externally, through improved productivity and greater access to technologies of offense and defense. What obtains is a “Gorbachev’s choice” of sorts: constant trade-offs between internal control via inward closure for the sake of outward security on the one hand and, on the other hand, external influence through a semblance of internal openness, as in Africa (see Brown and Kaiser 2008).

One obvious shortcoming on the part of territorial states in pursuit of the logic of their development resides in their enduring disputes over borders. A more ambivalent one is reflected in the relative stability achieved by some political systems that concede authority to federations or are engaged in purposeful decentralizations of control. Social and economic differences inside borders have come to require ever greater attention by the modern state. Much in contrast, suppression, expulsion, and closure of borders are the coercive means used by deficient or reactionary territorial states, which do not hesitate to launch programs based on brutal ideologies in quest of operational perfection, national purity, or a classless social homogeneity of sorts. Persuasive means include policies apt to reduce disparities, be they between centers and peripheries, between city and countryside, or among economic classes, religious communities, or ethnic groups. Whatever the means used, differences have continued to persist and have become especially problematic in the newly independent states that emerged before the current wave of globalization. With the advent of globalization, compulsive development by territorial states can no longer be justified as a legitimate aspiration. Although, and perhaps also because, most states have longstanding concessions to the realities of new kinds of citizens and to the newer necessities for different levels of control among centers and peripheries, the relative power of ‘the center’ continues to decline as the development of ‘the periphery’ fosters the emergence of manifold competing centers of control internally and of a truly global market economy externally. Farther-reaching electronic communication cannot but buttress this development. All in all, the center did not fail. Rather, the society and economy that the state long purported to control simply ran away.

The Weberian Model of the Modern Secular Territorial State

The linkage of citizenship to territory attained maturity with the emergence of the modern territorial state, where land is decisive as a com-
ponent of wealth and hence of political power (see Mulhern, chap. 2 in this book). And there are also territorial aggregations of political authority and power at the local, provincial, and national levels. So these linkages that are variable between weak and strong extremes can be broken. The aspiration of state development is a hierarchy where the national groups, based politically on armies, bureaucracies, and consultative councils, assert domination over both the intermediary and local levels. The intermediary and local levels are made up primarily of familial groups with claims to ‘land’, the main source of wealth in the formative decades of the modern European state. These levels of territorially based political power, along with groups in business and finance, ideological groups in universities and churches, and finally agricultural and other workers, follow the lines of state development discussed by Max Weber (Gerth and Mills 1958).

The Weberian concept of the state, with family claims to land (physical territory), thus also defines family membership in terms of place. Seen as a three-tiered political territory, Weber’s state is a conflictive hierarchical structure: no modern state has ever overcome conflicts among local or regional groups defined by family, emerging or established higher-order groups with ‘national’ claims to territory, and ambitions for systemwide power over land ownership and land use, within defined borders, let alone over disputed boundaries.

This three-tiered land-based society and economy, with political elements at each level, generates various conflicts in the development of a modern ‘capitalist economy’ endowed with independent entities for production, trade, and finance. Each of these tiers claims obligations to itself. It may confer rights of citizenship in a city, county, or a province while itself remaining bound by national citizenship. The historic territorial ‘realities’ inside countries around the world are three tiers of government—national, provincial, and local—even for states with relatively small spans. This is characteristic also of states encompassing almost totally urbanized societies today. The core is a national center; it may empower national elites with prerogatives such as control of resources through a bureaucracy, the capacity to tax, the right to disobey, and the right to deploy military force, as well as the latitude to address specific conflicts, sometimes via an integrated but often through a somewhat independent judicial system. Conflicts among the levels for control inhere in the territorial state. The logic of political development for these territorially ‘hierarchical’ political systems is that the center should get more control relative to the regional and the local, and the
regional relative to the local. According to this process of political development, the business and labor interests that are supposedly distinct from political interests, just as the ideological groups are supposedly distinct, should increasingly be brought under the political center’s control. A contending, anti-Weberian, and hence less state-centered view based on Karl Marx views the business and economic groups as, directly or indirectly but jointly, capturing the national political center and the ideological groups as controlling universities, political parties, and the ‘media’. In the Weberian logic of state formation, political efforts seek to consolidate control the better to overcome social and religious differences, incongruities in property and wealth, and inequalities among regions and localities. The end point of Weberian state formation is national development with a national core at the very summit and individual citizens well below in the peripheries—the horror of the fascist state—where citizenship may have no connection whatsoever to territory at the intermediate and local levels.

Political development in most states relies on the domination or destruction of all intermediate groups viewed as potential competitors and of all localities traditionally opposed to subjugation, the rather extreme measures taken by the state toward creating ‘one people, one society, one state’ notwithstanding. But nationalism’s intense efforts for state formation via central control over peripheries, societies, and economies could succeed neither under fascism nor under communism. Both of these absolutist ideologies sought totally to control regions and localities and to destroy all autonomous economic activities. One legitimating rationale of the formalistic Marxist Leninist states of Central Europe (Wiatr 2008) was a catch-up mode in the consolidation of those states and a top-down domination of their territories through subordination to a Soviet system of governance (Teune 1984). It produced visible shortcomings by the 1970s and undeniable failures by the end of the 1980s, globally yielding to the Second Democratic Revolution of 1989. Rapidly after the implosion of the Soviet Union itself, governmental efforts centrally to consolidate their states by abolishing all potentially threatening cleavages were abandoned. Political parties driven by social and economic differences once were believed to be intolerable and dangerous. These days they are celebrated as institutions of political accommodation, platforms for national integration, and vehicles for democratic accountability. With the democratization of the territorial state, political parties grew in numbers, organizing at the local, regional, and national levels—but local and national parties
resist globalization: it weakens the relevance of territory for political control.

Although the Weberian concept of the territorial state provides the basic structure of the liberal state with pluralistic democracy, it could also serve as a blueprint for a monarchial, authoritarian, illiberal democracy, or even for a system with totalitarian impulses. In a pluralistic system, differences can be tolerated and controlled from a center through constrained, contained, and competitive politics (see Botwinick 2008). Yet the same governing structure can be easily turned into a corporate state whose societal, economic, ideological, and national political leaders collude and act as one in deciding what should be done for the collective good, to the exclusion of all other groups with a different opinion. And citizenship suffers.

The irony in the development of the modern state is that just as it was beginning to acquire the technologies to achieve greater control over population and territory through transportation systems that bridge distances and computational capacity that facilitates both tax collection and behavior control, the citizens, individually or in groups, began to use the very same technologies the quicker to escape state-imposed bounds by responding to their social, economical, and psychological needs to migrate anywhere else. This virtual unshackling of individuals from territorial state control is intimately linked to worldwide social and democratic political developments, which tend to increase the capacities of the individual to identify, to compare, and ultimately even to elect to move to alternative social systems. Social development liberates the individual from the bonds of less developed local life in closed national settings by offering greater access to both ampler variety and vaster scale in the global political economy.

**Citizenship in Developmental Perspective**

Today, the nature of citizenship adheres to the more specific aspects of membership (see Kumar and Silver, chap. 3, Gaige, chap. 6, and Urban, chap. 13, this book) in particular types of political systems—the most important of which is the territorial state—just as it is affected by the general long-term dynamics of human development and their globalizing tenets and value-laden aspects (see Williams, chap. 5, and Rubin, chap. 12, this book). Whether membership in a political system carries citizenship based on autonomy and rights is a first-order question. As an attribute and a conferred status, the dual nature of citizenship as
'civic duty and a civil right' is still new and not easy to understand and even harder to accept for the vast majority of the world’s populace today (see Ciprut, chap. 1 this book).

Not only are the territorial state’s overriding traditional principles of birth and place in the allocation of privileges and obligations now being contested, they are also being superseded by more complex, universalistic forms of human organization across a global political system that is increasingly fostering human rights while continuing to reshape tired institutions and aged obligations, especially those that feed on long-unsuspecting total obedience and wholly unquestioned patriotism. This is integral to the global democratic revolution. It generates perceptions that the presumption of rights tied to place and to group is dragging down the pursuit of developments in human rights.

Nation-states did represent an advance in human development for conferring civil rights that can override those acquired from family, group, or place (see Mulhern, chap. 2 in this book). But the nation-state today is perceived as lagging (Teune 1981). The European Court of Human Rights has become empowered to offer superior recourse for human aspirations, by insisting on rights that are ‘more enlightened’ than any privileges derivable from documentation of country of birth or loyalty to groups wielding power. Human rights are outpacing civil rights for surpassing political systems that continue to impose increased obligations for the same few rights and privileges. Such developments weaken the old relationships where obligations, and competencies to meet them, are prerequisites for obtaining rights and privileges.

A lasting contribution of the late T. H. Marshall to theoretical sociology was his idea of ‘citizenship’ as a ‘developmental process’ (Blumer and Rees 1996). True, his interpretations and projections were grounded in national rather than global political development. But to his credit, he defined three such developments theoretically. First came civic rights (freedoms) providing for individual autonomy. Second was political recognition of individual rights to consent in the constitution of political authority. Next followed higher-order rights of material and nonmaterial well-being in terms of welfare and security (Rees 1996). Marshall’s three categories were couched into a progressively sequenced theoretical framework, the first leading to the second, which in turn led to the third. Of course, these three levels reflected British national political developments, particularly those experienced since the late eighteenth century. They were attacked not only for their parochialism
but also for implying that welfare values were of a moral worth far higher than civic and political citizenship. Although both of these criticisms may contain some truth, they do not diminish the theoretical power of Marshall’s distinctions for national political development, which reflected a moral democratic progression, if one hardly applicable outside the United Kingdom, and certainly not until much later than their application to former colonial peoples.

Marshall’s ‘historical stages’ of national citizenship are the consequence of more deterministic general developmental processes, not the type of citizenship that grows from or transforms into another. The stages require levels of integrated diversity within a society in order to create a national economy out the revenues raised from, and the redistributions directed to, a collection of villages and regions sufficiently strong to support a government that is powerful enough to guarantee citizenship rights. These stages must be based on credible assumptions that the economy will grow sufficiently to provide for welfare in the long term. They must embrace a belief that all citizens are equally worthy—enough to merit rationalization of their rights in law, to register as participants in political decisions, and to receive benefits from the production of others. This secular, ethical progression, however, cannot stop at territorial boundaries. If good enough for all Englishmen, then why not just as good for women, Indians, and others as well? But a theory of action of the kind would require dimensions of global economic and political development that did not enter the modal perceptual field of politics until the 1970s, first as the art of the possible, then as the science of the probable. Only thereafter did the two modes of political development take form.

Political Development: Mixed Individual and Collective Citizennships

It is the standing of individuals as elemental components that differentiates political systems and, crucially, democracies from all other modes of governance. There are three basic types of citizenships based on social systems theory in contemporary politics. The first is exemplified by political systems of which individuals can be a part only through membership in intermediate collectivities, to serve as the primary components of the political system. ‘Medieval’ European political systems had classes of people organized into “citizens’ institutions”: the royal family, the church, the aristocracy, the universities, the guilds, and so
on. Some aggregates of individuals—nonbelievers, illegitimate offspring, slaves, and women, among them—were excluded from these institutions or placed in severely constrained positions. Being ‘categorized’ was a historically significant distinction from being excluded completely or only partially. Early interpretations of citizenship under more modern federal systems did provide national citizenship, but as a derivative from state or local citizenships only, until all such positions became developmentally untenable or legally weakened, as the interpretations of membership in the nation-state came to require more uniformity in citizen’s rights. Political systems based on group citizenship cannot be democratic, as they depend on the suppression of personhood (see Williams, chap. 5 in this book) and the subordination of individuals to groups. The moral standing of the individual is not defined by the political system itself. Yet in many countries today, these collectivities, whether groups, strata, or institutions, almost exclusively still function as the recognized components of the political system.

The second type of citizenship based on social systems theory is exemplified by political systems that harbor both collective and individual members—a mode practiced by ancient Rome, and by most empires since. Variations characterized most of these political systems, which, while continuing to recognize citizenship by birth into families, also began to acknowledge groups organized collectively as “citizens”—Jews in Europe, Indian tribes in America, aboriginals elsewhere. Today, based on the moral primacy of the individual, group solutions to citizenship issues cannot but challenge all modern political systems committed to democratic principles. The mixed citizenship pattern remains, however, the dominant mode for almost all states, even in countries purporting to be at the cutting edge of democracy but still unable to reconcile minority rights with human rights. Even pluralistic democracies with competing political parties seem able to uphold the ideology of individual choice while tolerating or encouraging group propensities to form political coalitions and to organize block voting by persons, based on the fault lines of group interests and collective identities.

The third type of citizenship based on social systems theory is manifest in the newer political systems in which, perhaps with difficult and problematic exceptions, only individuals can be members. This is the direction of democratic development in an incipient global polity. As it unfolds, there will be further equivocations on the principle of ‘the
sovereign citizen’, exacerbated by simultaneous recognitions and accommodations of groups. A global or regional federation would fall into this category. With its strong commitment to individual human rights, a democratically progressive EU will defer to a significant (and in some cases to a preponderant) extent to ‘national’ citizenships while continuing to respect the identities of older ethnic groups and new and old regions alike. But most democratic political systems, even those that further democratize by recognizing the preeminence of human rights and by tolerating ‘subversive’ political parties, are reticent to make ‘concessions’ to groups, which in the adversarial exercise of governmental authority ‘represent’ business organizations, or voice the interests of labor unions, religions, ethnic groups, regions, and other entities, including aggregates in governmental agencies. Whereas some countries have come around to allowing multiple citizenships, a few may even elect to privilege them in the not so distant future. The United States, for instance, remains hamstrung between the principle of viewing Indian tribes as ‘citizen groups’, with which the national government can make ‘treaties’, and the precept of treating individuals of Indian descent as ‘citizens’. The destructive equivocations and the sporadic consequences generated by these contending conceptions of citizenship have been brutal in practice, first allowing tribal lands, then taking them away, next restoring those rights, then again modifying them, with an ultimate putative moral settlement personifying Indian tribes as corporations endowed with million-dollar casino concessions, and group guarantees to individual claims on profits nonetheless.

Democratic Political Development: Individual Citizens as Moral Agents

From the standpoint of democratic political development, groups can never be equal, morally or behaviorally. Nor can a truly democratic developmental perspective bestow anything but conditional moral equivalence to the individual. The evolutionary thrust of modern democratic citizenship is toward the ‘sovereignty’ of the individual, not the ‘supremacy’ of groups or institutions. The two main challenges to this necessary global democratic development are (1) ethnically or religiously self-identifying states that recognize two or more ‘groups of citizens’, of which members of the ruling group enjoy the fullest privileges of individual citizenship but members of subordinate groups are
afford more limited collective rights than ‘regular’ citizens and (2) ‘the corporation’ as ‘citizen’ with special rights, whether it be a church, a union, a university, or an economic enterprise. The longest-standing privileges are exemptions from taxation, whether granted or self-arrogated by political authorities. Ethnically or religiously self-defining entities and self-distinguishing corporations generally have had and continue to have manifold roles and standings outside the territory of any given state, and this trend is likely to continue into the near future. The often politically necessitated compromises over democratic principles in and of themselves very explicitly attest to the fundamental structures of conflict being perpetuated within democratic political systems. And there is no easy reconciliation of group and individual rights in democracies.

Permitting more than one kind of physical person to be classified into a variety of groups endowed with moral personality in the eyes of the state is inherently invidious, in practice a source of tension and conflict, and potentially the cause for the outright delegitimization of the state as such. This problem has gained in urgency today because of a ‘globalizing international political economy’ (Ciprut 2000). The only way two or more implicit or explicit categories of citizenship can ‘coexist’ in a single political system is either by intimidation or through regular exercise of force, assuming that incarceration, torture, murder, or expulsion are not used de facto, as deterre nts, or de jure, in retribution. The multi-ethnic state is an environment of uneasy accommodation (see Aronoff, chap. 11 in this book). States that subordinate one or more of their population groupings are viewed internationally as outlaw states. As such they are, or must be, pressured by global institutions to change their ways. South Africa’s apartheid state long provided the most publicly problematic example. It was coerced into removing its unequal citizenships and since then has resolved the dilemma of dual citizenship as a moral problem. Faced with a different challenge in a different context, Israel and a neighboring ‘Palestine’ in the future might opt for the classic solution of territorial partition. Conferring unequal status on the basis of religion is the practice in most Islamic countries. The new Russian democracy is no exception when it comes to selective recognition of religions and to corresponding conferral of rights.

Corporations, because of their resources, whether through their direct access to the ‘means of production’ or indirect control of labor, or via other special claims on diverse commitments, always require
oversight or regulation to contain their influence on individual persons, who are the only ‘real’ citizens in any democracy. Democracies must stand above corporate interests. States themselves are prone to, or threatened by, various forms of corporatism. The modern corporate state that tends to link government to labor to church or to connect the church with the military and the government cannot comfortably coexist with democracies, nor can it willingly foster their development. Political systems are always the target of attempts to control by strong or threatened interests. To a degree, such dangers can be offset by greater freedoms, permitting competing groups to operate and governmental actions to contain conflicts in a mutually benevolent balance. A global political economy with worldwide corporations can provide a means to control national-level corporate interests. For example, competing groups can be invited to offset the inordinate strength of entrenched or monopolistic corporate interests. This is what happened in the matter of government-business-labor deals in some of the European states after they joined the EU. Corporatisms of all shades will require a global political system apt to act as a counterweight, for sustaining the principles of democratic governance. Global governance is in the process of creation. Although a modest start has been made on environmental dumping by corporations, and even by state-controlled entities, and toward punishing egregious criminal behavior that individual states might fail to pursue, global governance is still at an embryonic stage (see Gaige, chap. 6 in this book).

Notwithstanding that the main vehicle for territorially defined individual citizenship today is still the national state, multiple state citizenships for individuals are more generally accepted, much in the way they have been applied for some time in treaties for corporations, which are held to multinational obligations in matters of taxes and business or industry regulation. Globalization means further migrations by peoples as well as further extensions of corporations in search of faraway resources and markets. And although today the number of people living and working in countries other than their place of birth constitutes not much more than 3 percent of the world’s population, the complexity of migration patterns (see Gutiérrez, chap. 9 in this book) is likely to increase as a result of the strengthening of regional economic and political associations (Faist 2000). Already the number of people known to be first identified and then linked globally by professional associations or vocational interests through communications networks far exceeds the number of people living together in enclaves
either as a consequence of displacements caused by national events or as a result of inducements by global opportunities away from home. Meanwhile, institutions and groups continue acquiring independent and sometimes nongovernmental organization (NGO) standing internationally, gaining formal recognition by international bodies and organizations. Some entities may include indigenous or displaced populations, as well as others with aspirations to nationhood or in search of statehood. NGOs, too, have been conferred worldwide standing by international or global bodies (World Council of Churches, Physicians without Borders). There are even networks of networks (the global American Association for the Advancement of Science, composed of hundreds of international scientific associations and societies), NGOs with international standing (recognized by the United Nations and invited for special purpose meetings), or specific associations of scientific societies (International Political Science Association) and cultural and professional bodies (world sport federations), among others. A major factor for the gradual weakening of the state’s control over its citizenry is the expansion of such global relationships, especially by its collective citizens.

The long-term developmental forces that have remained engaged in the individualization of citizenship also strengthen the foundations for asserting the supremacy of the individual over all collective entities, were it for being so congruent with the principle by which participatory democracy assumes primacy over the populist institutions of the state. If state institutions are ultimately to become creatures of democratic politics, then surely so will all other institutions that are creations of the state, including chartered corporations, incorporated ethnic groups, recognized religions, and registered societies. Democracy is a limited form of authority, and one of those limits is on what individuals may do to constitute and to participate in collectivities that have a right to exist and thus also to having rights conferred upon them, with attending responsibilities. This is the challenge of the ‘democratic balance’ between individual rights to personal sovereignty and individual rights to form autonomous groups that may diminish the rights of others and in so doing make themselves more powerful in politically significant ways.

What can be expected in the short run with regard to the ongoing globalization of hitherto national memberships and to the concomitant gradual deterritorialization of state powers? I foresee even more unusual, mixed forms of ‘citizenships’ and very likely also a much
greater variety of ‘citizens’. It will be a more messy world, with regional citizens suing their governments in regional courts, as is happening today in the Council of Europe. A citizen of South Africa suing the government of Italy in the European Court of Human Rights would not be odd and would be legally permitted. Some citizens may gain voting rights in the national elections of two, maybe more, countries, as is the case today for Mexican and Israeli citizens living and voting in the United States as ‘citizens’. Individuals working in organizations in one or more countries already have special rights and obligations regarding their movements, their taxes, and their behavior.

**Global Political Communities and New Citizenships**

For more than two centuries, the most powerful force of macro political change has been the emergence and ascendance of the state as an entity commanding obedience and subordination, followed by its own transformation, first into a voluntary constitutional polity (see Urban, chap. 13 in this book) and then into a democratic system. Efforts to establish and maintain democratic political systems have often been violently opposed by hierarchical polities, such as those inspired by Confucian traditions. The ideological battle today is essentially between two kinds of political systems, and not among the many religiously driven ancient cultures that have, sometimes for centuries, coexisted often in the most diverse neighborhoods. One kind is a political system that is open and inclusive. The other kind is a political system that bases its cohesion on the exclusion of ‘others’ on grounds of their ‘alien’ origin, culture, or belief. Thus, globalization yields two worlds of citizenship. One is wedded to the state, as exemplified by those few states that retain strong dispositions to subordinate their neighbors and to extend their influence beyond them, as little empires. Another is based on extending the human web globally, through activities of exchange that embrace all institutions (McNeil and McNeil 2003). The chasm that separates these two kinds of political universes, systems, and worldviews may be too great to overcome in the next few decades.

The question for the future of citizenship is whether a ‘global’ citizenship can transcend citizenships defined by ‘local’ states on the basis of blood and birth or through an act of the state itself. That is beginning to happen. At issue in this question is the prospect of a world with an inclusive global civilization based on diversity. The EU stands as a great human project for testing whether there can arise a civic commonality
among ethnoculturally different nationalities. The success or failure of the EU will help test the viability of an expanding citizenship, in much the same way that the United States has served as a test case—with massive failures and difficult successes—in the guise of a large receptacle for ethnonationally diverse immigrants or an abode inclusive of all cultures. The creation of a global political system awaits the emergence of many regional unions embracing diversity among individuals on a scale less than worldwide. It is practically impossible for any civilization to rise, to prolong, and to perpetuate itself simply by homogenizing the human values of its individual constituents. Learning to integrate cultural diversity is crucial for systemic longevity in fickle environments.

What we now do know in no uncertain terms is that human societies began to develop more rapidly and more massively only after humankind managed to harness inanimate power some 250 years ago. The use of our energy resources helped to integrate the world into an international system of accumulation and exchange. National citizenship en masse was the main consequence of the modern industrial state. The principle of national citizenship now has been adopted throughout the world. The next step will be a form of citizenship on a transnational scale. The technologies to register every person on the planet as an individual with unique identifiers are already available. Global citizenship, in turn, remains a vision for the future in the form of yet another ideal—approachable slowly, unevenly, and perhaps even very cautiously. Its beginnings wait for developments that will provide the foundations for a more effectively functioning global political economy on which a worldwide democracy can be shaped. It took several decades to reach the global economy of our day, one unlike any achieved by successful empires or even by coal-powered sea-borne international trade. It should not take as long for humankind to build global institutions that can anchor in a sense of shared dignity an incipient global democracy based on a vision of common citizenship.

References


Democratizations are endless, dynamic, and rarely unidirectional processes. Seen through myriad cultural prisms, their utopian goals are never fully achieved, nor ever wholly attainable. In the classic ancient Athenian model of democracy, those endowed with the benefits of citizenship and thus entitled to full participation in the polity’s governance were a distinct minority (see Mulhern, chap. 2 in this book). In contemporary democracies, the universality formally attributed to the notion of citizenship is often flawed by discrimination of varying subtlety and degree against minorities (see McDonogh, chap. 7 in this book), sometimes resulting in their virtual second-class citizenship (see Gutiérrez, chap. 9 in this book). Fissures do not merely separate majorities from minorities, they can also demarcate subsets within each category, which may be based on a wide range of criteria (see Gaige, chap. 6, and Fetni, chap. 8 in this book).

Sociopolitical fissures among the citizenry can be grounded in class, ethnicity, ideology, gender, caste, race, region, religion (religious/secular, inter-/intrareligious liberal/fundamentalist), language, generation, residence (rural/urban), power (elite/mass), status (civilian/military), and responsiveness to external forces (traditional/modern, global/local). These fissures vary considerably in depth and intensity and therefore in their destabilizing effects on the societies and political systems in which their contestation takes place (see Kumar and Silver, chap. 3 in this book). Social scientists agree that deep and extensive fissures within a society present a serious challenge for developing stable and viable democracies because such fissures tend to engender distrust, especially when there is a disparity in power between

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segments of the society. Since the end of the cold war, the most prominent political fissures in globalizing international settings (see Teune, chap. 10 in this book) have revolved around issues of collective identity—often expressed through volatile combinations of ethnicity and nationalism—which present special problems for the consolidation of a stable democracy. I use a constructionist approach to reassess a citizenry’s complex politics of collective identity.

Two key dimensions of achieving democratization in fissured societies are through the accommodation and control of the competing segments of society. In this chapter, I examine conceptual models of accommodation and control, the better to assess different means of peacefully reconciling conflicting citizen identities and interests. Different political and cultural paths leading to varying forms of democratic practice are scrutinized to determine arrangements that facilitate trust, an element essential for democratic self-governance. Tolerance of diversity and the role of civility are analyzed in terms of competing forms of nationalism. To explore the central question of how fissures affect and in turn are affected by the democratization of a citizenry, I compare selected aspects of the democratic experiences of the citizenries of the Netherlands, Israel, and India.

The Constructionist Approach to Collective Identity

The constructionist approach is based on the assumption that human sociability is expressed and facilitated through the cultural construction of bonds of collective identity. This process takes place through political competition between groups, which, while pursuing conflicting interests, negotiate the internal and external social boundaries. The outcome of this competition determines the social and political centrality and marginality of groups within the social unit at any given place and time. It also determines the included “us” and the excluded “them.” Making such distinctions is fundamental to all processes of human cognition and social interaction. William Connolly (1991, 64) suggests that “[a]n identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. . . . Identity requires difference in order to be, and converts

1. For the impact of religion and nationalism, see Jeff Spinner-Halev (2008).
difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.” The valuation of these differences in which “we” determine “us” to be superior to “them” transforms the cognitive distinction into a normative one (see Williams, chap. 5 in this book). Such mediation in the attribution of social valuation is an important second stage in the construction of collective identity. The central question for democracy is whether this process necessarily must be discriminatory.

Collective identities are cultural products of political processes. Whereas anthropologists tend to focus on the former and political scientists on the latter, a combined focus on the dialectical relations between the two dimensions is necessary to achieve a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the phenomenon. Collective identities are neither natural nor static. Within certain constraints, they are socially negotiated and dynamic. Ethnicity in essence refers to aspects of relationships between groups that consider themselves, and are regarded by others as, culturally distinct. The groups tend to stress common descent among their members and frequently rely on myths of common origin. Their ideologies often encourage endogamy. When cultural difference is given social relevance, the relationship is politicized and thereby becomes ethnic. Both choice and constraint characterize ethnicity. As Thomas H. Eriksen (1993, 57) has astutely observed, “Ethnic identities are neither ascribed nor achieved: they are both. They are wedged between situational selection and imperatives imposed from without.”

External imperatives imposed in the form of cultural definitions of reality, when internalized and reified (perceived as natural or divinely ordained), become subjective imperatives of considerable power. Ethnic relationships are most appropriately conceptualized in terms of degrees of similarity and difference and of relative inclusion and exclusion. As Eriksen (1993, 158) puts it, “Identity is elastic and negotiable, but not infinitely flexible.” And collective identity can only meaningfully be understood contextually.

Social identity becomes most important when it is threatened. The acquisition of ethnic identity is generally identifiable with the growing sense of self-consciousness commonly associated with so-called modernity. Because people objectively reflect on their way of life as a tradition, they may tend to create an abstract sense of community with a presumed shared history. Such revitalized identities can be differentiated from the more ancient ethnie in ways shown by Anthony D. Smith (1986, 1991). As so-called traditional peoples become integrated into
states, they tend to reflect on and more objectively perceive their way of life. It is such cultural revitalizations that often produce the ‘invented’ national traditions that claim contiguity with an imagined past (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

As societies become more pluralistic, all definitions of reality taken for granted (such as ‘shared collective identity’) become easier to question. The more complex and plural a society is, the more likely it becomes that groups will acquire greater consciousness of the subtle differences between their identity and that of others. Global trends tend to blur the boundaries of national cultures, making collective identities more open to negotiation. This in turn generates new processes of ethnic revitalization. Paradoxically, it would appear that in order to save a culture, one must first lose it. Smith (1986, 7) perceptively concludes, “We are probably never so aware of phenomena and objects as when we are about to gain or lose them. Conversely, we never take them so much for granted as when we are assured in their possession.”

It is from the past that modern states draw much of their claim to legitimacy. Frequently, the process of nation formation involves tensions between ethnic loyalties and solidarity attachments to the state. Such tensions often become evident in contestation over the definition of the nation. Smith (1986, 150) captures this tension by stressing “the inherent instability in the very concept of the nation, which appears to be driven . . . back and forth between the two poles of ethnie and state which it seeks to subsume and transcend.” Both Ernest Gellner (1983), for whom the modern state always emerges victorious, and Walker Conner (1994), for whom it is ethnicity that always triumphs, fail to consider the problématique of this essentially dual attachment.

Smith distinguishes between the territorial model of ‘state to nation’ (emphasizing territory, law, and institutions) and the ethnic model of ‘nation to state’ (emphasizing ethnicity, genealogy, and tribal myths). Pierre Atlas and I (1998) employ this distinction in our analysis of competing versions of civic (Israeli) and ethnic (Jewish) nationhood in contemporary Israel. Although analytically distinguishable, such competing cultural models invariably overlap in reality and manifest internal variations. Such a hybrid form of ethnic republican nationalism has dominated Israeli political culture for more than 50 years. It is currently under challenge from two opposite fronts: from a more inclusive liberal version of civic nationalism based on equal individual rights and from more exclusive secular and religious variants of ethnonationalism.
Democratizations in Fissured Societies

(Aronoff 2003). Similar competing forms of nationalism constitute salient political divisions in most states.

Evaluating Democratic Prospects in Fissured Societies

“Few research programs in comparative politics have concentrated as much sustained effort on as distinct an array of questions as that centered on how democracy can stably operate in culturally plural, fragmented, or deeply divided societies” (Lustick 1997, 89). These divisions must be accommodated through conciliatory mechanisms and/or controlled through stronger cultural and political mechanisms. Most scholars focus primarily, and frequently also exclusively, on a single dimension. Anthropologists tend to focus on either cultural mechanisms of accommodation designed to achieve consensus or on mechanisms of cultural control defined by notions of hegemony. Increasingly they also look at means of politically coercive domination. Political scientists tend to focus more on political mechanisms of accommodation or control. The consensual politics postulated by the pluralist paradigm that dominated American political science in the 1950s and 1960s, and the elite arrangements in the Netherlands (among other places) that are the essence of the consociational approach, are classic examples of political accommodation. The analysis of the more coercive types of minority control in deeply divided societies such as South Africa in the apartheid era have been analyzed in terms of a theory of social and cultural pluralism dramatically different from the pluralist paradigm of American political science. The former is much more coercive than the latter. It is unfortunate and confusing that both utilize the same term. It is essential to analyze the interaction of cultural and political mechanisms. Rather than treating models for the explanation of mechanisms of accommodation and control as if they were mutually exclusive alternatives, we should be applying these in combination, to explain the relations between extant fissures and the emergence of new fissures at various stages of democratization.

Pluralism was the most influential theoretical expression of the behavioral approach that dominated American political science after World War II. Two major pluralist assumptions summarized by Richard Merelman (2003), pertinent to our focus here, are that “political power is distributed in multiple, competing centers of power,” and that “political leaders are tolerant coalition-builders.”
Table 11.1
Cultural-Political Mechanisms of Accommodation and Control

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<td>Accommodation (conciliation)</td>
<td>1.1. Consensus</td>
<td>1.2. Power sharing</td>
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<td>(legitimating discourses)</td>
<td>(consociationalism or dominant party)</td>
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<td>Control (coercion)</td>
<td>2.1. Hegemony</td>
<td>2.2. Domination (by a minority segment)</td>
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The cultural model in which the politics of pluralism are thought to operate is one in which minority groups assimilate into the dominant culture in order to achieve social integration and political influence. This American ‘melting pot’ metaphor of the dominant pluralist discourse was transformed into a ‘pressure cooker’ in Israel. After the decline of pluralism as a legitimating discourse in both the United States and Israel with the emergence of identity politics, the ‘melting pot model’ has given way to a multicultural paradigm, one that is also dominant in the Netherlands.

I propose that we examine the cultural and political mechanisms of accommodation and control according to the analytic framework shown in table 11.1. Although theoretically it may be possible for a regime to achieve legitimacy through any of the four mechanisms summarized in the table, clearly it is most difficult and least likely to be effective and stable in conditions of minority domination (2.2). Legitimacy is likely to be strongest when achieved through consensual cultural forms such as legitimating discourses (1.1). It can also be achieved through hegemonic imposition of an interpretive system on the ruled by the rulers (2.1). A political system can achieve a degree of legitimacy even in the absence of a cohesive common culture if elites accept and play by the rules of the political game, especially when accommodative power-sharing political forms of consociationalism or dominant party systems are adopted (1.2).

Accommodation

Although pluralism was most influential in the study of American politics, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, among others, applied the paradigm in their influential comparative studies. Arend Lijphart’s
formulation of consociational democracy refined pluralism to explain the “deviant cases” of fragmented but stable democracies in a few Western European states. Scholars working with this approach were identified by Hans Daalder (1974, 97) as an “incipient school.” They aspired to apply the model, based on the experience of the small European states, to evaluate the prospects for democratic stability in other fissured states. The model focuses on ‘vertical’ cultural divides as opposed to ‘horizontal’ class divisions which can either cut across or coincide with the cultural fissures.\(^3\)

Lijphart’s (1969, 212) explanation for the stability of democracy in societies with subcultures divided from each other by such mutually reinforcing cleavages (namely, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria) emphasizes the central role of each citizenry’s political elites, who “make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” (his emphasis). Lijphart’s (1995, 856) four major characteristics of consociational democracy comprise two primary characteristics (the participation of representatives of all significant ethnic groups in political decision making and a high degree of autonomy for these groups to run their own internal affairs) and two secondary ones (proportionality and the minority veto). The major aim of these four devices is to increase each group’s sense of security by maximizing its control of its own destiny, without the insecurity of other groups. These four key characteristics of accommodation are presented here in order of importance.

**Power Sharing**

The participation of all major segments in the sharing of power can be accomplished by a variety of political mechanisms. Grand coalitions in which parties representing most of the segments are included in government or special governmental commissions are the classic models. Less conventionally, I suggest the dominant party in a dominant party democracy may incorporate representatives of major groups and thereby ensure their representation, as in India during the period of Congress Party dominance. Israel had a dominant party system for nearly 50 years (counting the period in which it dominated the Jewish sector in Palestine prior to independence) yet also larger than minimal winning coalitions. Particularly during the lengthy period of Mapai/

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3. In Dutch, the term most commonly used to define the phenomenon is *verzuiling* (polarization), which metaphorically emphasizes the notion of vertical divisions.
Labor dominance, party lists attempted (not always successfully or fairly) to balance various ethnic, immigrant, and interest groups. The dominant party paternalistically would sponsor affiliated Arab parliamentary lists, without neglecting to include the major religious party, in every government coalition. Toward the end of the dominant party system there was one grand coalition, and since the transition to a competitive party system there have been four more to date.

**Group Autonomy**
Similarly, group social and cultural autonomy can be achieved either through separate educational and cultural institutions within a unitary state, as in the Netherlands or Israel, or, when the groups are geographically concentrated, through federalism, as exemplified by Switzerland, Canada, and India. Specific examples are elaborated in the discussion of the three cases later in the chapter.

**Proportionality**
Proportionality generally pertains to the allocation of government portfolios and other forms of political representation and patronage, such as civil service appointments and budgets. The justifications for such arrangements vary in different political cultures. In Israel the “party key” system is accepted as a pragmatic arrangement; in the Netherlands, by contrast, citizens associate proportionality with notions of fairness. Obviously the two are not mutually exclusive.

**Minority Veto**
The minority veto, as Lijphart (1995, 857) remarks, “is usually restricted to the most vital and fundamental matters, and it is usually based on informal understandings rather than formal or constitutional rules.” It involves the recognition that neither side can win a decisive victory on such core issues. A classic example of such an informal accord is the status quo agreement between religious and secular Jews in Israel.\(^4\) This agreement maintains the jurisdiction of the Orthodox religious establishment on matters of personal status, as regards the supervision of dietary rules in public institutions, including the Israel Defense Forces, among a few others. And at least one religious party has been a member of every governing coalition since the establishment of the state.

**Major Criticisms of the Consociational Paradigm, and Responses to Them**

A first criticism is that *consociational mechanisms* can intensify and accommodate divisions. Brian Barry (1975, 504–505) deems this model inappropriate for ethnically divided societies, where the encouragement of politically antagonistic communities likely creates conditions for “potential civil war or of civil war averted by effective oppression of one group by another.” Given ample empirical evidence of successes and failures in such power-sharing arrangements, the challenge is to discover the *conditions* conducive to success. From the available evidence, it would appear that the best guarantor of success is the inability of any one segment to dominate the others. For example, M.P.C.M. van Schendelen (1984) argued that the extreme proportionality of the Dutch electoral system constitutes a sufficient incentive for interelite cooperation and for larger than minimal winning coalitions. Significant transformations in Dutch politics since the mid-1960s provide a test for this proposition, as discussed below.

Second, the *success of consociational arrangements* depends on the self-restraint of leaders. Ian Lustick (1997, 113) ends his comprehensive critique of the consociational model as follows: “First, scholars seem increasingly skeptical that cultural group leaders generally prefer self-restraining accommodation to outbidding aggressiveness. . . . And finally, collapse or transformation of previously exemplary consociational countries and confusion over how deeply divided a society must or should be for consociational institutions to work have made it difficult to restore focus to the consociational program.”

But rather than abandon an admittedly flawed model, we need to refine it by investigating the reasons why group leaders do restrain themselves and in what conditions they choose not to do so. For example, it has been suggested that the breakdown of Dutch consociationalism was due primarily to the loss of such restraint among the leaders of two political parties when they determined that they would gain more by forming narrower coalitions. The challenge for researchers is to discover the political and cultural conditions conducive to restraint and, for those interested in public policy, to recommend how such conditions can be created, strengthened, and sustained.

The third major criticism is based on the “*democratic deficit*” of *consociational democracy*. Critics question whether a system, based on
an elite cartel, qualifies as a democracy. Lustick notes that partisans of democracy have been dissatisfied with a notion of democracy that requires low levels of popular participation. Daalder even refers to the earlier Dutch political system as an oligarchy. Consociational accommodation ennobles the competition among elites, a consideration central to American political science’s pluralist democratic theory. A system based on the citizenry’s political passivity hardly conforms to the ideals of representative, much less participatory, democracy.

While low levels of citizen participation clearly fall short of the democratic ideal, real-world practices must be evaluated in terms of the most likely alternatives under circumstances of highly volatile cultural divisions. Lijphart (1975, 177, 179) admits, “Deferece, passivity, and lack of interest are the opposites of the traditional democratic civic virtues.” Yet, he concludes, “When fraternity is lacking, peaceful coexistence becomes the next highest objective.” Limitations that fall short of democratic ideals may be preferable to all-or-nothing confrontations, which threaten not only democracy but also the integrity of the state—much in the way it now threatens Iraq—especially when state disintegration is likely to result in massive ethnic cleansing, as in the former Yugoslavia.

Less than ideal democratic arrangements may amount to acceptable compromises when they are the means of establishing stability, as this may enable a more competitive and representative democracy to evolve. The three political systems that I examine in this chapter have become more participatory and more representative over the past four decades. But, by definition, they have thereby also empowered undemocratic forces. Viewed historically, and especially from a constructionist perspective, the bridging nature of consociational arrangements becomes apparent. It is important to investigate the role these arrangements play in transitions to other forms more or less democratic. A history of pragmatic accommodation may lead to the sharing of the symbols, myths, and rituals of political culture such as shared public commemoration and collective memory, which appears to be the case for the traditional Dutch segments if not for a minority of the newer segment composed of more recent immigrants from Muslim countries.

5. Lijphart’s emphasis.
The longer historical view of the evolution of political cultures and political systems invariably reveals the emergence of hybrid forms combining democratic and undemocratic elements. The challenge for research is to determine the directions in which societies and polities are moving. Rarely is the movement unidirectional democratization. Greater representation of previously marginalized groups may empower undemocratic elements and strengthen exclusive and more chauvinistic forms of nationalism as in the cases discussed in this chapter.

Control

For accommodation to work, a degree of control of each segment by its leaders, and of the polity by the collective leadership alike, is necessary. In the absence of successful accommodation, the degree of control of the society by that citizenry’s elite is generally much stronger. Conceptual models of control range from very strong control, which is the least compatible with democracy, to weaker control, which is more compatible. The theory of social and cultural pluralism (not to be confused with the pluralist approach in political science) is the most coercive model of political control. Grounded in a concept of hegemony, its approach uses subtler forms of cultural manipulation. Finally, the notion of legitimating discourse is more consensual.

The Theory of Sociocultural Pluralism in Deeply Divided Societies

This theory builds on J. S. Furnivall’s studies of colonial Burma and Java. He coined the term ‘plural society’ to characterize more sharply fissured societies, created artificially and held together by colonial power, largely through coercion. This theory has been applied to societies characterized by persistent, sharply defined cultural cleavages within citizenries, whether they are based on race, ethnicity, or religion, as in Jamaica, Grenada, British Guyana, and South Africa. Often coercive, political domination and usually more conciliatory economic interdependence are the mutually reinforcing bases of integration in societies lacking a minimally shared political culture. When dominance is by a minority segment of the citizenry, then democratic forms and practices are even more severely limited. As the case of South Africa

7. Prominent proponents of the theory of social and cultural pluralism include Pierre van den Berghe, Leo Despres, Leo Kuper, Richard Schermerhorn, and Michael G. Smith. They are mostly anthropologists and sociologists.
illustrates, even extreme forms of such regimes are, however, capable of undergoing relatively peaceful transitions to more democratic forms.

The Hegemonic Model of Control
This model, based on Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of domination via the cultural construction of reality, legitimates a structure of political and economic power. It has been refined by a number of scholars, including David Laitin (1986), Ian Lustick (1993), and Jan Kubik (1994, 11–12), the last of whom defines cultural hegemony as “that aspect of power relationships which is not produced or guaranteed by coercion but by the acceptance (even if fragmentary and not fully conscious) of the ruler’s definitions of reality by the ruled.” Hegemony is a process that “is always being contested (with varying intensity) by counterhegemonic symbolic systems (discourses) embedded in both the everyday practices of the ruled and the ceremonies and rituals they perform.” Counterhegemonic discourse can be expressed through what Kubik (1994, 247, 250) calls “ceremonial revolution” and “rites of discontinuity,” or through cultural forms of everyday life like the resistance of what James C. Scott (1990) calls the “hidden transcripts” of insubordination.

Legitimating Discourses
These are the weakest form of cultural control. Richard Merelman (2003, 9) defines a legitimating discourse as “any body of ideas, images, or practices that portrays a political regime to be functioning as its power holders claim it to be functioning, and, in so doing, provides support to those who exert power in the regime.” In contrast to stronger forms of ideological control, legitimating discourses assume neither consensus among the powerful nor universal acceptance ideologically among the weak. No determinate relationship between social position and belief is asserted. No truth value is attributed. Yet the wider they are believed, the deeper they are effective in legitimating regimes. The model makes no assumption about the rationality of power holders. Nor does it assume that such discourses must mystify reality. Even intellectuals frequently allied with power holders are not assumed to be controlled by them. And legitimating discourses do not necessarily proclaim explicit value statements: they provide politicians with a cultural base of legitimacy spared the more coercive elements of the other models.
Having arrayed the theoretical perspectives in their proper contexts, I proceed with a comparative case study of modes of citizenship.

Rationale

Most studies prefer to focus on one mechanism at a time among those present in a given society or political system most of the time. I submit that different mechanisms are applied by actors, depending on the type of fissures in a given polity in any given historical context, and that understanding their interaction should help to explain the relative success or failure of processes of democratization. To that effect, I chose three states, one Asian, one European, and one Middle Eastern, each representing a different type of fissured citizenry.

**India**, as the world’s largest democracy, is a case worth special focus. Owing to the Emergency, from 1975 to 1977, when martial law was invoked, the opposition was banned, and other antidemocratic measures were taken, India ranks second only to Israel as the longest-living and uninterruptedly successful democracy among the many new states founded after World War II. India identifies itself as multinational. It is characterized by complex class, caste, linguistic, religious, and regional divisions. Given this complexity, I confine my analysis to a comparison of the roles of the dominant party system and, in the wake of its demise, the rise of parties espousing more militant and exclusive forms of nationalism in India and Israel.

**The Netherlands** is a state which, though not formally recognized as multiethnic, has based its political system on institutionalized religious and ideological subcultures. As the original exemplar of the accommodation approach, it is also a case uniquely suitable for testing the model, in the context of the major social, cultural, and political transformations that have taken place during the past four decades. Central issues examined are the relationship between cultural divisions and the politics of accommodation (consociationalism) as a bridge to more participatory forms of democracy.

**Israel** is an example of a state in which the national minority, its Palestinian Arab citizens, identify with their ethnic (often actual) kin in the Palestinian state-in-the-making, the Palestinian Authority. There are also significant divisions based on ethnicity, class, and religiosity among the Jewish majority. As a fissured society par excellence, yet the only continually stable democracy among new states for more than 50 years despite highly adverse conditions, Israel is a particularly
appropriate case to examine. For this reason, Israel will serve as the comparative reference point for the discussions of the other two cases.

**Understanding the Comparable Dynamics in Comparative Context**

I evaluate relative success in balancing demands to give adequate representation to diverse ideologies, interests, and identities and the need to maintain stable governance in fast-changing circumstances, as this constitutes a central and enduring dilemma of democracy. The consequences of democratization and the reactions to globalization\(^8\) have sparked religiously inspired, popular, exclusive forms of ethnonationalism in India and Israel, and anti-immigrant (particularly anti-Muslim) populism and previously unthinkable political assassinations and violence in the Netherlands. These more militant forms of ethnic nationalism compete with the more moderate, if paternalistic, versions of civic nationalism espoused by the parties that dominated Israel and India in the first three decades of independence. And the populist nationalist challenge to the traditional Dutch political parties and their more liberal nationalism is similar in many respects to what is going on in the other two cases. These newer nationalist movements, whose successes are the products of, and reactions to, more inclusive democratic representation, contest previously hegemonic notions of Indian and Israeli collective identity and democracy. Their Dutch counterparts challenge the efficacy of traditional liberal policies of tolerance and accommodation in the integration of what are perceived to be militant Islamic immigrants who reject the basic democratic rules of the game as well as the Enlightenment values which the majority hold so dear.

**Israel**

Israel is a case in which all types of mechanisms or strategies for dealing with an array of fissures within the citizenry have been detected. For example, Sammy Smooha (1978) records several patterns of the relationship between the dominant group and different subordinate groups of citizens.

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From Consensus to Confrontation: The Jewish Ethnic Divide

Relations between the politically dominant Jewish citizens of European ‘Ashkenazic’ background and those of Middle Eastern origin (an assimilating minority that, for a brief period prior to the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union, became a majority) are explained in terms of a dynamic paternalism-cooptation model based on the pluralist paradigm. Success was facilitated, particularly in the early stages of statehood, through their shared Zionist political culture. Given the correlation between ethnicity and class, and the paternalism of the parties dominated by Jews of European background, a political party appealing to the religious sentiments and ethnic pride of Jewish citizens of Middle Eastern background emerged as the third largest in the parliament. Paradoxically, by making the politics of ethnicity more confrontational, it earned the consociational role as the representative ‘Sepharadic’ religious party in the coalition governments led by the Labor party since 1992.

The Breakdown of Accommodation Between Religious and Secular Jews

Relations between the nonassimilating religious minority and the integrated nonreligious majority are explained by Smooha in terms of a “contested accommodation” consociational model necessitated by the significant gulf in identity and culture between these citizen groups. The accommodation between the religious and secular, however, is eroding as the definition of the Jewish character of the state has become a struggle over the very essence of Israeli collective identity. Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser (2000, 14–15) address the paradox that “consociationalism is promoted when the cleavage lines dividing the political community into subcommunities are sharply defined rather than blurred.” Crosscutting cleavages encourage compromise “only in situations in which the various contending communities participate in the same political culture—when, whatever their differences, they agree about fundamental questions of identity and value.” They are concerned that consociational arrangements between secular and religious Jewish citizens of Israel are breaking down without an agreement on basic questions of identity and value.

Political cultures are, I stress, always contested. The central research question is whether the contending camps share pragmatic rules of the
game or symbols of sufficient salience to allow for stable, democratic contestation. In the case of Israel, the jury is still out. For example, the greater activism and militancy of religious parties has precipitated a backlash in which a new antireligious secular party won six seats in the 1999 Knesset elections the first time it contested an election. The few militant opponents to the 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a few settlements in the northern West Bank even threatened to oppose the democratic rules of the game.

Control: The Arab Minority from Quiescence to Activism

Smooha explains relations between the Jewish majority and the minority “nonassimilating” Arab Israeli citizens in terms of an “exclusionary domination model.” His analysis is based on the theory of social and cultural pluralism. Lustick (1980) had earlier analyzed the quiescence of Israeli Arabs, their dependence on and cooptation by Israel’s system of control. Since Jordan’s loss of its annexed land of Cis-Jordan during its aggressive war against Israel in 1967, Israeli Arabs have acquired an increasingly Palestinian sense of identity, and this has led to their greater political mobilization, activism, and independence. The concept of hegemony has been employed by Aronoff and Atlas (1998) to compare the relatively successful incorporation of the majority of Jewish citizens in Israel within the Zionist discourse, with the limited incorporation of the ultra-Orthodox Jews and the relative failure to incorporate the Palestinian Arabs. The counterhegemonic challenges of the increasingly more active and influential ultra-Orthodox and Arabs represent contradictory models of Israeli collective identity (Aronoff 2003).

The continued stability and vibrancy of Israeli democracy require either the implementation of comprehensive equal individual rights for Israel’s Arab citizens following the liberal model of democracy or the kind of accommodative arrangements that the Orthodox Jews have traditionally enjoyed, including representation of an Arab party in coalition governments and a ‘status quo’ agreement on core issues vital to them. Recent Knesset legislation mandated representation of Arabs in the civil service, and precedent-setting Israeli Supreme Court decisions mandated affirmative action in all public bodies and organizations, including the council of the Israel Lands Authority. These took place not coincidentally in the context of violent clashes in which a dozen Arab citizens lost their lives—an
event that led to investigations by a government-appointed judicial commission.

**Israel and the Netherlands: Consociational Characteristics**

Lijphart (1977, 129–134) has defined Israel as a “semiconsociational democracy.” Israel shared with the Netherlands cultural divisions organized by political movements into autonomous camps and strong proportionality. Whereas Israel had the mutual veto of the ‘status quo’ agreement between the religious and secular, the Arabs lack a veto and collective representation in the government.

**Power Sharing**

In earlier work, Lijphart (1977, 131) argued that Israel only “weakly approximates the primary consociational principle of grand coalition.” Until 1977, Israel, like India, had a dominant party system that, as Lijphart (1996) later recognized, serves power-sharing functions analogous to consociational grand coalitions. In 1967 during the Emergency, which culminated in the Six-Day War, in 1984 in response to the challenges of the war in Lebanon and runaway inflation, in 1988 at the outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising, in 2001 in response to the second, more violent Palestinian uprising, and in 2005 as active complementation of plans to evacuate all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in the West Bank, national unity governments were formed, each of which constituted consociational-type grand coalitions comprising both major parties and other smaller ones.

Using Lijphart’s (1984) categories of majoritarian and consensus (neoconsociational) models of democracy, Peter Y. Medding (1990) suggests that Israel is a hybrid combining four elements of each. It is strongly consensual in having a multiparty system, cabinets larger than the minimal needed, low average cabinet tenure, and multi-issue valences along which parties align. But the highly centralized government, unicameral legislature, and unwritten constitution are characteristic of the majoritarian or unitary model. Medding (1990, 210) concludes that during the founding period Israel was closer to the majoritarian-centralized model but that the balance has been shifting toward the consensus-centralized model.
Segmental Autonomy

Both the Netherlands and Israel were divided into fairly self-contained communities based on political ideology and religion. Israel’s primary divisions were based on ideology (labor, liberal, and nationalist); religion (secular, traditional, Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox); ethnicity (Western and Middle Eastern); and nationality (Jews and Arabs). In the Netherlands the fissures were based on religion (secular, Catholic/Protestant subdivided by denominations) and ideology (conservative/liberal and socialist). At the height of their autonomy, each camp lived an almost self-contained existence, with interaction and accommodation taking place among leaders.

These divisions were organized and represented by political parties or movements and their affiliated schools, youth movements, women’s organizations, trade unions, sports associations, newspapers, publishing houses, and insurance companies. In the Netherlands, radio stations and the national television authority allocate time to broadcasting networks affiliated with these movements, some of which even own radio stations. In Israel, paramilitary organizations were associated with the political camps prior to independence and the largest nationwide system of health care was affiliated with the Labor-dominated Histadrut labor federation until recently. Both have undergone dramatic changes in the nature and salience of these divisions.

Proportionality

Israel and the Netherlands have two of the most proportional electoral systems of representation in the world, in which the entire country serves as a single electoral district. Electors cast their vote for a party list of parliamentary candidates. The percentage of the vote each party receives above the minimal threshold determines the number of parliamentary mandates. The Dutch threshold, formed by dividing the number of votes cast at an election by the number of seats in parliament

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9. Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin’s (1993, 27–29) characterization of a typical Dutchman’s life history encapsulated within his zuiling is remarkably similar to that of a typical Israeli’s enmeshment in her camp, especially in the period prior to independence and in the first decade of independence.

10. In the Netherlands, the country is treated as a single electoral district for determination of the size of the parliamentary delegations, but there are nineteen electoral districts. Lijphart (1975, 214) claims: “This extreme electoral system has greatly accelerated the breakdown of the politics of accommodation.”
(0.667 percent), is the lowest in the world. Until 1996, in Israel a parliamentary list required only 1.0 percent of the valid votes cast to receive a seat in parliament. This was raised to 1.5 percent in the 1996 election. Coalition building is the most important phase of both Dutch and Israeli politics. A peculiar weakness of the Dutch system is that elections “have little impact on which coalition is formed” (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 116).

Israel experimented with the direct election of the prime minister in 1996, 1999, and 2000 (Aronoff 2000; Gideon Doron and Michael Harris 2000). The result of the experiment was opposite to its intended goals. The outcome was dramatic parliamentary losses for the two major mass parties and gains for several parties based on identity politics. The significant gains in the representation of groups that had traditionally been relatively marginal (namely, Arabs, religious and Middle Eastern Jews, and Russian immigrants) strengthened the representativeness of Israeli democracy. Yet, it also created serious problems of governance. Although the Dutch pillars weakened, in Israel the traditional ideological camps were weakened while new identity-based subcultures were strengthened. Rather than bolstering the prime minister and contributing to the stability of the government, Israeli electoral reform resulted in unstable coalitions and the premature termination of the terms of the first two directly elected premiers, Netanyahu and Barak. The third (and last) prime minister elected under the ill-fated reform was Ariel Sharon. In 2000, the Knesset (the parliament) voted to revert to the old electoral system.

**Changes in the Netherlands**

The era of the politics of accommodation appeared to end with the 1967 elections in the Netherlands, when a large number of parliamentary seats changed political hands.\(^\text{11}\) The end of public political passivity was expressed not only in increased electoral volatility but also in high voter turnouts, despite the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970. Extraparliamentary political activities, such as widespread student demonstrations (even riots) in the major cities and the proliferation of ad hoc protests and interest groups, were further indications of

\(^{11}\) Not all experts on Dutch politics employ the consociational model or find it appropriate. Among those who do, there is a consensus that 1967 constituted a major turning point. See Lijphart (1975, vi, 196–197); Eldersveld, Kooiman, and van der Tak (1981, 224); Ken Gladdish (1991, 50); and Andeweg and Irwin (1993, 44), among others.
increased social mobilization and involvement by nonelites in politics. Lijphart (1975, 201) views the frequent resort to civil disobedience and the higher turnover in cabinets, among many of the other “revolutionary” changes such as the “convulsions of the party system,” as signs of political instability. Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin (1993, 44–49) characterize these changes as examples of greater democratization. In fact, they were both, since the broadening and diversification of political participation led—at least temporarily—to a more active, broadly based, and volatile political system.

The role of the traditional ideological and religious subcultures declined as new ideological movements and organizations grew, resulting in splits and mergers of political parties and their affiliated organizations. There was a significant increase in the number of parties. The Democrats 66 (formed in the Netherlands in 1966) and the Israeli Democratic Movement for Change (formed in Israel in 1977) were remarkably similar in their academic leadership, the social profile of their electoral support, and almost identical reformist political programs. The subcultures became much less cohesive and much less self-contained as social apartheid waned. Three Dutch health organizations merged, as did the Socialist and Catholic trade unions. Most dramatically, the three main Christian parties merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal, in 1980. The elites, particularly in the Catholic Church, no longer encouraged separation. They appeared to have been “over-taken by the pressure of social change” (Gladdish 1991, 55). Changes were most dramatic among the Catholics. At the same time, Labor engaged in activities that were serious violations of consociational “rules of the game,” when it thought it might gain a parliamentary majority (Lijphart 1975, 198–199).

The decline of pillarization has been interpreted as successful emancipation of minorities (like the Catholics) and their integration in Dutch society and alternatively, as a failure of the elites to maintain their social control. It also has been suggested that the Social Democrats and the Liberals tacitly agreed to accelerate the process through polarization, since they hoped to gain from it. It was also the result of increasing democratization, influenced by a new generation of students and other activist groups. Lijphart (1975, 212) considers one of the main reasons Dutch politics was so unstable during this period was “the nervous,

ambivalent, and, as a result, ineffective reaction of the political leaders to such unfamiliar phenomena as the breakdown of bloc cohesion, declining deference, demands for democratization, and political polarization."

All of these explanations help depict the dramatic changes. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Jan Kooiman, and Theo van der Tak (1981, 246) predicted that the transition period would lead “to the politics of a new pacification, including both elites and masses, based on new elite perspectives towards the political system, a new elite political culture responsive to a new, developing mass political culture.” This prediction appears to have been remarkably prescient in the long term except for its inability to anticipate the failure of Dutch society to assimilate a significant segment of Muslim immigrants. Hans Daalder (1987, 277) concluded that by “the mid-1980s, Dutch politics therefore wavered uneasily between a return to traditional forms of coalition politics . . . and a deliberate policy of polarization from the right.”

After a period of conflict, politicization, and polarization that resulted in more open government, there appears to have been a return to the older style of political decision making. However, there has not been a similar return to old-type pillarization. Andeweg and Irwin (1993, 49) therefore ask, “If it was pillarisation that necessitated the politics of accommodation, how may we explain the continuation of accommodationist practices now that the pillars have crumbled?”13 They suggest that it was the minority position of all political parties that “may have been the crucial incentive for the elites to cooperate instead of to compete.” They explain the return to accommodation, after the Social Democrats failed to gain a majority in the mid-1970s, by the fact that all parties fell much too short of a parliamentary majority. This is primarily an outcome of the extreme proportionality of the electoral system, emphasized by van Schendelen.

**Changes in Israel**

The year 1967 portended significant change in Israel. The war in June 1967 left Israel in occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank of the Jordan River. National consensus on what constituted the greatest threat to Israeli security was thereby terminated. For many, the threat of the Arab states and of terrorism

13. Their emphasis.
continued to constitute the paramount menace, while for others the occupation and rule over the Palestinians was seen to endanger Israel by undermining its democracy. The nationalist Likud, supported by working-class Jews of Middle Eastern background, allied with a newly nationalistic religious party with a messianic settlers’ movement as its ideological vanguard came to power in 1977, ending Labor’s historical dominance (Aronoff 1990, 1993). This politically salient ideological new division between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ was imposed over—and also correlated with—extant class, ethnic, and religious-secular divisions. Joel Migdal (2001, 5) astutely observed that “unstable boundaries create a pervasive sense of insecurity that may push societies into ethnic self-definitions and increased ethnic conflict.” Ironically, economic liberalization and globalization contributed to both the peace process and reactions against it, which fed the fires of ethnic nationalism (Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled 2000).

**Evaluating the Capabilities of the Dutch and Israeli Political Systems**

Further fragmentation in the Netherlands has also reduced the capability of the political system: “Depillarisation has broken up these [traditional] segments into numerous smaller fragments, without replacing the former intrapillar integrating mechanisms with some functional equivalent” (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 229). With increasing numbers of them articulating more narrow interests, political parties in the Netherlands, as in Israel, have lost much of their ability to aggregate interests. Additionally, a form of functional fragmentation frequently identified as neocorporatism resulted in the incorporation of interest groups into the Dutch decision-making process. Critics argue that stalemate and immobilism are the price citizens pay for non-decision making often so characteristic of accommodation politics.

External threats and a hegemonic Zionist political culture have traditionally provided sufficient centripetal pull to counter the centrifugal push of polarized Israeli politics. The peace treaty with Jordan and the agreements with the Palestinians, including the Wye accords signed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led government, signaled the beginning of a new security consensus in Israel. This facilitated the contestations over collective identity until the renewed outbreak of Palestinian violence (September 29, 2000) that followed the failed Camp David talks.
(July 11–25, 2000) provided a renewed adversity and insecurity that would bring Israelis together again—at least for as long as the violence and insecurity continued. There developed a broad consensus in Israel as to the evident need for separation from the Palestinians, exemplified by the security fence (although there is significant division over where it should be built), and the need for unilateral actions, such as the withdrawal from Gaza, a feat now accomplished. The death of Yasir Arafat and the election of a more moderate successor did, however, renew divisions among Israelis as to the possibility of a political settlement with the Palestinians.

Andeweg and Irwin (1993, 231–240) have suggested that there is an underlying consensus in the Netherlands, symbolized by the exceptional popularity of the royal family. The Dutch credit the crucial role of independent experts in creating consensus and the use of tie-breakers such as the judiciary in preventing political stalemate. Also, Dutch governments take to blaming ‘Brussels’ (the European Community) when trying to break deadlocks and justify unpopular policies. Through such techniques they manage to maintain capable governance and a very high level of legitimacy compared with their fellow European states, if much less so compared with similarly fissured societies elsewhere. Yet, as I discuss in the next section, a new crisis in Dutch politics has emerged. In the Dutch case, it appeared that a shared political culture had developed with the demise of the autonomy of the previous pillars, to allow for peaceful transition. But the assassination of the leader of an anti-immigrant party and the murder of a filmmaker critical of the impact of Islamic immigrants in the Netherlands now raises questions as to the limits of the Dutch citizenry’s tolerance and whether significant minority sectors of society share a common political culture with the majority.

Israel and India as Dominant Party Democracies

Israel and India remained dominant-party democracies from their struggles for independence from Great Britain (achieved by India in 1947 and by Israel in 1948) until their national elections in 1977 (Aronoff 1993; Pempel 1990). After a decade-long decline, the defeat of Labor in the Israeli parliamentary election that year unambiguously signified the end of its dominance.

Complicating factors, such as the federal political structure of India, have made it more difficult to pinpoint with precision the end of
dominance by the Congress Party. This appears to have gained reality in three stages. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. (1980, 148) divides Congress rule into two periods: “The first, from 1947 to 1967, was that of the Congress ‘system’ of one-party dominance. The second period, [from] 1967 to 1977, witnessed the breakdown of the Congress system and the loss of Congress dominance in the states.” And Ayesha Jalal (1997, 91, 97) suggests: “The 1977 elections seemed to mark the end of Congress domination in Indian politics.” Yet she considers the 1989 election to have been “a watershed in India’s political development not only because of its implications for the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and the Congress but, more precisely, because it registered the most decisive success of regional political forces in exercising state power directly from the center.”

**Advantages of One-Party Dominance**

This unique form of democracy had decisive advantages in the early period of state formation and for the consolidation of democracy in ways analogous to the elite accommodation of consociationalism. The lengthy period of dominance by Mapai/Labor in Israel and by Congress in India provided continuity and stability during the critical period of the consolidation of both states. The continuity and predictability of leadership and policy were particularly important since the two new states were born in military conflict with their immediate neighbors. Both had to integrate vast numbers of refugees (proportionate to their populations) in the early years. Survivors of the Holocaust in Europe and refugees from hostile Arab states fled to Israel. Hindu refugees from what became Pakistan took refuge in India. Israel’s raison d’être as a haven for Jews is illustrated by the integration of a million immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The Russian émigrés constitute a fifth of the population and wield significant political force. The dominant party system facilitated national mobilization, integration, and the consolidation of democratic citizenship in both new states.

Although Lijphart (1995, 862) initially suggested that “[d]ominant-party systems are undemocratic,” only a year later (1996, 260) he identified India as a ‘consociational democracy’ in which “cabinets are produced by the broadly representative and inclusive nature of a single, dominant party, the Congress Party.” Eventually Lijphart (1999, 307) concluded that both Israel and India in the late 1990s were consensual democracies lacking consensual cultures.
Disadvantages of One-Party Dominance

The longer the dominant party system was allowed to perpetuate, however, the more its disadvantages began to outweigh its advantages. The centralization and central coordination of leadership selection and succession, as well as of decision making, strengthened oligarchic tendencies in both parties. And the breakdown in the responsiveness of leadership contributed to their growing arrogance and to their self-interested pursuit of power and corruption (Jalal 1997, 39). In India, this culminated in the state of emergency from 1975 to 1977.

Recruitment and advancement through patron-client networks also deprived the parties and the nations of potential leaders with greater independence, initiative, and originality. Lack of access to a share in national governance encouraged irresponsible behavior in leaders of opposition parties as well. In India, some opposition parties gained experience at the state level. As Jalal (1997, 165) concluded: “A closer scrutiny of the interplay between the structural rigidities and political fluidities of its federalism reveals why electoral democracy has proven to be a rudderless ship in the hard rocked sea of India’s cultural diversities.”

Lack of access to national public office deprived opposition party leaders of valuable experience in governing and increased public anxiety during their ascension to office after the dominant parties were defeated. It also contributed to the polarization of politics as the new ruling parties unsuccessfully attempted to establish their dominance. And since significant sectors remained loyal to the old dominant parties, competitiveness remains a feature of the new party systems that evolved after the collapse of party dominance (Aronoff 1989, 14–16, 1990, 279–281).

In both India and Israel, parties competing against the dominant parties were more nationalistic and could mobilize support through religious, and in Israel ethnic, appeals. They were the products of the greater participation and empowerment of previously marginal ‘groups’ (see Williams, chap. 5 in this book). In India there was a dramatic increase in the influence of the vernacular elite and a shift in the locus of power from upper castes to rising ‘backward’ lower castes. Whereas Hindu nationalism gained majority support from the expanding Indian middle class, in Israel the working class—especially

among Middle Eastern Jews—and religious Jews of all ethnic backgrounds have provided the main base for more militant forms of ethnonationalism.

**Contested Nationalisms in India and Israel**

The political ascendance of Hindu nationalism in India is the result of decades of painstaking organization and political strategy on part of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which drew on historical reserves of deeply rooted religious nationalism. This opposition force contributed to the disintegration of the Congress system and to its loss of dominance. The BJP dramatically increased its parliamentary representation from two seats in 1984 to 118 in 1991, emerging as the single largest party in 1996 and forming the government in 1998. Despite its loss to the Congress Party in the 2004 elections, it has profoundly influenced the political culture. Hindu nationalism emerged, as Thomas Blom Hansen (1999, 4–5) explains, in the realm of “public culture—the public space in which a society and its constituent individuals and communities imagine, represent, and recognize themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expressions, and representations of state and civic organizations.” Hansen goes on to demonstrate that this ‘conservative revolution’ is part of democratic transformations of both the political system and of the public culture—transformations that appeal foremost to those privileged groups that view their dominant positions as threatened and encroached upon.

Like the contest among Israeli nationalisms, Hindu nationalism’s competition with the more moderate traditional Congress version is a product of sustained democratic processes that include intensely contested election campaigns, battles over religious sites, rituals in public spaces, and debates over the meaning of collective memory and identity. Although extreme elements have reached xenophobic excesses of rhetoric and actions—such as the destruction of the Babri mosque in India, in 1992, and the massacre of 29 Muslims praying in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron by an American-born Israeli settler, in 1994—these movements have generally played by the democratic rules of the game. Just as the more militant ethno-Zionism is more exclusive and less tolerant, the success of Hindu nationalism, too, reveals the vulnerability of tolerance in large groups of privileged Indians who form the base of its support.

The antidemocratic consequences of democratic processes lead Hansen (1999, 6) to question the salience of the previous democratic
discourse in India. “Was the political culture of the so-called liberal middle class, which provided the backbone of the nationalist movement and later the independent nation-state, ever liberal and democratic?” Hansen questions whether Hindu nationalism actually does reveal the dark side of the culture of the educated middle class that continued to dominate Indian public culture and the Indian state since independence. He asks if this reflects “authoritarian longings” and the “fear of the ‘underdog,’ the ‘masses,’ and the Muslims?” Similar questions have been raised by Israeli intellectuals who question the liberalism of early Labor Zionism.  

According to Jalal (1997, 99–100), the communalization of state institutions “has transformed what used to be periodic outbreaks of communal riots into vicious and organized pogroms against members of India’s religious minorities.” Jalal contrasts this with “a formally democratic centre masking its application of increasing doses of overt authoritarianism in many regions.” For Hansen, Hindu nationalism deliberately imitates Zionism in at least one respect: “Just as Israel is the homeland for Jews all over the world, it was suggested, India should be made the ‘natural’ homeland for Hindus, where any Hindu could freely come and settle” (1999, 220). Hindu nationalism and the messianic religious Zionism of Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) are forms of revitalization movements claiming to revive traditional cultural patterns. Both nationalisms claim to revitalize the spirit of reform characteristic of an earlier era.

The religious Zionism of the settler’s movement is, in part, ‘a reaction against forces of globalization’ (see Fetni, chap. 8 in this book) associated by them with the historical assimilation of biblical Jews to Greek culture, which most contemporary Israelis see as Americanization (Abramson and Troen 2000). And similarly, Hindu nationalism asserts India’s spiritual superiority as a corrective to Western materialism and excessive rationalism. Both Hindu nationalists and religious Jewish nationalists are convinced of the redemptive consequences of their projects for others as well as for themselves. Zionism sees itself as a moral “light unto the nations” and Hindu nationalists see themselves as “lights unto themselves” (Hansen 1999, 234). Such altruistic goals are used to justify anti-democratic and sometimes extreme methods employed in the name of nationalism. These movements attempt to overcome their supporters’ longstanding sense of alienation in public spheres traditionally dominated by secular liberal discourses.

15. See, for example, Zeev Sternhell (1998).
Conclusion: Democratic Prospects in Three Fissured Societies

In all three cases investigated, various combined elements of accommodation and control were employed to constrain the centrifugal forces at work in these fissured societies. Elite accommodation played a crucial role, although it took different forms in each case. Grand councils characterized the Netherlands, whereas both India and Israel relied on balancing forces within dominant parties for their first 30 years of independence. Even when Mapai/Labor was at the peak of its dominance, it lacked a parliamentary majority. Therefore, it was forced to rely on coalition partners—always to create larger than minimal winning coalitions. For being twice as large as its nearest competitor and, like Congress in India, encompassing the ideological center, it remained mathematically and ideologically impossible to form a coalition without it as the dominant party. Mapai resorted to a grand coalition only once, in an extreme emergency, as its dominance was waning. However, since the end of dominant party rule there have been four grand coalitions containing both major parties and other smaller ones in response to different crises. With the change in the party system, a different form of elite accommodation and power sharing was adopted when the citizenry’s electoral results were inconclusive.

In India, since Congress had a comfortable majority in the Lok Sabha until 1977, coalitions were based on balancing internal party factions and reconciling religious, regional, caste, and linguistic interests. Territorial constituencies and the large number of rival and competing opposition parties enabled Congress candidates to get elected, sometimes with as little as 30 percent of the popular vote. The symbiotic relationship between the top Congress national leadership and the civil service, the police, and the army contributed to its covert authoritarian tendencies. The political mobilization of a broader social base led to greater appeals to populism. Since the defeat of Congress in 1977, coalition politics has become as critical as in Israel, although somewhat more chaotic.

17. From 1952 to 1971, Congress won a high of 75 percent and a low of 54.42 percent of the central parliamentary seats. It received a low of 48.59 percent of the seats in state assemblies in 1967 and a high of 70.22 percent of the seats in the state assemblies in 1972. But it did so with only 40.73–47.78 percent of the electoral vote (Hardgrave 1980, 204–207).
A key constant variable, despite formidable changes in the Netherlands and Israel, is that no single political party could command a majority in the main parliamentary institutions. Since no Dutch or Israeli party was able to impose its will, as long as their leaders were unwilling to undertake undemocratic means to gain power, they remained obligated to form coalitions. Given cultural pluralism and proportional representation, a coalition of parties representing different segments was required to govern the citizenry after every election. Inclusion parties representing all segments over time in the ruling coalition, except the Arabs in Israel, enhanced stable democratic governance.

The major structural condition for stable democracy in this context has been the absence of a majority in a proportional system of elections, which hence made it necessary for coalitions to govern. The cultural condition has been the commitment of the elite to democratic rules of the game that recognizes that all the players must get a turn at bat. To permanently exclude any segment of the society from governance attenuates the democratic nature of the system, threatening its long-term stability. This is a danger posed by continued exclusion of Arab parties in Israel from the governing coalitions. While broader entrenchment of tolerance in the culture would clearly be preferable, in the meantime, the political elite must recognize the utilitarian need for this kind of inclusion and the accommodations that ensure it.

The Dutch case illustrates that as the general public became more tolerant of traditional religious and cultural differences and more politically involved, citizens challenged the accommodative rules of the ruling elite cartels. All three cases illustrate that, at least initially, democratization through the mobilization of larger segments of the citizenry, and greater political representation and influence of erstwhile peripheral groups, can release intolerant and undemocratic forces. Even in the Netherlands, despite its much longer history as an independent democratic state with a profoundly entrenched culture of tolerance (Schama 1987), the hardship of integrating significant segments of the million and a half first-generation immigrants (10 percent of the population)—of which two-thirds are Muslim—has been dramatically illustrated by the consequences of politically motivated violence and hitherto unthinkable murders.

The personal electoral list of populist anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim nationalist leader Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated one week before electoral victory, came off as the second largest parliamen-
tary party the first time it contested an election in 2002, briefly serving in the coalition government. Richard Herzinger (2002, 79) suggests that “right wing” is the wrong adjective for the new European populists like Fortuyn, who was no racist: “His anti-immigrant stance arose from a popular fear that conservative Islamic attitudes would dilute Dutch tolerance.” Anson Rabinbach (2002, 3) described Fortuyn’s party as “a curious mix of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment and racial and sexual tolerance that does not square with any traditional notions of Europe’s far right.” Although the party eventually self-destructed, another, led by Geert Wilders, continues to promote anti-immigrant populism, which was strengthened by the citizenry’s reaction of fear following the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh was brutally slain by a Dutch-born young man of Moroccan parents, in protestation of his provocative film Submission, a work highly critical of the treatment of women in some Islamic cultures.

A perception that Dutch culture is threatened is the dominant factor in generating a negative reaction by the indigenous citizenry to immigrant minorities. And the issue of cultural integration, when it becomes salient, evokes proportionately just as strong a reaction from those who are least concerned about a threat to Dutch culture as also from those who are concerned about one: a readiness to respond on the issue of culture. The propensity extends throughout Dutch society (see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004, espec. 47).

Observers suggest that such strains over immigration are rooted in a genuine conflict of values. Ian Buruma (2005, 26, 32) portrays the Dutch creed of tolerance as being “under siege,” suggesting that the “naiveté” here resides in “the wrong state of mind for defending one of the oldest and most liberal democracies against those who wish to destroy it.” As The Economist (2005, 26) put it: “In a mood of confusion over national identity, there have been calls for a new canon of Dutch history, hitherto an unfashionable subject.” It quotes the liberal Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen, who said the Netherlands “seems as if it has lost its anchor.”

18. Fortuyn was assassinated by a militant animal-rights activist.
19. In Flanders, in neighboring Belgium, the right-wing populist anti-immigrant (and anti-Muslim) Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) surged from 10 percent of the electorate in 1999 to nearly a quarter by 2005.
20. Wilders was temporarily forced to live in a high-security prison cell; and his fellow parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born feminist who collaborated with Van Gogh on the controversial film, after being sent abroad for a period, was forced to live on a military base for a time because of the many death threats each had received.
In Israel and India, militant, exclusive, and even xenophobic forms of nationalism successfully challenged the milder and more inclusive forms of nationalism advocated by the paternalistic leaders of the formerly dominant parties. All three cases discussed here provide vivid verification of the fact that processes of democratization are dynamic and not necessarily unidirectional. The more exclusive nationalisms in Israel and India do encourage greater militancy in the longstanding border disputes between them and their neighbors. They tend to induce not only increased domestic violence among the citizens but increased levels of violence with neighbors as well. The prospects for peaceful order among the citizenry and for stability in both Israeli and Indian democracies in their volatile regions, and for societal harmony in the Netherlands, will depend on the strengthening of domestic accommodative practices and of moderate and inclusive forms of collective identity.

References


The recent revival of interest in the concept of citizenship stems, at least in part, from a concern for civic virtue. Citizenship scholars argue that citizens should participate in the process of democracy. They should join organizations, engage in political discourse, run for public office, and nurture a spirit of mutual respect, equal treatment, and cooperation with their fellow citizens (Fishkin 1991; Galston 1991; Macedo 1990; Oldfield 1990; Touraine 1997). This scholarly literature is objectionable because it is part of the age-old pattern of the privileged, well-educated, and well-connected wagging their fingers and clucking their tongues at ordinary people for their lack of higher virtues.

A further and more specific problem with these theorists of ‘citizenship as civic virtue’ is that they base their ideas on the concept of citizenship—a concept that, at its core, involves membership in a polity (Walzer 1983). Civil virtue theorists reject the idea that the concept of citizenship is limited to mere membership and have added a vast superstructure of duties, values, and aspirations to the foundational concept of membership. But the foundation, although it may be regarded to be far from sufficient, remains necessary. For without the principled notion of membership, the civic virtue concept of citizenship—and for that matter, any concept of citizenship—would lack meaning and coherence (see Williams, chap. 5, and Urban, chap. 13 in this book, for more complex understandings of the term).

Membership, however, is a troubling concept that fits very poorly with the civic virtue theories that rest upon it. In essence, the idea of membership involves a division of the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’—the ‘in group’ and the ‘out group’, as it were. It implies a basic inequality that contradicts the egalitarian values of civic virtue theorists, a kind of exclusivity that contradicts their very claims to universality, an arbitrariness that challenges their high reliance on reasoned
discourse, and an authoritarianism that runs counter to their avowed commitments to democratic values. On this last point, it can be noted that there are a variety of democratic accounts of the way members of an existing polity can choose their leaders or determine public policy, but no democratic accounts of the way in which membership in a polity can be determined in the first place (Rubin 1997). Determining prerequisites for membership involves an authoritarian process of some sort in which a high-placed external actor declares who is part of the polity and who is not.

But rather than pursuing the concept of membership and its connection to citizenship at the philosophical level, this chapter explores two particular dangers posed by such a concept of membership and by the concept of citizenship that necessarily rests on it: the problem of membership denial and the problem of collective unconcern. The next two sections of the chapter explore these problems. Based on that discussion, an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between polities and individuals, an alternative that assesses the polity’s moral obligations to those whom it affects, is proposed. I argue that this alternative is more consonant with our moral commitments, as well as being more attuned to the realities of the modern world.

Citizenship and Membership

Before I proceed any further, the connection between membership and citizenship should be discussed in a bit more detail. Michael Walzer (1983) has pointed out that membership refers to a form of participation in a voluntary organization, in an ethnic group, in a religion, as also in a nation-state. However, I submit that when discussing membership in a polity and, more relevantly, in a modern nation-state, direct analogies to any of these situations need to be avoided. Whereas the analogy between membership in a voluntary association—say, a men’s club—and membership in a polity possesses an august pedigree in social contract theory (Hobbes 1951; Kant 1996; Locke 1952; Rousseau 1954), it makes little sense in a modern context. People do not choose the nation to which they belong in any realistic sense, in part because the nation into which they are born possesses a monopoly on their cultural heritage, on their childhood associations, and on their full economic opportunities (Rawls 1993), in part because the Westphalian system and national immigration policies combine to deny most people any attractive opportunities for choosing some alternative polity (see Gutiérrez, chap. 9 in this book).
These considerations may make ethnic groups seem more analogous to nation-states, since people are born into their ethnic group and experience difficulty in exchanging it for another. But ethnic groups are sociological generalizations, whereas a modern nation-state is a decision-making apparatus. There exist, of course, diffuse social patterns of rejection and acceptance involving ethnic identity, but there is no single body that can dictate rules of behavior to Anglo-Saxons or Italian Americans. Some religions have a decision-making apparatus of this sort, and people are indeed born into them, but they control only limited aspects of most people’s lives. One need not belong to any particular religion to have even a spiritually fulfilled existence, and in any case, unlike most nation-states, most religions are eager to accept new members.

In short, membership in a polity is a sui generis concept. People are born into a modern-nation-state and cannot leave without incurring vast, often unacceptable costs. By virtue of their extant membership, they are subject to a decision-making apparatus that controls much of their lives. Rather than trying to analogize this situation to any other form of membership, it is best to treat it as a distinct phenomenon and to assess it on its own terms.

Citizenship as mere membership in a polity, without any further characterizations of citizenship, generally confers a variety of obligations, duties, privileges, and benefits on the citizen members. They must obey the laws promulgated by the polity’s decision-making apparatus and exhibit some sort of loyalty for the regime. They receive some rights and rewards, including qualification for a state-run education system, eligibility for health and social welfare programs, protection while in foreign countries, and sometimes even a variety of human rights. Finally, as members, they are also granted various opportunities to participate in government, such as the right to vote or to petition government authorities.

With respect to benefits, it is common to distinguish between democracies and dictatorships. The basis of this distinction is the idea that democratic regimes are governed by law, while dictatorships are ruled by force and impose arbitrary rules. In practice, although it undoubtedly exists, this general distinction is a much narrower one. As Weber (1978, 217–226) has pointed out, all modern bureaucratic regimes depend on law, or standardized rules, as a general technique of governance. Virtually all modern regimes confer various benefits on their members. Indeed, the level of educational, health, and social welfare benefits and of protection during foreign residence or travel generally
depends on the economic and military strength of the nation rather than on its form of government. The dictatorial Soviet Union conferred a substantially higher level of benefits in these areas than democratic India or Mali do today. The difference between the benefits of membership in a dictatorial regime and in a democratic regime lies mainly in the area of political rights, and even within that purview it is not as great as might be supposed. In the Soviet Union, for example, the right to vote was an essential and highly valued feature of membership in the polity, even though the votes themselves determined little (Fitzgerald 1999, 116–122) of anything.

Conversely, the obligations that result from membership are roughly the same in any modern regime, dictatorial or democratic. Members of the polity must obey the laws, whatever their content. The content of the laws, moreover, is often similar as well: modern regimes require citizens to support the government through taxes and by adhering to principles of civilian order, by serving in the armed forces when required, and by caring for their children. The distinction, once again, lies primordially in the area of one’s political rights.

The point here is that membership in any polity, along with its attendant obligations and benefits, is a universal aspect of modern regimes and a necessary precondition to any theory of citizenship. Whatever the injustices, whatever the violations of one’s critical morality, they are implicit to the concept of membership that is embedded in any theory of citizenship, no matter how grandiose in its aspirations such a theory may turn out to be. These implications of membership, moreover, cannot be avoided by constructing a uniquely democratic theory of membership. However necessary democratic institutions may prove to be to one’s particular theory of citizenship, however impossible it may be for a dictatorial or oppressive regime to confer true citizenship, however one chooses to define such a status, the core idea of membership will remain, and as such will be applicable to all regimes. Put plainly, even the most elaborate among the theories of deliberative democracy—including those with features that have never been enacted in any real polity, or with demands for behaviors that have never been displayed by any real group of people—must employ a concept of citizenship that depends on membership in the regime.

Moreover, the relationship between citizenship and membership is complicated by a feature that has no private analogue, and that indicates further the sui generis character of membership in a modern state: I refer to the issue of resident aliens, or more precisely to resident
nonmembers who are subject to state control because they live within state borders. Someone who is rejected or expelled by a private organization or a religious group is simply not a member of that group, and continues to live in an unaltered dissociated manner. Much in contrast, however, and because nation-states are regimes that exercise comprehensive controls over politically defined territories, those who are denied membership for one reason or another yet remain within the aloof nation’s territory are often subject to many of the same obligations as that nation’s members. The result is that certain people, often a significant part of the total population, occupy an intermediate status that must be taken into account when considering membership in modern nation states.

Nations differ in their treatment of nonmembers inside their territory. A rough generalization is that nonmembers are subject to the same obligations as members but are denied the same benefits, yet this is far from an invariable rule. While everyone within a nation’s territory is obligated to obey laws securing civil peace, many nations excuse nonmembers of various types from paying taxes, from serving in the armed forces, or from obeying certain elements of family law. Conversely, many nations provide to nonmembers a variety of benefits that are similar to the ones they provide to those they legally recognize to be accredited members.

To some extent, the way nation-states treat nonmembers within their purview depends on whether the nonmember is still a member of another nation. Protection during foreign residence or travel is a major benefit that modern nations confer on their regular members. To arrest or even to expel a nonmember on arbitrary grounds can become a very serious matter if the person’s own nation imposes sanctions, retaliates against the arresting nation’s own members, or complains to an international body. Treatment of nonmembers depends not least on the extent to which the nonmember is “valuated” by the controlling nation. In the United States, for example, British citizens who teach at institutions of higher learning are treated with the utmost respect, while Haitian refugees are routinely confined to facilities that are worse than prisons for domestic criminals.

The impact on the individual of a nation’s varying treatment of nonmembers under its control will depend on the status of the nonmember in question. A major component of one’s status is the extent of that nonmember’s dependence on the controlling nation. At one end of the continuum, an occasional tourist depends only minimally on the
fiat of the host nation. While it may be unpleasant to have one’s vacation shortened or business trip canceled, the contrariety imposed represents only a minor disruption of one’s life, and as such would typically remain below the level of high moral concern. People who are studying or working in a host nation for a delimited period find themselves in an intermediate position, since they happen to have at stake a rather significant investment of time and personal resources. At the other end of the continuum, of course, are those permanent residents, whose entire life is being spent in the nation that denies them membership.

A second factor that determines the impact of nonmembership is whether the person involved is a member of another nation. If she is, then she has a place to which she can return if she is expelled, or if she decides to depart. Whereas such a departure will vary in its shorter- and longer-term consequences depending on whether the person is a tourist, a student, or a permanent resident, it does provide an option. Of course, this option will not be available in any realistic sense if, for political, economic, or any other reasons, that person cannot survive in the nation to which she is in principle entitled to return at considerable risk for her or her vulnerable family members.

Membership Denial

Implicit in the very concept of membership in any consciously organized entity is the capability of that entity’s decision-making apparatus to determine the conditions of membership. A modern nation-state is an entity of just such aptitude and possesses exactly this sort of latitude. It determines who is a member from birth, how new persons who are not members from birth can be admitted as members, and also how membership can be taken away from those who are already members. This means that a nation-state is in a position of authority to adopt policies that deny membership to anyone it chooses, whatever that person’s previous circumstances or present or potential status.

The potential for membership denial is intrinsic especially to the concept of ascriptive membership inside an entity with a decision-making apparatus, and by definition therefore also to the concept of citizenship that rests on the ascribed membership precept. As long as there are innate conditions for belonging to a polity—that is, insofar as mere presence is not the determinative factor—a person who fails to fulfill those specific conditions can be deprived of membership. This is
true even if membership is defined in ethnic or religious terms, since those terms can be violated in various ways—say, by intermarriage or apostasy. In any event, very few modern nations use such definitions. Rather, they elect to rely on political definitions of membership whose terms they can more readily control.

All nations deny membership to at least some members of other nations who desire to enter it. This is hardly surprising, since the ability to exclude outsiders is essential to a nation’s integrity as a functioning polity and an element intrinsic to the world’s current political structure. In addition, all nations deny membership to at least some persons who have been allowed to enter, say, as tourists, students, business visitors, or temporary residents. This too may be deemed pertinent to the way the world’s political setup works, since tourism, business, and diplomacy are basic elements of international relations that it is considered best to foster without compromising the integrity of nation-states. Neither of these denials raises moral concerns of a general nature, although they may do so in specific instances to be discussed later in the chapter. The ability to deny membership to persons who desire to enter a nation, or who already are present in the nation on a temporary basis, is intrinsic to our idea of a nation. In addition, such persons do not have a significant stake, let alone any established commitment, to living in that nation; and generally they will be members of another nation to which they can return.

But a nation also possesses the capacity to deny membership to one of its own permanent residents, either by never granting them membership or by taking away a membership previously granted. This is certainly not a necessary element of the world’s political structure. A permanent resident by definition is one who is already living in a particular nation, subject to that nation’s laws, and an element of that nation’s political, economic, and cultural reality. True, some nations have large populations of refugees, but once those refugees have lived in the host nation for an extended period of time, and certainly once they have lived there for more than one generation, they too become an integral part of the host nation’s economy, culture, and political situation. It is thus the concept of membership, and not the Westphalian system per se, that implies the possibility of membership denial to permanent residents.

By implying the possibility of membership denial, the concept of membership, and hence the concept of citizenship itself, authorizes a device of ferocious oppression. To deny ascribed membership to, say,
a permanent resident is the modern equivalent of outlawing a person or of declaring him a heretic. Denial provides the government with legal authority to deprive the person of all the benefits that flow from citizenship, and to impose a variety of burdens and oppressions. Moreover, it allows the government to impose such targeted oppressions without threatening the majority of its citizens, who retain their status, thereby separating the denaturalized person from potential sources of support. It employs the moral authority of the state to cast obloquy on the denaturalized citizen as someone not worthy of belonging to the polity, thus further separating him from others. It also signals to those others that they may impose private oppressions on the nonmember, and do so without even having to suffer the severe consequences that would follow from equivalent treatment of fellow member citizens. In essence, membership denial is a means by which a nation can declare war also on persons or a group of persons under its implacable control.

Once denied membership, a person is left with very few options apart from armed resistance, which is always available but has all too evident disadvantages. That person can petition or campaign for restoration of her status, but the denial tends to foreclose precisely those very channels by which such protests can be conveyed. She no longer has a vote, nor is she now entitled to whatever care, credence, and attention the government grants to recognized members. Being separated from the remaining citizens, moreover, her efforts to encourage help or enlist support will be seriously and increasingly impeded. Alternatively, she can seek to leave her homeland, but doing so could occasion tremendous loss in affective ties and in economic possibilities. Unless the person has valued skills or a strong ethnic or familial bond to the dominant group of citizens in another nation, she is likely to be denied membership in any other nation and often even physically shunned by such other nations. Thus it is likely that she will find herself trapped in a nation that has declared her to be an outcast and has decided to treat her as such.

Denial of membership is not merely an abstract possibility that flows from the concept of membership but a potent mechanism that has been repeatedly employed during the course of modern history. As Hannah Arendt (1973, 3–88) has described, Nazi Germany initiated its extermination of the Jews by progressively stripping the benefits of citizenship from them until it ultimately declared them to be noncitizens entirely. One may treat this example, quite correctly, as indicating
how important the benefits of citizenship are, but it also indicates the dangers of citizenship as a concept. Because membership lies at the core of citizenship, the idea of denying membership to those who were previously members becomes conceptually available. It was this possibility that the Nazis exploited to create a legal rationale for the incarceration, and ultimately the extermination, of the German Jews (see Ciprut 2008).

The Soviet Union made use of the same device when dealing with people whose backgrounds it deemed undesirable: former nobles, owners of capital, private traders, kulaks (prosperous peasants), monks, priests, and former employees of the Tsarist government (Fitzgerald 1999, 115–188). These people were denied the right to vote, which was insignificant in itself but emblematic of a denial of membership that would soon carry the most serious consequences. And they were denied passports, another emblem of membership, which precluded them from living in most cities; they lost their jobs and were denied the right to seek further employment in most fields; their children were expelled from school; and they were evicted from their apartments. More to the point—indicative of the way public obloquy will induce private discrimination—they were not only denied decent livelihood and shelter but shunned by former acquaintances. It is estimated that 8.6 percent of the Soviet Union’s adult population was disenfranchised in this manner as of 1929 (Fitzgerald 1999, 249 n.9).

Denial of membership is not limited to authoritarian regimes. Japan, for example, has consistently refused to grant citizenship to the ethnic Koreans who were brought to Japan by force during World War II to supplement the wartime workforce. No matter that these people have been residents of Japan for at least three generations, speak Japanese, and have no formal affiliation with any other nation. Japan has refused to grant them citizenship because they are not Japanese (Reischauer 1977, 35–36). As a result, they have been relegated to the role of resentful outsiders in an otherwise closely integrated and quite intraegalitarian culture.

Another and still more egregious example is American slavery. To have granted citizenship to the people who were transported from Africa would have precluded their use as slaves, given the principles that the nation had established for itself. Instead, these people were denied membership in the American polity, which meant that the moral principles stated in the Declaration of Independence, and the legal rights established in the Constitution, simply did not apply to them.
(Finkelman 1996). The decision in *Dred Scott v. Sanford* (1857) is explicitly grounded in the noncitizenship of blacks. Indeed, the position that slaves were not members, that is, not citizens of the United States was so central to the continuation of slavery that it is the very first right granted by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Only after this section states that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside” does it go on to its more familiar guarantees of privileges and immunities, equal protection, and due process.

As these examples indicate, denial of membership is a device employed by both totalitarian and democratic regimes. Nazi Germany was the most ferociously cruel and oppressive regime in modern history, and the Soviet Union under Stalin was only slightly better. Japan, in contrast, has been a functioning democracy for the past 50 years, that is, during the time it denied membership to its residents of Korean ancestry. The United States, at the time it denied membership to its residents of African origin and used them as slaves, was the most democratic nation in the world for its white majority, granting broad freedom of speech and religion and imposing no property requirement for the franchise. This serves to emphasize once again that the concept of membership, on which all theories of citizenship are based, has nothing to do with democracy. All nations base their conception of citizenship on the idea of membership, and this provides all nations, dictatorial or democratic, with a device for oppression.

The reasons for these denials of membership vary. American slavery resulted from a complex mixture of economic and racial motivations. Those who captured, transported, and made use of African people had no desire to do anything to Africans other than using their work; their motivation was entirely economic. On the other hand, given general public opinion and even their own beliefs, they could not have treated white people in this manner. They needed their rationale of blacks’ ‘racial inferiority’—indeed, of their ‘lack of true humanity’. As Montesquieu sagely noted, in his veiled but nonetheless trenchant attack on slavery, “[i]t is impossible for us to assume that these people are men because if we assumed they were men one would begin to believe that we ourselves are not Christians” (Montesquieu 1989, Book 15, chap. 5, 250). The Japanese policy, in partial contrast, seems to be motivated exclusively by racial implications. The cost of granting benefits and opportunities to its permanent residents of Korean origin would be
insignificant, given the proportionally small size of the group (less than 1 percent of the total population) and the great wealth of the Japanese nation.

Nazi Germany was motivated by racial considerations in its denial of membership to the Jews, but this motivation was not a major factor in the Soviet Union’s denials. Those denied membership were of the same ethnicity as those who were not, and Soviet policies at the time regarding the people in the non-Russian republics were explicitly inclusive. Arguably, there may have been some economic considerations mixed in, but the primary motivation for both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was doubt—about the ‘loyalty’ of the affected populations. According to his own account, Hitler knew very few Jews and gave them very little thought when he was a young man in Linz; his anti-Semitic epiphany came first when he saw black-robed Jews in Vienna and asked himself, “Is this a German?” (Hitler 1943, 52–57). Hitler himself is not necessarily a reliable reporter, but his certainty that the Jews were ‘disloyal’ to Germany was clearly a major motivation for his anti-Semitism and for his leading public justification of it. He took enormous political advantage of the widespread belief that the Jews had caused Germany’s defeat in World War I by “stabbing it in the back” and by continuing to undermine it through their participation in an ‘international conspiracy’ (Shirer 1960, 31–32).

One might argue that people like Hitler and Stalin did not need the idea of membership or its necessary implication that civic membership can be denied in order to oppress or even exterminate at will citizens of their regimes. That argument would not apply to the United States or postwar Japan, where justification of government policy is important, yet this was not necessarily true either of Nazi Germany or of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, we know that Hitler and Stalin were never deposed, but they could not know this at the time; and both did face serious threats to their control at various times. We should not underestimate the need for dictators to justify their policies to the populations that are, in the final analysis, capable of overthrowing them and whose willing participation must be obtained for their own policies to be achieved (see Goldhagen 1996).

More important, the very fact that dictatorial regimes, like democratic regimes, use the rhetoric of membership denial, and thus of the negation of citizenship, to oppress permanent residents is by itself sufficient to cast doubt on the desirability of citizenship as a concept. After all, concepts do live in the world of rhetoric: and any advantages
claimed for the construct of citizenship are equally abstract. It thus cannot be argued that the participatory rights and social benefits provided to citizens of a regime like the United States are directly caused by the concept of citizenship, that absent this concept we would not be a democracy or provide the members of our regime with social security. The value of a concept, for good and ill, must be measured by its potential implications and not by its actual effects. If a concept, taken as a whole, does describe and incorporate values and behaviors we desire, then those possibilities count in favor of its use. If, however, it describes and incorporates undesirable values and behaviors, that must count against it to the same extent. The concept of citizenship, in modes discussed in some of the other chapters in this book, incorporates many attractive ideas about community, political participation, and collective action. But it rests on the idea of membership and thus also provides a rationale for the ferocious oppression that results from denying membership to the permanent residents of a political regime (see Urban’s discussion of citizenship as volitional association, chap. 13).

In fact, the United States has begun to back away from this mode of membership, and hence citizenship, precisely because of its harsh implications for resident nonmembers. Rejecting earlier decisions that countenanced the denial of various opportunities to aliens (Terrace v. Thompson 1923; State of Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach 1927; Crane v. New York 1915) the U.S. Supreme Court declared that alienage was a suspect classification and that many of the laws discriminating against aliens, particularly at the state level, would be subjected to strict scrutiny (Graham v. Richardson 1971; Sugarman v. Dougall 1973; In re Griffiths 1973; Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 1976; see also Aleinikoff 1990). While recent decisions have undermined this position to some extent, they have not rejected it (Ambach v. Norwick 1979). Thus, constitutional doctrine gives at least partial recognition to the idea that a denial of benefits or opportunities is a severe sanction that should not be imposed on a permanent resident of the United States simply because he or she does not meet government-established criteria for nonmembership.

Collective Unconcern

Because the concept of citizenship is based on membership, it divides the world into two types of persons, colloquially known as “us” and “them,” or “the ins” and “the outs.” To some extent, such a dichotomi-
zation is unavoidable; as social systems theorists have long maintained, every organism or institution, if it is to function as an entity, must have a boundary that separates it from its environment (Bertalanffy 1968, 120–154; Luhmann 1995, 176–209). But putting to use the concept of citizenship to define this ‘boundary’ carries strong implications that can lead to morally undesirable consequences. In particular, it tends to suggest that a given polity possesses moral obligations only to its own citizens, or its “in” members, and not ‘to others’. The more one expatiates on the values of citizenship, the more one emphasizes the virtues of participation; and the more one equates the polity with a community, the stronger this inherent meaning of citizenship will be.

The differential obligations that an entity sees itself as owing to members and nonmembers is harmless enough for ‘truly voluntary’ (see Williams, chap. 5, and Urban, chap. 13, in this book) organizations, to the extent that these affect only delimited aspects of people’s lives. We need not worry about, say, the fact that the YMCA or the Veterans of Foreign Wars provide significant benefits to their own members and none to others. In fact, we regard people’s ability to aggregate and join in such voluntary organizations, and indeed these organizations’ own ability to restrict membership to the people whom its existing membership wants, as a constitutional right that ‘the government’ may not impede (Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 2000; Roberts v. United States Jaycees 1984; see Karst 1980; Raggi 1977). Moral difficulties do arise, however, especially when an organization that restricts its benefits to members exercises significant control over nonmembers’ lives. A Rotary Club may seem like a rather benign fraternal organization, but if it controls the ability of everyone in town to prosper in a business, its exclusive concern with its own members becomes a potential abuse.

Nation-states often exercise extensive control over the lives of those outside their borders, of course. The policies of those among the world’s most powerful and influential institutions, therefore, may often command profound effects on people who do not reside within them. The emphasis that the concept of citizenship places on membership, belonging, and community thus poses a serious moral problem, quite apart from its evident ability to authorize the denial of membership to permanent residents. Indeed, it encourages these powerful nation-states to focus on the benefits they provide to their own citizens and ignore whatever burdens they impose on nonmembers outside their borders. By incorrectly analogizing a nation-state to a fraternal organization, the concept suggests that a nation’s only moral obligations are
to its own citizens, tending to underemphasize thereby its obligations to all the other people it affects.

To be sure, a variety of moral arguments support a nation’s primary or even exclusive concern with its own citizens or residents. There are also, however, various moral arguments that contest this position. Most systems of morality, for example, would insist that an actor assume moral responsibility for any action that affects the lives of others; they might recognize that the actor has greater responsibility for people to whom it had special commitments, but they rarely if at all exempt an actor from moral responsibility for affirmative effects because such a commitment is lacking. The very difficulty with the concept of citizenship is that it tends to favor the harbored exclusivist position by invoking emotive images of belonging, of community, of participation and civic virtue, without really adding to the arguments that favor this position or engaging the arguments that oppose it.

Consider the position of the world’s wealthier nations: the United States, Canada, Japan, especially the Western European nations in the European Union, and Australia. Although they added up to only one-seventh (14 percent) of the world’s population, they controlled nearly four-fifths (79 percent) of the world’s wealth, at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002, 770–771). Through their trade policies, and through organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, they can amply determine whether less developed nations will starve or prosper. Corporations under their control have the capacity to corrupt at least the lower levels, and often the highest levels of government in these nations. In sum, their affirmative effects on other nations, particularly less developed nations, is extensive and profound. Whether these wealthy nations have moral obligations to the people in so many other, less fortunate nations, and what the scope of these moral obligations is, clearly are very serious questions. By defining these people as nonmembers, the concept of citizenship implies an answer that offends most people’s sense of political morality.

To take one example, the charcoal used to produce the steel that Brazil exports to other nations is produced by slaves. Typically, they are poor people from the coastal regions induced to take jobs in the remote interior by promises of good pay, then forced to work for no pay under brutal conditions until their health is broken (Bales 1999, 121–148). None of the world’s wealthy nations in North America, Western European countries in the EU, or Japan would tolerate such
treatment of its own citizens, and any government seen to tolerate it would be ousted in the next popular election. These nations could end Brazilian slavery overnight, probably merely by threatening some trade sanctions, yet they have not done so. Clearly, they regard their moral obligation to the Brazilian slaves, who are neither citizens nor even residents, as minimal or nonexistent. To the extent that the concept of ‘citizenship’ is what encourages such attitudes, or what provides a conceptual basis for condoning them, it raises serious moral qualms.

Just as the United States has begun to move away from the implications of the citizenship concept for resident nonmembers, it has begun to move away from the implications of this concept also for nonresident nonmembers. U.S. nonmilitary foreign aid, although shamefully low by European standards, has come to reflect the recognition that the United States is obligated to share at least some of its vast wealth with less fortunate nations (Lancaster 2000; Omoruyi 2001). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, passed in the United States in 1977, prohibits publicly owned American corporations from offering any payments, in money or in kind, to foreign officials, political parties, or private citizens who intend to give such payments to foreign officials for the purpose of inducing such officials to violate the law or to neglect their lawful duties. Penalties can be as high as $2 million for a firm and $100,000 or five years' imprisonment for an officer or director of a firm. The act has a number of exceptions, and its enforcement is somewhat lax, but it unmistakably indicates a clear recognition that America’s wealth, and consequent capacity to corrupt foreign officials, does create a handful of moral responsibilities.

But America’s most definitive rejection of the citizenship model not surprisingly has not involved the assumption of moral obligations for the welfare of others, if rather, the imposition of moral obligations on others. Consider a nation like Burkina Faso, a nation of some 12 million people with a gross domestic product (GDP) roughly equal to that of a midsize American city. U.S. policies have enormous effects on Burkina Faso, but there is little if anything at all that Burkina Faso can impose on the United States: it cannot invade it, nor, since the end of the Cold War, can it threaten its international interest in any significant way, and it certainly cannot affect the U.S. economy. Thus, whether it chooses to trade with the United States, and if so on what terms, is a matter the United States can safely let Burkina Faso decide for itself. There is only one thing that Burkina Faso could do that would pose a threat to the
United States: offer shelter to anti-American terrorists. With respect to that possibility, the United States has made its position clear. Every nation owes to citizens of other nations a moral obligation that is exactly equivalent to the kind of obligation that it owes to its own citizens. That is, even though anti-American terrorists would pose no threat to the citizens of Burkina Faso, and might even bring in some much-needed resources, Burkina Faso must take decisive action to eliminate those terrorists because of the threat they can pose to U.S. Americans. If Burkina Faso fails to do so, the United States has declared, the United States will have the moral right to compel them, by overthrowing their government if necessary, because opposition to terrorism is a moral obligation that every nation in the world owes to the citizens of every other nation.

The Obligations of Government: An Alternative to Citizenship

The concept of citizenship is so deeply embedded in our ideas about nation-states, both in their domestic and in their international relations, that any wholesale abandonment of the concept as such seems inconceivable. Thus, even writers who recognize some of its dangers seem to believe that the best course may be to search for ways to improve the concept, to pour meaning into it, so that it becomes a repository of both individual virtues and those government policies that we find desirable (King 1987; Touraine 1997; Vogel and Moran 1991; Young 1990). That is the approach taken by many of the contributions to this symposium. The difficulty is that ‘citizenship’, and its underlying concept of ‘membership’, necessarily incorporates the possibility of denying membership to permanent residents and of undervaluing the obligations of a nation to nonresidents. The moral consequences of these implications are so serious that it is worth exploring the idea that we might dispense with the concept of citizenship and find some other way to describe a state’s relationship to its residents and nonresidents. True, only the preliminary contours of such an inquiry can be traced in this chapter. The main point here is to suggest that the very enterprise is worth pursuing and might yield a plausible alternative to a fast-aging concept of citizenship.

One way to begin such an inquiry would be to shift the focus from the individual to the government. Citizenship is conceived as an issue of individual status: one is either a citizen or a noncitizen of a particular regime. At best, this depicts citizenship as a right that certain people
may claim, which necessarily also implies that there are other people who cannot assert this claim. At worst, it depicts citizenship as a privilege that a political entity can grant or deny at will. In either case, the idea that citizenship is some thing that an individual possesses harks back to the racial definition of the concept in the ancient Greek polis (Grant 1987, 44–70; see also Joint Association of Classical Teachers 1984, 153–54), also reminding us of the status-oriented organization of society in the Middle Ages (Bloch 1961; Duby 1977, 88–111; Fichtenau 1991; Ganshof 1996; Weber 1978, 1070–1109). Shifting the focus to government would replace this outdated conception with a more contemporary, purely political, perspective. It would invite us to derive this alternative perspective from our prevailing theories of government rather than to continue searching for attributes intrinsic to the individual.

A nation-state, as a powerful actor that affects people’s lives, has moral obligations to those whom it affects. These obligations vary depending on the magnitude of the effects. They are at a maximum when the people are permanent residents who were born or who have spent the major portion of their lives within that state, and who have no formal relationship with any other state. They are weaker for temporary or short-term residents or for residents who recognize (and are recognized by) another state as an object of primary moral obligation. They are weaker still, but still significant, for nonresidents, and they do not fall to zero until the state has no effect at all on the individual in question.

This reconceptualization of a nation-state’s relationship to individuals may or may not be adequate to capture in its entirety the political morality regarding this topic. The single criterion that the alternative concept incorporates, that is, the magnitude of the nation’s effect on the individual, may not be sufficiently complex for determining all the permutations of a nation’s relationship to persons as individuals. Other elements too, such as history, geographic proximity, or national resource levels, may need to be factored in to produce a morally more complete account. There may be still other moral principles, such as the possibility of affecting others or the magnitude of the harm suffered by others, that provide a basis for responsibility. At this time, the principal (indeed, only) assertion one may make is that, in its rudimentary form, this concept of governmental obligation is free of the dark implications that the concept of citizenship incorporates, thereby also reflecting better one’s aspiration for truer political morality.
To be able to support such an assertion, however, one would need to explore the operational viability of the alternative standard. The first implication of this standard is that a nation—the United States, say—owes its strongest moral obligations to its permanent residents, whom it affects directly and most fully so. These obligations would include providing social benefits and political liberties at the highest of levels available to anyone, and also allowing political participation, including the franchise, at those same highest levels. The nation’s obligation to temporary residents (whether they are tourists, students, foreign workers and employees, or recently arrived illegal immigrants) would not be as extensive, but because of the physical presence of these individuals within its borders, would still include various benefits. Even a tourist, for example, is entitled to health care if he falls ill. Hence, temporary residents would be entitled to necessary social benefits—health but not retirement, minimal subsistence but not compensation for unemployment—and certain political liberties as well.

This actually means that if a nation wanted to avoid extensive obligations to individuals, such as the franchise or maximum social benefits, it would need to clarify the status of those persons in some standard manner. With respect to illegal immigrants, say, it could do so by obtaining agreement that they would leave the country at some specified time, or by deporting them in accordance with basic considerations of fair treatment. Once persons had been allowed to enter a nation, to remain there for an indefinite period, and to establish their livelihood in that nation without a formal ongoing connection (see Gutiérrez, chap. 9 in this book) with their nation of origin, the ‘host’ nation’s government would be obligated to grant these nested individuals full social and political participatory rights and benefits. This principle, in effect, would operate as an estoppel of sorts against the government. It would prevent a government from simply defining permanent residents as nonmembers (noncitizens) and then visiting upon them the oppressions that frequently do flow from such characterization.

With respect to nonresidents, too, a nation’s moral obligations would depend on its actual or potential effect on the individuals in question. With the exception of harboring terrorists, Burkina Faso need not worry about its obligations to residents of the United States, because

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1. An estoppel is a legal rule barring the advancement of a position or a statement inconsistent with an extant representation on which almost general reliance already has been placed (see any legal dictionary for greater detail).—Ed.
it exercises no significant effect on them. The United States, however, does need to be concerned about its obligations to the residents of Burkina Faso, precisely because U.S. policies will exert a massive, perhaps even decisive, effect on those very residents. Even excluding apocalyptic scenarios, such as America’s capability to wipe Burkina Faso off the face of the earth in 15 minutes or so, U.S. stance on trade policy, U.S. American decisions over foreign aid, World Bank lending, and influence over the behavior of the private corporations within its jurisdiction will determine whether the lives of the indigent in Burkina Faso stand to improve or to deteriorate. These enormous effects trigger moral obligations on the part of the United States, even though the people in Burkina Faso are not citizens or residents of the United States.

As stated above, considerations other than the magnitude of the effect of the United States on people around the world may determine the scope of the United States’ moral obligations. France may have greater obligations to Burkina Faso than the United States does because it controlled the place as a colony and ultimately defined it as a country. This former colonial connection is partially reflected by trade and cultural links that can be incorporated into the idea of effects, but it may also possess some historical significance that counts independently—in ‘moral’ terms. Similarly, France is not only closer to Burkina Faso but has more extensive connections with its neighbors than the United States entertains. As a result of such considerations, it might be possible to perceive that America’s moral obligations to Burkina Faso are weaker than its obligations to some other nations, such as Liberia, the Philippines, or Nicaragua. Alternatively, the physical capability of the United States to intervene in Burkina Faso may create a separate moral obligation, particularly if that country were to succumb to the sort of violence that has afflicted other African nations (Berkeley 2001; Gourevitch 1998). The point made here is that a nation’s effect on individuals, regardless of those individuals’ location, is a source of moral obligation.

Admittedly, the precise contours of a nation’s moral obligations to permanent residents, temporary residents, and even nonresidents are too complex a matter for it to be definitively delineated within the compass of this chapter. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the issue of national sovereignty, for one, does appear to create some discontinuity in the content of the obligations. With respect to residents, the principle appears to require little more than equal treatment. In
forbidding denial of membership to permanent residents, the principle simply requires that the group potentially disfavored, whether third-generation Japanese Koreans or the children of illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States, be treated the same way as the most favored residents. It would not require that these people receive any particular political rights, distinctive social benefits, or opportunities for participation. For example, if the nation in question is a dictatorship that does not grant anyone the opportunity to vote for its leaders, the principle would not grant that denied opportunity to the potentially disfavored group; or if the nation imposes the death penalty on children in the favored group, or fails to provide adequate medical care, then the principle would allow the same executions and denials to be visited on all permanent residents. With respect to permanent residents of a nation, the essentially procedural character of the principle follows from the very idea of sovereignty, which allows a nation to set its own policies within its borders. Of course, a fully developed theory of political morality might well demand that nations meet certain standards—say, that they institute democracy and avoid executing children. But such standards would need to be derived from considerations that are external to the principle of moral obligation that is being proposed here primarily as an ‘alternative’ to the concept of citizenship. In addition, standards might be partially or entirely counterbalanced by whatever moral weight one is willing to accord to sovereignty; that is, to the ability of each nation to determine its own policies.

In contrast, the principle of moral obligation would contain some substantive standards with respect to nonresidents. It could not say simply that a nation need treat nonresidents in the very same way it treats its residents, or in ways no worse than it treats them. On the one hand, nations are allowed to, and mostly do, treat nonresidents worse than residents, such differential treatment being inherent in the idea of a nation. On the other hand, the principle would not allow a nation to treat nonresidents abysmally just because it treats its residents not any less abysmally. The standards for treatment of nonresidents cannot be determined by internal considerations alone, they have to be set by worldwide standards. Also, one cannot invoke the countervailing moral force of sovereignty when assessing a nation’s moral obligation to the permanent residents of another nation. Thus, a nation that is content to allow its own residents to be enslaved may be morally obligated to avoid policies that encourage slavery in other nations. A nation that is content to allow some of its own citizens to starve may nonethe-
less be obligated to provide food to starving persons in other nations, rather than burning that food staple or paying its farmers to stop producing it.

Another moral problem involving a nation’s treatment of nonresidents, or nonpermanent residents, is whether it is obligated to provide asylum. The principle of moral obligation based on effects does not provide a full solution to this problem. It is preferable to citizenship or membership, however, if only because it offers a starting point, since the concept of citizenship tells us nothing other than that refugees are not members of the nation and so can be treated in any way the nation chooses. The alternative suggested here would hold that a nation’s obligation to provide asylum, on either a temporary or a permanent basis, depends on the nation’s effect on the asylum seekers. Here, the idea of effect has two separate elements: first, the nation’s effect on ‘causing’ the people involved to seek asylum and, second, the nation’s effect on them once they are seeking it. If a nation caused the circumstances that induced or compelled people to flee, then it has the highest obligation to accept them and to treat them in the same manner as it treats its other residents. Thus, the nations surrounding Israel, which induced the Palestinians to flee in 1948, are morally obligated to accept the Palestinian refugees and to integrate them into their own societies. And, having fomented civil war in Nicaragua during the 1980s, the United States has the obligation to accept Nicaraguan refugees. The second element in the idea of effect suggests that it would make a difference whether the refugees could return to their homeland, at the time they left or later, and whether they have any other place to go. As stated, other factors, such as proximity or history, may also be relevant, in moral terms; yet the idea of ‘moral obligations based on effects’ at least provides some guidance in this difficult area.

Conclusion

There are other problems with the concept of citizenship besides those discussed above. We have inherited the concept from the ancient world and, more immediately, from premodern Europe. With its heavy emphasis on status and privilege and its tendency to treat a nation as a voluntary organization, it seems grounded in modes of thought that are inapplicable to a contemporary administrative state. This chapter makes no attempt to canvass problems of this sort. Rather, it focuses on two specific problems of political morality that the concept of
citizenship creates: the problems of membership denial and the problem of collective unconcern. On the basis of these twin problems, it suggests that we should seek alternatives to the extant concept of citizenship. The alternative suggested requires thinking in terms of a nation’s moral obligations to those whom it affects.

People are not about to stop using the term citizenship. It is an idea deeply embedded in our modes of thought and political rhetoric. But before scholars rely on this term, before they assume that it can serve as a repository for their aspirations or service a standard of virtue according to which they can berate people with less income, less leisure, and no tenure, they should pause. Is citizenship as ducky an idea as these scholars have assumed? Or does it necessarily imply, or invite, so many breaches of most people’s political morality that it should be altogether avoided as a source of standards and replaced with a different notion of a nation-state’s relationship to individuals?

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**Cases and Statutes**


Citizenship, the subject of this book, is, if nothing else, a form of belonging in communities. I propose in this closing chapter to situate the concept of citizenship, as “a form of belonging based on the self-conscious association of free individuals” in a larger civil society (see Williams, chap. 5), within the broader problem of group membership (see Rubin, chap. 12). Specifically, I argue that the various conceptions of belonging found around the world play a role in how culture moves through space and time. Conceptions of belonging exert forces that propel culture, while in important ways they also constrain the pathways of its motion. My claim is that the volitional citizenship concept, unlike the others I discuss, impels the movement of culture on a truly global scale. And precisely because it impels culture on a global scale, it is likely to find itself on a collision course with every other form of belonging based on ascribed identity.

In a classic formulation of the idea of community, Max Weber (1968, 40) characterized social relationships as communal “if and in so far as the orientation of social action . . . is based on a subjective feeling of the parties . . . that they belong together.” It is this notion of belonging (and its associated feeling) that I intend to scrutinize in this chapter. However, some clarification of Weber’s idea of community, or “communal social relations,” is in order, since he saw those relations as only one pole of a continuum. The other pole was “associative relations,” “where the orientation of social action . . . rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement” (Weber 1968, 41). These kinds of relationships give rise to what has been glossed as “society” or “economy.”

Against the broad backdrop of European social theory, associative relationships have played a central role in the conceptualization of community. Thomas Hobbes’s 1651 work Leviathan developed a notion
of society as based on contract—that is to say, a rational agreement among individuals designed to further their own interests. In Hobbes’s case, the basic contract involved giving up some rights in order to secure others, namely safety and stability, in a group of individuals operating under a sovereign. In contract theory, social relationships on which community is based are established for rationally conceived purposes. Because of their foundation in calculation rather than in a sense of belonging, social relations so constituted fall toward the associative rather than communal pole of Weber’s \(^1\) continuum.

Similarly, social relations as conceived in Kant’s notion of “civil society,” developed in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), fall toward the associative end. For Kant, the state of nature, or the natural condition of human beings, is social, but not necessarily therefore civil. Kant rather implicitly distinguished kinds of belonging within a community. The *civil* kind of belonging is based on reason: reasoning from freedom of choice to a conception of rights. Hence, it is aligned with Weber’s associative pole. A society based on reasoning processes is said to be civil, and hence distinct from the social formations that are a product of nature.

At the same time the argument seems to presuppose a collectivity as the initial possessor of all property, and hence of all rights. Implicitly, therefore, Kant’s argument for a civil society presupposes a sense of belonging—pre-civil membership in a collectivity, even if that collectivity is ‘willable to the entire human race’, as Kant concludes ultimately it must be: the reasoned basis for association is placed by Kant in the context of a broader sense of belonging in communities, although one not adequately formulated or conceptualized, to be sure.

To provide such a broader sense of community, and the better to situate concepts of community relative to the motion of culture, I examine each of a linked set of propositions: (1) the sense of belonging in communities, as experienced by individuals, depends on representations or signs; (2) it is the circulation of these representations or signs that creates communities; (3) the community as created by the circulation of signs is not necessarily the same as the community that is depicted in or imagined through the signs; (4) there are different ways in which belonging in communities can be represented and hence expe-

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1. Weber builds on Ferdinand Tönnies’ ([1887] 1957) contrast between *Gemeinschaft* (community based on belonging) and *Gesellschaft* (association or economy). Tönnies’ contrast, however, applied to types of society. He did not think of these as poles of a continuum or have in mind “ideal type” analysis.
rienced; (5) some of those ways of belonging make for better circulation than others; (6) citizenship—in the sense of European contract theory discussed above—is one of those ways of representing belonging that makes for particularly good circulation, because it involves a volitional sense of membership, in which the individual experiences the belonging as a matter of preference or choice; (7) the communities produced by the circulation of representations of belonging grounded in citizenship are actually not nations per se but rather transnational; (8) citizenship ultimately produces and depends on a global community, despite (or because of) the existence of national belonging; (9) the future of citizenship will entail a clash or clashes between two main ideas of belonging, one based on the axiom of freely chosen membership, the other grounded in a supposition that belonging is based on birth and upbringing.

1. A Sense of Belonging in Communities Depends on Representations

What is missing from Weber’s formulation of the sense of belonging is a conceptualization of the mechanism through which belonging is produced. That individuals have such a subjective sense is taken as given. The question is not how a subjective sense of belonging is produced, but rather what senses of belonging can be postulated to exist.

The mechanism for transmitting to individuals a specific sense of belonging lay outside the scope of Weber’s framework, but it did play a central role for Emile Durkheim, especially in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1969). Although Durkheim did not develop a theory of signs or representations per se, signs were central to his understanding of the collectivity. People create representations of collectivities, like the *churinga* (totemic emblems) of Australian aborigines or the flags of modern nations, and those representations bring about, in individuals, an awareness of their collectivities, of the power the collectivities have over them, and of their sense of belonging in the collectivity.

Durkheim’s interest in religious phenomena, such as the sense of awe at the sacred, grew out of his concern with how collectivities came to hold sway over individuals. The idea of gods and spiritual forces, and the representation of those ideas in symbols and ritual, gave individuals a particular sense of belonging. Here belonging is not something compelled by reason, starting from a premise of free individuals.
Rather, it is a result of the recognition of powerful and ultimately mysterious forces that lead one to obey the collectivity. That recognition depends on representations or signs. You must obey not because reason compels you to do so but rather because you are part of something larger, something that created you in the first place and that holds your fate in its hands.

From a contractarian or rational associationalist perspective, it is difficult to accept this sense of belonging as a legitimate basis for community, and yet the sense is widespread in the world today. It is the basis, for example, of Islamic representations of community. Such representations—although themselves also responses to the spread of modern national forms and hence not simply primordial—find their actualization in some contemporary nations, such as Iran, as well as in revolutionary movements aimed at the separatist formation of newer Islamic nations (e.g., Kashmir) or in the overthrow of existing governments in others (e.g., Algeria). The word “Islam” itself derives from the Arabic word for “submission,” referring to submission to the will of Allah (God) (see Fetni, chap. 8 in this book).

The notion of representations as producing in individuals a sense of belonging is not confined to the representation of a supreme deity, or even necessarily to divinity per se. An extension of Durkheim’s notion would view signs more generally as situating individuals with respect to collectivities, giving them a sense of their position within a larger whole.2

2. Circulation of Representations Creates Communities

Signs or representations operate via processes of communication, and the act of communication itself is a form of social relationship. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith ([1776] 1994, 14) refers to the human propensity to “truck, barter . . . exchange one thing for another.” Commerce between individuals is a form of social relationship, one that is presumably, in Weber’s sense, rationally calculated. In an important essay in Structural Anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1967) generalizes that Smithian notion of commerce to include not only goods but also signs, including the exchange of spouses in marriage and communica-

2. Michel Foucault is not usually read as a theorist of belonging, and yet it is possible to see his interest in the capillary action of power (1980, 151–152)—through the practices of everyday life—as an explication of the foundations of belonging, rather than (or in addition to) a charter for resistance.
tion through language. Communicative relations are, in this sense, social relations.

From this it follows that communicative relations do not produce community just by virtue of the representational value or the meaning of what is communicated. The meanings of signs, to be sure, are quite important. They provide the motivation for the communication in the first place. People are interested in the communication for what is communicated, for the content and the aesthetic form of the message. However, in being interested in what is communicated, they also become interested in one another. The recipient of a communication becomes attached, however momentarily, however fleetingly, to the persons or groups from whom the communications have emanated. As the channels are kept open by further communications, the attachments are maintained. Hence, participation in communicative processes itself produces social relations.

Thus, there is here a significant advance over the conceptual framework put forth by Durkheim, whose focus was on the effects of collective representations—churingas, flags . . . —on individuals. For Durkheim, the representational value or meaning of a sign creates in individuals certain effects that result in their attachment to those signs and to the collectivity for which they stand. What Lévi-Strauss adds to that understanding is the idea that the communicative process itself, quite apart from what is represented by the signs themselves, establishes social relationships. At the same time, the parties to the communication must be interested in what is communicated. The representational value and aesthetic form of the signs provide the motivation for the social relationship. But this does not mean that the signs must stand in any direct way for a collectivity to which the individuals somehow feel themselves to belong. Regular communications within a group of people produce the group as a de facto community. This is what I have elsewhere (Urban 1996) referred to, following Kant’s distinction, as a “sensible” community. It is not necessarily a community by association in the strict sense, since the repeated layering of communication on communication within a group results in the solidification of pathways of communication. This makes it impossible for each or every individual communicative act to be subjected to rational calculation. Belonging in such a communicative community is not the product so much of rational calculation as it is of tradition or habituation.3

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3. This kind of belonging is created by what Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 170 ff.) calls the “habitus” of an individual.
If a communicative grouping of this sort is sensible, however, it is not necessarily intelligible to its members as a community. The intelligibility of a community to its members depends on the circulation of signs or representations of a community. The signs that are circulated within a group determine, by virtue of their content, what community the individuals understand themselves to belong to. They give shape or form to that community. In so doing, they create a subjective sense of belonging.

3. The Community Created by Communication
Is Not Necessarily (and Perhaps Necessarily Not) the Same as the Community Depicted in the Communication

It is possible to distinguish two kinds of “subjective feeling of belonging” to communities, to follow Weber’s terminology. One is the feeling created by participation in the sensible community formed by the circulation of signs. The other is the feeling created by one’s intellectual understanding of a group to which one is attached. The two do not necessarily coincide. Specifically, the group that people understand themselves to belong to may not be the same as the group to which they feel they belong (without necessarily reflecting upon it) by virtue of interaction.

An example would be the clan, which anthropologists have shown to be important in various parts of the world, including Africa and the Americas. Membership in the clan is typically determined by descent, so that one belongs, in some cases, to the father’s clan (patrilineal descent), in other cases to the mother’s clan (matrilineal descent). Choice does not enter into the determination of clan membership, which is determined rather by the circumstances of one’s birth.

The clan creates a subjective understanding of group membership or belonging. But in many instances that clan includes people with whom one never interacts. Indeed, it may include people of whose existence one is completely unaware. The understanding of belonging leads to a kind of fantasy about a group to which one has ties that could, in prin-

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4. I will simplify here, collapsing the distinction made by Murdock (1965, 66 ff.) between “clan” and “sib”: in a sib, in-marrying spouses do not change group membership. They retain the membership given to them at birth. In the case of Murdock’s clan, a spouse marrying into a group defined both by residence and by descent changes membership to become a member of that group. Here I am using the term clan in its broader sense as encompassing both sibs and compromise kin groups.
principle, remove one from the everyday interactions one experiences in
the here and now. The group becomes a kind of imagined refuge from
the world of sensible interactions.

At the same time, that world of sensible interactions creates a feeling
of belonging that is not necessarily cognized but appreciated on a
practical basis as the world with which one is familiar, with which one
feels naturally comfortable. In the case of matrilineal and patrilineal
clan, the sensible community is typically built up from the family. This
is because clans, in these cases, are typically “exogamous,” that is, they
require one to marry outside the clan. The family—along with the face-
to-face relationships built up in a larger local community consisting of
a group of families—thus is constituted out of interactions among
people who are members of different clans. Hence, whereas individuals
can cognize themselves as belonging to a group (the clan) that extends
beyond the limits of their local community without thereby encompassing all of that local community, the community with which they
interact daily, and in which they feel themselves in unreflective ways
to belong, is not the same as that “group.” Restated, the community
created by the communication is not the same as the community por-
trayed in the communication.

For readers not familiar with anthropological research, the idea of a
marriage rule requiring you to marry outside your group may seem
strange. However, it is by far the predominant form around the world
in small-scale societies that make use of unilineal rules of descent. In
G. P. Murdock’s (1965, 49) cross-cultural study of 250 social organiza-
tions, 175 (or 70 percent) were unilineal. Of the societies making use of
an idea of unilineal descent groups, some 94 percent were exclusively
exogamous. There exists a close correlation between unilineal descent
groups and the idea of exogamy (marrying out). In such circumstances,
individuals experience a disjuncture between the group as understood
(the clan) and the group as lived (the family).

Such a disjuncture between group as understood and group as felt
through interaction might be a necessary one under many circum-
stances, and not merely in small-scale societies based on ideas of uni-
lineal descent. The group understood (the clan) appears as one to
which the individual can belong when goings in the day-to-day com-

5. In the case of Murdock’s clans, where the in-marrying spouse joins the group to which
the other spouse belongs, the two may still imagine themselves as members of different
groups.
appears as an escape hatch, it may make the day-to-day community seem somewhat more tolerable. So it may be that a discrepancy between the community as created by communication and the community as depicted in the communication is necessary to the existence and perpetuation of the latter. The clan makes for good conversation, and good conversation makes for community. But the foremost reason clans make for such good conversation may be precisely that the community they describe is distinct from the interactional community created by the circulation of such descriptions as part of discourse.

4. There Are Different Ways in Which Belonging in Communities Can Be Represented and Hence Experienced

One distinct problem with Durkheim’s conception of the role of representation in relationship to community is that it does not allow for this discrepancy. Durkheim’s suggestion is that people represent to themselves the community to which they belong, primarily by virtue of interaction. Yet, at least in many known instances, they represent their membership as one distinct from the community created by their interactions with others.

Another intriguing problem is that, in Durkheim’s formulation, no particular reason is found as to why there should be different representations of community. Why should it be the matrilineal clan here, the patrilineal clan there? Why should some communities have moi eties or lineages and not clans? Why should there be numerous differences in how the clan is construed, from myths of its origins to details of its membership, and its relationship to other clans or groupings? For Durkheim, all that matters is that the group represent itself to itself. There otherwise is no motivation for the plethora of forms or ways in which group membership is imagined through signs.

A circulatory model, such as that proposed here, suggests an answer to the problem. The different ways of representing community are in competition. The question is, how good-to-talk is the specific understanding of community found in one discourse? How interested in it are people? How much does it grip the mind? A circulatory model suggests there may be different ways of understanding belonging in communities that achieve success in getting people to talk about them. If the particular way of understanding gets talked about, it is successful in creating a community based on communication just owing to that fact.
5. Some of Those Ways of Belonging Make for Better Circulation Than Others

In reality, some ways of talking about community make for better conversation and hence help build communities based on interaction more readily than others. Moreover, since people do not always agree on which representations of community make for the best conversation, alternative ways of representing community are constantly springing up within one and the same community. The diversity of models, but also the competition among them (whereby some models displace others), is inherent to both notions of community: the ones that are created by communication and the ones that are depicted in communication.

5.1. The Idea of the Clan

The general idea of clan membership—granted all the variations within it—seems to work well in many societies around the world as a way of talking about belonging. Consequently, historically and in many places, it has tended to displace other possible ways of talking about (and, more generally, representing) community.

Anthropologists studying such communities often have committed the mistake of believing that the clan is a reality independent of and prior to its representation in signs. True, on some occasions it may become an interactional reality, and precisely because the people that are involved continue to find (both the linguistic and the nonlinguistic) signs interesting. However, the clan does not exist prior to its representation (the little volume by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss entitled *Primitive Classification* [1963], at variance with this submission, notwithstanding): the clan crystallizes out of interactions as a way of representing community.

I have tried to suggest a reason why the clan is a particularly good way to represent community, and hence why it circulates. The answer I have given is somewhat counterintuitive. I suggest that the clan is a good way to think about belonging precisely because it is not identical to the community built up from interactions. The disjuncture between the “imagined community” and the interactional community is crucial to making the latter community possible. People always can imagine there is another community to which they belong, one in addition to, despite of, or rather than the one before
their very eyes and ears: it is a community they nurture in their mind.

However, for being the content of representations that circulate publicly, a community in the mind can become a community in reality. Thus, ritual events often are a time when the clan regroups. Yet, if the clan really were the same as ‘the interactive community’, there would be no need for it to regroup, for it would be always identical with the group. Here the circulatory account explains the apparent disjuncture. The clan regroups ‘to remind’ people of ‘the potential reality’ they hold in their minds. And because the representation establishes a sense of community that is different from the day-to-day version of such, the account also makes sense of why it might be an especially good way of representing belonging.

At the same time, the idea of the clan is not fixed. There are not only the variations in rules of descent and the differences in levels of groupings mentioned earlier on, but also differentiations as regards the number of clans people talk about, the ancestors from whom descent is traced, and the beliefs about the characteristics of the clan members, the ideas about the responsibilities of the members to one another, and, of course, the conceptions of the clan’s internal organization. By making room for variation, the clan concept renders it possible to spawn a vast array of types of community—the kinds of community anthropologists spend so much of their time documenting.

5.2. The Idea of the Class

So far I have described the clan as a way of talking about belonging. My submission here is that a clan makes for good circulation, as a topic of discourse, because it directs attention away from a central preoccupation: the day-to-day interactions. It gives one the idea that true community resides inside the clan, when in fact mundane community arises from interactions between clans. The circulation of discourse about clans creates a de facto community by virtue of its circulation.

However, there is a major limitation on the circulation of this kind of discourse of community. Discourse built around the idea of the clan (or equivalent concepts) has no built-in impulse to develop beyond the community within which it grows and already circulates. It has staying power over time, because it is a particularly catchy form of discourse for succeeding in making sense out of community in a way that simul-
taneously satisfies intellect and feeling. However, it does not as such contain a motive force that compels it to move beyond the community boundaries. It is culture in the classic sense, passed down within the very community that it created and that it recreates over time (see Krippendorff 2000, 2008). It extends laterally only insofar as its carrying community actually grows and expands, or alternatively insofar as in effect processes of diffusion and imitation take place.

From this point of view, the discourse of class represents a breakthrough in motion. The idea of class is one that makes sense out of the discursive transgression of boundaries. It not only makes sense out of boundary crossings, it actually demands such crossovers.

In communities built up around them, we saw that clans typically are exogamous units: one must marry outside the clan. Consequently, relations inside the community created by the very circulation of clan discourse are relations placing focus on the possibility of marriage. But this implies that the interactional community built up via internal circulation of clan discourse is effectively endogamous: people marry inside that community. Put succintly, the logic of clan discourse is to suture together what is but an endogamous community.

In the class system, the opposite is the case. Because, unlike the clan, the class is defined as endogamous—that is, one must marry inside the class—class discourse necessitates an idea of interaction beyond the endogamous community. Otherwise there would be a single-class system, and that would not be a ‘class system’ at all. The very idea of class requires that there be at least two classes, and that means that it requires relations outside the endogamously marrying class.

But why does the idea of class impel the lateral spread of the discourse beyond the bounds of the internally interacting community? To answer this, it is necessary to examine the two key components of the class system. One is the endogamous principle, which has already been mentioned. The other is the relative sense of “better than.” This latter idea is usually absent in cases where the clan concept predominates. Clans typically are not ranked, although this does not mean that ideas of inequality are absent. Even in the smallest-scale societies, it is commonplace to discover the notion that those who are not deemed integral to one’s broader-based interactional community are viewed as ‘inferior’—for example, the speakers of a different language living relatively far away. But this is not typical of the relations between different exogamous clans within a community.
The notions of ‘superiority’ and ‘inferiority’ are intrinsic to the idea of class. One class is not merely ‘different from’ another class, it is also ‘better than’ the other, in whatever important way. There is an impulse built into such a system, toward finding someone in relation to whom one can deem oneself better. If the ‘lower’ class accepts the ‘upper’ class as ‘better’, it nevertheless wants to find someone in relation to whom it in turn is ‘better’. There is thus a generalized impulse to conquest, or to conversion, built into the idea of a class-based community. Why, one may ask, should the lower classes be inclined to fight wars on behalf of the upper classes? So that they too may find—or create—those in relationship to whom they now arguably can feel superior.

There is a standard understanding of the role of conquest that accepts it as a fact about the world. People conquer other people. But I am suggesting that the matter is not so straightforward. The idea of class must be present first in order to make the idea of conquest seem possible. For without such an idea, conquest would be meaningless. The conquered would never accept to see themselves as conquered. They would, by preference, even die out, as was so often the case, for example, among the indigenous peoples of lowland South America whom Europeans attempted to subjugate. The Europeans were simply unable to find slaves in these populations, for whom the idea of subordinating oneself to another person was largely absent. Better to die than to exist under such circumstances. No, it cannot be that the idea of conquest precedes the circulation of a notion of “better than.” It must be that a notion of better than impels the idea of conquest.

What we see here is a form of discourse about community that moves explosively across and beyond existing communal boundaries. If people understand their community in subjective terms of comparative advantage, then they have a reason to want to propel their community to levels of accomplishment, whereby everyone within the community can be better than someone who is not included in it. But once that conquest is asserted, and the conquered become part of a community based on an idea of better than, the community must find or invent others in relation to whom it further can assert itself to be better.

There is a key similarity between the idea of the clan and that of the class. The clan gives to the intellect an almost false notion of what community is about. It says that the community is the clan, when in fact community is the interactional unit forged by relations between clans based on ties of marriage. Similarly, in class-based communities, the
class is portrayed as the locus of community, even though the key locus that defines the sensible community is in cross-class interactions: for example, the relationship between lords and serfs in feudal Europe. Both conceptions give individuals the idea that their “true” community provides a refuge from their community of the moment—that community built up around cross-class interactions, and without which a class system would have no reason to be, just as a clan system without exogamy would be unimaginable.

The conception I am putting forth here is admittedly at odds with folk conceptions as to what conquest might have been about in earlier times. I am suggesting that conquest is not natural, that its possibility depends on the acceptance of a discourse of class as the basis of community. Absent such a discourse, conquest makes no sense. Another people cannot be conquered; they would simply die out, or be absorbed into the conquering group. With the discourse, however, not only can they be conquered, they are also motivated to ally with the conquerors rather than rebelling against them, for they can see the possibility of bettering themselves by conquering others. How else, under these circumstances, could they end up in a position of becoming better than their other?

6. Citizenship Is One of Those Ways of Representing Community That Makes for Particularly Good Circulation Because It Involves a Volitional Sense of Belonging, in Which the Individual Experiences the Belonging as Option, Preference, or Choice

I want now to try to bring the notion of citizenship as a kind of belonging into focus as a kind of cogent discourse that makes for particularly good circulation. This is not easy, once one has grasped the power of a class discourse, which builds community by giving all individuals the idea that they might be better than someone else, and thereby instilling the impulse to conquest. What could citizenship do that is not already done by the powerful idea of class for moving a discourse of community through the world?

The unique characteristic that distinguishes the modern notion of citizenship from other forms of communal belonging is the one with which this chapter began: the idea of associative relationships into which one enters voluntarily. The class system, like the clan system, is based on a notion of hereditary membership. There is nothing
The citizen in a modern nation, however, is one who (at least, ideally) is supposed to enter into the nation voluntarily, as part of an idea of rationally chosen communal membership.

Why is the idea of voluntary membership so compelling? It is so compelling, I submit, because it does what both clan discourses and class discourses do; only it does it even better. Notions of clan and class create an understood community, one that is distinct from the interactional community, an intelligible community that is distinct from a sensible community—its counterpart. The notion of voluntarism in association accomplishes much the same thing.

If individuals are voluntarily attached to a nation, then they do not have to remain there if they decide not to. There exists a refuge, an elsewhere from the here-and-now of interaction, by way of opting out of the present association. This is quite analogous to the situation in a clan system, wherein the daily interactions among the families within a community can be escaped mentally (even actually, on occasion) by retreat into the idealized communitarian image of the clan. Similarly, the core relations on which the class system depends (namely, cross-class relations) are the ones from which an individual can mentally retreat and withdraw into the community imagined as true: the community of the class. But in the case of citizenship, the interactional and ideal communities (the nations) are the same; it is just that the form of belonging is different: in the nation you can imagine leaving.

All three systems share the characteristic of creating in an individual the idea that one could escape from one’s actual community of interaction, should the going become unbearable in that community. But the discourse of citizenship is new and distinct in one important respect. It focuses conscious attention on the idea of free choice as the basis of participation in the community. Furthermore, if one did not wish to take part, one (at least in theory) could opt out. This perhaps is best captured in the obnoxious but revealing Vietnam-era slogan, “America—love it or leave it.”

6. This is not to say that people never change their group memberships in hereditary systems. On the contrary, they sometimes do. Meyer Fortes (1969, 52 ff.), for example, documents changes in clan membership among the Tallensi of Africa. What he calls “assimilated lineages” inside a clan are the ones that have “sprung from ‘strangers,’ slaves or refugees.” It is not clear to what extent or over how many generations social amnesia actually erases the traces of their “stranger” ancestry.
But is the discourse of citizenship any better to circulate than that of class or clan? I have argued already that the discourse of class makes for better circulation than the discourse of clan. This is because the class discourse generates its own impulse to expand beyond its existing boundaries. By virtue of such expansion, everyone in an interactional community built up around a discourse of class can hope to be better than someone else—say, the ever newer people, to whom the class conception expands. Now, from the point of view of discourse circulation, what kind of improvement over this could the discourse of citizenship possibly represent?

7. The Communities Produced by the Circulation of Representations of Belonging Grounded in Citizenship Are Not Actually Nations Per Se But Rather Transnational

Under a circulating discourse of citizenship, it follows from the notion of voluntary attachment of individuals to nations that the very conception of the citizen requires there be more than one nation to which that citizen might belong. How then could one be voluntarily attached to a nation (as in the phrase ‘America—love it or leave it’) if there were no alternative nations to which the individuals could go in the event their erstwhile chosen nation no longer appealed to them? For there to be choice, must there not be at least two nations in which citizenship is possible?

From this logic, it follows that the contemporary notion of citizenship as a form of voluntary belonging (a mode of “associative relationship,” in Weber’s terms) is essentially transnational, not national, in character. For practical reasons, it may be the case that citizenship in one nation requires you to give up citizenship in another nation, so that you may be a citizen of that nation and that nation alone. But for that attachment to be voluntary or associative, it must be possible (at least in theory) to change the attachment and to be able freely and voluntarily to associate with another nation.

The logic of the discourse of citizenship requires that there be not only multiple nations but also sufficient interaction among those nations so that such movement is possible. Moreover, the interaction must be such that not only movement but also the act of relinquishing and acquiring citizenship is possible as such. If citizenship as a way of understanding community and belonging is to work at all, then the logic of the discourse compels one to reimagine the processes of linking,
delinking, and relinking (as in McDonogh’s description of diasporic Chinese in chap. 7).  

Were those processes never to be actualized, the reality of the discourse of citizenship might well fade. After all, most individuals in the vast majority of empirical nations acquire their citizenship by virtue of birth, as in the cases of the clan and the caste. If no one ever left or entered a nation, the notion of citizenship would quickly fade from memory, and a traditional hereditary system would reassert itself. Hence, the logic of citizenship requires not only the theoretical possibility of delinking and relinking but also the empirical occurrences of at least some actual instances of these processes.

For this reason, the concept of citizenship as a circulating representation of belonging in communities requires an interactional community that is greater than the ‘nation’, any nation. Summarizing, communities produced and sustained by the circulation of discourses of citizenship as a form of belonging cannot but be transnational in character. Even in a country like the contemporary United States, where the notion of volitional belonging as the basis of citizenship circulates especially broadly, the notion of belonging by birth and upbringing is far from absent. Ascription continues to be a powerful way of understanding the notion of belonging within groups, the nation being just such a group.

At the same time, however, the question of the internal logic of volitional citizenship as a cultural concept is distinct from that of the scope of dissemination of the concept itself. Should even only half of a population, or, indeed, only one person, subscribe to a metacultural idea of volitional citizenship, that half or that person just must imagine that there is more than one nation to choose from. Otherwise, volition would be reduced to a Hobson’s choice, in which you can choose to be a member of any nation, provided it is the one to which you already belong.

The very idea of volitional citizenship impels its circulation beyond national boundaries. Subscribers to the notion must want that there be at least one other nation that agrees with the volitional model, or else there can be no volition in the first nation and no explicitly sanctioned

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7. See the work by Aihwa Ong (1999). In her investigation of Chinese transnationals, she finds that global markets and mass migrations of skilled and unskilled laborers have altered the form and meaning of citizenship. As people in diasporas navigate economic possibilities brought forth by globalization, they challenge notions of citizenship based on political rights and participation inside a sovereign state.
migration from one to the next. They therefore can find motivation for bringing about a world in which more than one nation based on volitional citizenship exists.

Insofar as they succeed in doing so, those who subscribe to this notion effect a transnational circulation of the idea of volitional citizenship that may end up creating a community of interaction that may be greater than the community described in the representation of citizenship itself. To be a citizen means to belong to a discernable nation; the understood community is that single nation. Yet the sense of community created by the circulation of volitional citizenship, as a representation of community, must involve more than one nation. For how else could volition be possible at all? It simply could not be.

Here, insofar as circulation is concerned, we glimpse the evident superiority of citizenship over class. The internal logic of class is predicated on an idea of traversing class boundaries, if only because the concept of “better than,” intrinsic to class, provides a powerful motivation for the idea of class to move beyond its original habitat. This creates an impulse toward conquest or conversion. However, the interactional community created by the class concept expands only to the limits of a given empire. If only because the circulation of its representations remains within the confines of a self-contained administrative entity, it cannot produce an interactional community broader than that administrative entity. As I have suggested, and propose to show next, the citizenship concept transcends that of class. It contains within itself a globalizing impulse. It restlessly and relentlessly expands beyond its initial boundaries, experiencing itself as limited only by the universe of possible human interaction, namely, and for the moment, the entire globe.

8. Citizenship Ultimately Produces and Depends on a Global Community—Despite (or Because of) the Existence of National Belonging

It is one thing to ask whether a concept of national citizenship requires a transnational community of interaction and another to ask whether the concept of citizenship, as a discourse about national belonging, is globalizing. One may raise the question as to whether the notion of citizenship as a transnationally circulating discourse should require that all the peoples on the planet understand their communal belonging in terms of citizenship or voluntary association. If this were the
case, then there ought to exist a rhetorical force to the discourse of citizenship that propels it outward around the globe.

My main contention is that the discourse of citizenship, as construed here, is the first truly globalizing discourse of communal belonging—with prospects far more enduring than the mere impulse to conquest associated with the idea of class, which once might have had similarly global aspirations, as in the motto, “The sun never sets on the British Empire.”

Here is how, I believe, citizenship works. Let us assume that only a few nation-states have developed within which the concept of volitional citizenship operates. Where hereditary forms of belonging predominate, communal attachment will appear as a state of relative unfreedom to those accustomed to volitional citizenship; the people bound to such a community appear to be in need of liberation. This is especially true in the case of class systems that spawned Rousseau’s celebrated observation, “men are born free but everywhere found in chains.” While the system that preceded the infusion of a notion of citizenship might have seemed natural, the steady advent of voluntary citizenship now makes it seem anything but natural. And once the aged system exposes itself as flawed to some of its members, it is hard to staunch the spread of that understanding to all of its members. The mass movement toward “liberation” is unleashed.

In the case of globalization, we are dealing with the processes by which the discourse of citizenship works its way, over time, into new communities in which it was not formerly to be found. These are processes of the motion of culture outside of its traditional bounds and into new territory. A discourse of citizenship, much like that of class, compels those who subscribe to it also to spread it. Not only does it contain within it a motive force, it also compels people to move the discourse itself throughout the world, until the entire globe is brought within its purview.

In the case of citizenship, the movement happens not by conquest but by liberation. Once the liberation takes place, the liberating nation can (in theory, at least) leave the newly liberated social entity to its own devices. Unlike class discourse, whose impulse is to conquest, and consequently to the incorporation of the conquered into the interactional community of the empire, the liberating nation can be effectively done with the liberated entity, once the idea of citizenship has taken hold—except, of course, for the possibility of migration to the liberating country or in the opposite direction. A discourse of citizenship spreads
without the corresponding necessity for administrative involvement. Citizenship is ultimately compatible with an idea of formally free and independent nation-states, even if in reality wars erupt when one nation disapproves of another nation’s use of its freedom.

9. The Future of Citizenship Will Witness a Continuing Clash Between Two Main Ideas of Belonging, One Based on the Axiom of Freely Chosen Membership, the Other Grounded in a Supposition That Belonging Is Based on Privilege of Birth and Upbringing

In a circulatory understanding of culture such as I described, volitional citizenship as a part of culture cannot be viewed merely as describing a type of society: one cannot say “the contemporary United States is a society characterized by volitional citizenship” and leave it at that. For there is a truth in the typological characterization, since one can point to institutions and laws surrounding citizenship that provide evidence for the type—the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United States, for example. But “volitional citizenship” is not least also a cultural conception that, in greater or lesser measure, circulates among people, whether separate from or in addition to the institutional organization. And the same qualification is necessary when referring to “clan-based” or to “class-based” societies. While it is surely possible to point to institutions, it remains imperative to look into the conceptions that actually circulate among people.

The importance of this distinction is found in the competition among circulating conceptions. As the dominant, widely circulating conceptions shift, so can and do the institutions, either in their day-to-day operation or in their structure and characteristics. It is thus possible for one type of society to morph into another, and indeed, for the various types themselves to continue to multiply.

At the same time, the two main types of cultural understanding of belonging I have described here, the volitional (by choice) and the ascriptive (by birth or upbringing), have quite distinct internal logics, which I have endeavored to trace out in some detail. All these logics are in competition at any given moment. If one comes to dominate, that does not mean that the others are expunged. For as I have argued, volitional citizenship has been dominant in the United States and in Europe for more than two centuries now, whereas the notion has begun to appear only recently and timidly, if at all, elsewhere in the world.
It would be foolhardy to imagine that ascription has simply died out. There is a remarkable staying power to ascriptive belonging, the idea that people have a group identity that cannot be taken away from them by others or even by themselves, the idea that individuals are part of a solid block. Such an ascriptive conception of social life seems to have dominated throughout history, with very few exceptions, until recent times. It does furnish individuals with a positive and inalienable sense of who they are as they navigate human affairs—a sense that seems to be stripped away from them by the very makings of the notion of volition. From the perspective of ascriptive belonging, free choice appears to deny intrinsic worth and intrinsic identity.

No wonder these dominant conceptions of belonging have been in competition. I mentioned earlier that various Islamic fundamentalist representations of community—such as those which motivate separatist movements in Kashmir and elsewhere—cannot be viewed only as returns to a primordial conception of community based on intrinsic identity. They must be regarded also as real reactions to the spread of modern nationalism. Modern nationalism is based on the logic of volitional citizenship and grounded in the rhetoric of “the will of the people.” Hence, Islamic fundamentalism is, in part, a reaction to all identity based on choice. It articulates the frontal clash of two circulating cultural conceptions of community. It reflects competition over what it means to belong, to be included, and to be excluded.⁸

In the United States, the “melting pot” notion so widely accepted in the 1950s and 1960s gave way in the 1980s and 1990s to the idea of “multiculturalism,” itself based on intrinsic ethnic identities. The multicultural movement overtly responded to the covert inequities of the melting pot idea, but it also reasserted an ideal of intrinsic identity in harmony with the dominant conception that has shaped human social life throughout most of its history: the idea that we are born and raised with a specific identity that cannot be taken away from us, that we are intrinsically worthy. Hence, this is why multiculturalism, laudable in so many ways, has the potential to push social institutions in the direction of lines of descent, lineage-based belonging, analogous to clan and class systems. And this in turn pulls citizenship in the direction of ascription and away from choice.

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⁸ May Joseph (1999) has examined the transitory communities created by the emergence of novel economic, regional, and corporate identities. Belonging, in these emerging communities, delegitimates state-defined notions of citizenship and dissolves any coherent concepts of belonging.
Herein, centrally, lies the rub in the relationship between the volitional and the ascriptive senses of belonging. Free choice is problematic from the perspective of ascription because it appears to deny intrinsic worth. Worth appears to be assigned only extrinsically, as a matter of choice. At the same time, ascription is problematic from the perspective of free choice because it appears to emphasize the ineluctable, fundamentally inexorable unfreedom of individuals.9

A globalizing impetus is built in to a cultural conception of citizenship grounded in volition. It makes institutional arrangements and cultural formations based on ascription appear to limit freedoms severely, and therefore to be in dire need of emancipation. It also motivates people to undertake the liberation of others. For this reason, institutional arrangements and cultural formations based on free choice appear, from the perspective of ascription, as denials of intrinsic worth.

A corollary of the proposition that volitional citizenship powers an explosive global expansion of culture is this: the global expansion of culture under volitional citizenship spawns intense opposition from the perspective of ascription. In order to experience “liberation” as liberation, you have to understand yourself as unfree. This truism presupposes the circulation of a cultural conception of volitional citizenship. Absent that circulation, liberation can appear as denial of authenticity—as a denial of the intrinsic criteria and characteristics for membership in a group.

Granted the riskiness of any attempt at foreseeing what is yet to come, given culture’s mysterious ability to morph as it moves through time and space, if the argument put forth here foresees a future, it is one that augurs the confrontation within national belonging between volition and ascription as competing bases of citizenship. This is a confrontation that is not solely marginal to the global expansion of the volitional citizenship concept. It is a confrontation also, and especially, within the hearts of nations built around the volitional citizenship ideal.10

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10. See the work of Kathleen Hall (2002), who studied Sikhs living in England. She found that, while the postcolonial Sikhs who came to England initially adopted English clothing and appearance, over time they reasserted their Sikh identity, readopting turbans, uncut hair, sword or dagger worn at the side, and other markers of Sikhness.
Given the global spread of the freedom concept, one might imagine that ‘ascription’, as a way of conceptualizing human relations, is a thing of the past, a weak or flimsy concept, destined for extinction if not already extinct. From the point of view of culture, however, as something that moves through both space and time, ascription is of far greater antiquity and has far greater demonstrated staying power than volitional citizenship. And it has had that power because of its appeal as a way of thinking about human relations. The idea of a core group identity that excludes others and that is an intrinsic property of the self continues to be a potent force in shaping social life. Who knows, one day the notion of free choice in identity may itself come under sustained attack, and subsequently it may not be intrinsic identity (as in the case of multiculturalism) but rather volition that proves in need of protection and nurturing, remote as that possibility seems at the time of this writing.

References


As a mode of active voluntary association, citizenship cannot be grounded merely in the static; it has to engage the dynamic also. The static, in the main, grounds itself in documentable status, hence in the pertinent socio-politico-juridical-economic structures designed to impart necessary form, provide sufficient cause, erect manageable order, draw controllable borders, and establish requisite monopolistic powers for the governing authority. The dynamic, on the other hand, by straddling established functions, redirecting hardened processes, and

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1. I view ‘membership’ as little if anything more than a documentable ‘state’, an organizational ‘fact’, an ipso facto ‘status’ that condones privileged passivity for as long as ‘dues’ are paid fully, received on time, and pro forma ‘belonging’ hence automatically, uneventfully, is extended unless and until it is challenged by acts or events warranting review/revision, limitation, cancellation, incarceration, eviction, or self-exile. Conversely, I sense in, and attribute to, the notion of association a freely responsible and voluntarily loyal sense of partnership in an active mode of participation, the motivations and meanings of which are put to test continually, or at least frequently, not merely for their productive tenor and underlying intent but also for their synergetic meaning and social effectiveness. As tsunamis, pandemics, terror, other threats to humanity, and the prospects for a sustainably high quality of life on Earth become more broadly diffused, understood, and hence more palpably addressed in real time around the world than can be conjectured from afar in the abstract, greater collective empathy is likely to replace voting based on rationalizations in absentia, or via pseudo-representation, thereby also imparting to ‘globalization’ a more comparably perceivable value-laden reality. Ultimately, chances are that, sooner than later, an expanding civilized sense of shared human history, the mastery of a common second language, and a cultivated sense of an indivisible physical-spiritual living space—the world, as a whole—buttressed by a healthy dose of emotional intelligence that empowers to seek out and to celebrate self-enriching complementary differences, will engender more ‘association’ than mere ‘membership’ on an otherwise fast-shrinking planet, where self and other cannot for much longer continue barely to recognize or merely to acknowledge each other by ‘tolerating’(!) respectively each other’s right to coexist but, in conscientiously engaged ways, will prefer to decide on helping each other toward bettering the human condition in the course of humankind’s very brief passage on Earth, and not only within an individual’s own generational cohort but well into and beyond that of the children of others’ children’s generation as well.
reconfiguring aging contexts, invites unprecedented relational and transactional implications, unleashing value-laden changes and consequences that impinge on the entrenched purviews of bureaucratic turfs in ways that trespass the disciplinary boundaries of a number of related fields of inquiry—anthropology, conflict management, decision making, economics, governance, group dynamics, leadership, organization, policy sciences, politics, psychology, and sociology, among them. It is the dynamic mode that helps bring sustained reform.

Perhaps what could most benefit a dynamic mode of active voluntary citizenship is an unprecedented attention to an ethic of citizenship—the kind of input that combines a situational-relational code of private behavior in public places, a deontological public sense of practical conduct in private spaces, with a commitment to cooperative mutual recognition among all partners in citizenship, whether between a civilian society and a state that the citizenry can call its own or, around the globe, throughout the states themselves. The question of which of these precedes, procreates, or perpetuates the other, why, and how, could sustain a whole series. Our purpose in this book was to submit that citizen-citizen, state-citizen, citizen-state, and state-state relations do coproduce and interactively support each other, qualitatively and quantitatively so.

To the extent that exogenous forces can contribute to shaping or reshaping the endogenous bidirectional relations between the state and the citizen, the notion of citizenship in democratizing contexts can become complex in its emergence and unwieldy in its maturation and evolution, as efforts to democratize citizenries unaccustomed to the personal responsibilities of collective freedom are robustly demonstrating in parts of the late-modernizing world today. And as Kauders (2004, 2–38) has suggested, it is always useful to distinguish the structural from the economic and to place content in context when seeking to understand the evolution of citizenship, the processes of democratization, and the pursuits of democracy by peoples and states.

2. Kauders “explains” the post-World War II democratization of Nazi Germany for instance, in virtue of the transformation of state-citizen and citizen-state relations, along dimensions of structure (absolute military defeat/rebuttal of ‘stab-in-the-back’ talk, Allied occupation, reeducation, de-Nazification, international reintegration . . . Europeanization); of economy (linkage of economic liberalism with competition and competition with conflict, conflict with pluralism, and pluralism with liberal democracy, as Dahrendorf [1967, 416] suggests); and order (a search for effective constitutionality, efficient re/distribution conducive to perceptions of legitimacy through evident sacrifices in the name of democratization by state and by citizenry alike), whence the joint production
Commenting on the contemporary significance of citizenship as a mode of "membership in the liberal polity," P. Schuck (1989, 64–65) views citizenship as providing "a focus of political allegiance and emotional energy on a scale capable of satisfying deep human longings for human solidarity, symbolic identification and community," noting that such a focus "may be especially important in a liberal ethos whose centrifugal cosmopolitan aspirations for global principles and universal human rights must somehow be balanced against the more parochial imperatives of organizing societies dominated by more limited commitments to family, locality, region, and nation." While agreeing with Schuck that "the nation-state sometimes balances the drives toward globalization and localization," Bonnie Honig suggests that "the contrary is also true," that the "nation-state is often a vehicle of both globalization and localization . . . [as was evident, say, in the United States' creation of NAFTA]"; that "global and local affiliations are not necessarily disempowering or undemocratic" since they "can provide helpful, democratizing checks against the coercive powers of the nation-state; that, indeed, "it is therefore important to think about the ways in which the 'emotional' human satisfactions of citizenship can be appropriated for nonnational entities"; hence, that there is good reason to agree with Peter Schuck that "today's conception of citizenship may not be adequate to meet tomorrow's needs (Schuck 1989, 65)" (Honig 2001, 167). The evolutionary paths to citizenship historically would seem to corroborate this conclusion.

The City/State as Unit of Governance

Between 2000 and 1600 B.C.E., the mainland to the west of the Aegean Sea and the Peloponnesus were invaded by newcomers, 'the Greeks'. They were Achaean warrior-herdsmen seeking newer pastures for their herds: Indo-Europeans whom Hittites called the Ahiyawa. Upon penetrating that territory, the Greeks settled in Argolis, Attica, Boetia, Messenia, and Thessaly, ending their seminomadic lifestyle and undertaking to build their cities. Each city ended up being ruled by a king from the wanax, their landowning war-tested aristocracy. Their cities began to trade in the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, and they came to

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3. NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Association.
be known as the Mycenaeans. Their culture thrived between 1400 and 1200 B.C.E. In the years thought to coincide with the destruction of Troy, however, the Mycenaean civilization mysteriously faded out (almost completely by 1100 B.C.E.). Until about 800 B.C.E., the Greeks lived as a nomadic rural people, some even migrating away from the continent to the islands in the Aegean. These ‘Dark Ages’ were not a total blackout, however: the Greeks acquired a creed and a mythology. In the subsequent ‘Archaic period’ (800–500 B.C.E.), they began to return to urban life—to rebuild and to govern their poleis—first under firm basileic (i.e., hereditary monarchical) regimes, next under oligarchic and timocratic rule (by the few and by the wealthy), only much later (after the overturn of the oligarchs and timocrats) by the tyrants (totalitarian leaders), and ultimately by the demos (‘people’) itself, upon the adoption in Athens of a ‘people- led’ mode of governance. By the time Athens turned itself into a ‘civic’ space that the philosopher could call home, Aristotle’s model ‘citizen’ was someone who both could rule and be ruled. No sooner was a self-governing demos in command than an aboriginal ‘democracy’ was born. The lesson? No demos, no democracy. And likewise: no democracy, no citizenship. Not then, and not now. However, citizenship does require a political ethic—one that sets it apart from the servility of subjecthood—an ethic understood solely by the well-born, and a mentality put to practice exclusively by the free-born in the days of ancient Greece and imperial Rome.

4. Derived from the Latin civis, for townsman or bourgeois, and sprung from the same root as civilis (civil, civic) and civitas (city/state, citizenship), the French word citoyen and the English word citizen refer to a member of la cité, the city. Civis is Latin for the Greek polites, used to designate someone qualified to occupy one of the many statuses reserved solely for recognized members of the ancient Greek city/state, that is, the polis, or poleis in the plural. Polis ushered in a keen sense of politics, the art of governance, and sovereignty.

In antiquity, polis meant both city and state. In 1893, however, when historian William Warde Fowler published a book titled The City-State of the Greeks and Romans, that archaic duality (city/state) became concretized into an expedient syncretism (city-state) that would soon make room for another neologism: the generalization nation-state. The city-state can be exemplified in contemporary history by the likes of Singapore, Vatican City, and Monaco. The nation-state has led to a range of infelicitous outcomes, from loveless divorce in Czechoslovakia to hateful wars of secession (where tribe, descent, and creed combine to fuel territorial and ethnic nationalisms kindling irredentism in many places around the world) to bloody ethnic cleansings (in Europe and Africa, for instance)—none of which solutions have been able to provide felicitous ways out of the artificial creations the syncretic term nation-state connotes, especially in regard to the products of postcolonialism.

The city/state was not a Greco-Roman innovation, however: Sumer (ca. 3500–2000 B.C.E.) in southeastern Mesopotamia, probably the first socioeconomically and politicoculturally integrated geographic span to mark the beginnings of human civilization on Earth, encompassed a complex network of twelve city/states—Adab, Akshak, Bad-Tibira Ereh, Kish, Lagash, Larak, Larsa, Nippur, Sippar, Umma, and Ur. And to Elam, built to the proximate east of Sumer, belonged four other prominent cities, Awan, Anshan, Simash, and, not least, the capital city, Susa. Built to the north of Sumer, Akkad (Agade in Sumerian) was a city/state of its own right. All these city/states were autonomous. As independent entities, each boasted its own deity, temple, and ritual system. Each ruled freely over its self-supporting urban and rural infrastructures (agriculture and animal breeding). Within its fortified confines, each exercised its legitimate sovereignty across its territorially demarcated and power-politically delineated spatial reach to the fullest extent of its proven relative potency and military prowess. Though they traded extensively with each other, Sumer’s city/states nonetheless often waged war against each other; sometimes one on one and sometimes in convenient configurations and circumstantial partial alliances in a semblance of unity, whether against Akkad to the north or Elam to the west. The rulers were autocratic, usually tributary to a *prinus inter pares* (first among equals)—say, a high king, the Great One, like those who were to reign later on, under the assumed titles of Negus Neghesti in West Africa, Shehinshah in Persia, Maharajah in India, or Ard-Rí in Ireland: True, there was no ‘demos-led’ rule in those places. But how well did the demos do, and for how long, in demos-ruled Athens, all things considered?

**Did City/State Do as City-State Does?**

Can Periclean (495–429 B.C.E.) political rhetoric—especially as a vision of civism in the manner set forth in the ‘Funeral Oration’—be reconciled in any way with “Socrates’ radically revised conception of

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6. As Assyriologist Barry Eichler (2008) suggests, “Biblical thought broadened and democratized the Mesopotamian notion of divine selection and covenant between deity and king by clearly positioning the people on par with the king. This unique Biblical notion of law as covenant, established upon a mutual and reciprocal basis in which the people join as one of the covenanting parties, is a major contribution to Western thought” (see Ciprut 2008).
citizenship”? Villa (2001, 11–12) argues that, while according to some readings it can, not so in his view:

[T]he tragedy of Athens is found not in the breakdown of an original harmony of speech and action . . . but rather in the very vision Pericles articulates . . . — Athens at its greatest, as the best the world has seen — already contains the worst (the Melian genocide) possible. From the Socratic perspective, it ignores or is ignorant of the most important things . . . . we see (as Thucydides wants us to see) an unmistakable decline, a failure to marry intelligence, power, and moderation. Cleon⁷ attacks learning, intelligence, and discussion as vehicles by which clever elites undermine the common sense (and passion for revenge) of average citizens, inserting compassion and moderation where they are least needed. Alcibiades⁸ . . . ( . . . universally recognized for his extraordinary ability) . . . [owing to his] immoderate, self-aggrandizing character arouses the fatal distrust of his fellow citizens. Nicias⁹ trusts neither intelligence nor power to achieve the city’s goals; his piety and superstition are more Spartan than Athenian [see Strauss 1964, 146, 149]. Finally, we have the evidence of the Melian Dialogue, which shows the degree to which the Athenians came to view themselves as mere executors of a “general and necessary law of nature,” a law which dictated that one “rule whatever one can” [Thucydides 1972, 404–405]. Here the space for free action guided and moderated by intelligence has disappeared. The Athenians wearily instruct the Melians, who would remain neutral, that they must either become subjects of Athens or be destroyed. The imperatives of imperial power offer no . . . alternative: “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” [Thucydides 1972, 402].

Even in those days, much of the glitter came from fool’s gold:

[D]espite the brilliance of its political achievement, the city-state possessed the defects of its virtues. If it created once for all the ideal of constitutional government, it realized that ideal only on a very narrow scale; in foreign affairs, the city-state failed conspicuously in the maintenance of peace and order throughout the Greek world. If it created the ideal of free citizenship and of government by law rather than by arbitrary will, it realized this ideal also for only part of its inhabitants; the slave and the metic were as much a part of the

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7. A valiant general (?–422 B.C.E.) hated for his violence, remembered for having insisted on the execution of the island people of Mytilene after their revolt, and much satirized by Aristophanes, Cleon is said to have had a hand in the expulsion of Thucydides.

8. Acceding to power after Pericles’ death, Alcibiades championed military might in support of his self-assigned mission to spread Athenian democracy and freedom to other cities, by means of what he deemed to be just wars—a very ‘modern’ scenario.

9. A general, who chose to feign to respect and to fear the common citizenry, which returned his veneration of them with popular affection for him, Nicias (?–413 B.C.E) is said to have been a superstititious man, ready to bribe gods and men when it came to be left in peace at the mere cost of rich offerings in abundantly mined silver.
city-state economy as the citizen. And if it realized the ideal of government by discussion and under the forms of law, it rarely succeeded in attaining the orderliness and stability which larger states have achieved; factionalism and civil strife were curses from which Greek politics never escaped. When we reflect upon the many values, both ethical and political, which have grown from the separation of church and state into distinct social bodies, with distinct institutions and organizations, we perceive how far removed is the life of the city-state from the condition of personal privacy and independence which we should deem essential to a good life. (Sabine and Smith 1951, 9–10)

The Impulse to Empire

By the time Aristotle died, in 322 B.C.E. (months after Alexander the Great), Plato’s city/state had already lost its earlier aura. The political organization embodied by the Greek city/state now was ceding pride of place to ‘worldwide’ empire, and the local citizen’s inward-oriented entitlements and self-circumscribing purview—now accordingly promoted and commensurately inflated into a sense of ‘world citizenry’ of sorts—opened up to new vistas, generated outward-looking mindsets, whetted imperial appetites, and encouraged expansive predispositions. Upon the discovery of the possibility of other nonbarbarian cultures elsewhere, it would seem to have become more sensible for the elitist Hellenes to yield to the notion of an all-embracing single humanity than to find oneself doomed constantly to compete with those who could not be promptly or entirely dominated for long. It would befall European nationalism to compete with the meanwhile deep-rooted ancient sense of cosmopolitanism, the remnants of which seem to have survived the bloody rites of passage suffered by Western European internationalism over the last 400 years or so. Greek thought on how ‘the city/state’ should be run influenced the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and late modernity. In early twentieth century it was not uncommon to regard ancient Greece’s problems and classical Athens’ problem-solving experience as Western Europe’s own cherished heritage (Barker 1918). And the scrutiny of the latter-day impacts on modern democracy and citizenship of ancient Greek savvy is alive and well in the twenty-first century (see Carcieri 2002).

10. See McInerney (2008).
Vestiges of Empire: The European and the Postcolonial Nation-State

The French Revolution of 1789 sought to transform the monarch’s sujets into the state’s citoyens by offering the new citizenship of France liberté, égalité, fraternité in a monarchy now transmuted into a national state, and where liberty, equality under law, and, yes, fraternity were to reign forever. Remarkably swiftly, however, the revolution devoured its children, and elusive nation-state briefly became ephemeral empire.

After the fall of the Russian, Ottoman, and ‘Holy Roman’ empires, and much later, following the implosion of the Soviet imperium as well, new ‘nation-states’ emerged, each with residual minorities of minorities in their midst—burdens they would begrudgingly recognize now to have become their very own. ‘Citizenship’ hence would begin to create its newer problématiques: unlike empires, which (almost by definition) had been able somehow to accommodate ‘difference’ by coming to terms with the multiethnic character of their expanse, the ‘nation-state’ found it hard to stomach ‘differences’ viewed from the top as the seeds of the negation of the nation-state’s homogenizing aims, of the weakening and retardation of its basic nationalist drive, and thus of the ultimate destruction of its foundational core and its ideals. Now, instead of adopting longer-term-accommodating integrationist dispositions, a majority of states were drawn into a characterizing nationalist stance in the faded shadow of the central and peripheral European empires of which they had long been a part, preferring instead to pursue what seemed to be a crisper-paced if a tad harsher, more impatient short-run policy based on assimilationist expediency that neither in the Balkans nor in Turkey nor in the USSR—and not even in France and Spain—would prove successful in erasing historic differences or in relegating to the dustbin of history lingering memories of origin and lineage, either by adopting subtle inclusionary stratagems from below or by sharing greater power at the top. Basques, Bosniaks, Bosnian-Herzegovinians, Bretons, Croats, Corsicans, Catalans, Chechens, Kurds, and Serbs, among others, expect—some peacefully, some violently—to be made to feel perfectly at home in their historic homelands, politically polite ambivalence in periodically heard public parlance to the contrary notwithstanding.
From Politics of Local Distrust to Ethics of Global Communication

One of the outcomes of dynamic heterogeneity, in the city/states of the ancient world and in the nation-states of our modern era, has been serious concern over threats from nonendogenizable exogeneity as personified, in the eyes of citizens, by a growing nonassimilable alien presence on home territory. Then as now, when the latitudes accorded to the local population’s more or less tolerated ‘others’ appear to gather ‘critical mass’—enough to require legal reconsideration of limits to incoming flows, to exact legal measures against potential negative externalities from such entries (based on factual incidents or fictive endangerments attributable to ‘foreign arrivals’ or ‘alien presences’), or to produce new laws against those ‘others’—things begin to happen, either on explicit grounds (‘trade’ laws then, internal ‘security’ and ‘immigration’ acts now) or out of implicit motives (fear of the other then, distrust in oneself now), but always in ways amply apt at providing the rational thinking and the swift justifications politically appropriate in such cases.\(^{11}\)

Issues of illegal immigration continue to preoccupy industrially advanced societies, which find themselves hamstrung between the low-wage regimes that such availability of cheap labor encourages and the social overhead that looms behind the need to provide the kind of welfare necessitated by undocumented aliens, especially by those with domestic-born progeny in countries where \textit{ius solis} applies (in the United States, for example, where a child born on U.S. soil gains the right to adulthood as a U.S. citizen). The ensuing total impact on the theory and practice, but especially on the governance of citizenship, is no easier or harder today than at any time in early antiquity, when comings and goings engendered their own advantages and liabilities, even if the motilities in our globalizing international political economy

\(^{11}\) Laws governing exogenous partnerships are said to have existed in ancient Babylon; a detailed Roman Civil Law treated of domestic and foreign partnerships under the name of \textit{societas}; a great and growing foreign presence in Rome ultimately led to the appointment of a praetor qualified to deal with domestic and foreign cases under the purview of \textit{ius gentium}; the “Law Merchant” in England was to address cases “on foreign ideas as to matters of trade and the customs of merchants drawn frequently from the Lombard or Jew traders of the Continent” (\textit{Catholic Encyclopedia}); and the Patriot Act issued in the United States in the name of the national interest, following the dastardly attacks of September 11, 2001, addresses homeland security concerns that extend to immigration (for details on Law Merchant, see http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11509a.htm, and for a firsthand rationale of the U.S. Patriot Act, see Viet D. Dinh [2008]).
nowadays seem to introduce ever newer complexities on a daily basis, as different types and varied levels of modernity come in contact and sometimes even collide with greater relative frequency and intensity in these increasingly worldwide-effervescent times.

Governance, and by association government, deserves meticulous scrutiny when discussing the makings and implications of citizenship. Over the span of two centuries (roughly from the seventeenth to the nineteenth), the theory that humankind originally lived without government, ‘in a state of nature’, led Hobbes to regard human life as “poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan [1660] 1946, I, 13) and to envision the first society as one in which everyone was at war with everyone else (bellum omnium contra omnes: war of all against all), enough to convince men to devise a compact of sorts. The idea here was that if everyone gave up some ‘natural liberties’, then the implicit ‘social contract’, based on common rationality, would permit humans to be governed under a multilaterally recognized, legitimate central authority. Rousseau ([1762] 1896) would build on the notion of the General Will, and it would take some very long, hard-earned experience before ordinary people could distinguish among a state (a politically organized social system), a government (the association of functions and competences through which the state functions), a people (without whom a country cannot exist), and a citizenry (absent which modern democracy cannot function). The multitude of ways in which state and government affect citizenship have become of even greater interest since, but as a social animal, a human being, beyond craving for good governance, feeds on culture first. A citizen is the sum total of the culture that he or she embodies, of the norms to which he or she conforms, of the statuses that he or she commands, the roles he or she fulfills, and the groups to which he or she adheres. At once the sum of one’s individualized circumstances and of one’s sociopolitical ambit, a citizen is foremost an active associate of the society in which he or she functions as someone who is not somehow also ‘included’ but as one who integrally ‘belongs’, even though as a part, as a mere element of the hosting social system, he or she does not have, nor ever can have, a perfect or complete view of the system of which he or she is, all at once, a vicariously rule-making and yet a directly price-taking component.

12. See also Sterling P. Lamprecht’s (1949) introduction to his excellent translation of De cive; or, The citizen, by Hobbes (1588–1679).
Wherefrom then does the citizen in the street draw knowledge, and guidance, and moral inspiration permitting proper respect for codified contract, and compliance with the unwritten rules conducive to social conduct ‘appropriate’ for a delineated commons, in a shared space, be it the neighborhood, the city, the nation, or the globe? The distinction among a body, an individual, a person, and a citizen is of highest particular importance here. Insufflated into a mortal body that grows up and develops even as it continues to decay from the moment it is born, the human entity gains individuality from a mixture of innate and acquired potentials for personality, even as it proceeds to ‘build’ character commensurate with the extent of its embeddedness in the ethics of the existential and social (relational and transactional) environments that breed it. From the cultivated physical person emerges the legal person, with duties and liberties, and the moral person, with a civic conscience: namely, the citizen, entitled to rights and privileges and to duties and responsibilities, which imply and require conscientious association displaying implicit loyalty and explicit solidarity in all-inclusive human groupings that can vary in size, from one’s family den to one’s local workplace, and so forth and so on to one’s globally shared life-space.

It is based on this awareness that, methodically and under the guise of revolutionary legality, the Nazis could decree and enact national-socialist ‘laws’ that, at first, denied some privileges of ownership and some rights of access, thereby reducing legal citizen to illegitimate person, then restricted the means of livelihood, hence reducing illegitimate person to undesirable individual, and finally lumped these now exterminable individuals in death camps reached by cattle-cars, where, as bodies, they could be triaged into commodities whose hair, skin, and golden teeth were to be recycled, whose organs were used in experiments, before their ‘carcasses’ were thrown away and their existence annihilated. The objectification of subjectivity via the dehumanization of personhood thus ‘logically’ could conduce to the commodification of human life to the point of leaving impassive the managers, the staff, and the surrounding townsfolk—that is, the very practitioners and witnesses to these by now detachedly rationalized, routinely executed, and efficiently expedited atrocities-become-nonissues.

In slaughterhouse parlance, branding is the alpha (exclusion) and omega (death) of obliterating one’s others, from “Get lost, gypsy!” to “Cherish our piety / Fight for our deity, miscreant!” to “Death to you, pig!” Branding can serve diametrically opposite objectives and agendas, however: much in contrast to one’s branding of others, self-branding
(far apart though négritude, latinidad, and Aryanism are from each other) has proved, at least for a while, useful in reinventing identity, for claiming one’s place somewhere center-stage, long and loud enough to attract attention to the myriad social, economic, and political interests, cravings, and claims long deemed in need of focal attention; and still today, toward motivating individual quests for social personhood and for catapulting group demands for modes of nonnegotiable (all ‘here-and-now’ kinds of) more widely recognized membership.

Over the past two decades, at various times and in varied places around the world, especially in undemocratically ruled poor countries but also in cyclically mismanaged or newly established democracies, many questions of both contract and conduct in matters of citizenship seem to have increased in frequency, intensity, and magnitude. Long left “unproblematized” out of fear or sheer neglect, they have transmuted from putative threats to their society to ticking time bombs for their state and government. They have turned into sources for civil disobedience, social turbulence and popular unrest, and violent conflict, with increasing nefarious effects that have led to ever-deepening rifts, simmering internecine struggles, prospects for civil war, and ensuing massive displacements of human beings within, between, and across national borders the world over, although mostly in a south-northerly direction, inside all kinds of globalizations and often in atrocious circumstances plagued by dialogues of the deaf. Ensuing miscommunications have come to aggravate misunderstandings to extents where the consequent discord is adversely affecting relations not only between self and other but among and within selves as well.

In this book, we sought to expose the roots, to illustrate the makings, and to corroborate the unmakings of the manifold causes of the discord that underlies most of the impediments to understanding, accepting, and practicing good citizenship. We sought to show and to substantiate the urgent need and the practical requirements for a global ethic of citizenship via an ethic of uncondescending, truthful, and respectful modes of worldwide communication likely to restore dignity, enhance justice, and promote peace without recourse to holy aspersions or prayer. The task is not one of homogenizing the world through mass conversions but one of fostering synergistically constructive differences that humans can at long last acknowledge and celebrate without being laughed off for having fallen into a passing fad of puerile innocence in moments of unrecognized despair.
We adopted a cross-disciplinary stance, the more fully to expose the socioeconomic and political-cultural makings of ‘citizenship’, not as mere societal contract but also and particularly as an ethical relational construct in the service of the future of citizenship in a globalizing international political economy: would that, at least, we may have marked a distinction between ‘membership’ and ‘association’.

For an industrial chemical technologist become an international political economist, the word *association* is pregnant with an array of meanings. In the social sciences, the term routinely refers to an organized societal body of people who pursue an interest, activity, or purpose in common, who may discover or replicate, ideate, imagine, or even sense a mental connection—some ‘close relation’—among their thoughts, feelings, ideas, or sensations, whether based on or framed by a remembered circumstance, an imagined recollection, a fecund subjective feeling, an objectified possessive emotion, an intimately cherished idea, or an overtly pursued guiding sensation, often linked to a person, an object, an idea, or an ideology, in the mind’s eye. The denotation in the realm of chemistry is even more eye-opening: an association comprises a variety of combinatory processes—among them, hydration, solvation, or complex-ion formation—all of which depend on relatively weak (chemical) bonding. In the ecological sciences, however, the term association acquires an unmistakably clear communal meaning among all living organisms: here, ‘association’ wields even greater sociopolitical import, in that it refers to a large number of organisms in a specific geographic area constituting a community with one or two dominant species. Thus, as a live connection among persons, things, or ideas—as a bridging platform—‘association’ in each case connotes ‘union’: a quality neither implied nor guaranteed, much less attributable to garden varieties of formal ‘membership’, were it for implying a functional connection of two or more ideas, events, or psychosomatic phenomena (potential, extant, or already ongoing) via self-renewing processes and individual-level experiences that are assimilated in plural contexts characterized by similarities and especially also by differences productive of ‘negative feedback’, in and of themselves sources of constant learning and relearning.

It is in this voluntarily self-mobilizing and freely snowballing sense, in this mass-gathering direction, that one sees ‘citizenship’ to be acquiring momentum, even before the advent of the twenty-second century. Some of us will not be around to hear complaints or to address them, if by the end of the twenty-first century it still has not culminated
in all it can become. But one thing remains certain: the civic partnerships that we fail to multiply here and now, and that our progeny therefore finds itself encouraged further to neglect, negate, or postpone, their offspring will bitterly pay for. Not a shadow of a doubt about that.

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